VOL 19 No 1

Torwali Language, Music, and Poetry: An Heirloom of Love from Northern Pakistan

On a cold afternoon in the winter of 2016, my colleague and I parked at a fuel station in the city of Bahrain, northern Pakistan. As we rushed to the station office for some heat, an old man stood by our car. He had a sweet smile on his face, and his eyes were filled with tears. I greeted him, but he waved me away with his hand. I realized he was engrossed by sounds coming from our open car door: a DVD player hooked up to the car stereo was playing the video album Manjoora, a collection of ancient folk songs known in the Torwali language as Zo. The old man stood in the cold, moved by these Zo couplets. When the singers finished, the old man turned towards me and asked my name. I told him my name and my role in creating the Manjoora album. He hugged me and kissed my forehead. That day was a powerful moment in my career of promoting Torwali language and culture, but I have always lived in a place with a rich history of language diversity. I grew up in the Swat region and in other regions of North Pakistan, where more than half of the country’s seventy-eight languages are spoken. Torwali people are of Indo-Aryan descent and are one of the many Indigenous Dardic communities living in the region for over 5,000 years. But between the eleventh and seventeenth centuries, during several waves of invasions, many of the Torwalis and other Indigenous groups of Swat were gradually subjugated, driven out, or killed, leading to a substantial loss of Indigenous culture, identity, and language. Today, the Torwali people are Sunni Muslim, and we mostly live in the upper reaches of the Swat valley, around the town of Bahrain. An overwhelming majority of Torwalis are multilingual in Torwali, Pashto, and Urdu. A small number can also speak English and other Dardic languages, such as Gawri, Indus Kohistani, and Shina. Until 2004, Torwali was not a written language; today, there are some books written in and about Torwali, but it is still under-resourced. According to my research for the 2017 national census of Pakistan, Torwali is presently spoken by a population of about 140,000 people. Torwali is one of the twenty-seven languages in Pakistan which face attrition and are categorized by UNESCO as endangered.   The Zo and Phal The story of my involvement in language revitalization starts in my teens. I often went to the jungles in Swat to gather firewood or morel mushrooms. While on the pine tree ridges, I used to hear sweet singing of Zo, traditional Torwali folksongs, by other foragers. The sound mingled with the breeze which gushed over the trees, providing a kind of accompaniment. I also tried to sing loudly. It often became a kind of competition in which the singers could not see each other, only hearing the songs and responding. When I was young I would see my mother performing the unique Torwali women’s dance known as naar. Now, the dance is mostly replaced by those from the dominant communities, yet many elderly women and some young women know this special dance. My mother has always been an inspiration for and source of my love of our language and culture. She has also made Zo and remembers hundreds of Zo by others. Now in her seventies, she is an Indigenous intellectual, having great knowledge of cultural practices and folk poetry. During my childhood, the Torwali community had lost their sense of identity, history, and pride. Centuries of domination had triggered a sense of shame about their culture and language. In most cases, attempts to revitalize our ancestral culture, especially the music, ignites people’s wrath even within our own communities. Many have been indoctrinated immensely by religious extremism and see our musical traditions as sacrilegious. I became curious about my mother tongue in college because of some unpleasant incidents. I felt that my classmates and some teachers looked down on me for being ethnically different and for using a language other than Pashto. These incidents would haunt me, and I used to be anxious about speaking Torwali. However, because my early youth was embedded in Torwali culture, I resisted some of that feeling of shame. These memories prompted me to not only help revitalize my language and culture but also work on Torwali history in order to reclaim our lost identity. In 2007, I motivated some other Torwali youth to join me in this mission. We established our small organization with the Urdu name Idara Baraye Taleem wa Taraqi (IBT), which translates to the Institute for Education and Development. Since then, our organization has been working for the mobilization and revitalization of Torwali language and culture, along with other endangered languages in the Swat region. IBT has initiated many programs for Torwali language and cultural heritage, including the use of Torwali in education, developing a writing system, enhancing literacy among young people, celebrating culture and music through festivals, and documenting folk poetry and music.   Torwali Music and Poetry In the past, through the 1980s, Torwali music was popular and sung by everyday people without specially trained singers, musicians, or poets. Singing was accompanied by instruments like the sitar, ɖhūmām (drum), béʃél (flute), sūrni (traditional pipe), and bhédæn (a pitcher made of mud with its lid tightened with animal hide or string cloth). People used to sing Torwali music during community gatherings and festivities, such as haʃər, a time when villagers came together to cultivate and harvest crops or build a house. Music, singing, and dancing have also been common at wedding ceremonies and other rites of passage. Ancient Torwali musical traditions have continued to grow and change in recent times. When audiotapes arrived in the Swat Valley in the 1970s and 1980s, the ability to record led to the growth of Torwali music and poetry. After the late 1990s, however, we noticed a fast decline in Torwali musical traditions. Access to Bollywood movies

