Unipolarity and the liberal rules-based international order affiliated with it are being challenged by the emergence of other great powers and an ascendancy of nationalist sentiments.
The unipolar initiative, from the 1990’s onwards, attempted to establish a global liberal order – liberal rules-based democracies, economic integration, and interdependence (globalization) and the establishment of institutions to back the liberal order. Keeping within the parameters of this strategy, policymakers in the US believed that engagement with China through economic cooperation and the latter’s participation as a stakeholder in international institutions would lead to the country’s economic prosperity which would eventually result in its embracing democratic liberal values and institutions. This did not happen; the change was limited to economic growth and did not impact its political system. The economic growth, however, was immense, and this, along with a more assertive foreign policy, threatened the dominance that the US and its liberal narrative had enjoyed since the 1990’s over the global system. Hence the US began rolling back its engagement policy and gradually began replacing it with containment vis a vis China.
As a result of the new global dynamics, the liberal institutionalist (also called neoliberals) worldview receded as realism resurfaced. This is where realpolitik comes to play along with associated terminologies like balance-of-power, containment, spheres of influence, etc. Some may assume that these familiar terminologies are an indication of a transition towards a new cold war.
Nationalist Sentiments and the Middle Powers
J. Peter Scoblic and Philip E. Tetlock wrote a paper for Foreign Affairs (Nov/Dec 2020 issue) titled: ‘A Better Crystal Ball – The Right way to Think about the Future.’ In this paper they stated, “Every policy is a prediction… This makes every policymaker a forecaster… The limits of imagination create blind spots that policymakers tend to fill with past experiences. They often assume that tomorrow’s dangers look like yesterday’s, retaining the same mental map even as the territory around them changes dramatically.”
There are innumerable blind spots and variables in this fluid geopolitical power shift phase. The new world order emerging from within the confines of great power rivalry is still in its nascent stage and ambiguity prevails pertaining to how this will eventually play out. The instinct to fill in the blanks with references from the US-Soviet cold war era can be misleading.
For instance, the conditions that clearly defined the bloc system (Western/US led bloc and Eastern/Soviet led bloc) during the cold war can no longer be applied in the development of coalitions and alliances.
The post-World War II era brought about the cold war and simultaneously the decolonization of countries in Africa and Asia. “Between 1945 and 1960, three dozen new states in Asia and Africa achieved autonomy or outright independence from their European colonial rulers… In 1946, there were 35 member states in the United Nations; as the newly independent nations of the “third world” joined the organization, by 1970 membership had swelled to 127” (https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/asia-and-africa).
The inexperienced administrations of these newly decolonized countries had to confront multiple challenges of governance, fragile and basic economic conditions, limited resources, and, for some, even conflict—primarily due to some of the territorial boundaries that were drawn by the imperial powers with complete disregard to national, cultural, political, and economic realities.
Despite not wanting to get drawn into the vortex of bipolar geopolitics, many, because of the frailty of their nations, had to choose between the two superpower blocs vying to expand their spheres of influence. The hope was that this would enhance these newly formed independent states’ chances of gaining economic and military assistance in their pursuit for stability and survival. Pakistan being a case in point.
The scenario is quite different now. There is a proliferation of middle powers. Tim Sweijs and Michael J. Mazarr, in their article titled: “Mind the Middle Powers”, attempted to define middle powers as, “nations that are not strong enough to count as “great” powers but still have significant influence and strategic importance. Typically, middle powers are characterized by a certain degree of heft — in economic, geographic, demographic, or military terms — but some relatively small states can vault into the category as a function of their international activism and influence.
“As a result, the set of countries typically identified as middle powers varies. Some are fully developed, former colonial powers like Germany and Japan. Some are smaller developed nations that punch above their weight in global role and influence, including Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Poland, Singapore, and South Korea. Some are petro-powers — Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, as well as smaller Gulf states like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Others are large developing states such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey, and Vietnam.”
The transitional phase of the global order has provided such countries the space to project their nationalist sentiments in their foreign policies as opposed to committing to an outright alliance with either of the great powers. As many analysts have observed, “the middle power diplomatic game” is less about taking sides and more about leveraging the great power rivalry to their advantage. In addition, the synergy through multilateralism has provided platforms for the middle powers to assert themselves and make sure that their perspectives are heard, thereby, shifting from the periphery to the core in global matters.
Turkey asserting itself on issues pertaining to the expansion of NATO (Sweden), Saudi Arabia raising oil prices in defiance of what the US wanted, India cultivating its relations with Russia despite being the US’ strategic partner, etc. are all examples of “Middle power activism”.
This suggests that the New World Order will not be bipolar, but multipolar with: the US and its allies and strategic partners; China and its sphere of influence (Russia is being drawn into this sphere and147 countries have signed on to projects or are interested in its Belt and Road Initiative – cfr.org); and the middle powers hedging the great powers rivalry in favor of their national interests and using multilateral institutions to boost their influence over global issues.
