Gaza’s AI Warfare Crisis: Ethical Dilemmas and Civilian Impact

In Gaza, Syria and Southern Lebanon, Israel is battle-testing its own set of high-tech AI-driven weapons, leaving thousands of civilian victims in its wake.

Even during Israel’s 2021 Gaza war, also known as the “Unity Intifada” (Intifada denotes a rebellion, resistance or uprising) the Israeli assault was executed with disciplined and stricter rules of engagement,[i] seeking to reduce civilian casualties, and to limit, as much as possible, harm to innocent civilians, as was/is the case with conventional warfare.

 Now, however, Artificial Intelligence[ii] (AI[iii]) has been militarized[iv] and weaponised, nowhere more so than in Israel. Warfare in the Gaza Strip catalyses the deployment of lethal Israeli technologies in its campaign against Hamas, following the latter’s October 7, 2023 attack.

Major Israeli AI-powered tech are: “The Gospel”, an AI which identifies militant whereabouts, collecting and geo-locating coordinates of homes and edifices and monitoring their movements, which is subsequently confirmed by human intelligence (HUMINT). Gospel[v] permits the utilization of automated systems to generate targets with more velocity.

“Lavender” is not an autonomous weapon but hastens the kill chain[vi] and renders the process of killing increasingly more autonomous. AI targeting systems access and utilise data from computer sensors to statistically evaluate what comprises a possible target[vii]. Huge quantities of such data and analysis are collected by the Mossad and other intel agencies via surveillance on over 2 million Gazans. Owing to Lavender, the IDF marked thousands of Gazans as suspects for killing, deploying an AI targeting recommendation system with scant human supervision and a non-restrictive casualty toll number.

Lavender has been (mis)used, often blurring the already nebulous lines between innocent civilians and Hamas operatives, all of whom have been targeted en masse to deter future[viii] aggression.

“Lavender” traces and assesses people red-flagged as potential militants placing them on arbitrary kill-lists[ix].Lavender’s ten per cent error rate, caused in part by a rapid target corroboration process, is highly problematic and controversial.

The issue with AI based Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) is that they inspect and examine present data and analytics and often covertly and autonomously pre-select targets where civilians are caught in the crosshairs, rendering such systems ethically dubious and deadly, remaining anathema to the laws of war and creating highly questionable rules of engagement.

A key differentiator between Gospel and Lavender AI is that while The Gospel selects edifices, buildings and structures that the IDF allege Hamas militants operate from, Lavender marks people and places them on a (highly controversial) kill list, as streamed and documented by Democracy Now. 

Then there is “Where’s Daddy?”, which uses phone[x] tracking to confirm individual whereabouts and identities, thereafter, targeting them for airstrikes. This represents an automation[xi] of the find-fix-track-target aspects labelled by contemporary militaries as the infamous “kill chain”.

Exodigo,  a much less publicized underground mapping AI app, scooped up $105 million from venture capital, and was founded by Israel Defence Forces’ (IDF) veterans and intelligence units[xii].

Exodigo departed from tradition by opting not to establish yet another cyber/digital company, as the majority of Israeli drone swarms, army veterans do, but instead developed an Artificial Intelligence proprietary platform uniquely for underground mapping with multi-sensing tech developed through the simulation of multiple sensors, 3D visualization and data merging which are all decisive in pinpointing underground Hamas tunnels. Though Exodigo does not openly publicize this reality, this is its de facto intent and raison d`etre.

Exodigo is highly expedient for Israel`s specialist subterranean commando unit or the “Weasel” team[xiii] who are aptly skilled in the logistical nightmare of subterranean combat. These elite underground Yahalom Units, trained for long drawn-out battles  with Hamas in the 300 miles of labyrinthine tunnels Hamas purpose-built to hide and transport goods for military and strategic purposes.

The newly founded and funded Exodigo startup was applied in the 2023-2024 war while its employees were drafted as IDF reserves, simultaneously applying its groundbreaking AI technology for underground mapping. Exodigo technology allows for subterranean infrastructures and various subsoil features to be identified on a map without the need for time-consuming and costly digging operations, totally transforming below-ground mapping[xiv] and offering Israeli defence key visibility to Hamas, Hezbollah (and in the future) even Houthi related underground hide-outs and operations.