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Qazi Mohammed Isa

Introduction Sometime in 1943, Mohammed Ali Jinnah asked one of his close associates within the Muslim League to go to Lahore and to evaluate whether or not a house for sale in the city’s cantonment area, owned by a gentleman by the name of Nazir Ahmed, was worth purchasing. The Quaid also handed over a blank cheque to his associate in order to effect the transaction, in the event that the house met with the latter’s approval. The person in question baulked at the prospect of having to make an independent judgment call about the suitability of the house and potentially incurring the ire of his leader in the event that the house failed to meet his expectations. He expressed this apprehension to the Quaid, but the response he received was that if the house met with the associate’s approval, then it should be assumed that it would also be looked upon favourably by the Quaid himself. With such a blanket authority at his disposal, Qazi Isa journeyed to Lahore and acquired the house in question for his leaderi. Tragically, on 9 May 2023, that historic building, known to all and sundry as Jinnah House, was brazenly attacked and set on fire in the backdrop of the arrest of the then chairman of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf. To those familiar with the Quaid’s austere, reserved and non-emotional personality, it does not appear to have been in character for him to have generously placed such unqualified confidence and trust in a party-man on a personal matter of property acquisition. But for those who know of the unique bond between Qazi Mohammed Isa and the Quaid, this incident will not seem out of place. In truth, the entrusting of this responsibility by the Quaid to Isa is just one of the many pieces of evidence which substantiate the claim that the former looked upon the latter as one of his closest and most devoted lieutenants. Bearing the above aspect in mind, it is strange, to say the least, that little is known by Pakistanis in general about the role of Qazi Muhammad Isa in the freedom struggle, the services rendered by him for the cause of Pakistan and how he fared in the post-1947 era. The reason for this is probably because once Pakistan came into being, Qazi Isa never earned his rightful place under the sun. Instead, persons who had had little, if at all any, role in the Muslim League’s struggle for Pakistan muscled out stalwarts such as Qazi Isa and arrogated to themselves the position of Pakistan’s rulers and powerbrokers. And since we as a nation are swayed more by the trappings of office rather than by the power of selfless service, therefore it was but natural that Qazi Isa, who neither became a governor nor a chief minister nor a federal minister in Pakistan, simply fell off the national political radar. However, I believe it is never too late to make amends for past mistakes. Today, when the son of Qazi Isa occupies the position of the Chief Justice of Pakistan, this being the first, and will remain the only ever time in the country’s history when the son of a genuine freedom fighter and one of the leading lights of the Pakistan Movement has attained the position of the country’s chief justice, it is all the more appropriate to honour the memory of the Lion of Baluchistanii.  This article makes a humble start to fill the unforgivable deficiency of the published historical material on Qazi Isa, with the hope that this effort will trigger the interest of scholars and historical researchers and in the fullness of time a more comprehensive and detailed analysis will emerge on the life and times of this freedom fighter par excellence.   Background Qazi Isa was born in Pishin, then a dusty little town of British Baluchistan, in July 1914. His father, Qazi Jalaluddin, had been the hereditary Qazi (judge) of Kandahar in Afghanistan, before he fell out with the then Afghan monarch, Amir Abdur Rehman, in the late nineteenth century and migrated to Baluchistan, settling down in Pishin. Impressed by his status as a jurist and as a man of learning, the Khan of Kalat, the foremost ruler amongst the princely states of Baluchistan, appointed him as his prime minister. Qazi Isa was one of the three sons born to Qazi Jalaluddin, the other two being Qazi Musa – who himself remained active in Muslim League politics until his untimely death in 1956 in a car accident – and Qazi Ismail. After completing his schooling in Quetta, Isa proceeded to England for his further studies and in due course he qualified from the Middle Temple as the first barrister-at-law from Baluchistan. Upon returning to India in 1938, Isa decided to undertake a visit of different Indian cities before settling down to the practice of law. During one such visit, to Bombay in January 1939, it was fortuitous that he had an introductory encounter with Mohammed Ali Jinnah at the Bombay Race Club, thanks to Nawab Talah Mohammed Khan of Palanpur, who was a friend of both men. The Quaid invited them to lunch at his house the next day, and by the end of the lunch proceedings Qazi Isa was prevailed upon by his host to return to Baluchistan and to set up the Muslim League in the province. Clearly, Isa must have impressed the Quaid in no small measure to have been handed this onerous task. It was obviously a singular achievement for Isa, since the Quaid was considered a shrewd judge of character and a man driven by cold logic rather than by emotions. From that momentous day onwards, Isa never looked back. Perhaps few Pakistanis today would know that from the summer of 1939, when he actually established the first formal branch of the Muslim League in Balochistan at the age of 25, to partition eight years later, Qazi Isa virtually single-handedly shouldered the burden of building and