Pakistan and its Dwindling Middle Power Status.
Pakistan is a middle power that wants to remain neutral. The economic gravitational pull towards China is apparent (CPEC, the Gwadar port, etc.). It is a resilient partnership that has withstood multiple transitions of the world order. However, international relations do not necessarily have to be a zero-sum game. Pakistan’s socio-economic progress also depends on US support—the latter is the country’s biggest export market, one of the largest sources of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and development aid and influences the Bretton Wood institutions (the IMF and World bank).
Due to its internal/domestic challenges and ad hoc foreign policy measures that are more aligned with the past than present realities, Pakistan has limited space to leverage the great powers rivalry in favor of its national interests. The foundation of its neutral stance is also as strong or weak as its internal capacity to endure external pressure.
A comprehensive foreign policy needs to be formulated that is simultaneously in sync with global realities and the country’s national interests—economic prosperity and security.
As mentioned earlier, “the success and failures” of a country’s international relations are directly linked to its internal state. Pakistan can maintain its relevance in the “international mainstream” as a middle power if its economy is strong. Addressing domestic shortcomings, therefore, becomes a priority. Unfortunately, political instability and inefficient governance have had a multiplying affect on the already dismal state of Pakistan’s socio-economic set up. Tackling inflation, economic stagnation, low foreign exchange reserves, debt burden, illiteracy, a tattering health care system, security threats, poverty, etc. require extreme structural changes and the present dispensation comprising of an antiquated bureaucratic system and elitist governance approach is only adding fuel to the fire.
Two papers—’Economic Woes of Pakistan’ by Jamil Nasir and ‘A Renewed Commitment on Foreign Direct Investment’ by Khalil Hamdani—have been placed in this issue of Criterion Quarterly. They highlight not only the economic predicaments afflicting the nation, but also provide solutions that may play a part in the country’s journey towards structural change. Papers addressing the other issues mentioned above will follow in upcoming issues of this journal.
Apart from internal restructuring, Pakistan must diversify its options to create mutually beneficial relations with countries that have hitherto been neglected within the country’s traditional foreign policy dynamics. Countries in Africa, South/Central America and even parts of Asia have remained in the periphery of Pakistan’s diplomatic efforts. Economic diplomacy must be at the forefront of an outreach policy towards these countries. New groups, coalitions and bilateral and multilateral initiatives need to be established to enhance economic cooperation and explore new markets.
Closer to home, security threats emanating from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Afghanistan have created hurdles in Pakistan’s vision of establishing itself as the hub of regional integration through connectivity and infrastructure projects. The Afghan Taliban, emboldened by Indian support, have dismissed Pakistan’s demands to rein in the TTP and remain steadfast in their support for the latter. (for an in-depth study see: ‘The Re-emergence of Transnational Terror in Pakistan’ By Ozair Khalid in the ‘Previous Issues’ section – July-Sept. 2023 issue – of criterion-quarterly.com). Consequently, an emboldened TTP has escalated terrorist attacks in Pakistan which is in line with the Indian agenda to minimize Pakistan’s and China’s influence in the region.
The Afghan Taliban seem incapable of realizing that Afghanistan’s sustainable and long-term prosperity and stability is linked with Pakistan. The benefits of trade and transit alone, through regional blocs (Pakistan along with the Central Asian Republics, China, etc.), outweigh any transactional relation that may emanate from India.
In the meanwhile, the way forward for Pakistan remains in regional cooperation and coordination to pressurize the Afghan Taliban and simultaneously expose India for the role it is playing in destabilizing the region. It is worth restating here that influence and leverage have a multiplying affect when middle powers converge under a united platform to assert their demands.
Middle powers will shape the new world order as much as the great powers will. Pakistan has formidable obstacles to overcome to achieve its potential as a middle power and regain the space that it has yielded in a global and regional context, partly due to its own mistakes and partly due to the unpredictable transitional forces in play. The opportunities are there, but a country’s foreign policy is limited by its internal capabilities. Socio-economic overhauling through structural reforms is required. In addition, a foreign policy needs to be formulated whereby the country’s diplomatic efforts must be aligned with its national interests and needs. Nontraditional alignments need to be forged and synchronized diplomatic efforts under the banner of ‘The Economy First’ need to be established.
Abdul Sattar (a former Ambassador, Foreign Secretary and Foreign Minister of Pakistan), wrote in his book, ‘Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2019: A Concise History,’ “The success as well as failures of our foreign policy can be traced by whether or not it earned the nation a place of respect in the international mainstream. A policy that leads to isolation is inimical to the interests, particularly of middle and small countries.”