The deployment of the aforementioned Artificial Intelligence tech has substantially hastened the velocity and intensity of IDF and Israeli Air Force (IAF) as compared to former wars.

It is IDF’s Unit 8200, especially their Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) branch, that adopts, innovates and integrates such AI within Israel`s warfare[xv] toolkit. Concomitantly, what previously necessitated months of intelligence reconnaissance by dozens of intelligence analysts is now achievable via AI within a few days.

Israel also used AI[xvi] to help track and target Hassan Nasrallah[xvii], the now assassinated former head of Hezbollah and decimate the organization`s chain of command. This technological sea-change accelerated the death of over 45,000 Palestinians, a figure stated by Gaza`s Health Ministry and deemed reliable by America and the United Nations. This regresses Israel`s AI evolution from innovation to occupation.

As per the Israeli Academia Monitor, an IDF source confessed to have authorized the inhumane bombing of “hundreds” of private homes based on AI targeting processes and algorithms. Though humans[xviii] ultimately make the decisions, AI tools such as “Lavender” have scaled and accelerated such lethal practices.

Such AI applications have substantially hastened the momentum of the IAF`s airstrikes accomplishing in a few days what would previously have taken months. Such enhanced efficiency intensified a carpet-bombing campaign, leading to over 45,000 deaths, seventy percent of which are women and children.

Israel’s Technologies of Extermination

The IDF`s AI ammo kit also involves autonomous[xix] and sovereign unmanned aerial systems (UAS or UAVs) or AIwhich represent an exponential increase in the autonomy and machine-to-machine (M2M) collaboration in warfare.

For more on drones and what this scribe termed as “Drone based terrorism” or DBT refer to “The Dangers of Drone-Based Terrorism Warfare” published in Criterion Quarterly (Vol 13-3,  July/Sep 2018). 

UAVs[xx] would formerly be guided by one operator who ‘flew’ the drone from a remote base. Yet of late, militaries (especially, Israel, Russia[xxi], China[xxii] and UK) worked on pioneering AI permitting the drones to work together without the requirement of a human operator to perform precision strikes and gather timely reconnaissance data.

The machine learning (ML) system is nourished with data obtained from satellites, other reconnaissance drones[xxiii] (surveillance UAVs), and intelligence gathered by land-based units, especially Unit 8200 of IDF, their Intelligence Corps which has developed algorithms using geographical, signal (SIGINT), and human intelligence (HUMINT) data to pin-point strategic strike points.

The IDF have been using AI and supercomputers (as built on cloud computing by Nvidia)[xxiv] to identify prime locations of Hamas activity and orchestrate drone swarmsattacks to remove the Hamas insurgent`s competitive asymmetric edge.

In addition, Israel`s AI armoury includes a myriad of robotic unmanned combat systems powered with sensors and recording devices deployed during incursions into Gaza, Southern Lebanon and now Syria.

Global armies (Israel`s and Ukraine`s included) presently battle-test a variety of autonomous unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) on multiple battlefields. Israel has multiple autonomous[xxv] unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) such as RONI, Talon, and Panda—all are next-generation, remote-controlled autonomous vehicles which the IDF deploys.

Vision 60 units are semi-autonomous K-9 species (robodogs) resembling strolling robots pioneered by Pennovation`s Ghost Robotics (inducted by the IDF`s Combat Engineering Corps’s Yahalom Unit, an elite commando corps whose soldiers specialize in finding, mining, and eradicating Hamas tunnels forces)[xxvi].

Such robots[xxvii] are also deployed to pinpoint traps and Hamas whereabouts. Another robotic unit deployed in Gaza is the Rooster, conjured up by Israeli company Robotican. The Rooster is a drone able to travel across diverse territory. If required, it has the wherewithal to leap, spring and transcend barriers by flying through windows to surge ahead of soldiers and identify any ambush or pitfall.

