Abstract
(This essay recalls the main provisions of the IWT concerning the rights and obligations of India and Pakistan over the waters of the six rivers of the Indus Basin in order to set the context of the crisis facing the agreement. It will examine the aim and purpose of India’s bid to re-open an agreement that had served it and its major neighbor and co-riparian of the Indian River Basin for nearly six and a half decades. It also examines the arguments of influential Indian experts in a spate of writings during the last couple of years. The essay concludes by offering some suggestions which might help in salvaging the agreement that was aptly described by President Dwight D. Eisenhower as “the one bright spot” in a “very depressing world picture”. – Author)
Table of Contents
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed by India and Pakistan on 19 September 1960, has been widely acclaimed as the world’s most successful water sharing agreement. It is especially lauded for ensuring un-impeded access to the water resources of the shared Indus River Basin by India and Pakistan, its major riparians, whose relations had been predominantly adversarial. India and Pakistan have time and again reiterated their commitment to its implementation in letter and spirit. Regrettably, since January 2023, India has thrice called for bilateral negotiations to “ review and modify” the IWT in the backdrop of an acrimonious dispute over the implementation of its provision concerning its entitlement for limited use of the waters of rivers allotted to Pakistan under the Treaty.
In August 2024, India suspended the meetings of the bilateral Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) until Islamabad agreed to start negotiations to re-write the Treaty.
The PIC is mandated to serve “as the regular channel of communication on all matters relating to the implementation of the Treaty…”. The “purpose and functions” of the Commission are, inter alia, to “establish and maintain cooperation between the Parties in the development of of the waters of the (Indus Basin’s) Rivers…” The Indian Government’s decision linking the meetings of the PIC to a revision of some of its provisions, therefore, gravely threatens the survival of the IWT.
This essay recalls the main provisions of the IWT concerning the rights and obligations of India and Pakistan over the waters of the six rivers of the Indus Basin in order to set the context of the crisis facing the agreement. It will examine the aim and purpose of India’s bid to re-open an agreement that had served it and its major neighbor and co-riparian of the Indian River Basin for nearly six and a half decades. It also examines the arguments of influential Indian experts in a spate of writings during the last couple of years. The essay concludes by offering some suggestions which might help in salvaging the agreement that was aptly described by President Dwight D. Eisenhower as “the one bright spot” in a “very depressing world picture”.
The negotiations (1952-1960) leading to the signing of the IWT were facilitated by the World Bank (WB) which provided technical backstopping and assigned a Vice President to ensure uninterrupted communications between Indian and Pakistani negotiators. It mobilized funds for large water storage projects for ensuring year-long perennial irrigation and several long link canals for carrying water for irrigating Pakistan’s lands that had depended on the three eastern rivers allocated to India for its exclusive use. The Bank was entrusted crucial roles in the 10-year transition period (1960-70) and in facilitating the key dispute settlement mechanism that is at the heart of the crisis facing the Treaty.
MAIN PROVISIONS OF THE IWT
The Treaty bifurcated the six rivers of the Indus Basin between India and Pakistan, assigning the three eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej) to India for its unrestricted use and allocating the three western rivers (The Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum) to Pakistan. However, India was allowed to use their flows for limited use for human consumption, irrigation, and generation of electricity by run-of–the–river plants that do not need permanent storage of water.
The IWT established a Permanent Indus Commission (PIC), comprised of Indus Commissioners of India and Pakistan, to serve as the main institutional mechanism for communication on all matters pertaining to the implementation of the Treaty. The Treaty created a three-tier mechanism for dispute settlement; all ‘questions’ relating to the Treaty raised by either Party were to be resolved by the PIC; if the ‘questions’ could not be resolved, the resultant dispute was to be referred for arbitration by a Neutral Expert. Disputes involving both engineering and legal matters had to be submitted to a 7-member Court of Arbitration chaired by an expert nominated by the World Bank. The Parties were to be consulted on both methods of arbitration.