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Pakistan, Middle Powers and a Multipolar World

Unipolarity and the liberal rules-based international order affiliated with it are being challenged by the emergence of other great powers and an ascendancy of nationalist sentiments. The unipolar initiative, from the 1990’s onwards, attempted to establish a global liberal order – liberal rules-based democracies, economic integration, and interdependence (globalization) and the establishment of institutions to back the liberal order. Keeping within the parameters of this strategy, policymakers in the US believed that engagement with China through economic cooperation and the latter’s participation as a stakeholder in international institutions would lead to the country’s economic prosperity which would eventually result in its embracing democratic liberal values and institutions. This did not happen; the change was limited to economic growth and did not impact its political system.  The economic growth, however, was immense, and this, along with a more assertive foreign policy, threatened the dominance that the US and its liberal narrative had enjoyed since the 1990’s over the global system.  Hence the US began rolling back its engagement policy and gradually began replacing it with containment vis a vis China. As a result of the new global dynamics, the liberal institutionalist (also called neoliberals) worldview receded as realism resurfaced.  This is where realpolitik comes to play along with associated terminologies like balance-of-power, containment, spheres of influence, etc.  Some may assume that these familiar terminologies are an indication of a transition towards a new cold war.   Nationalist Sentiments and the Middle Powers J. Peter Scoblic and Philip E. Tetlock wrote a paper for Foreign Affairs (Nov/Dec 2020 issue) titled: ‘A Better Crystal Ball – The Right way to Think about the Future.’ In this paper they stated, “Every policy is a prediction… This makes every policymaker a forecaster… The limits of imagination create blind spots that policymakers tend to fill with past experiences. They often assume that tomorrow’s dangers look like yesterday’s, retaining the same mental map even as the territory around them changes dramatically.” There are innumerable blind spots and variables in this fluid geopolitical power shift phase. The new world order emerging from within the confines of great power rivalry is still in its nascent stage and ambiguity prevails pertaining to how this will eventually play out.  The instinct to fill in the blanks with references from the US-Soviet cold war era can be misleading. For instance, the conditions that clearly defined the bloc system (Western/US led bloc and Eastern/Soviet led bloc) during the cold war can no longer be applied in the development of coalitions and alliances. The post-World War II era brought about the cold war and simultaneously the decolonization of countries in Africa and Asia.   “Between 1945 and 1960, three dozen new states in Asia and Africa achieved autonomy or outright independence from their European colonial rulers… In 1946, there were 35 member states in the United Nations; as the newly independent nations of the “third world” joined the organization, by 1970 membership had swelled to 127” (https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/asia-and-africa). The inexperienced administrations of these newly decolonized countries had to confront multiple challenges of governance, fragile and basic economic conditions, limited resources, and, for some, even conflict—primarily due to some of the territorial boundaries that were drawn by the imperial powers with complete disregard to national, cultural, political, and economic realities. Despite not wanting to get drawn into the vortex of bipolar geopolitics, many, because of the frailty of their nations, had to choose between the two superpower blocs vying to expand their spheres of influence.  The hope was that this would enhance these newly formed independent states’ chances of gaining economic and military assistance in their pursuit for stability and survival. Pakistan being a case in point. The scenario is quite different now. There is a proliferation of middle powers.  Tim Sweijs and Michael J. Mazarr, in their article titled: “Mind the Middle Powers”, attempted to define middle powers as, “nations that are not strong enough to count as “great” powers but still have significant influence and strategic importance. Typically, middle powers are characterized by a certain degree of heft — in economic, geographic, demographic, or military terms — but some relatively small states can vault into the category as a function of their international activism and influence. “As a result, the set of countries typically identified as middle powers varies. Some are fully developed, former colonial powers like Germany and Japan. Some are smaller developed nations that punch above their weight in global role and influence, including Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Poland, Singapore, and South Korea. Some are petro-powers — Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, as well as smaller Gulf states like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Others are large developing states such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey, and Vietnam.” The transitional phase of the global order has provided such countries the space to project their nationalist sentiments in their foreign policies as opposed to committing to an outright alliance with either of the great powers.  As many analysts have observed, “the middle power diplomatic game” is less about taking sides and more about leveraging the great power rivalry to their advantage. In addition, the synergy through multilateralism has provided platforms for the middle powers to assert themselves and make sure that their perspectives are heard, thereby, shifting from the periphery to the core in global matters. Turkey asserting itself on issues pertaining to the expansion of NATO (Sweden), Saudi Arabia raising oil prices in defiance of what the US wanted, India cultivating its relations with Russia despite being the US’ strategic partner, etc. are all examples of “Middle power activism”. This suggests that the New World Order will not be bipolar, but multipolar with: the US and its allies and strategic partners; China and its sphere of influence (Russia is being drawn into this sphere and147 countries have signed on to projects or are interested in its  Belt and Road Initiative – cfr.org); and  the middle powers hedging the great powers rivalry in favor of their national interests and using multilateral