Along with Israel, Ukraine[xxviii] has also taken great strides in forging defence-based tech alliances, deploying AI in its war with Russia. For instance, Palantir Technologies, which also signed contracts with the IDF (owned by Peter Thiel) provides software that intuitively clusters data from UAV`s, satellites, and battlefront dossiers offering recommended “target” possibilities.

The ubiquity of AI and its future[xxix] distribution will offer a distinctive competitive edge even to fledging and fragile[xxx] states on the edge.  

AI’s Brave New World – A Beast Burdened by Automation Bias

While AI systems enhance operational efficacy, they promote ethical and humanitarian concerns, mainly regarding civilian fatalities and the broader inferences of AI-driven warfare.

An over-reliance on AI-driven targeting raises concerns over its role in escalating civilian injuries and accentuates the ethical and operational risks of integrating AI into warfare.

Ethicists warn that an over-dependence on AI for targeting potential suspects augments the risk of fatalities and casualties[xxxi] because of “automation bias“—the blind faith vested in AI-generated data and analytics. Such prejudice often leads to soldiers and operatives unthinkingly green-lighting AI “kill lists” and target recommendations.

Such an “automation bias” has empirically translated into much more fatalities and corpses in Gaza than would be the case in conventional warfare. Though AI bears the potential to refine and boost military targeting, evidence concedes that the IDF`s use of AI systems like Lavender and Gospel are more about “speed” than “accuracy”[xxxii]. Such AI systems` targeting technique is laced with multiple points of failure. With AI IDF soldiers are “socially engineered” to allow many more civilian casualties to eradicate Hamas insurgents, with mathematical ratios placed at twenty civilians per Hamas combatant and over 99 for commanders – totally dehumanizing the lives of Gazans.

As a matter of fact, the risk of AI internalizing an “automation bias” becomes more acute when humans over-rely on systems which bear way too much influence over complex human decisions, especially when it comes to whether someone should live or die.

No matter how much AI advances, humans must, at all times, remain an integral aspect of the AI decision-making process. It is a fatal flaw (as is presently the tendency) to circumscribe a human`s role to just ratifying or rubber-stamping AI verdicts.

Even the previous IDF head, Aviv Kochavi, voiced reservations that though the AI, as is currently being applied in Gaza, may not control humans altogether, yet risks intuitively determining the outcome of dangerous and deadly decisions[xxxiii] and substituting irreplaceable human instinct and judgment without total awareness. AI simply is not ready to make unsupervised decisions.

Adil Haque[xxxiv], executive editor of Just Security, articulates a crucial fault-line in the military use of AI. Legally, the standard is that no person should be targeted without a very strong burden of proof, proving beyond reasonable doubt, their lawful status as a combatant. AI systems and their questionable profiling criteria often bias decision-makers toward presuming targets are lawful and fair game unless robust evidence suggests otherwise.

Artificial Intelligence as an Ethical Conundrum – Suggestions for Steps Forward

Though such tech-fuelled revolutionary enhancements optimize operational meticulousness and speed, they also raise profoundly ethical[xxxv] and humanitarian dilemmas, particularly concerning civilian casualties and the moral implications of AI in modern warfare[xxxvi].

With the challenge of aligning military necessities with human rights, especially for dual-use technologies[xxxvii] (which can be used for both civilian and military objectives), AI becomes an even broader moral dilemma.

The international proliferation of AI in military systems raises legal quandaries. American lawmakers, such as Senators Peter Welch and Dick Durbin, have voiced the need for pre-emptive procedures to controlling and monitoring AI in defence. Welch’s proposed AWARE Act[xxxviii] necessitates the Department of Defence to document AI implementation, measure and balance risks, and keep a watchful eye in cases of the foreign sharing of AI tech and projects.

Humans must never succumb to the total tyranny of Orwellian technological determinism[xxxix] (a tenet implying that tech is and will remain the key catalyst fueling socio-cultural progress). The use of AI in military conflicts, such as those of Gaza and Ukraine are and will remain an ethical minefield. The integration of AI into military operations vividly accelerates procedures that once required extensive manpower and time.