India’s notice, conveyed on 25 January 2023 by its Indus Commissioner to his Pakistani counterpart, demanding bilateral negotiations on modifying the Indus Waters Treaty imperils the future of the IWT. The Indian move was made under Article XII (3) which states: “The provisions of this treaty may from time to time be modified by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two Governments.”
Indian media reports, reflecting official briefing, accused Pakistan of “intransigence” and criticized its “actions since 2015 in handling disputes over the Kishenganga and Ratle Hydroelectric plants.” The media reported the differences between India and Pakistan over the mode of arbitration (a Neutral Expert is favored by India while a Court of Arbitration is demanded by Pakistan). Curiously, Indian External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar, declined to comment on, what he described as, “a matter for the two (Indus) Commissioners to sort out.”
Following inter-ministerial consultations on the Indian notice convened by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on 3 April 2023 the Pakistan Indus Commissioner conveyed to his Indian counterpart that the Permanent Indus Commission was the appropriate forum for discussing Indian concerns. Pakistan’s response was acknowledged by the Indian External Affairs Ministry on 5 April.
On 13 July 2023, following Pakistani media reports that India had been releasing excess water of eastern rivers (Ravi and Sutlej) toward Pakistan, the Foreign Office spokesperson dismissed the reports, saying that New Delhi had been sharing with Islamabad regular updates on water discharges toward Pakistan since 9 July as envisaged in Article 6 of the IWT. The Spokesperson said that the IWT “is a very important treaty that has served both Pakistan and India well”, adding that the Treaty “is gold standard of bilateral treaties on water sharing.” She added that “Pakistan is fully committed to its full implementation”. And “we hope India will also remain committed to the Treaty”. The latest reaffirmation of Pakistan’s commitment to the IWT was stated by Ambassador Munir Akram on 14 February 2025 during a UN Security Council debate on climate and water security.Referring to “increasing water demand (which), coupled with climate change impacts, creates the potential for transboundary water disputes in several parts of the world”, he declared: “Pakistan attaches high priority to the strict implementation of the Indus Waters Treaty”.
Notwithstanding Pakistan’s offer to consider India’s grievances through the Permanent Indus Commission, New Delhi has reiterated its call for renegotiating the Treaty three times, the last instance being on 30 August 2024. According to a report in The Hindu newspaper, “India’s notification highlights fundamental and unforeseen changes in circumstances that require a reassessment of obligations under various articles of the Treaty”. It added that, “among various concerns, important ones include changes in population demographics; environmental issues;the need to accelerate development of clean energy to meet India’s emission (reduction) targets; and the impact of persistent cross-border terrorism etc.”
According to a report on 18 September 2024 in ‘The Hindu’: “since January 2023 India has written four times to Pakistan to initiate talks on revising the treaty but …has not received a satisfactory response”. Consequently, “India has decided that there will be no more meetings of the Permanent Indus Commission till the governments of India and Pakistan meet and discuss the renegotiation of the …Indus Waters Treaty”. The report noted that India had declined Pakistan’s proposal for discussing its concerns at the level of Indus Commissioners, because“Commissioners only execute the Treaty”. However, “if the governmental negotiations were to begin to renegotiate the treaty, India could consider reviving the Commission as a goodwill measure”. Significantly, the Hindu’s comment underlined that “India’s prime focus was solving the dispute resolution mechanism set out in the Treaty”.
The New Indian Express, in a comment captioned ‘Coercive Diplomacy to Renegotiate the Indus Waters Treaty’ on 18 March 2025 stated: “India appears to have taken a calibrated step to leverage its upper riparian advantage to renegotiate the Treaty”.
The reasons cited by India to justify its call for renegotiating the IWT are not prima facie convincing. However, it would be useful to view the move in a historic context through a broad-brushed overview of the implementation of the Treaty since its inception, in particular the differences and disputes that have arisen and how they were dealt with in accordance with the dispute settlement mechanism prescribed by the IWT.
OVERVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY AND RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES CONCERNING THE PROVISIONS OF THE IWT
During the fourteen years after the signing of the IWT (1960-1974), India and Pakistan were preoccupied with actions relating to their entitlements pertaining to the waters of the six rivers as defined by the Treaty. India focused on the means of utilizing the waters of the three eastern rivers assigned to it for irrigation and other uses in East Punjab, Rajasthan, and Haryana states. Pakistan had to make extraordinary efforts to build the enormous civil works infrastructure, including large storage dams, for utilizing the waters of the western rivers for perennial irrigation, hydropower generation, and other water needs of areas previously served by the eastern rivers.
Since 1974, all the differences and disputes over the implementation of the IWT relate solely to India’s hydroelectric plants on the western (Pakistani) rivers as if the only purpose of the Treaty was to facilitate India’s utilization of the flows of western rivers for producing electricity. The first dispute related to the Salal Dam on Chenab River. In I974, Pakistan objected to the design of the plant which, it alleged, violated the provisions of Annex D of the IWT on the designs of permissible Indian hydroelectric plants (HEPs). The dispute was discussed by the Foreign Secretaries after the Indus Commission failed to find a solution. India agreed to design changes sought by Pakistan and an agreement was signed by the Foreign Ministers of the two countries in April 1978.
The second dispute arose in 1985 and relates to what India calls the ‘Tulbul Navigation Project’ and Pakistan calls the Wullar Barrage. The project provides for the construction of a barrage on the Jhelum River at the mouth of the Wullar Lake, 30km north of Srinagar in Indian-administered Kashmir. In 1986-7, Pakistan opposed the project on the ground that it would create water storage exceeding the limit allowed by the IWT. India claimed that the barrage was not meant for power generation only as it would also regulate water release from the lake to the river in order to ensure year–round navigation for transporting people and goods between Srinagar and two other towns. However, in 1987, India suspended work on the project. Since then, a dozen meetings of the Commission and high level officials ofIndia and Pakistan have failed to settle the dispute. Meanwhile, the project has reportedly lost urgency owing to the construction and upgrading of roads linking Srinagar with other towns.
The third dispute relates to the 900 MW hydroelectric project on the Chenab at Baglihar upstream from the Salal Dam. Construction of the civil works of the project started in the year 2000. Pakistan objected to several aspects of the design of the plant, in particular its low gated spillways which, in its view, would increase the storage capacity of the plant. India explained that the gated spillways were needed to prevent the silting of the reservoir as had happened in the case of the Salal Dam.
In January 2005, after discussions of the Indus Commission and water resource secretaries of India and Pakistan failed to resolve the dispute over the Baglihar project, it was decided to refer it to a Neutral Expert. The Neutral Expert, Professor Raymond Lafitte, a renowned Swiss civil engineer, issued his verdict in December 2007. The verdict upheld the design of the dam which, according to the Neutral Expert, was based on the latest advances in civil engineering. Pakistan was not satisfied with the logic behind the verdict.
The fourth dispute relates to the construction of India’s Kishenganga Hydroelectric Plant (the KHEP) located on the Kishenganga/Neelum River in the Gurez Valley of Baramula District in Indian-administered Kashmir. The project was initially designed by India in 1994 as a storage project, but the design was altered in order to make it ‘Run of the River’, permissible under the IWT. Pakistan opposed the project on several grounds; the dispute was referred to a Court of Arbitration which was constituted in December 2010. The Court gave its Final Award in December 2013 which allowed India to build the KHEP but directed it to effect changes in the design of the project in order to reduce its adverse impact on agriculture in Pakistan. India was obligated to build and operate the plant in such a way as to maintain a minimum flow of water (8 cusec) in the Kishanganga/Neelum River.Subsequently, India completed the construction of the Kishenganga project which was inaugurated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi on 19 May 2018.
