Abstract
(Pakistan has oscillated between military rule and some form of democracy throughout its chequered political history. Several factors, widely discussed in political literature, are responsible for the shallow roots of democracy in Pakistan. The root causes, however, are exclusionary policies of the state, politico-economic arrangements benefitting the elite, and outmoded governance structures from colonial times. Empirics suggest that democracy per se has no effect on economic growth, corruption, and inequality. Its benefits accrue to the citizenry through good governance, cost-effective public service delivery, and rule of law. There is a clear nexus between inclusion, good governance and democracy. Reforms of fundamental nature are needed to disperse the economic and political power in society to sustain democracy. The main areas of reform identified in this regard are the civil service, local governance, taxation and education. – Author)
What ails the political system of Pakistan? What explains the fragility of its democracy? These questions are far from trivial. Pakistan has experimented with various forms of political systems: presidential, parliamentary, guided democracy, etc. It has oscillated between military rule and democratically elected regimes since its inception. It is estimated that out of total 24,488 days, Pakistan had democratic regimes for 8,781 days while for 8,503 days military ruled the country1. A consistent pattern is visible in the political history of Pakistan. Once the military takes over, struggle for a rocky and uncertain transition back towards democracy starts. Why political institutions are so sclerotic in Pakistan and why these institutions have failed to nourish democracy is a big question. Some generalized and partial explanations discussed in literature on the issue are as follows:2
- Mr. Jinnah did not live long after the birth of Pakistan. Due to his demise, soon after the independence, he did not have time and opportunity to impose his vision on Pakistan unlike his Indian counterpart, Mr. Nehru, who had enough time to put India on the trajectory of democracy. It is argued that Mr. Jinnah was a modern, secular and liberal leader who wanted to lay the foundations of the country on the modern principles of democracy and secularism but his early demise did not let him translate his vision into reality. “The death of Jinnah in the state’s infancy created confusion over whether Pakistan should remain secular or should follow the momentum for Islamization generated during the independence struggle. The lack of strong leadership with well-defined vision deepened the confusion, and to this day the country struggles to achieve a clear vision of its future”.3
- It is also argued that the majority of the elite who played an active part in the ‘Pakistan Movement’ had migrated from the minority provinces of India. These elite did not have indigenous political and economic roots and were, therefore, reluctant to initiate a democratic process.
- The political leaders of the Western part of the country were fearful of the domination by the politicians of East Pakistan in the legislature due to their supremacy in numbers. Had democracy been the choice, it was very likely that the politicians from the Eastern part would form governments and run the state affairs by virtue of their majority.
- Low level of capitalist development and industrialization is also held responsible for the shallow roots of democracy. History of evolution of modern democracy in countries like the UK bears testimony to this argument. Industrialization became a big driving force for liberal democracy in the Western World. There is a strong thesis by political economists that in UK extension of franchise to the labour and middle classes was a strategic decision on the part of the elite, who were fearful of revolution due to changed socioeconomic conditions unleashed by the Industrial revolution4. In case of Pakistan, power shifts did not take place between various classes and segments of society due to a low level of industrialization. Political and economic power remained concentrated in the land owning elite who already had access to power, privilege and authority. They did not need democracy to get their rights. Rather democracy could be a threat to their power due to the voice democracy gives to the common people who could challenge the existing power structures and demand their share of the pie. A majority of the population lived in the rural hinterland and elections were decided (and still so) by rural Pakistan. Even if there was an urge among the rural people for their political and economic rights, which only a real democracy could bestow upon them, they were faced with what the economists call a collective action problem.5 Most of the people were dependent on the landed elite for their livelihood and access to public services from local institutions.
- Civilian bureaucracy and military were comparatively two well-organized and powerful institutions immediately after the independence of Pakistan. They thought that they could take Pakistan forward towards economic progress as the politicians lacked the necessary vision and will to put the country on the trajectory of development. These reasons for fragility of democracy in Pakistan are true to a large extent but do not complete the story.The roots of fragility run much deeper than generally understood.
