Abstract

(This document analyses Pakistan’s water distribution history, highlighting the persistent inter-provincial conflicts, particularly between upstream Punjab and downstream Sindh, which date back to the British colonial era. The 1991 Water Apportionment Accord, while a landmark agreement, has faced significant implementation challenges, interpretational disputes, and has been strained by increasing water scarcity, population growth, and the profound impacts of climate change. Key issues include the deep-seated “trust deficit” among provinces that is inculcated by an imbalance of leverage always tilted towards the upper riparian, the controversial “Three-Tier Formula” for shortage sharing, the alarming ecological degradation of the Indus Delta, and the ongoing debates surrounding new water infrastructure projects. Recommendations emphasize strengthening institutional autonomy and transparency, updating the Accord to reflect contemporary realities, prioritizing consensual water storage projects, and adopting sustainable water management practices to ensure long-term water security and mitigate internal conflicts. – Author)

I.        Introduction: Pakistan’s Hydrological Lifeline and Enduring Conflicts

The Indus River Basin System (IRBS) is unequivocally the “hydrological lifeline” of Pakistan, underpinning its economic stability and societal well-being (Khan and Majeed, 2020). The nation’s economy is predominantly agrarian, with approximately 92% of its water consumed by the agricultural sector, which accounts for 37% of national employment and 24% of GDP (Ranjan and Donnellon-May, 2025). The IRBS is primarily fed by rainfall and glacial melt from the formidable Himalayan, Hindu Kush, and Karakoram ranges (Ahmed, 2019). This reliance on a single, vast river system for virtually all water needs makes its equitable distribution a matter of national security and survival.

Water distribution has consistently been a highly contentious issue, creating deep rifts between Pakistan’s federating units, particularly between Sindh province and the central government, with historical roots extending back to the colonial period (Khan and Majeed, 2020). These disputes are a classic manifestation of upstream-downstream rivalry, where upper riparian regions are often accused of disproportionately utilizing water resources, leading to grievances among those further downstream (Ahmad, 2010). The complex interplay of geography, historical development, and political dynamics has fostered an environment of persistent disagreement over this vital resource.

This report systematically examines the intricate history of water distribution in Pakistan, commencing from the colonial period and the immediate post-partition challenges, progressing through the crucial 1991 Water Apportionment Accord, and culminating in an analysis of the developments and persistent challenges observed from 1991 to the present day.

II.          The Genesis of Conflict: Water Distribution Before the 1991 Water Accord

1. Colonial Legacy and Early Irrigation Development (Pre-1947)

The British administration inherited and subsequently undertook massive expansion of the existing, albeit rudimentary, canal systems within the Indus Basin (Kanwal, 2014). Modern irrigation engineering, initiated around 1860, culminated in the establishment of what became the world’s most extensive canal irrigation network (Britannica, n.d.). This ambitious development was primarily driven by the objective of augmenting agricultural output and maximizing colonial revenues (Ranjan, 2015). While these projects brought significant areas under cultivation, they also fundamentally altered natural water flows and laid the groundwork for future conflicts.

The construction of large-scale, perennial irrigation projects, predominantly in the upper riparian province of Punjab, instigated the earliest significant water distribution conflicts between Sindh (the lower riparian) and Punjab following the First World War (Khan and Majeed, 2020). Sindh consistently perceived these upstream developments as a direct threat to its established riverine rights and agricultural sustainability (Kanwal, 2014).

Early attempts were made to resolve these escalating disputes through various commissions and agreements. The Tripartite Agreement (1921) and the Indus Discharge Committee (1921) represented initial efforts to mediate, particularly concerning the shared waters of the Sutlej and Beas rivers (Khan and Majeed, 2020). These early mechanisms sought to establish a framework for inter-state cooperation.

The Anderson Committee, constituted in 1935, was formed to address new conflicts arising from the completion of the Sutlej Valley Project (SVP) in 1932. Various princely states and provinces, including Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Sindh, and Punjab, intensified their demands for increased water shares following this development.