Tasks which previously took months, AI can now easily accomplish within a week, revolutionizing the speed and scope of modern warfare yet contravening the international laws of war, Geneva Conventions and other quintessential tenets of International Humanitarian Law (IHL).

An AI arms race has been thrust upon humanity. Whereas, Huntington famously popularized a “clash of civilizations” (still highly applicable) now expect a fierce clash of AI superpowers[xl] over the coming years in a re-aligned multi-polar world order. All the more reason why an AI arms control[xli] must be top of the agenda.

Militaries, such as the IDF, must neither abuse nor exploit Hans Kelsen`s[xlii] doctrine of “military necessity” (which they clearly have) and Gaza is an example for all to bear witness.

Kelsen`s “doctrine of necessity “denotes that under moments of intense calamities, terror, or predicaments, where true emergencies arise, a nation-state can initiate actions that would otherwise be deemed illegal, provided those actions are mandatory to protect law and order, so that a state does not descend into a Hobbesian state of lawlessness, chaos or anarchy or what Hobbes[xliii] termed a “state of nature” where life is “short, nasty and brutish”.

Kelsen`s “military necessity” conceptually aligns with John Stuart Mill`s[xliv] or Rousseau`s “greater harm” principle, within the context of the “general will” where the collective good of society is preserved. Kelsen`s “military necessity” legitimates “mandatory activities” that can otherwise contravene legal norms owing to the imperative requirement for security and stability.

When it comes to human life, even a 0.0001% per cent of error margin by AI leading to any human fatality is unbearably high. Even though, to a large extent, framed in Clausewitzian terms of realpolitik[xlv], loss of life is unavoidable, the AI arms race must be regulated[xlvi]. A proliferation of AI simultaneously requires a plethora of regulations which keep pace with tech ingenuity and novelty.

AI disarmament is essential along with more sophisticated and discerning AI verification[xlvii] protocols[xlviii] which have to evolve with a creative global corpus of competent authorities who need to promulgate timely, ethically-sensitive and requisite laws and Standards Operating Procedures (SOPs hereafter).

Evolving moral principles of military AI governance amid a geopolitical minefield, if not undertaken judiciously, is an existential risk for the very future of humanity in a potentially nuclear apocalyptic age[xlix].

International organisations, including the recently active International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Criminal Court (ICC), led by the United Nations (which already addressed AI and autonomous weapon systems)[l] BRICS, ECO, Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP), EU, SCO, MERCOSUR, OIC and many more must pioneer guiding principles, regulations, governance models and international standards to safeguard the moral and responsible[li] use of AI in warfare and statecraft.

Case law will dictate the future direction of AI in warfare[lii], especially as tech outpaces and out-evolves the development of related laws, regulations and policies. Therefore, how the AI doctrine of precedent progresses remains crucial. Though prevalent laws of war—emphasise on proportionality, precaution, and the distinction between civilians and combatants—are applicable irrespective of the weapon, skeptics contend that AI’s potentially harmful wherewithal require new legal regulations.  

It is this very lack of proportionality, precaution, and a lack of fair distinction between civilians and Hamas combatants which places Israel and its ruling Likud party on the knife`s edge of valid criticism.

The persistent and ongoing vigilance with a need for human oversight in AI and fast-tracking norms of AI warfare accountability to thwart misuse is recommended. The need to align AI with humanitarian ethics cannot be over-stated.

The adoption of global norms and moral standards for AI weapons is obligatory and must be made enforceable and binding. Though governments may hesitate to apply limitations on their defence capabilities, past disarmament[liii] treaties such as the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation[liv] of nuclear weapons (NPT)[lv] (worked on extensively by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs or UNODA), the 1997 Ottawa Anti-personnel Landmine Convention and the 2008 Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM – 2008) reveal that an international consensus on military limitations of divisive weapons, while challenging, is attainable.

Selected Bibliography and Citations

Khalid, Ozer (2018) The Dangers of “Drone Based Terrorism Warfare” (DBT), Criterion Quarterly, Volume 13-3, July/Sep, 2018.

Payne, K. (2018). Artificial intelligence: A revolution in strategic affairs? Survival, 60(5), 7–32.

