VOL 18 No 3

I hail from Dardistan1, a region in northern Pakistan that forms part of the Hindu Kush-Karakoram area, known as the crossroads between South and Central Asia. The name Dardistan describes the area comprising the highest mountain ranges of Hindu Kush, Karakoram, western Himalaya and the Pamir mountains, and includes northern Pakistan, parts of Eastern Tibet in China, eastern Afghanistan and the Kashmir valley on both sides of the Pakistan-India border. My work, as an ethnographer and linguist, is focused on north Pakistan. North Pakistan is a spectacular mountainous land of immense linguistic, ethnic and geographic diversity. It is undoubtedly one of the most multilingual places on the planet. Over centuries, the movement and contact of people at this crossroads of Central and South Asia have left a complex pattern of languages and dialects. By north Pakistan, I mean the region of Gilgit-Baltistan, the upper parts of Pakistan’s northwest province, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, including the districts of Chitral, Dir, Swat, Buner, Shangla, the upper Hazara division, and the part of Kashmir Vale under Pakistan’s control. In terms of area and population, north Pakistan covers more land and has more people than Austria and Switzerland put together. Traditionally, these communities lived in what the social anthropologist Fredrik Barth called “acephalous states”—societies without political leaders or hierarchies but with their own local, egalitarian system of governance. Notions of rights and responsibilities were deeply embedded in their pastoral cultures and worldviews. Before the expansion of the states into these areas, the people of Dardistan, including northern Pakistan, had their own traditional political organization. Villages and valleys were autonomous and political allegiance was mostly based on lineage and descent. In some communities, however, there existed political organizations based on villages and valleys. There is also evidence of the existence of centralized minor states in Gilgit and in Hunza since 700 CE. In the wake of the “Great Game”—the struggle for control over Central Asia between Russia and Britain—the latter applied a policy of controlling the northern borderline states, in Gilgit and in Chitral. They consolidated their power through the local rulers in these areas. By 1889 the British formed the Gilgit Agency to control the region of Hindu Kush and Karakoram by establishing good relations with the local monarchs in Gilgit-Baltistan and Chitral areas; and thus established their ‘indirect rule’ there. Prior to their indirect rule there were smaller princely states in Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar, Yasin, Baltistan and Chitral that were responsible for maintaining the political order with the support of village and valley level local influentials. The British, however, did not apply this policy to areas further south of Dardistan—in Kohistan, Diamer, Swat and Dir. These regions mostly remained independent and uncontrolled until the end of British rule in the sub-continent. The local princely states established in Swat and Dir in the beginning of the twentieth century were indirectly controlled by the British Political Agent at the Malakand top. These states were allowed to expand their rule in areas where the Dardic people, such as the Torwalis, Gawris, Mayo and Shina, were living. The Swat state extended to the Torwal area in 1921-22, leaving the Kalam territory under the direct rule of the British Political Agent. The Panjkora valley in upper Dir came under the rule of the Nawab of Dir, while the western part of Indus Kohistan up to Kandhia was annexed to the Swat State by 1939. Before the annexations these areas were mostly autonomous. The Shinkari and Indus Koshistani areas had independent political units called ‘segmentary republics’ by the German anthropologists, Karl Jettmar. On the right bank of the Indus River, according to the ethnographer Jurgen Wasim Frembegen, the main political units were Duber, Jijal, Patan, Seo and Kandhia; whereas on the left bank of the Indus River, in Shinkari Kohistan, these units were Basha, Harban, Shatial, Sazin, Sumer, Jalkot, Palas, Kolai and Batera. These are valleys in the Kohistan and each valley was a political unit. Each valley had a fortified village in which the houses had huge watch towers, known as Shikari, which were like forts for the purpose of defending their ‘republics’ against invasion by other such republics. The main conflicts were over grazing lands. There were constant armed conflicts between these village or valleybased republics; and for that reason, these areas were mostly known as Yaghistan, literally meaning ‘land of lawlessness’. Frembegen mentions in his 1999 paper, ‘Indus Kohistan: An Historical and Ethnographic Outline’, that the valleys of Tangir and Darel in the Diamer were different in as much as they seemed to be considered as a transitional zone between the northernmost centralized states of Gilgit and Yasin and the southern areas where the ‘segmentary republics’ existed. Internal conflicts were common until the British took over the ‘valley republics’. The fortified villages were abandoned, and various clans were able to easily move out of these villages to settle elsewhere. According to Keiser, in his1991 book, ‘Friend by Day; Enemy by Night’, apart from the major conflicts on grazing lands, blood feuds were also common in these areas as well as in the areas of Panjkora, upper Dir. The main cause was family honour. Crimes such as rape or adultery were resolved by local people through their traditional social norms and dispute resolution mechanism. There were male assemblies with different names in different areas. For instance, in Harban these were known as Sigas whereas in Torwal in Swat and  Panjkora in Dir these were known as Yarak and Kher respectively.  In former Kafiristan, now Nuristan, these were known as Ure. These terms have now been mostly replaced by the word Jirga. Its members used to be village influentials from the landholding class of the male population. These men are now mostly known as Maliks in Swat, Dir and Kohistan, while in Shinkari Kohistan, Gilgit and Chitral the men associated with Sigas and Mahraka were known as Jashtero (they were also known as Dharmus in Chitral).  The term Jast, meaning elder man, was also common among the Kati and