During the meetings of the PIC, Pakistan raised several objections to the design of the Kishenganga HEP and the 850 MW Ratle Hydropower plant on the Chenab River in the Kishtwar District of Kashmir (RHEP). Pakistan complained that the changes in design made by India did not comply fully with the verdict of the Court of Arbitration. In 2015, Pakistan proposed the appointment of a Neutral Expert to resolve the differences over both the KHEP and the RHEP. India argued that the issues could be addressed by the PIC. In March 2016, Pakistan demanded the establishment of a Court of Arbitration, arguing that the differences involved both engineering and legal issues. In August 2016, the Indian Government agreed to the appointment of a Neutral Expert, but Pakistan persisted in demanding a Court of Arbitration. Both countries pressed the World Bank to act on their request.
The World Bank (WB) tried to promote an agreement between India and Pakistan on the means of arbitration but failed. In August 2016, the WB announced a “pause” in acting on the conflicting requests of India and Pakistan and urged them to jointly suggest a course of action. It could not get a positive response. In March 2022, the WB announced that it had ended its “pause”. In October, it announced the appointment of eminent Swiss Engineer Michel Lino, currently President of the non-governmental International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD), as Neutral Expert, as demanded by India, and the appointment of Mr Sean Murphy, Law Professor at the US George Washington University, to chair a Court of Arbitration, as requested by Pakistan, to settle the differences over the Kishenganga and Ratle hydropower projects.
India opposed the operation of two parallel processes for resolving the same issues which, it contended, carried the risk of contradictory outcomes that would create a legally untenable situation and endanger the IWT. The WB countered the Indian objection saying that, “the lack of success in finding an acceptable solution over the past five years is also a risk to the Treaty”.
The Court of Arbitration convened its first meeting on 23 January 2023. India boycotted the Court and has not attended its sessions. The Court held meetings in The Hague on 27-28 January 2023. In a press release on 3 February, the Court acknowledged “India’s objections to the Court’s competence”, adding that “the objections must be addressed as a preliminary matter in an expedited proceeding”. The Court stated that it would seek further submissions from the Parties. On 6 July, the seven-member-Court unanimously rejected India’s objections and declared that India’s non-participation in its proceedings did not deprive the Court of competence to address all the questions raised by Pakistan. In a swift reaction, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) reiterated “India’s consistent and principled position that the so-called Court of Arbitration is in contravention of the Indus Waters Treaty”. The statement added that “as per the graded mechanism provided in the Treaty, the Neutral Expert is the only valid proceeding at this juncture”.
On the other hand, Neutral Expert Michel Lino issued a 151-page decision on 7January 2025 forcefully asserting his competence to settle all “Points of Difference” in the positions taken by India and Pakistan pertaining to the Kishenganga and Ratle hydropower projects. The decision summarized the points of view of the contending Parties as conveyed through their respective “memorials” and presentations at the meetings convened by the NE in February and September 2023 as well as February and June 2024. It also refers to the site visit of KHEP and RHEP undertaken by Mr. Lino from 20 to 28 June 2024. The NE held a third meeting with the Parties on 10-11 September 2024 at which oral presentations were made by the Parties on the competence of the Neutral Expert.
India, in a statement issued on 21 January 2025 by the Ministry of External Affairs(MEA), welcomed the decision of the Neutral Expert confirming his competence to decide on the differences between India and Pakistan concerning the Kishenganga and Ratle hydroelectric projects. It pointed out that “the decision upholds and vindicates India’s stand that all seven questions that were referred to the Neutral Expert are …differences falling within his competence under the Treaty”. The MEA noted that the Neutral Expert “will now proceed to the next (merits) phase of his proceeding” leading to “a final decision”.
The MEA statement declared that “being committed to preserving the sanctity and integrity of the Treaty, India will continue to participate in the Neutral Expert’s process so that the differences are resolved in a manner consistent with the provisions of the Treaty, which does not provide for parallel proceedings on the same set of issues”.
The statement mentioned that the Governments of India and Pakistan “also remain in touch on the matter of modification and review of the Indus Waters Treaty under Article X11(3) of the Treaty”.
THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE INDIAN CALL FOR RENEGOTIATING THE IWT
Indian Government’s call for a review and modification of the IWT has ostensiblybeen prompted by its annoyance with Pakistan’s objections to the designs of the Kishenganga and Ratle HEPs and insistence on a court of arbitration. India has claimed that it “had offered on multiple occasions the possibility of discussing the issues (raised by Pakistan) bilaterally at the level of the Permanent Indus Commission” but Pakistan did not cooperate.
Since 2023, the Indian media has, as usual, overwhelmingly backed New Delhi’s point of view concerning the IWT. However, the respected ‘Hindu’ newspaper has made a strong plea for moderation. In an editorial captioned ‘Stauch the Breach’on 21 September 2024, the Hindu called on India and Pakistan “to drop their hard line stances” on the Treaty. It added: “It is no coincidence that the spiral mirrors the unravelling of the India-Pakistan bilateral relationship in the same period. There is no political engagement or trade and the 2021 Line of Control ceasefire agreement is in danger…”
During the past two years, a flurry of articles by Indian experts, including those who had previously held important official positions, have sought to make a robust case for its bid to amend Article 1X of the IWT, captioned, ‘Settlement of Differences and Disputes’ and Annexure D – ‘Generation of Hydro-Electric Power by India on the Western Rivers’. The recently established Think Tank, the ‘Centre for Research on Strategic and Security Issues’, also known by its acronym, NATSRAT, with unmistakable links to the Indian Security apparatus Government, published a number of articles to justify New Delhi’s attempt to amend some provisions of the IWT. The authors of the articles include Pankaj Saran, a veteran diplomat and former Deputy National Security Adviser for Strategic Affairs under Prime Minister Narendra Modi and convener of NATSTRAT, RK Saxena, ex-Indian Indus Commissioner, a veteran water resources and energy expert, and a senior fellow of the Manohar Panikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, a think tank funded by the Ministry of Defence. Five of the papers have been put together under the title ‘Revisiting the Indus Waters Treaty’, published in October 2023. The main arguments for justifying the renegotiation of the IWT are noted below.
(a) Alleged abuse of the IWT by Pakistan:
Indian experts have accused Pakistan of abusing the IWT in order to “advance its agenda of hampering the development of Jammu and Kashmir” which has fostered the “growing feeling (in India) that the Treaty is an impedimenttowards the development of J&K”. The ex-Indus Commissioner calls the IWT “a relic of the colonial era…” Earlier, they had charged Pakistan with attempts to obstruct Indian power generation plants on the western rivers by raising all kinds of objections. These accusations are belied by the fact that India has built as many as 36 hydropower plants with a total capacity of 3,478 MW, most of them on the Chenab and Jhelum in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir.The charge of obstructing development of J&K is absurd because Indian hydropower projects have thus far mainly benefited areas other than J&K.
(b) The need for accommodating technological advances in civil engineering:
Indian experts have argued that technological progress has outpaced the original intent and spirit of the Treaty, thus making it imperative for India and Pakistan to renegotiate its contents under Article X11(3) of the Treaty.Specifically, they contend that technology advances warrant revisiting the provisions concerning spillways in order to prevent sedimentation as had occurred in Salal and Baglihar dams. In this regard, they claim that Pakistan’s hydropower plants have low-level sluice spillways – not 1960 technology. They insist that “India must have the freedom to construct HEPs with low-level sluice spillways”, adding that “this requires a new framework to be established”.
Pakistani legal experts oppose tampering with the painstakingly negotiated texts of all the provisions of the IWT in order not to set a precedent for changes which would adversely affect the integrity of the IWT. But the possibility of finding a solution in exceptional cases short of textual amendment should be explored.