Boucher, P. (2020). Artificial intelligence: How does it work, why does it matter, and what can we do about it? European Parliamentary Research Service PE 641.54712, 1–64.

Szabadföldi, I. (2021). Artificial Intelligence in Military Application – Opportunities and challenges. Land Forces Academy Review, 26(2), 157–165

Tekin, Emre (2024) Assessing Artificial Intelligence’s Military Application in Urban War: A Study of the Israel Defense Forces Operations Since 2021, Bilkent University M.A. The Faculty of The Elliott School of International Affairs of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts May 19, 2024.

Fatafta, M., Shakir, O., Goodfriend, S., & Mimran, T. (2023) The Gospel: Israel turns to a new AI system in the Gaza war, Al-Jazeera, Al-Jazeera, Dec 9, 2023.

Cummings, M. L. (2017, January). Artificial intelligence and the future of warfare. Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Freese, Kevin (2023) “Smart Phones Playing Prominent Role in Russia-Ukraine War,” Red Diamond Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer of 2023.

McDermott, Roger N and Charles K Bartles (2020) “The Russian Military Decision Making-Process & Automated Command and Control”, German Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies, October, 2020.

AI Genocide (2024), Visualizing Palestine, Feb 2024.

Prabhu, Abhinaya – Israeli Defence Forces alum`s Exodigo closes $105M to generate 3D underground maps using AI, Tech Funding News (TFN), Feb 28, 2024.

Vavra, Shannon (2023) Inside Israel’s Tunnel Commando Team Waging War Under Gaza, In the Dark, The Daily Beast, Nov 4, 2023.

Collins, Matt (2024) Exodigo is leaning on AI to help map the underground, Geo Week News, Nov 26, 2024.

Haney, B. S. (2020). Security policy applied artificial intelligence in modern warfare and national security policy, 11(1), 60–100.

Arvatz, Alon (2023) The battle for your computer: Israel and the growth of the cyber-security industry, John Wiley & Sons.

Bohbot, Amir (2024) Inside Israel`s operation: step-by-step breakdown of how Nasrallah was eliminated, The Jerusalem Post, September 28, 2024. 

Goldfarb, A., & Lindsay, J. R. (2021). Prediction and judgment: Why artificial intelligence increases the importance of humans in war. International Security, 46(3), 7–50.

The New Arab (2024) Israel expands use of ‘suicide robots’ in deadly north Gaza assault, 14 October, 2024.

Bode, I., & Huelss, H. (2022). Autonomous Weapons Systems and International Norms.

Rolly, R. M., Malarvezhi, P., & Lagkas, T. D. (2022). Unmanned aerial vehicles: Applications, techniques, and challenges as aerial base stations. International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks, 18(9), 155013292211239.

Sofiia Syngaivska (2023) “Russia Has Unveiled a New Kamikaze Drone with a 200 km Range, which Is More Dangerous than the Lancet UAV”, Defense Express, Sep 22, 2023.

Shrimpton, Thomas (2023) “People’s Liberation Army Exploring Military Applications of ChatGPT,” Foreign Military Studies Office, May 1, 2023.

Scheer, Steven (2023) Nvidia to build Israeli supercomputer as AI demand soars, Reuters, May 29, 2023.

Gubrud, M., & Altmann, J. (2014). Can an autonomous weapons ban be verified? ICRAC, Apr 14, 2014.

Rinde, Meir (2024) Philly manufacturer of military robot dogs is a target of Gaza war protests, Billy Penn, April 22, 2024.

Future of Life Institute (2016), Autonomous weapons open letter: AI & robotics researchers. Feb 9, 2016.

Banerjee, V., & Tkach, B. (2023). Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas Wars Reveal the Importance of Weapons Production. The Diplomat, Dec 16, 2023.

Ali, B. (2023). AI in modern warfare: A glimpse into the future of conflict. Paradigm Shift. Nov 13, 2023.

Atashbar, T. (2023). How nations become fragile: An AI-augmented bird’s-eye view (with a case study of South Sudan). IMF Working Papers, 2023(167), 1–36.

Prins, C (2023) Mission AI, Tilburg University Research Portal.