A formal complaint lodged by Sindh under the Government of India Act of 1935 led to the establishment of the Rao Commission in 1939, which submitted its report in July 1942 (Daily Times, n.d.). The Commission acknowledged the injustice being perpetrated against Sindh, issuing directives for the construction of two new barrages in Sindh on the Indus side and recommending a financial compensation of Rs20 million from Punjab to Sindh (Daily Times, n.d.). Furthermore, it concluded that Punjab’s water withdrawals would detrimentally affect Sindh’s flood canals,

particularly in September, and offered recommendations for winter water apportionment (Bhatti et al., 2020). Despite these findings, both Punjab and Sindh rejected the Commission’s recommendations, leading to an impasse (Bhatti et al., 2020).

Following the Rao Commission’s directives, a committee composed of engineers from both provinces reached a mutual understanding in 1945. This agreement, known as the ‘Sindh Punjab agreement,’ established Sindh’s pre-eminence over the Indus River basin, stipulating that no upstream infrastructure could be constructed on the Indus without Sindh’s explicit permission (Daily Times, n.d.). This marked a significant recognition of Sindh’s prior water rights (Ahmad, 2010).

Table 1: Key Pre-1GG1 Water Commissions and Agreements

B.      Post-Partition Challenges and the Indus Waters Treaty (1947-1960)

The abrupt partition of British India in 1947 severely fragmented the integrated irrigation system, with critical headworks falling within Indian territory while the dependent canals extended into Pakistan (Britannica, n.d.). This fragmentation immediately ignited a severe water dispute when East Punjab (India) unilaterally cut off water supplies to West Punjab (Pakistan) from the Upper Bari Doab Canal and Dipalpur Canal in April 1948 (Kanwal, 2014). This action, described as “draconian” (Qureshi, 2017), caused profound apprehension in Pakistan, underscoring its vulnerable position as a lower riparian state dependent on Indian goodwill (Liu, n.d.).

A temporary agreement was subsequently signed in May 1948, allowing for the restoration of supplies contingent upon cash payments (Kanwal, 2014). ThisInter Dominion agreement paved the way for Indus Water Treaty (IWT). The problem was solved as between East Punjab (India) and West Punjab (Pakistan), with the lower riparian Sindh not being part of the negotiations and top leadership of newly formed country including Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaqat Ali Khan, found it unnecessary to be part of the Delhi deal, which was negotiated by Indian top political leadership and signed by their Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. By agreeing to give waters of the eastern rivers (Ravi, Sutlej and Beas) to India until Pakistan developed the systems to divert water for those command areas, in a way, Pakistan conceded the basic idea that later turned into IWT. The 1945 agreement between Sindh and Punjab, that at this stage only required financial detailing to be implemented, went into the background with the 1947 Independence and division of the Subcontinent into India and Pakistan. Now West Pakistan became the lower riparian.

Through the mediation of the World Bank, the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) was signed in Karachi on September 19, 1960, by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani President Ayub Khan (Kanwal, 2014). The treaty allocated the Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Sutlej, Beas) for the unrestricted use of India, while the Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) were assigned to Pakistan (Ranjan and Donnellon-May, 2025). India was granted control over 30% of the total water flow, with Pakistan receiving 70% (Wikipedia, n.d.b). To mitigate the impact of losing the Eastern Rivers, Pakistan embarked on an extensive program of infrastructure development under the IWT. This included the construction of two major storage dams (Mangla and Tarbela), eight inter-link canals, and six barrages (Kanwal, 2014). A prime example is the Chashma-Jhelum (CJ) Link Canal, specifically designed to divert water from the Indus River to the Jhelum River (Britannica, n.d.).