(c) The “need to re-examine the Pact in the light of climate change”:
Indian experts contend that the IWT should address the impacts of climate change, but their suggestions are selective, self- serving, and outrageous. They claim that the IWT had created “imbalances in water distribution “by allowingIndia only 19.6% of the waters of the Indus River Basin through the eastern rivers though it has almost double the catchment area of this percentage. They advance the specious claim that “Pakistan was given a disproportionate and excessive share of water despite having a lesser catchment area”. Further, they mention the acute shortage of water in Indian states of Punjab, Rajasthan, andHaryana. Indian experts ignore the acute scarcity of water in Pakistan that has been exacerbated by the impacts of climate change. Indian experts do not mention the need for cooperation between India and Pakistan on climate adaptation and mitigation, in particular addressing the risks posed by climate change to the supply and quality of fresh water.
(d) “India had given too much to Pakistan in 1960 through the IWT”:
Indian experts claim that driven by the “initial euphoria of trying to build good relations with a new-born state and belief in the principle of fairness’’, India had given too much to Pakistan in 1960 through the IWT. This is factually incorrect. Niranjan D. Gulhati, the Indian civil engineer who had participated in the IWT negotiations from the first to the last day, writes in his book, ‘Indus Waters Treaty: An Exercise in International Mediation’ (1973), “The truth of the matter has been set out in the preceding pages. Neither Pakistan nor Indiamade any permanent concessions to the other side… . Both countries have gained enormously in material benefits”.
(e) Criticism of the “central position given by the Treaty to the World Bank”:
Indian expert’s criticism against the role assigned to the WB is blatantly inaccurate and uncalled for. The WB had indeed made an indispensable contribution to the success of the IWT negotiations for which it was lavishly praised by Prime Minister Nehru. The roles assigned to the Bank in the IWT were to negotiate arrangements for continued supply of canal water to Pakistan by India in case Pakistan was unable to build, by the end of the 10-year transitional period (1960-1970), irrigation infrastructure to carry flows from the western rivers to areas previously dependent on the eastern rivers. With the timely completion of the infrastructure by Pakistan there was no need for the Bank to intervene. The second obligation of the Bank relates to the dispute settlement mechanism which is widely acclaimed for fairness. Moreover, India has planned to build as many as 65 additional power plants in the future, taking advantage of the lack of any limitation on the number of projects that could be built by India on the western rivers.
(f) Imperfections and ambiguities in the IWT:
Indian experts refer to the imperfections and ambiguities in the IWT but do not substantiate the claims. They have criticized the World Bank’s “lack of competence to handle such disputes”, ignoring the fact that under the IWT, disputes are either handled bilaterally by the Indus Commissioners who, according to the Treaty, “should ordinarily be a high ranking engineer competent in the field of hydrology and water-use”, and can draw upon all the expertise available in their respective countries and elsewhere, or by a NeutralExpert or a Court of Arbitration.
(g) Pakistan’s use of the IWT “to advance its agenda of hampering the development of Kashmir”:
Indian experts allege that Pakistan objects to “every development project, irrespective of its size, which fosters the growing feeling that the Treaty is a major impediment to the development of the water resources of Jammu and Kashmir.” How much India cares for the wellbeing of the people of Indian-administered J&K was highlighted by a report in the daily Kashmir Times’ issue of 25 November 2023, captioned ‘Surplus Power Production in J&K, but power outages go up’. The report states:
“A resource-rich region, Jammu and Kashmir, which produces surplus electricity from the hydroelectric projects is facing the worst power crisis in many decades during harsh winters.” It adds: “Jammu and Kashmir which produces 3188 MW of energy gets an overall share (from power harnessed by state- run NHPC – run and private projects) of 1441.35 MW. To meet its requirements, Jammu and Kashmir has to purchase power back from the Northern Power Grid Corporation”.
(h) An Indian water resource expert has also called for revising Annexure E –‘Storage of Waters by India on the Western Rivers’ in order to allow India to store water in reservoirs on the western rivers in India “so that it is utilized for the benefit of humanity”! Clearly, his’ humanity’ excludes the 250 millionPakistanis for whom the Indus Basin, especially the western rivers, are the main sources of fresh water and, therefore, a paramount existential imperative.