Sylvia, Noah (2024) The Israel Defense Forces` use of AI in Gaza: A case study of misplaced purposed, RUSI, July 4, 2024.

Thurai, Andy and McKendrick, Joe (2022) AI isn`t ready to make unsupervised decisions, Harvard Business Review, Sep 15, 2022.

Haque, Adil Ahmad. Law and Morality at War. Oxford University Press, 2017.

International Committee of the Red Cross. (2024). Martens Clause | How does law protect in war? – Online casebook.

Uzer, Akif, Mehmet (2024) The Integration of AI in modern warfare: ethical, legal and practical implications, Center for Youth and International Studies, Sep 24, 2024.

Stanley-Lockman Z (2021) Responsible and Ethical Military AI, Center for Security and Emerging Technology.

Welch and Durbin (2024) Welch and Durbin request information from State Department on the use of AI in Gaza. Vermont Biz, 20 Sep, 2024. 

Nextoceans (2024) What is technological determinism. Sep 30, 2024.

UN Human Rights Office. (2024). Arms exports to Israel must stop immediately: UN experts. Feb 23, 2024.

Abraham, Yuval (2024) ‘Lavender’: The AI machine directing Israel`s bombing spree in Gaza, +972 magazine, Apr 3, 2024.

Allison, G. T. (2020). The clash of AI superpowers. The National Interest, 165, 11–24.

Lamberth, M., & Scharre, P. (2023). Arms control for artificial intelligence. Texas National Security Review, 6(2), 95–110.

U.S. Department of State. (2024). 2023 Report to Congress on Implementation of the New START Treaty. Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability.

Hans Kelsen’s magnum opus, the “Pure Theory of Law,” for more on the “doctrine of necessity”.

Hobbes, Thomas (1994) The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic: Part I, Human Nature, Part II, De Corpore Politico; with Three Lives. From (1588-1679). Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Mill, John Stuart. (2002). On Liberty. Dover Thrift Editions. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. (2004). The Social Contract. Penguin Great Ideas. Harlow, England: Penguin Books.

Miyata, F. (2021, March 26). The grand strategy of Carl Von Clausewitz. War Room – U.S. Army War College. 

Fornasier, M. D. E. O. (2021). The regulation of the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in warfare: between International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Meaningful Human Control. Revista Jurídica da Presidência, 23(129), 67–93.

Mittelsteadt, M. (2021). AI Verification. Center for Security and Emerging Technology.

Dahlman, O. (2010). Verification: To detect, to deter and to build confidence. In U. N. Research, K. Vignard, & J. Linekar (Eds.), Arms control verification (pp. 3–13). United Nations.

Csernatoni, Raluca (2024) Governing military AI amid a geopolitical minefield, Carnegie Europe, July 17, 2024.

Arms Control Association. (2023). UN to address autonomous weapons systems.

Stanley-Lockman Z (2021) Responsible and Ethical Military AI, Center for Security and Emerging Technology.

Ahmed, U. N. (2019). Emergence of artificial intelligence in future warfare: Preparedness of Bangladesh armed forces. NDC Journal, 18(1), 179–209.

Erdem, T., & Özbek, C. (2023). The problem of disarmament in artificial intelligence technology from the perspective of the United Nations. Akademik Hassasiyetler, 10(21), 57–79.

Perkovich, G. (1999). India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation. Berkeley: University of California Press.

International Panel on Fissile Materials. (2022). Global Fissile Material Report 2022. Fifty Years of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Materials, and Nuclear Energy. Princeton: International Panel on Fissile Materials.

References

[i] Rules of engagement are a military directive specifying the restrictions under which armed forces will engage in combat/war with their nemesis.

[ii] Payne, K. (2018). Artificial intelligence: A revolution in strategic affairs? Survival, 60(5), 7–32.

[iii] Boucher, P. (2020). Artificial intelligence: How does it work, why does it matter, and what can we do about it? European Parliamentary Research Service PE 641.54712, 1–64.