Punjab was well represented by West Pakistan in One Unit, with Sindh not directly involved in the eventual settlement of the treaty (Kanwal, 2014). The exclusion of provincial voices from such a critical national agreement would later contribute to internal divisions. Because of One Unit (merging four provinces into One Unit- West Pakistan), with General Ayub leading the country, provinces were nowhere in this treaty.

The Indus Waters Treaty, while a monumental international agreement that successfully resolved a critical transboundary water dispute, had profound and often unforeseen internal ramifications for Pakistan. Though represented as a success story of transboundary water resolution, it was the first in the world that divided the rivers rather than sharing them. The necessity of constructing “replacement works” to compensate for the waters of the Eastern Rivers, which were allocated to India, led to the development of massive internal infrastructures, as mentioned before, which also included Chashma-Jhelum Link Canal, feeding Jhelum from Indus. This very infrastructure, intended to mitigate an external water loss, subsequently became a significant source of internal conflict, particularly between Punjab and Sindh, regarding its operational purpose (flood canal versus perennial irrigation) and equitable utilization (Hassan, 2025). This demonstrates a crucial causal relationship: resolving an international water dispute, without a robust and pre-agreed internal distribution mechanism, can inadvertently create or exacerbate domestic water conflicts, highlighting the complex multi-scalar nature of water governance challenges. Pakistan’s overall water security and stability are intrinsically linked to both its transboundary agreements and its internal water governance frameworks. A successful resolution at the international level does not automatically guarantee internal harmony; instead, it can shift the locus of conflict inward, underscoring the need for integrated and adaptive water management policies that consider both external and internal hydrological and political dynamics.

C.        Escalating Internal Tensions (1960-1991)

In the post-IWT period, Pakistan began experiencing increasing water scarcity, which, coupled with a lack of robust internal water management, led to serious grievances over inter-provincial water distribution (Khan and Majeed, 2020). The persistent “trust deficit” among provinces, a legacy of colonial governance and exacerbated by Pakistan’s struggle to evolve stable democratic institutions, significantly hampered efforts to achieve consensus on water distribution (Khan and Majeed, 2020). Lower riparian provinces, especially Sindh, harbored deep-seated fears of being deprived of their rightful water share by the upper riparian Punjab (Khan and Majeed, 2020).

From 1970 onwards, in the absence of a comprehensive internal agreement, the federal government resorted to allocating water on an ad-hoc basis (Ahmad, 2010). Sindh consistently maintained that these ad-hoc allocations were biased in favor of Punjab, further deepening the provincial divide (Ahmad, 2010). This approach, while providing temporary solutions, failed to build long-term confidence or address underlying grievances.

Numerous committees and commissions were established during this period to address the escalating inter-provincial water conflicts, but they largely failed to achieve lasting agreements (Khan and Majeed, 2020). The Akhtar Hussain Committee, formed in 1968 to investigate grievances over inter-provincial water distribution stemming from observed water shortages, submitted its report in 1970. However, its recommendations remained inconclusive due to the prevailing political

crises of the time, including the termination of One Unit, the 1970 elections, and the subsequent disintegration of Pakistan (Khan and Majeed, 2020).

Similarly, the Fazl-e-Akbar Committee, appointed by the Yahya Khan regime in October 1970 to resolve disputes among the provinces of West Pakistan, saw its members fail to reach a consensus even on purely technical matters. The chairman’s independently prepared report was ultimately not published due to provincial reservations (Kanwal, 2014). These failures highlighted the difficulty of achieving technical consensus in a politically charged environment.

The Anwar-ul-Haq Commission, constituted in 1976, played a crucial role in determining “historic use” during 1977-82 (Business Recorder, 2018). This “historic use” baseline later served as a guiding principle for the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord (Business Recorder, 2018). However, the provided information does not detail its specific recommendations or any provincial objections to them (Business Recorder, 2018). The Justice Haleem Commission, established in 1983, also contributed to establishing the “historic use” baseline for 1977-82 (Business Recorder, 2018). Like its predecessors, it failed to resolve the inter-provincial water disputes, with key reasons cited as fundamental water shortages, perceived injustice in distribution, and a pervasive fear of future adverse impacts among the provinces (MUET, n.d.).