The opening article of a compilation of articles on the IWT issued by NATSRAT by Pankaj Saran and PK Saxena, titled: ‘Revising the Indus Waters Treaty’,discloses a likely compelling reason for India’s call for revising the Indus Waters Treaty. It recalls the angry outburst of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in September 2016 following a terrorist attack against an Indian Army base in Uri in Kashmir that “blood and water cannot flow together”. It describes the remark as “one of the boldest statements on the Indus Waters Treaty by an Indian Prime Minister”, adding that “the message to Pakistan was that it cannot run with the hares and hunt with the hounds. It can not expect business as usual from India while waging a proxy war of terror and more against India”.
The article describes India’s January 2023 call for amendments to the Treaty as “a major and long overdue move which should have been made many years ago”. It discloses that the “Government has set up a Task Force under the directions of the Prime Minster’s Office to ensure exercise of India’s rights under the Treaty. The second meeting of the Task Force took place on 26 May 2023, in Srinagar, and was chaired by Deputy National Security Advisor Vikram Misri”.
The Task Force is said to have “fast tracked” nine projects on the Chenab, including Ratle (850MW), Swalkot (1850 MW), Kirthai-11(930 MW), Kiru (624 MW), Kwai (287 MW) , Sachkhas (287MW ), Dugar (500 MW), Kiro, and Kwar. The total capacity of these projects adds up to 6500 MW. Notably, all the “fast tracked” projects are run-of-the-river, allowed by the IWT. It is also worth mentioning that 58% of the already completed Indian projects are also on the Chenab River in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. Indian media had recently disclosed their Government’s plan to turn the Chenab Valley into a Valley of Dams, while water resource experts underline the adverse effects of cascades of hydroelectric projects on a single river.
THE WAY AHEAD
The Indian Government’s bid to renegotiate the Indus Waters Treaty cannot be seen in isolation from the dismal state of India-Pakistan relations since 2016. High level contacts between the two neighbors have been frozen; trade, travel, and all kinds of socio-cultural interaction have sharply declined; and diplomatic missions have skeletal staff strength. Indian authorities discourage contacts and cooperation between the civil society representatives of the two countries.
Following several deadly attacks by Kashmiris against Indian military bases in Indian-administered Kashmir on 29 September 2016, New Delhi announced its decision to boycott the SAARC summit to be hosted by Pakistan in November. It actively lobbied other SAARC countries to oppose the convening of the Summit in Islamabad. India’s hostility has paralyzed the major inter-governmental organization devoted to regional cooperation in all fields, including climate change and water security.
On 5 August 2019, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Government spearheaded a decision by the Indian Parliament to abolish Articles 370 and 35 A of the IndianConstitution which recognized the special status of the Jammu and Kashmir state. Pakistan denounced the Indian move on 6 August; the Pakistan parliament condemned the unilateral change in the status of a disputed territory; and the Foreign Minister complained to the UN Security Council against the unilateral change of the status of J&K in violation of Security Council resolutions.
The revocation of the special status of J&K led to the withdrawal of the High Commissioners and suspension of all transport links between India and Pakistan and the two halves of J&K. During the past five and a half years, Prime Minister Modi and Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar have carried out a ferocious campaign of vilification against Pakistan, accusing it of being an “epicenter of terrorism”. They have spurned Islamabad’s repeated calls for peaceful and cooperative relations and amicable resolution of outstanding disputes, and, instead, sought Islamabad’s isolation at the global level.
India’s call for re-negotiating the IWT is a corollary of its unremitting hostility against Pakistan; it also manifests its growing self-confidence buttressed by its impressive economic growth and burgeoning security-centered alliance with the United States which has enlisted Indian support for its global effort to counterChina’s inexorable rise. Moreover, amendment of the dispute settlement mechanism prescribed by the IWT sought by India is aimed at reinforcing India’s hegemony over the transboundary rivers of South Asia.