Pakistan, Middle Powers and a Multipolar World
Unipolarity and the liberal rules-based international order affiliated with it are being challenged by the emergence of other great powers and an ascendancy of nationalist sentiments.
The unipolar initiative, from the 1990’s onwards, attempted to establish a global liberal order – liberal rules-based democracies, economic integration, and interdependence (globalization) and the establishment of institutions to back the liberal order. Keeping within the parameters of this strategy, policymakers in the US believed that engagement with China through economic cooperation and the latter’s participation as a stakeholder in international institutions would lead to the country’s economic prosperity which would eventually result in its embracing democratic liberal values and institutions. This did not happen; the change was limited to economic growth and did not impact its political system. The economic growth, however, was immense, and this, along with a more assertive foreign policy, threatened the dominance that the US and its liberal narrative had enjoyed since the 1990’s over the global system. Hence the US began rolling back its engagement policy and gradually began replacing it with containment vis a vis China.
As a result of the new global dynamics, the liberal institutionalist (also called neoliberals) worldview receded as realism resurfaced. This is where realpolitik comes to play along with associated terminologies like balance-of-power, containment, spheres of influence, etc. Some may assume that these familiar terminologies are an indication of a transition towards a new cold war.
Nationalist Sentiments and the Middle Powers
J. Peter Scoblic and Philip E. Tetlock wrote a paper for Foreign Affairs (Nov/Dec 2020 issue) titled: ‘A Better Crystal Ball – The Right way to Think about the Future.’ In this paper they stated, “Every policy is a prediction… This makes every policymaker a forecaster… The limits of imagination create blind spots that policymakers tend to fill with past experiences. They often assume that tomorrow’s dangers look like yesterday’s, retaining the same mental map even as the territory around them changes dramatically.”
There are innumerable blind spots and variables in this fluid geopolitical power shift phase. The new world order emerging from within the confines of great power rivalry is still in its nascent stage and ambiguity prevails pertaining to how this will eventually play out. The instinct to fill in the blanks with references from the US-Soviet cold war era can be misleading.
For instance, the conditions that clearly defined the bloc system (Western/US led bloc and Eastern/Soviet led bloc) during the cold war can no longer be applied in the development of coalitions and alliances.
The post-World War II era brought about the cold war and simultaneously the decolonization of countries in Africa and Asia. “Between 1945 and 1960, three dozen new states in Asia and Africa achieved autonomy or outright independence from their European colonial rulers… In 1946, there were 35 member states in the United Nations; as the newly independent nations of the “third world” joined the organization, by 1970 membership had swelled to 127” (https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/asia-and-africa).
The inexperienced administrations of these newly decolonized countries had to confront multiple challenges of governance, fragile and basic economic conditions, limited resources, and, for some, even conflict—primarily due to some of the territorial boundaries that were drawn by the imperial powers with complete disregard to national, cultural, political, and economic realities.
Despite not wanting to get drawn into the vortex of bipolar geopolitics, many, because of the frailty of their nations, had to choose between the two superpower blocs vying to expand their spheres of influence. The hope was that this would enhance these newly formed independent states’ chances of gaining economic and military assistance in their pursuit for stability and survival. Pakistan being a case in point.
The scenario is quite different now. There is a proliferation of middle powers. Tim Sweijs and Michael J. Mazarr, in their article titled: “Mind the Middle Powers”, attempted to define middle powers as, “nations that are not strong enough to count as “great” powers but still have significant influence and strategic importance. Typically, middle powers are characterized by a certain degree of heft — in economic, geographic, demographic, or military terms — but some relatively small states can vault into the category as a function of their international activism and influence.
“As a result, the set of countries typically identified as middle powers varies. Some are fully developed, former colonial powers like Germany and Japan. Some are smaller developed nations that punch above their weight in global role and influence, including Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Poland, Singapore, and South Korea. Some are petro-powers — Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, as well as smaller Gulf states like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Others are large developing states such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey, and Vietnam.”
The transitional phase of the global order has provided such countries the space to project their nationalist sentiments in their foreign policies as opposed to committing to an outright alliance with either of the great powers. As many analysts have observed, “the middle power diplomatic game” is less about taking sides and more about leveraging the great power rivalry to their advantage. In addition, the synergy through multilateralism has provided platforms for the middle powers to assert themselves and make sure that their perspectives are heard, thereby, shifting from the periphery to the core in global matters.
Turkey asserting itself on issues pertaining to the expansion of NATO (Sweden), Saudi Arabia raising oil prices in defiance of what the US wanted, India cultivating its relations with Russia despite being the US’ strategic partner, etc. are all examples of “Middle power activism”.