The consistent failures of these commissions and committees can be attributed to a confluence of factors: the deeply entrenched “trust deficit” (Khan and Majeed, 2020), the intense politicization of water resources (Ahmed, 2019), the absence of a comprehensive and consolidated national water policy (Khalid and Begum, 2013), and the inherent difficulty in achieving genuine consensus among provinces, which often prioritized their individual interests over national unity (Khan and Majeed, 2020).

III.      The 1991 Water Apportionment Accord: A Landmark Agreement

1. Context and Negotiation

The Accord was the culmination of extensive and painstaking negotiations. This included crucial meetings of the Chief Ministers in Lahore on March 3, 1991, followed by subsequent meetings of provincial representatives in Lahore on March 4, 1991, and in Karachi on March 16, 1991 (IRSA, n.d.). It was widely hailed as a “historic agreement” and a “consensus document,” reflecting the collective will to finally resolve the long-standing disputes (Anwar and Bhatti, 2018). A testament to its significance, the Accord was unanimously signed by the Chief Ministers of all four provinces of Pakistan (Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan) and subsequently ratified by the Prime Minister and Council of Common Interest (CCI) (Ahmad, 2010). This unanimous appro val represented a rare and significant political achievement in Pakistan’s history of water governance, demonstrating a collective commitment to a stable water future (Business Recorder, 2018).

B.      Key Provisions and Allocations

The Accord established specific water allocations for each province during both the Kharif (summer) and Rabi (winter) seasons, totaling a baseline volume of 114.35 Million Acre-Feet (MAF) (Ahmad, 2010).

Table 2: 1GG1 Water Apportionment Accord Provincial Allocations

A uniform procedure for sharing both water shortages and surpluses on an “all Pakistan basis” was charted out. This involved adjusting ten-daily water uses pro-rata to correspond to the indicated seasonal allocations for different canal systems, aiming for equitable distribution during varying flow conditions (Khan and Majeed, 2020).

The Accord explicitly recognized the critical need for a minimum escapage of freshwater to the sea below the Kotri Barrage. This provision aimed to prevent seawater intrusion into the Indus Delta and sustain its vital ecosystem, acknowledging the ecological and livelihood importance of the delta (Khan and Majeed, 2020). Sindh advocated for an optimum level of 10 MAF, though the Accord deferred the precise figure for further studies (IRSA, n.d.).

The Accord acknowledged and emphasized the necessity for new water storages, wherever feasible, on the Indus and its tributaries to support planned future agricultural development (Khan and Majeed, 2020). This foresight recognized the growing demand for water and the need for enhanced storage capacity. Furthermore, industrial and urban water supplies, particularly for metropolitan areas like Karachi, were accorded priority, reflecting the increasing urbanization and industrialization of the country (Ahmad, 2010).

Provinces were granted the flexibility, within their allocated shares, to modify system-wise and period-wise water uses and to undertake new irrigation projects (Ahmad, 2010). Specific clauses allowed for small irrigation schemes (not exceeding 5,000 acres) and unrestricted development in

certain basins (Kurram/Gomal/Kohat and Indus right bank tributaries in Balochistan), provided existing uses were not adversely affected (Ahmad, 2010). This aimed to balance central allocation with provincial development needs.

A key institutional outcome of the Accord was the recognition and acceptance of the need to establish the Indus River System Authority (IRSA). This body was mandated to regulate and monitor the distribution of water resources of the Indus River System among the provinces in accordance with the Accord’s provisions (Khan and Majeed, 2020). IRSA was formally established through the IRSA Act, 1992 (Business Recorder, 2018).