Democracy is more than Elections
Before delving into the causes of the fragility of our political system, let me briefly state as to what makes democracy a superior form of governance or what are the advantages of democracy. Professor Jared Diamond, in one of his recent articles on American democracy, has emphasized the following virtues of democracy: 1) Democracy encourages debate and even seemingly unpalatable ideas can be discussed in democracy; 2) Citizens have a voice in democracy. They are heard. Democracy acts as a safety valve against violence and frustration; 3) Democracy acts as a shield against tyranny and oppression. A spirit of compromise and accommodation is its hallmark; 4) In democracy all citizens can vote, so governments are motivated to invest in the people at large rather than the few elite.6
So democracy empowers people. It gives them voice. It does not safeguard the interests of the elite alone. But the questions here are: Is democracy just a political concept? Has it nothing to do with the economic and social lives of the people? Is the principle of ‘one man one vote’ sufficient for the sustainability of democracy? Dr B.R.Ambedkar said, “On the 26th of January, 1950, we are going to enter into a life of contradictions. In politics, we will be recognizing the principle of one man one vote, and one vote one value. In our social and economic life, we shall, by reason of our social and economic structure, continue to deny the principle of one man one value. How long shall we continue to deny equality in our social and economic life? If we continue it for long, we will do so only by putting our political democracy in peril. We must remove the contradiction at the earliest possible moment, or else those who suffer from inequality will blow up the structure of political democracy.”7
Democracy is more than elections even if they are held on the principle of one man, one vote. Real and sustainable democracy is not possible without appreciating its economic and social aspects. One of the prime reasons for the failure of democracies is that too much emphasis is put on elections and too little on other essential features of democracy8.Meritocracy, rule of law, good governance, and accountability, which should be the defining features of a democracy, are often lacking in developing countries like Pakistan. That is why democracy stumbles again and again. Professor Dani Rodrik of Harvard University says, “When democracy fails to deliver economically and politically, perhaps it is to be expected that some people will look for authoritarian solutions. As long as the military remains the ultimate arbiter, these groups (political) focus their strategies on military rather than on one another.”9
Sustainability of democracy mainly depends on its capacity to incorporate more societal sectors and distribute public goods among the citizenry. The extent to which the system makes itself inclusive with the passage of time is the real test of democracy in a country. History of the evolution of democracy testifies this assertion. For example, the evolution of democracy in the UK not only gave the disenfranchised sections voting rights,but also initiated broad based reforms in the 19th century by Prime Ministers Disraeli and Gladstone (though belonging to different political parties) in the spheres of education, public health and social security.
Pakistan’s situation is quite paradoxical. Rather than making the people stakeholders in the democratic system,we have tried to keep the base of the democracy narrow through exclusionary policies and perpetuation of the status quo. For example, local governments that could disperse political power in society have not been established. Similarly, no effective land reforms were introduced to disperse economic power. Concentration of land in the hands of a small landed elite has had long-term implications for the growth of political institutions and democracy in the country. Institutions generally evolve and become stronger in comparatively egalitarian societal arrangements. India made effective land reforms soon after independence. Land reforms were also vital in the initial stages of development of South East Asian countries, now called Asian Tigers, at least from three angles10. First, land reforms enhanced rural productivity and income of the rural people. Consequently, domestic savings increased. Second, higher incomes resulted in higher domestic demand for goods. Third, redistribution of income contributed to political stability, an important factor for creating an environment for domestic and foreign investment.
The distribution of assets and income was thus highly skewed from the very beginning in case of Pakistan. No serious efforts were undertaken by the state to smoothen the inequitable distribution of assets through redistribution. The literature on redistribution under democracy gives some very useful insights which may explain, though partially, the fragility of democracy in Pakistan. Empirics suggest that if redistribution is insufficient for the poor or excessive for the rich, people may turn against democracy. A threshold of capital stock is required for democracy to survive. Perhaps we have not yet achieved this threshold of capital stock and perhaps it partially explains our low level of patience with democracy.