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India Goes to Polls

India is headed for general elections beginning on 19th April 2024, and closing on 1st June, with the results to be announced on 4th June. At stake are 543 seats of the lower house of parliament for a term of five years. The Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party – BJP led by prime minister Narendra Modi, seeking its third term in office is seen as a favourite to win the polls as India’s first-past-the-post electoral system helps the leading party to consolidate its gains. It is supported by several smaller parties in the National Democratic Alliance – NDA. Barring a big upset, the opposition alliance led by the Indian National Congress does not appear to be in a position to dislodge the BJP and its allies from power. Modi has been stepping up his election campaign by inaugurating symbolic projects notably a Hindu temple at the site of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya. Since he first came to power in 2014, Modi has increased his popularity by mixing religion with politics, a formula that resonates well with the country’s Hindu majority while undermining India’s secular credentials. Besides the centre, BJP and its allies rule in 18 out of 31 states and union territories. The capital Delhi, Punjab, West Bengal and five southern states are prominent among those ruled by the opposition parties. In an overdrive to win the upcoming elections, the BJP-led government has started to use strong arm tactics to weaken the opposition parties by instituting cases against them. Delhi’s chief minister, Arvind Kejriwal was arrested on corruption charges just a month before the election. Some other AAP leaders were also detained. The chief minister of Jharkhand too has been arrested. Overall, the authorities raided or investigated 1500 politicians from the opposition parties since Modi came to power ten years ago. Congress leader Rahul Gandhi was convicted on defamation charges for insulting prime minister Modi. Barely three weeks before the polls, the tax department ordered the Congress party to pay an additional 18.2 billion Indian rupees in taxes. The main opposition party termed it an attempt to financially cripple them before the elections. The government’s actions have caused great anxiety in the opposition parties but it remains to be seen whether the 27-member INDIA alliance can close its ranks and have a major effect in preventing another victory for the BJP. A recent opinion survey gave Modi a 75 percent approval rating. High income disparities and unemployment have not dented the mass appeal he enjoys by promoting a Hindu nationalist agenda, a rising economy, achievements in multiple social areas and an aggressive diplomacy. India’s foreign ministry dismissed calls by the US and Germany for a fair and transparent legal process for Kejriwal, describing the comments as interference in India’s domestic affairs. Michael Kugelman, a Washington based South Asia expert expressed the view that “the government’s pre-election moves may momentarily unite a fractured opposition, but they won’t make many dents in Modi’s popularity or undercut his electoral prospects”. (Foreign Policy) In a significant development, Modi government’s hostile actions have prompted the opposition alliance to close their ranks as seen in a huge protest rally in New Delhi on 31st March. They have also hastened to finalise lists of common candidates before the nominations are filed. The BJP swept the 2019 elections by winning 303 of 543 seats of the Lok Sabha. The BJP-led National Democratic Alliance finished with a total of 353 seats giving it an overwhelming majority in the lower house of Indian parliament. The Congress Party led by Rahul Gandhi won 52 seats but reached a total of 91 seats with its allies in the United Progressive Alliance. However, this time around, it may not be smooth sailing for the ruling coalition in many regions. A report by ‘The Economist’ on India’s north-south divide in March, 2024 noted that Modi’s Hindu-first populism has helped him carry the Hindi speaking poorer, more populous and rural north. This programme does not appeal to the country’s richer, urban and more advanced south. “This north-south divide will be a defining issue in the election in April and May”. India’s five southern states (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Telangana) contain 20% of India’s population, and 35% of the flow of foreign investment in the past three years. The south votes for regional parties, largely ignoring BJP’s Hindu identity politics and demonisation of Muslims. In a recent analysis of the election campaign raging in India, Pakistani daily Dawn’s veteran New Delhi correspondent Jawed Naqvi wrote that the Modi government’s punitive measures against the opposition appear to “have revitalised a foundering campaign to dislodge Mr Modi in the multi-stage elections starting on April 19”. Short of a victory, a weakened BJP-led coalition would be a worthwhile outcome for the united opposition. In an analysis sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Milan Vaishnav affirms that Modi’s popularity remains intact and opinion surveys point to a victory for the BJP-led NDA alliance even if its majority reduces compared to its 2019 tally of 353 seats. Among the pointers for the upcoming elections, Vaishnav cites: challenge of opposition coordination, battle for backward castes, race of competitive welfarism, and emergence of foreign policy as a mass issue. As regards the opposition’s manoeuvres, Vaishnav refers to their decision in July, 2023 for the creation of a new formation of 27 parties by the name of Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance – INDIA. It includes the Congress Party, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (the ruling party in Tamil Nadu) the Aam Aadmi Party, ruling Punjab and Delhi, Communists of all stripes and several other parties. INDIA group of parties does not have a popular figure who can take on a larger-than-life leader to seriously challenge Modi. Caste politics is an important factor in Indian elections. India’s Other Backward Classes (OBCs) account for more than 40 percent of the population. Modi, who happens to hail from the OBCs has worked hard to win over their votes. By 2014 elections,