Introduction Narcotic substance abuse in the form of opium has been a historical phenomenon in the Asian regions, quite often destroying nations’ capacities and resilience. However, in recent times narcotics have transformed into more sophisticated and deadly substances, affecting societies in dangerous ways. World-wide drug addiction or substance abuse, in present times, has emerged as a major threat posing serious problems for the safety and security of states and societies. Given the increased association of criminality with narcotics and the huge economic dividends from narcotics-business, the demand-supply dynamics have disrupted societal stability confronting the security and law enforcement agencies with serious challenges. To arrest the spread of narcotic substances, well targeted strategies are being strengthened at the national level to tackle both the demand and supply sides. Since the drugs related issues have wider dimensions, close coordination within the region and beyond is critical. In the context of Pakistan’s Anti-Narcotics Policy, 2019 three policy objectives have been reemphasized: i) Drug supply reduction; ii) Drug demand reduction; and iii) International cooperation.1 The paper will briefly look into some of these dynamics with a view to possibly develop understanding of the problem. Wake up Call for Pakistan As per the reported figure, the number of drug addicts in the country could be around 7.6 million (78% male and 22%female). An article on the subject indicates that “Pakistan’s drug addicts have increased exponentially from 7 million in 2015 to 9 million in 2021”.2 The number of drug addicts is reported to be increasing by 40,000 per year with 700 dying every day. Because of wide availability of and easy access to   drugs at cheaper prices, more and more of the younger population and children are becoming susceptible to falling into the trap of narcotic substance abuse. Already, drug addiction is found to be common among children as young as 14 years of age. The danger of these young children becoming targets of drug peddlers and cartels, thus getting warped in criminal activities, remains high. Since drug addiction seriously impairs individual’s behavior and capacity to lead a productive life, it poses multi-facet ted challenges for the country, more importantly, in inter-generational terms. Narcotics have the tendency to manipulate the responses of individuals in different ways. Therefore, prioritized remedial measures are imperative. The complex picture of narcotics abuse in Pakistan is hostage to the vicious cycle of rapid population growth overstretching the country’s resources and physical capacities and pushing communities into poverty. It is further compounded by rising unemployment, food insecurity and despair, changing societal norms and social status syndrome among the elite circles. The menace of injection-drug-abuse has specially emerged as a serious threat for the safety and well being of the people and state of Pakistan as it has enhanced the risks of AIDS/HIV and other blood borne diseases. Different surveys conducted reveal that the situation in schools and universities is alarming, as drug addiction seems to be growing for various reasons. Also “drug addicts (are seen) freely sitting on…road (sides), greenbelts, parapets, footpaths, bridges and inside the underpasses, injecting themselves with drugs.”3 As the police shoulders multiple responsibilities, their focus is more on dealing with drug peddlers, rings and mafias. The last survey of drug addicts in Pakistan was done in 2012-13 in collaboration with the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC). It “reveal(ed) that a substantial portion of the country’s population suffers from the devastating consequences of substance abuse” and estimated that “nearly 6.4 million Pakistani adults used drugs in the last 12 months (2012).”4 For a realistic appraisal of the current situation related to the prevalence of drug abuse in Pakistan the “National Drug Use Survey Pakistan 2022-2024 – A Key Milestone in Developing Effective Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation Programmes” initiative has been launched. Under this initiative, the Survey 2022-24, is to be conducted by the UNODC Country Office in collaboration with the Ministry of Narcotics Control of Pakistan and US State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. The deadline for the first draft is December 2023 and the report is to be finalized by 20245. This survey will be crucial in understanding: i) the extent of substance abuse in Pakistan; ii) the type of substances that are being consumed; iii) control and prevention initiatives of the government; and iv) the regional dimension of the threat. Geopolitical Landscape—Narcotic Abuse and Trade Paradigm shifts in the geopolitical landscape took place in the late 1970s, which had an overall impact on the socio-economic fabric. The Iranian revolution of 1979 together with the Soviet invasion and the intensified proxy war in Afghanistan significantly disturbed the regional equilibrium. In Pakistan the impact, inter alia, manifested in the form of proliferation of narcotic substances in the country. With the passage of time, a drug culture started taking root, especially in Pakistan’s adjacent territories to Afghanistan. Perpetual instability on the western border of Pakistan, particularly with Afghanistan, seems to have posed challenges for continued coordinated strategies to deal with the narcotics issues. The socio-economic compulsions and provision of sustained meaningful alternate livelihoods are major hurdles in weaning people away from narcotics trade and poppy cultivation in the context of Afghanistan. The current dispensation in Afghanistan is disconnected with the international community. With the Interim Afghan government’s funds frozen and very little outside support, the situation can be characterized as untenable. Underlining the social and economic causes, a Brooking study of 2016 points out that “the significance of opium poppy production for the Afghan economy and crucially for employment, will only grow as Afghanistan will continue to experience serious economic and fiscal crises.”6   Moreover, Pakistan’s and Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours’ primary concern is to ensure that the threat of terrorist groups operating against them from Afghan soil are thwarted. Since instability and disorder in the neighbourhood could have a “contagion effect”, providing space to terrorists and other criminal groups to operate with impunity, regional conversations need to focus on the challenges in an integrated manner. In a recent interview with Voice of