Democracy, what is it good for? Some empirics
(a) What is the linkage between democracy and income? Empirics suggest a direct relationship between per capita GDP and democracy, meaning rich countries have more probability to be democratic than poor countries: “The probability that a democracy would survive rises steeply in per capita income. Between 1950 and 1999,the probability that a democracy would die during any year in countries with per capita income under $1000 (1985 PPP dollars) was 0.0845 so that one in twelve died—and no democracy ever fell in a country with per capita income higher than that of Argentina in 1975, $6055. This is a startling fact, given that throughout history about seventy democracies collapsed in poorer countries, while thirty-seven democracies spent over 1000 years in more developed countries and not one died”.11
Several other economists have also suggested a strong link between income and democracy. According to Professor Robert J. Barro an increase in living standards is certainly associated with gradual rise in democracy, and the democracies without economic development fail to sustain. Economic development, argues Samuel Huntington,12 has a positive impact on the process of democratization. He further argues that when a nation reaches a given threshold of development, it is likely to become a democracy. Slow development means slow transition to democracy whereas rapid development creates tensions in the society which eventually lead to broader political participation.
Some have, however, questioned this thesis. Professor Acemoglu et al13 have suggested that although a relationship exists between income and democracy but as to whether income contributes towards democracy is questionable. Peculiar history and development paths and not income explain the adoption and sustainability of democracy in a country. If the thesis of Professor Daron Acemoglu et al is accepted, then it means that we have little space and leverage to sustain democracy due to historical determinism. Interestingly, ‘democracy-development tradeoff’ does not hold in the case of Pakistan. The economic growth rate during military rule was above 6% while in democratic regimes it hovered around 4%. Economic growth has been successfully achieved during the authoritarian regimes but this growth neither enhanced democracy nor reflected itself in the lives of the people.
(b)Does democracy reduce inequality? Ideally democracy should take care of inequality as democracy means rule of the majority and if everybody has got the right to vote, then it makes sense that people will vote for redistribution of resources from the rich to the poor. If it happens, social and income inequalities of extreme nature should eventually go. But contrary to this, democracy does not necessarily reduce inequality. Extreme economic and social inequities persist even in long-established democracies. USA and India are cases in point. In USA, inequality has emerged as a big issue despite a well-established democracy.14 According to an Oxfam report, Income inequality has also deepened in India, in the last three decades.15
Why democracy does not necessarily reduce inequality? Daron Acemoglu et al have identified several channels for the limited impact of democracy on inequality.16 First, democracy may be ‘captured’ or ‘constrained’. Though democracy reallocates de jure power to the poorer segments of the society by giving power of vote on the basis of universal franchise but de jure power does not necessarily mean de facto power as well. The political system does not work for the majority due to the control the elite have over political parties, lobbying, provision of funds for electioneering, local law enforcement agencies, etc. In a developed country, like the USA, the political system may be influenced by corporate interests and lobbies, whereas, in a developing country like Pakistan, the democratic system may be hijacked by the feudal or ethnic interests.
Second, democracy does not necessarily transfer power to the poor. Rather it may transfer political power only to the middle class. Inequality can only be reduced if the middle class is in favour of redistribution. In a real democracy, the taxation system is supposed to be highly progressive with a major component of the total composition of taxes being direct taxes. A substantial amount of revenue also has to be allocated for primary health, basic education, transfer payments, etc. instead of big health projects and tertiary education. This, however, is usually not the case, especially with democracy in Pakistan.
(c) Does democracy contribute towards economic growth? Not necessarily. The empirics exploring the impact of democracy on economic growth indicate that either democracy is detrimental to economic growth or at best it is neutral. In this regard, the first forceful paper that explored the relationship between economic growth and democracy was that of Professor Robert Barro.17 Based on an analysis of about 100 countries, he found that democracy reduces economic growth. Professor Paul collier has even argued that authoritarianism can be good for economic growth. The debate that economic growth is related to ‘regime-type’ is gaining lot of attention even in developed democracies. China’s impressive growth rate in the last couple of decades has ignited this debate in the academic and policy circles of the West. Is it a coincidence that some of the best growth experiences of the world have been either under dictatorships or in less-than-democratic regimes? Post-Mao China, Lee Kwan Yew’s Singapore, or General Park Chung Hee’s South Korea may be cited as some examples.