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Economic Woes of Pakistan

Abstract (This paper takes stock of the economic challenges Pakistan is currently faced with. Ten areas are identified: scarcity of savings, low investment, limited availability of formal credit particularly to small and medium enterprises, low financial inclusion, dwindling FDI, low human capital, deficient and low-quality public infrastructure, regressive taxation structure, weak institutional quality, and stagnant exports. The key issues in the identified areas are discussed in the light of data and evidence. Comparison is also drawn with comparator countries on various accounts to highlight the issue of low national competitiveness. It is emphasized that constraints posed by the said economic factors have induced macroeconomic instability, further dampening the prospects of economic recovery. Summing up the discussion of the economic woes of Pakistan, this paper suggests that the creation of an entrepreneurial ecosystem would be required to put the country on the path of economic development – Author). Increasing the size of GDP and wealth creation are important levers of prosperity. Sustained economic growth constitutes the minimum necessary condition for poverty reduction and well-being.  One cannot directly see, or smell, or touch economic growth but it is in the newspaper headlines. It is in political debates. Economists and historians do research and publish books and papers on its determinants. IMF and World Bank forecast its short-term and long-term pace country-wise and for the globe. Despite its intangibility, it is omnipresent. It reflects itself in bricks and mortars, in schools, in hospitals, in kitchens, in health, in education and in overall wellbeing of the people though it tells little about the distribution of said things in the society1. The growth story of Pakistan is a story of fluctuations, of ebbs and flows, of boom and bust cycles. It showed high growth rates during the 1960s and 1980s, however, in the 1990s growth took a downward trajectory. In the second half of the 1990s, it almost collapsed. The decade of 1990s was a lost decade in the economic history of Pakistan from the perspective of economic growth. The low trend, with the exception of FYs 2003-2005, is continuing. During the period 2000-2021, Pakistan’s average annual real per capita GDP growth was 2.1%, the lowest among all the South Asian countries except Afghanistan (Table 1). Low Savings and Investment What is stopping Pakistan from riding the high trajectory of sustainable economic growth. Let us start with savings. Pakistan is a bad saver. Compared to its regional and other comparators like China, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, etc., Pakistan’s rate of saving is low. In 1990, its domestic savings were 13.5 % of the GDP, the lowest among the selected countries which gradually declined, except in early 2000s, when national savings increased around the level of 1990 due to improved macroeconomic environment and substantial increase in foreign remittances. Since 2005-06, Pakistan’s savings have persistently declined. In 2005-06, domestic savings were 13.4% of the GDP, which almost halved by 2013-14 when the domestic savings were estimated 7.54 % of the GDP (as per the Economic Survey of Pakistan 2013-14).  