This suggests that the New World Order will not be bipolar, but multipolar with: the US and its allies and strategic partners; China and its sphere of influence (Russia is being drawn into this sphere and147 countries have signed on to projects or are interested in its Belt and Road Initiative – cfr.org); and the middle powers hedging the great powers rivalry in favor of their national interests and using multilateral institutions to boost their influence over global issues.
Pakistan and its Dwindling Middle Power Status.
Pakistan is a middle power that wants to remain neutral. The economic gravitational pull towards China is apparent (CPEC, the Gwadar port, etc.). It is a resilient partnership that has withstood multiple transitions of the world order. However, international relations do not necessarily have to be a zero-sum game. Pakistan’s socio-economic progress also depends on US support—the latter is the country’s biggest export market, one of the largest sources of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and development aid and influences the Bretton Wood institutions (the IMF and World bank).
Due to its internal/domestic challenges and ad hoc foreign policy measures that are more aligned with the past than present realities, Pakistan has limited space to leverage the great powers rivalry in favor of its national interests. The foundation of its neutral stance is also as strong or weak as its internal capacity to endure external pressure.
A comprehensive foreign policy needs to be formulated that is simultaneously in sync with global realities and the country’s national interests—economic prosperity and security.
As mentioned earlier, “the success and failures” of a country’s international relations are directly linked to its internal state. Pakistan can maintain its relevance in the “international mainstream” as a middle power if its economy is strong. Addressing domestic shortcomings, therefore, becomes a priority. Unfortunately, political instability and inefficient governance have had a multiplying affect on the already dismal state of Pakistan’s socio-economic set up. Tackling inflation, economic stagnation, low foreign exchange reserves, debt burden, illiteracy, a tattering health care system, security threats, poverty, etc. require extreme structural changes and the present dispensation comprising of an antiquated bureaucratic system and elitist governance approach is only adding fuel to the fire.
Two papers—’Economic Woes of Pakistan’ by Jamil Nasir and ‘A Renewed Commitment on Foreign Direct Investment’ by Khalil Hamdani—have been placed in this issue of Criterion Quarterly. They highlight not only the economic predicaments afflicting the nation, but also provide solutions that may play a part in the country’s journey towards structural change. Papers addressing the other issues mentioned above will follow in upcoming issues of this journal.
Apart from internal restructuring, Pakistan must diversify its options to create mutually beneficial relations with countries that have hitherto been neglected within the country’s traditional foreign policy dynamics. Countries in Africa, South/Central America and even parts of Asia have remained in the periphery of Pakistan’s diplomatic efforts. Economic diplomacy must be at the forefront of an outreach policy towards these countries. New groups, coalitions and bilateral and multilateral initiatives need to be established to enhance economic cooperation and explore new markets.
Closer to home, security threats emanating from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Afghanistan have created hurdles in Pakistan’s vision of establishing itself as the hub of regional integration through connectivity and infrastructure projects. The Afghan Taliban, emboldened by Indian support, have dismissed Pakistan’s demands to rein in the TTP and remain steadfast in their support for the latter. (for an in-depth study see: ‘The Re-emergence of Transnational Terror in Pakistan’ By Ozair Khalid in the ‘Previous Issues’ section – July-Sept. 2023 issue – of criterion-quarterly.com). Consequently, an emboldened TTP has escalated terrorist attacks in Pakistan which is in line with the Indian agenda to minimize Pakistan’s and China’s influence in the region.
The Afghan Taliban seem incapable of realizing that Afghanistan’s sustainable and long-term prosperity and stability is linked with Pakistan. The benefits of trade and transit alone, through regional blocs (Pakistan along with the Central Asian Republics, China, etc.), outweigh any transactional relation that may emanate from India.
In the meanwhile, the way forward for Pakistan remains in regional cooperation and coordination to pressurize the Afghan Taliban and simultaneously expose India for the role it is playing in destabilizing the region. It is worth restating here that influence and leverage have a multiplying affect when middle powers converge under a united platform to assert their demands.
Middle powers will shape the new world order as much as the great powers will. Pakistan has formidable obstacles to overcome to achieve its potential as a middle power and regain the space that it has yielded in a global and regional context, partly due to its own mistakes and partly due to the unpredictable transitional forces in play. The opportunities are there, but a country’s foreign policy is limited by its internal capabilities. Socio-economic overhauling through structural reforms is required. In addition, a foreign policy needs to be formulated whereby the country’s diplomatic efforts must be aligned with its national interests and needs. Nontraditional alignments need to be forged and synchronized diplomatic efforts under the banner of ‘The Economy First’ need to be established.
Abdul Sattar (a former Ambassador, Foreign Secretary and Foreign Minister of Pakistan), wrote in his book, ‘Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2019: A Concise History,’ “The success as well as failures of our foreign policy can be traced by whether or not it earned the nation a place of respect in the international mainstream. A policy that leads to isolation is inimical to the interests, particularly of middle and small countries.”
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