Why economic growth may be compromised in a democratic dispensation? The argument isthat in a democratic dispensation the government is under persistent pressure from the electorate for immediate consumption at the cost of long-term investment. The political parties have to have recourse to the people for elections and to stay in power. If the government prefers long-term investment over immediate consumption, it may not have ‘sellable projects’ for elections, and has every likelihood to be voted out.This argument can also be constructed as follows: poor have high propensity to consume. If they are organized then they demand high wages and immediate relief through transfers and subsidies. Consequently, profits and investment are reduced and in turn economic growth slows down. The flipside of this argument is that if a government is a true representative of the people and reflects the preferences of the majority in the real sense, then it will take measures for more progressive taxation and redistribution which in turn will increase the spending capacity of the poor. Resultantly, aggregate demand will increase and hence economic growth. Even otherwise, economic literature says that democracy per se has no effect on growth. Accountability, good governance and reduction in corruption will impact growth. A fragile and weak democracy, however, does not necessarily guarantee good governance and accountability.
(d) Does democracy reduce corruption? Not necessarily at least in the short-run. Economists say that the relationship between democracy and corruption is somewhat complex. The relationship between democracy and corruption can at best be described as an ‘inverted U’ relationship. In the beginning the corruption level in a democratic regime goes up, then stabilizes and eventually falls when the norms of democratic accountability and rule of law are established. It happened in the case of UK where dismantling of what was called ‘old corruption’ took several decades but as the franchise expanded and democratic norms evolved, misuse of public office for personal gains became less likely. Democracy in developing countries, however, has not clearly proven more successful at tackling corruption. India is a case in point where corruption is rampant despite a well- established democratic system of governance since almost seven decades. The track record of democracy in controlling corruption in poor and developing countries is not better than that of an authoritarian development state.18 These empirics about democracy are mind-boggling.
The people can get disillusioned if they do not consider themselves stakeholders in the system. The problem with democracy is that it may be of many stripes. Fareed Zakaria writes, “It appears that many countries are setting into a form of government that mixes a substantial degree of democracy with substantial degree of illiberalism. Just as nations across the world have become comfortable with many variations of capitalism, they could well adopt and sustain varied forms of democracy.”19 Mr. Zakaria may be right. All democracies may not strictly be called liberal democracies as those of the West but there can be the worst forms of democracy that may not have even a semblance of democratic virtues in society from social and economic perspectives. Competitive authoritative regimes are such examples.20 We can have a democracy but a dysfunctional one, captured by the elite and vested interests. Such democracies may not be inclusive at all and may not be much different from dictatorial regimes. Safeguarding the interests of few groups or families cannot be a democracy in the true sense.
Exclusion: The root of fragility
People need to feel that they have a stake in the democracy. It can be done through policies of inclusion and incorporation but in case of Pakistan the state has followed exclusionary policies and the result is that people have become disillusioned with the political system. Sit-ins and agitations are the very manifestations of such disillusionment. Political, economic and social exclusions are deeply entrenched in Pakistan. A small segment of society has monopoly over power, profit and patronage. Huge gaps exist between theory (constitutional rights as enshrined in the Constitution) and their implementation in real life. Plutocracy,as it existed in colonial times when the British relied on very few families to perpetuate their colonial rules, is still a reality of political life where very few families perpetuate their hegemony over political and economic power.
The state apparatus- bureaucracy, judiciary, police, etc. —has not adapted to the needs of a modern democratic dispensation that is supposed to be working on the principle of equality. At least four forms of exclusion can be identified very easily i.e. regional exclusion, exclusion from access to land, exclusions based on religion, and exclusion of youth and women. While Pakistan is a federation, exclusion of some regions from political power and economic development is a big source of conflict and fragility. Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Sindh have persistently complained against Punjab’s domination indecision making at the central level. Then there are further divides among the provinces themselves.
In Punjab, the divide between its Northern and Southern parts due to uneven development is apparent. In Sindh, it is evident in the shape of rural-urban disparities. In KPK, there is a clear divide in development indicators and priorities for the settled districts such as Mardan, Charsada, and Nowshera andthe tribal area starting from Peshawar to the Afghan border at Torkham. The grievances of the Baluchis and Pashtuns are not only limited to exclusion from national power and resources buttheir traditional governance structures there are also highly exclusionary in nature. The tribal areas stretch from Chitral in the northeast to Baluchistan’s Mountain’s southwest end and the Pakistan-Afghanistan 2430 km Durand line frontier. It seems as if the Pakistani State is totally out of touch with the tribal dimension and has hardly made any serious effort to incorporate these areas in the national mainstream.