C.        Intended Vision and Objectives

Although the Accord itself does not possess a single, clearly stated objective (Anwar and Bhatti, 2018), its implicit goals were to overcome the historical lack of water resource development, address the suboptimal utilization of additional water made available by projects like Tarbela Dam, and unlock unrealized economic and employment opportunities (Anwar and Bhatti, 2017). A primary aim was also to reduce inter-provincial conflict over much-needed major water infrastructure (Anwar and Bhatti, 2017).

The 1991 Water Accord was hailed as a “historic agreement” (Anwar and Bhatti, 2018). It also contained forward-looking provisions that extended far beyond mere water allocation, explicitly recognizing the need for new storages, environmental flows, and provincial autonomy in development (IRSA, n.d.). However, a significant number of these crucial “forward-looking provisions” (Dawn, 2025a) were not fully or effectively implemented. This suggests a fundamental and critical disconnect between the ambitious, aspirational goals unanimously agreed upon in 1991 and the subsequent political will, institutional capacity, or sustained commitment required for their comprehensive execution. The Accord, while a political solution to an immediate crisis (Syed, 2023), appears to have lacked the continuous political impetus necessary to realize its broader, long-term vision. The absence of a clearly stated objective might have also contributed to this ambiguity, allowing for differing interpretations and selective implementation. This gap between the Accord’s comprehensive vision and its partial implementation highlights a critical lesson in water governance: a well-designed policy document, even one achieved through broad consensus, is insufficient on its own. The weak democratic setup at center always wanted to have engineering solutions for water management with tunnel vision thinking and did not foresee the environmental concerns, rights of the rivers and climate change as key drivers of water management now and for the future. Moreover, the 1991 accord only distributes surface water and the connectivity of groundwater and non-Indus Basin Irrigation System (off grid) water management has been missed completely.

IV.  Post-Accord Realities: Developments and Persistent Challenges (1991-Present)

A. Implementation Gaps and Enduring Disputes

Despite the landmark nature of the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord, its implementation has been fraught with challenges, leading to persistent inter-provincial disputes.

IRSA’s Performance and Controversies

The Indus River System Authority (IRSA) was established in 1992, following the Accord, with the mandate to regulate and monitor the distribution of Indus River water among the provinces (Climate Diplomacy, n.d.b). Its decisions are subject to review by the Council of Common Interests (CCI), the constitutional forum for inter-provincial disputes (Climate Diplomacy, n.d.b). However, IRSA has consistently struggled to satisfy all federating units, particularly Sindh, which frequently accuses it of bias and alleges receiving less water than its allocated share (Ahmad, 2010). Sindh has specifically accused Punjab of water theft, reflecting a deep-seated distrust (Khan and Majeed, 2020).

Recent attempts (2024-25) to amend the IRSA Act, 1992, aiming to centralize its authority under the Prime Minister’s office and diminish provincial representation, provoked strong opposition. Sindh views these moves as “illegal and unconstitutional” attempts to “usurp” provincial rights and deface the federal character of IRSA (Memon, 2024). These centralization efforts have been linked to proponents of controversial projects like the Kalabagh Dam, further fueling provincial anxieties (Dawn, 2024a).

Interpretational Conflicts: “Historic Use” vs. “Accord Percentages”

A primary source of ongoing conflict stems from divergent interpretations of the Accord’s clauses (Ahmad, 2010). Punjab often advocates for water distribution based on “historic use” (specifically the 1977-82 average, which was a baseline for the Accord), while Sindh insists on strict adherence to the Accord’s stipulated percentages based on assumed water availability (Ahmad, 2010). This fundamental disagreement on the basis of distribution has led to continuous friction.

IRSA has, for over a decade, utilized a controversial “three-tier formula” for sharing water shortages and surpluses proportionately (Soomro, 2024). Under this formula, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan are exempt from sharing shortages, placing the burden of adjustment primarily on Punjab and Sindh (Soomro, 2024). Sindh has consistently opposed this approach, arguing that it disproportionately exacerbates their already severe water shortages and negatively impacts their agriculture (Soomro, 2024). Sindh’s case is in the Council of Common Interests and IRSA continues using this disputed formula (Soomro, 2024).