[iv] Szabadföldi, I. (2021). Artificial Intelligence in Military Application – Opportunities and challenges. Land Forces Academy Review, 26(2), 157–165

[v] Fatafta, M., Shakir, O., Goodfriend, S., & Mimran, T. (2023) The Gospel: Israel turns to a new AI system in the Gaza war, Al-Jazeera, Al-Jazeera, Dec 9, 2023.

[vi] The kill chain refers to identifying, geo-locating, monitoring, targeting, engaging, and evaluating an enemy target, fundamentally highlighting the stages of an attack from preliminary identification to the final target elimination.

[vii] Abraham, Yuval (2024) ‘Lavender’: The AI machine directing Israel`s bombing spree in Gaza, +972 magazine, Apr 3, 2024.

[viii] Cummings, M. L. (2017, January). Artificial intelligence and the future of warfare. Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

[ix] Abraham, Yuval (2024) ‘Lavender AI’: The AI machine directing Israel`s bombing spree in Gaza, +972, April 3, 2024.

[x] Freese, Kevin (2023) “Smart Phones Playing Prominent Role in Russia-Ukraine War,” Red Diamond Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer of 2023.

[xi] To read more on automation: McDermott, Roger N and Charles K Bartles (2020) “The Russian Military Decision Making-Process & Automated Command and Control”, German Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies, October, 2020.

[xii] Prabhu, Abhinaya – Israeli Defence Forces alum`s Exodigo closes $105M to generate 3D underground maps using AI, Tech Funding News (TFN, Feb 28, 2024.

[xiii] Vavra, Shannon (2023) Inside Israel’s Tunnel Commando Team Waging War Under Gaza, In the Dark, The Daily Beast, Nov 4, 2023.

[xiv] Collins, Matt (2024) Exodigo is leaning on AI to help map the underground, Geo Week News, Nov 26, 2024.

[xv] Haney, B. S. (2020). Security policy applied artificial intelligence in modern warfare and national security policy, 11(1), 60–100.

[xvi] Arvatz, Alon (2023) The battle for your computer: Israel and the growth of the cyber-security industry, John Wiley & Sons.

[xvii] Bohbot, Amir (2024) Inside Israel`s operation: step-by-step breakdown of how Nasrallah was eliminated, The Jerusalem Post, September 28, 2024. 

[xviii] Goldfarb, A., & Lindsay, J. R. (2021). Prediction and judgment: Why artificial intelligence increases the importance of humans in war. International Security, 46(3), 7–50.

[xix] Bode, I., & Huelss, H. (2022). Autonomous Weapons Systems and International Norms.

[xx] Rolly, R. M., Malarvezhi, P., & Lagkas, T. D. (2022). Unmanned aerial vehicles: Applications, techniques, and challenges as aerial base stations. International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks, 18(9), 155013292211239.

[xxi] For more on Russian drones: Sofiia Syngaivska (2023) “Russia Has Unveiled a New Kamikaze Drone with a 200 km Range, which Is More Dangerous than the Lancet UAV”, Defense Express, Sep 22, 2023.

[xxii] China developed long-endurance UAV`s like the CH-4, their KVD-002 which is the PLA`s first armed reconnaissance drone and the Wing Loon 1. Pakistan inducted the Wing Loong I Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV) and is present at, inter alia, Mianwali air base.

[xxiii] A recon drone is also referred to as a surveillance drone, or an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) essentially developed to acquire intelligence by collecting and collating visual data via cameras and sensors, allowing for observation of an area without putting jeopardizing human pilots.

[xxiv] Scheer, Steven (2023) Nvidia to build Israeli supercomputer as AI demand soars, Reuters, May 29, 2023.

[xxv] Gubrud, M., & Altmann, J. (2014). Can an autonomous weapons ban be verified? ICRAC, Apr 14, 2014.

[xxvi] Rinde, Meir (2024) Philly manufacturer of military robot dogs is a target of Gaza war protests, Billy Penn, April 22, 2024.

[xxvii] For a better grasp on AI and robots: Future of Life Institute (2016), Autonomous weapons open letter: AI & robotics researchers. Feb 9, 2016.