The governance structures have not changed from what they were prior to independence. For example, in the FATA, the federal government’s representative (the political agent) uses tribal leaders (maliks) to maintain control over the local population and channel development resources. Maliks were widely resented by the people and this resentment helpedthe Taliban attract support through a narrative of struggle against the corrupt Political agent-malik nexus. The case of Baluchistan is similar where hereditary leaders called ‘sardars’ wield power and act as intermediaries between the state and the populace. They are the main beneficiariesof natural resources, hold political offices and control the allocation of development budgets in their interest. So the point here is that no serious efforts were ever taken by the state to make the political system inclusive by incorporating these geographical areas through adoption of modern governance structures. The seventh 2009 National Finance Commission award and 18th Amendment are some steps forward but the results of the same yet remain to be seen as these steps have not yet fundamentally done away withexclusions, even at a theoretical level.
Another source of exclusion is the highly skewed distribution of land in Pakistan. Traditionally, the big landlords have remained the custodians of economic and political power. If poverty is endemic and no light is visible at the end of the tunnel, then democracy will remain in peril. We have seen that democracy and income are directly linked. Empirics suggest that land reforms have a significant and positive impact on income growth and accumulation of human and physical capital. Land reforms introduced in India are a case in point.21 Unequal distribution of land in rural areas is a major cause for the skewed political and economic power in Pakistan. Highly skewed power structures explain the fragility of institutions in Pakistan as institutions evolve and become strong in comparatively egalitarian societal arrangements.
According to estimates about 67 % of households own no land. About 18.25% of households own 5 acres of land and 9.66 % own 5 to 12.5 acres of land. A very small portion of households, 0.37%, own large farms above 55 acres of land. High level of unequal land distribution is thus the main reason and manifestation of poverty in rural areas.22 With the passage of time things have worsened and poverty has deepened. The impact of the industrial revolution and mechanization of farming is now very much visible in rural areas. Added to this, the policies for rural development were tailored on the assumption that agricultural development is synonymous with rural development. Such is not the case. Small percentage of households own land in the rural areas. The landless majority did not benefit from the agricultural policies. The fallacious approach to rural development has further strengthened the grip of the land owners on the political and economic landscape while the landless have become poorer and poorer with the passage of time. No concrete policy has ever been tailored for the rural non-farm economy23 and surplus labour with the result that even the so-called democracies have failed to disperse power among the rural landless class.
Due to the concentration of power in a few hands, institutions have not become inclusive with the result that a majority of the people now do not consider themselves stakeholders in the affairs of the state. The nexus between land ownership and political power is a big stumbling block in the political empowerment of the landless. They can neither exercise their political power nor hold the leaders accountable. They are just mobilized to provide support to their patrons at the time of elections. Theycannot form horizontal networks and are helpless in face of the corrupt and elite-controlled system of governance. Persistence of power of the landed elite, especially in the province of Punjab,is a result of the reinforcement overtime of an institutional framework of politics where the landed elite has provided services in exchange of patronage. The dependence trajectory path which started with the advent of the rule of the British in the subcontinent could not be altered even after hundreds of years. Several critical moments came in the history of Pakistan but all the ‘critical junctures’ were wasted due to the deeply entrenched power of the landed elite.24
The third category of exclusion relates to minorities. They have been formally as well as informally discriminated against by the state and the society. Social, economic and political space has shrunk for them with each passing day. Our society has slowly but steadily grown intolerant towards the minorities. The last couple of years have registered sharp deteriorating trends in this regard. An alarming trend of persecution of those advocating minorities’ causes and raising their voice for a more inclusive, harmonious and tolerant polity has become more pronounced. Now it seems as if our society has internalized this culture of intolerance towards the minorities. Against this backdrop, it is important to go back to Pakistan’s founding fathers to see as to what kind of polity they wanted and what place they reserved for non-Muslim communities in the body politic of the newly created state.
Pakistan is lucky enough to have what is called a ‘youth bulge,’ when developed countries like Japan are worried about the future economic growth due to their aging population. There are, however, apprehensions that the youth bulge may not necessarily turn out into a ‘youth dividend’ mainly due to their non-integration into the economy. The economic growth rate is not sufficient to provide the youth decent employment. Pakistan is faced with twin challenges with regard to the youth. First, how to increase economic growth to at least above 7% and then sustain it to absorb the burgeoning population of the youth in the labour market and second how to provide the skillset to the youth required by the labour market. Pakistan’s economic growth rate is hovering around 4% which is not sufficient at all to provide employment to the youth entering the labour market. The determinants of long-term economic growth are nowwidely known and discussed in economic literature. It is now well recognized that institutions and human resources are the main determinants of long-term economic growth and by tinkering at the margins, you cannot sustain economic growth. Liberal investments are required for human resource development.