The ongoing disputes surrounding the interpretation of the 1991 Accord, particularly the arguments over “historic use” versus “accord percentages” and the contentious “Three-Tier Formula” (Ahmad, 2010), appear, on the surface, to be technical disagreements concerning water accounting and distribution methodologies. However, the persistent and often vehement provincial objections, coupled with the deep-seated “trust deficit” (Khan and Majeed, 2020), reveal that these technical arguments are profoundly politicized. Provinces consistently interpret data and clauses in a manner that aligns with their perceived self-interest, rather than seeking a purely objective, collaborative, or technically optimal solution. This pervasive politicization fundamentally undermines efforts to establish clear, universally accepted, and consistently applied operating rules for water management, a critical need highlighted by water experts (Anwar and Bhatti, 2018). Effective water governance in Pakistan is not merely a technical challenge but fundamentally a political one. When technical mechanisms designed for equitable resource management become battlegrounds for provincial rivalries and political point-scoring, the entire system’s legitimacy, efficiency, and capacity for long-term planning are severely compromised. This cycle prevents the necessary adaptive management required to address evolving water challenges.

Operational Disputes of Link Canals

The Chashma-Jhelum (CJ) Link Canal, constructed as part of the IWT replacement works to transfer water from the Western rivers, remains a major point of contention (Britannica, n.d.). Sindh maintains it is solely a “flood canal” asserting that it was not intended for perennial irrigation under the IWT (Hassan, 2025). Conversely, Punjab considers it vital for year-round irrigation to compensate for the loss of eastern rivers (Hassan, 2025). Despite agreements signed in 1972 and 1974 regarding its operation, disputes persist, highlighting the unresolved nature of its operational purpose (Hassan, 2025).

Recent controversies include Sindh’s strong objections to Punjab’s opening of the Taunsa -Panjnad (TP) link canal during periods of acute water shortage in Sindh, further intensifying inter-provincial distrust (The Friday Times, 2025). These operational disagreements underscore the ongoing struggle to implement the Accord’s principles in daily water management.

B.      New Projects and Renewed Opposition

The increasing water scarcity and the need for enhanced agricultural productivity have led to proposals for new water infrastructure projects, which, in turn, have reignited inter-provincial tensions.

The Cholistan Canal Project (Green Pakistan Initiative – GPI)

Though started in 2023, the Green Pakistan Initiative (GPI), launched in February 2025 by Government of Pakistan aims to transform the Cholistan Desert through corporate farming. This involves constructing six canals to irrigate 1.9 million hectares (4.8 million acres), with the stated

goals of enhancing food production and fostering economic growth (Angaria, 2025). Supporters champion it as a “game-changer” for national food security (Imran, n.d.).

However, the project has ignited widespread protests in Sindh, with thousands demonstrating against it. Opponents fear it will cause extreme water shortages in the province, leading to the destruction of the Indus Delta and depriving small-scale farmers and fishers of essential water (Angaria, 2025). Sindh, as a lower riparian province, already experiences a significant 40 -45% annual water shortage due to perceived unfair distribution (Arijo, 2025). The project is viewed as a direct violation of the 1991 Water Accord, which mandates consultation and consensus among provinces for new projects (Imran, n.d.). Critics also argue that relying solely on “excess floodwaters” from India-controlled rivers is an unreliable proposition, given the documented decline in their flows (Al Jazeera, 2025). Researchers and activists explicitly characterize the Cholistan Canal Project as an “extension of the Kalabagh Dam project,” asserting that both endeavors prioritize upscale crop production in Punjab while disregarding the severe water crisis faced by Sindh (Angaria, 2025).