Pakistan’s rejection of India’s call for renegotiating the IWT, and its proposal that India’s concerns should be taken up by the Permanent Indus Commission has led to a stalemate. The suspension of the annual sessions of the Indus Commission entails the grave risk of India going ahead with its dam-building spree on the western rivers, starting with the “fast tracked” projects on the (already heavily damned) Chenab River, thereby grievously weakening the IWT. It is, therefore, necessary on the part of Pakistan to exert all possible efforts to salvage the one and only functioning and internationally recognized means of avoiding and resolving disputes over its access to the transboundary water resources.
New Delhi’s call for formal negotiations to rectify its complaints against the process for resolving technical issues pertaining to its hydropower projects on the three rivers flowing into Pakistan from India and J&K is unwarranted. The history of India-Pakistan relations in general and the agonizing process of negotiations leading to the IWT, in particular, highlight the enormous hazards in formal negotiations on even the most innocuous issues.
The appropriate means for addressing the issues raised by Indian experts and Pakistan’s complaints is the holding of a comprehensive dialogue on integrated water resource management focusing on the assets of the shared Indus River Basin.It is unfortunate that the governments of India and Pakistan have never carried out an open ended, detailed dialogue on the range of water related issues. The single topic of the sessions of the Indus Commission since 1974 has been the Indian hydropower projects on the western rivers. Article 7 of the Treaty on future cooperation has never been discussed.
The holding of an all-encompassing conversation could be a major step toward the goal, defined by the opening sentence of the IWT, of fulfillment of “the most complete and satisfactory utilization of the waters of the Indus system of rivers”. It would also be in consonance with the Treaty’s affirmation of “a spirit of goodwill and friendship” driving the determination of the rights and obligations of the two countries.
As mentioned by this writer in several newspaper articles in March and April 2023and elsewhere, during the decade 2010-20, four Track-2 dialogues between Indian and Pakistani experts were held. Convened by friendly governments or institutions, the dialogues had taken up all the important issues that were not addressed by the protracted IWT negotiations because they were not regarded important or even recognized as relevant or urgent. The dialogues were prompted by alarming warnings about the impacts of climate change on freshwater resources, including those in South Asia, by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its fourth Assessment Report (AR 4) issued in 2007.
The Track-2 discussions were neither mandated to, nor achieved, formal agreements on water issues but they did evolve broad understandings on the cooperative measures needed to cope with the effects of climate change on water and their far-reaching socio-economic consequences. A major goal was to build up a robust knowledge base to guide prudent decision making by Governments and other stakeholders of India and Pakistan.
The understandings emerging from the Track-2 dialogues included calls for joint studies by Indian and Pakistani experts on the impacts of climate change on the glaciers of the Himalaya-Karakoram-Hindu Kush (HKH); investigation of diminishing water availability upstream in the Indus Basin; pollution abatement in the catchment areas of the western rivers; joint monitoring of the HKH glaciers; promoting the sustainability of the shared Indus Aquifer; regular and timely exchange of hydrological data concerning dry season flows as well as heavy precipitation events for use in flood control; cooperation in promoting modern micro irrigation methods and technologies for water conservation and optimum use of water; and joint studies aimed at enhanced knowledge on monsoon variability trends, and the imperative of environmentally and ecologically necessary flows in the eastern rivers.
The proposed India-Pakistan water dialogue should revisit and fine tune the relevant understandings from previous Track-2 dialogues on the climate change water nexus and, hopefully, agree on the recommendations for consideration by the two Governments.
Islamabad should also propose a bilateral exchange of views on energizing the implementation of the IWT by streamlining and updating the communication between the Indus Commissioners.
In short, Pakistan should proactively call for the holding of a comprehensive bilateral dialogue on promoting the integrated management of the water resources of the shared Indus Basin, in collaboration with relevant regional and international organizations and institutions based on mutual agreement. These measures would, hopefully, help in achieving the shared resolve of the two major riparians of the Indus Basin to preserve the Indus Waters Treaty.