[xxviii] Banerjee, V., & Tkach, B. (2023). Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas Wars Reveal the Importance of Weapons Production. The Diplomat, Dec 16, 2023.

[xxix] Ali, B. (2023). AI in modern warfare: A glimpse into the future of conflict. Paradigm Shift. Nov 13, 2023.

[xxx] Atashbar, T. (2023). How nations become fragile: An AI-augmented bird’s-eye view (with a case study of South Sudan). IMF Working Papers, 2023(167), 1–36.

[xxxi] Prins, C (2023) Mission AI, Tilburg University Research Portal.

[xxxii] Sylvia, Noah (2024) The Israel Defense Forces` use of AI in Gaza: A case study of misplaced purposed, RUSI, July 4, 2024.

[xxxiii] Thurai, Andy and McKendrick, Joe (2022) AI isn`t ready to make unsupervised decisions, Harvard Business Review, Sep 15, 2022.

[xxxiv] Haque, Adil Ahmad. Law and Morality at War. Oxford University Press, 2017.

[xxxv] International Committee of the Red Cross. (2024). Martens Clause | How does law protect in war? – Online casebook.

[xxxvi] Uzer, Akif, Mehmet (2024) The Integration of AI in modern warfare: ethical, legal and practical implications, Center for Youth and International Studies, Sep 24, 2024.

[xxxvii] Stanley-Lockman Z (2021) Responsible and Ethical Military AI, Center for Security and Emerging Technology.

[xxxviii] Welch and Durbin (2024) Welch and Durbin request information from State Department on the use of AI in Gaza. Vermont Biz, 20 Sep, 2024. 

[xxxix] Nextoceans (2023) What is technological determinism. Sep 30, 2024.

[xl] Allison, G. T. (2020). The clash of AI superpowers. The National Interest, 165, 11–24.

[xli] Lamberth, M., & Scharre, P. (2023). Arms control for artificial intelligence. Texas National Security Review, 6(2), 95–110. For more on arms control also view: U.S. Department of State. (2024). 2023 Report to Congress on Implementation of the New START Treaty. Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability.

[xlii] View Hans Kelsen’s magnum opus, the “Pure Theory of Law,” for more on the “doctrine of necessity”.

[xliii] Hobbes, Thomas (1994) The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic: Part I, Human Nature, Part II, De Corpore Politico; with Three Lives. From (1588-1679). Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

[xliv] Mill, John Stuart. (2002). On Liberty. Dover Thrift Editions. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications.

[xlv] Miyata, F. (2021, March 26). The grand strategy of Carl Von Clausewitz. War Room – U.S. Army War College. 

[xlvi] Fornasier, M. D. E. O. (2021). The regulation of the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in warfare: between International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Meaningful Human Control. Revista Jurídica da Presidência, 23(129), 67–93.

[xlvii] Mittelsteadt, M. (2021). AI Verification. Center for Security and Emerging Technology.

[xlviii] Dahlman, O. (2010). Verification: To detect, to deter and to build confidence. In U. N. Research, K. Vignard, & J. Linekar (Eds.), Arms control verification (pp. 3–13). United Nations.

[xlix] Csernatoni, Raluca (2024) Governing military AI amid a geopolitical minefield, Carnegie Europe, July 17, 2024.

[l] Arms Control Association. (2023). UN to address autonomous weapons systems.

[li] Stanley-Lockman Z (2021) Responsible and Ethical Military AI, Center for Security and Emerging Technology.

[lii] Ahmed, U. N. (2019). Emergence of artificial intelligence in future warfare: Preparedness of Bangladesh armed forces. NDC Journal, 18(1), 179–209.

[liii] Erdem, T., & Özbek, C. (2023). The problem of disarmament in artificial intelligence technology from the perspective of the United Nations. Akademik Hassasiyetler, 10(21), 57–79.

[liv] International Panel on Fissile Materials. (2022). Global Fissile Material Report 2022. Fifty Years of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Materials, and Nuclear Energy. Princeton: International Panel on Fissile Materials.

[lv] Neither Pakistan nor India is a party to the 1968 NPT. For more: Perkovich, G. (1999). India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation. Berkeley: University of California Press.