Gross domestic savings of Pakistan were 3.8 % of GDP in 2022 whereas in case of China, India, and Bangladesh, domestic savings respectively are 44.7 % (year 2020 figure), 29% and 25.2 % (Table 2). Low savings mean less investment or low capital formation. Gross fixed capital formation in terms of GDP or, in simple words, the investment ratio is persistently low, compared to regional and other comparator countries. Pakistan ploughs back less than half for capital formation compared to China, India, Bangladesh and other comparator countries (Table 3). What are the main factors responsible for low savings and investment in Pakistan? Low tax revenue is perhaps the major culprit. Pakistan’s total revenue collection averaged to 12.8 % of GDP in the last decade, substantially lower than the South Asian average of 19.6 %.  The worrying part is that total revenue collection in terms of GDP is on a decline. For example, total revenue collection averaged 13.2 % for the FYs 2013-17 and 12.5% for the FYs 2018-22. During FY 2021-22, Pakistan collected 12.4 % of GDP in total while tax revenues constituted 11.2 %. The revenues are persistently low and fall short of expenditures, resulting in large fiscal deficits. Tax exemptions, concessions, corruption in the tax machinery, political economy considerations, low fiscal capacity, and hesitation by the government to take hard choices are some of the reasons why Pakistan is unable to realize the huge tax potential.  Large fiscal deficits contribute to the recurrent surges in the current account deficit. An analysis conducted by the World Bank shows that Pakistan’s fiscal deficit and current account deficit empirically tend to move together, meaning thereby that a strong correlation exists between the two. The financing of fiscal deficits generates other related but distinct macroeconomic challenges. Large fiscal deficits have led to accumulation of huge public and publicly guaranteed debt, which stood at approximately 78 % of the GDP at the end of FY 22. Moreover, extensive borrowing from the financial sector crowds out the private sector from the credit market. Large public debts also crowds out development expenditure, having negative externalities for long-term growth. Debt servicing costs constitute a big share of the fiscal expenditures, which have now increased to an unsustainable level. During FY 22, interest payments stood around 4.7% of GDP and accounted for 35 % of the total federal expenditure. Large expenditure on interest payments and other pre-committed and largely rigid expenditure like government salaries, pensions, and government operating expenditures leave little for growth-enhancing expenditure and public investments. Subsidies to state owned enterprises (SOEs), security, contingency expenditures, and salaries to the public sector crowd out public sector investment. In order to fill the savings-investment gap, Pakistan has to rely on foreign inflows. Foreign inflows have an in-built element of volatility. Pressure on reserves creates unsustainable current account deficits and macroeconomic instability. A nexus between the sovereign and commercial sector is apparent. The share of foreign debt and debt service payments is rising since 2014 which has

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