Greater Thal Canal Phase II

Sindh has also raised strong objections to the inclusion of the Greater Thal Canal (GTC) Phase II and Chaubara Canal projects in the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (Ecnec) agenda. Sindh argues that these projects are not part of the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord and would further divert its legitimate water share, potentially rendering vast agricultural lands barren (Dawn, 2023b). The province questions the source of additional water for these projects, especially given existing shortages and the lack of a functional telemetry system to monitor water flows (Dawn, 2023b).

The Council of Common Interest Decisions about the six canals:

A meeting of the Council of Common Interests (CCI) on 28th April 2025 endorsed the federal government’s move to halt the initiative of the much-contested six new canals on the Indus River until “mutual understanding” could be achieved among provinces in the wake of widespread blowback to the project. This was the result of great resistance that was put up by the common people of Sindh without any political divide.

The Persistent Controversy Surrounding the Kalabagh Dam

The Kalabagh Dam remains one of Pakistan’s most contentious and politically charged water projects. Despite strong historical opposition, Punjab’s Irrigation Minister has recently reiterated calls for its construction, arguing that it would benefit all provinces by providing much-needed water storage, particularly for floodwaters (News Desk, 2025).

However, the provincial assemblies of Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan have consistently adopted multiple resolutions against the dam, effectively rejecting it on technical and political grounds (Khan and Majeed, 2020). Sindh’s Irrigation Minister has questioned the feasibility of filling Kalabagh Dam when existing reservoirs are often empty and has criticized IRSA’s “incompetence” in ensuring water reaches downstream Kotri (Dawn, 2025b).

A critical provision of the 1991 Water Accord was the explicit recognition of the “need for storages, wherever feasible” (IRSA, n.d.), underscoring the importance of increasing Pakistan’s water storage capacity. However, the construction of larger dams like Bhasha is still in progress. Though many in the centre and Punjab strongly think that dams are the only panacea, Sindh and environmentalists all over the country realize otherwise. Many still think that the failure to construct new large-scale reservoirs (Dawn, 2025a) has left the country highly vulnerable to increasing water scarcity, a problem exacerbated by population growth and climate change. This chronic lack of storage capacity then acts as a catalyst for the proposal of highly controversial new projects, such as the Kalabagh Dam or the Cholistan Canal (Angaria, 2025). These projects, in turn, are met with fierce and often unified opposition from lower riparian provinces, particularly Sindh, due to deep-seated fears of water diversion and perceived inequity (Angaria, 2025). The political inability to build consensus on essential water storage projects—often due to land disputes (Ranjan, 2020) or historical distrust—means that the fundamental issue of water availability remains unaddressed. This perpetuates a vicious cycle where new projects are proposed, immediately become politicized, and are frequently stalled or abandoned, thereby deepening the water crisis and intensifying inter-provincial animosity. The ongoing failure to develop critical water storage infrastructure in Pakistan is not merely an engineering or financial challenge but a profound manifestation of entrenched inter-provincial distrust and political fragmentation. This inaction not only exacerbates the nation’s water scarcity but also entrenches regional grievances, making future consensus on vital national projects increasingly difficult to achieve, thereby threatening long-term stability and development.

C.        Exacerbating Factors: Water Scarcity and Climate Change

The challenges of water distribution in Pakistan are compounded by severe water scarcity and the escalating impacts of climate change.

Pakistan has undergone a dramatic transformation from a water-abundant nation to a water-stressed, and now water-scarce, country within a few decades (Ahmed, 2019). Per capita water availability has plummeted from approximately 5,600 cubic meters in 1951 to below 1,000 cubic meters today, placing it dangerously close to the internationally recognized “water-scarce” threshold of 1,700 cubic meters (Zeshan, n.d.). This alarming decline is primarily attributable to rapid population growth (from around 34 million in 1951 to over 240 million in 2024) and

exponentially increasing water demand from the agricultural, industrial, and domestic sectors (Farooq, 2023).

Pakistan is ranked among the top 10 countries most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change (Zeshan, n.d.). It is experiencing a significant average annual temperature increase of 0.3 degrees Celsius per decade, leading to accelerated glacial melt in the northern mountains (Zeshan, n.d.). While this may temporarily increase river flows, it is projected to result in a sharp long-term decline in water availability as glaciers recede (Climate Diplomacy, n.d.a). Furthermore, climate change is causing increased variability in rainfall patterns, leading to more frequent and intense droughts (e.g., in Thar, Balochistan, and parts of southern Punjab) and severe floods (e.g., the devastating floods of 2010, 2011, and most recently 2022, which caused billions in da mages and displaced millions) (Climate Diplomacy, n.d.a). These erratic weather patterns make water management and allocation even more challenging, as predictability of supply diminishes.

The Indus Delta, a vital ecological zone and a source of livelihood for millions, is rapidly “disappearing” due to drastically reduced freshwater flow downstream of the Kotri Barrage (Angaria, 2025). The average water discharge from Kotri Barrage plummeted from about 41 MAF between 1976 and 1998 to 14 MAF between 1999 and 2023, and in some years as low as 0.75 MAF (ICSF, n.d.). This absence of freshwater flow results in severe seawater intrusion, destroying soil and aquifers, rendering land unfit for agriculture, and leading to the loss of mangrove forests and a decline in fish and bird species (Angaria, 2025). The shrinking delta and coastal migrations highlight a severe ecological and humanitarian crisis directly linked to upstream water diversions and climate impacts (Angaria, 2025).

V.         Conclusion and Recommendations

The history of water distribution in Pakistan is a complex narrative of persistent inter-provincial conflicts, deeply rooted in colonial irrigation practices and exacerbated by post-partition challenges. While the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord represented a significant political achievement and a comprehensive framework for water management, its implementation has been hampered by a pervasive “trust deficit” among provinces, divergent interpretations of its clauses, and the politicization of technical issues. The failure to build consensus on new water storage projects, despite their recognized necessity, has left Pakistan increasingly vulnerable to the escalating impacts of water scarcity and climate change, threatening agricultural productivity, environmental sustainability, and national cohesion. The alarming decline in per capita water availability and the critical state of the Indus Delta underscore the urgency of a paradigm shift in water governance. To ensure long-term water security and mitigate internal conflicts, the following recommendations are put forth:

1. Strengthen Institutional Autonomy and Transparency: The Indus River System Authority (IRSA) must be empowered with genuine autonomy, free from political interference, and its decision-making processes must be made fully transparent. This includes ensuring equitable provincial representation and establishing clear, mutually agreed-upon operating rules for water distribution, moving beyond ad-hoc arrangements and contentious formulas like the “Three-Tier Formula.”
2. Update and modernize the 1991 Water Accord: The Accord, while foundational, needs to be revisited and updated to explicitly account for the profound impacts of climate change, including accelerated glacial melt, erratic monsoon patterns, and increased frequency of droughts and floods. This update should also incorporate contemporary understanding of environmental flow requirements for the Indus Delta, moving beyond deferred studies to concrete, enforceable provisions. It should be based on the rights of the rivers. The water auditing and accounting system should be established with counting complete water balance including groundwater.
3. Implement Sustainable Water Management Practices: Beyond infrastructure, there is an urgent need to improve water use efficiency across all sectors, particularly agriculture, which consumes the vast majority of water. This involves promoting water-saving irrigation technologies (e.g., drip irrigation), encouraging cultivation of water-thrifty crops, and curbing water wastage. Public awareness campaigns on water conservation and responsible usage are also crucial.
4. Foster Inter-Provincial Dialogue and Trust-Building: The deep-seated “trust deficit” is a fundamental impediment to effective water governance. Initiatives that promote continuous, constructive dialogue among provincial stakeholders, supported by objective data and independent expert analysis, are vital. This includes establishing neutral forums for dispute resolution and promoting a shared national vision for water resources that transcends narrow provincial interests.

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