Unfortunately, Pakistan has invested very little in education and health, even when compared to countries with similar economic development and per capita income. Unemployment among the youth is the most serious area of concern for Pakistan. This has a direct link with political stability. If urgent policy steps for creating decent employment are not taken, things may get worse in the coming years simply due to heightened awareness and expectations of the youth. When people become more educated, their relations with the state change. They become more demanding. According to the UNDP report, 2014 Pakistan is ranked 146in the Human Development Index, at the same position it was last year, among a total of 187 countries. Pakistan has been bracketed with low development countries like Nepal, Afghanistan, Myanmar, Mali, Kenya, Rwanda, Nigeria, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Liberia. Pakistan is the worst scorer, even in South Asia, as India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Maldives, and Nepal respectively sit at 135,142, 73, 136, 103, and145. Further, Pakistan has the lowest female HDI in the South Asian region. In terms of GDI Pakistan is ranked 145 while India, Sri lanka, Maldives, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Bhutan are respectively placed at 132, 66, 90, 102, 107, and 136. Pakistan is ranked 127 out of 187 countries in terms of gender inequality. Pakistan is bracketed with Afghanistan, Niger, and Yemen where gender gaps are 30-40% higher and business as usual approach may take decades to narrow down these gaps25.
Pakistan’s educational system has been a main contributor towards exclusion and fragility of democracy. It is highly exclusionary with three streams running parallel to one another. The first stream relates to Urdu medium schools which mostly operate in the public sector. Students in Urdu medium public schools come from low-income groups of society. Madressahs are the second stream of education in Pakistan. These religious seminaries cater to the needs of the poorest of the poor. The third category of schools is of the privately run schools. They cater to the needs of the upper and upper middle class. Schools established by the Army also fall under this category. The point here is that different streams of education adopted in Pakistan have accentuated schisms in the society with different outlooks towards democracy and worldviews which are at loggerheads with one another. The educational system has contributed towards alienation and polarization in society. Education in Pakistan is stratified according to the socio-economic status of people. It also provides different earning opportunities with different income levels. Education is considered a great social and economic leveler. Contrary to this, the education system in Pakistan has helped create haves and have-nots through sustained focus on elite education to the detriment of the common man26 .
Here arises an interesting question: why did the state patronize elite education and neglect the poor and the downtrodden? In Pakistan, education has historically received little priority both in terms of resource allocation and policy focus. The reasons are quite obvious. The political system, democratic or otherwise, was never broad-based in character as well as orientation. As the decision-making power was dominated by the rich elite, the poor never figured in political priorities. If the political arrangements are not broad-based, politicians are not responsive to the needs of the families using public schools27. It implies that neglect of public education for the poor will continue unless political arrangements are broad-based and reflect the preferences of the people.
It may be added here that sustainability of democracy is also closely linked to education. The idea that higher education leads to more democracy has received a great deal of empirical support. What are the channels through which education promotes and sustains democracy? First is the standard efficiency argument. It says that democracy provides an effective mechanism to oust corrupt, incompetent and inept politicians through elections. This would, however, be possible only if the voters are capable to process information to evaluate and monitor government actions and policies. The uneducated and illiterate voters are certainly in a disadvantageous position compared with the well-educated voters as far as their ability to process information and take rational decisions is concerned. Winston Churchill is reported to have once said that the best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter. The sustainability of democracy thus depends on the quality of the average voter as well. Democratic elections do not help and may possibly harm in the recruitment of a competent and honest political elite in countries with largely uneducated populations28.
Good governance and inclusion
Empirics on democracy suggest that it does not per se contribute towards economic growth. It does not reduce corruption at least in the short-run and its impact on inequality is also doubtful. The salubrious impacts of democracy on development and growth come via good governance. Governance is still an amorphous concept. However, it essentially means rule of the law, institutions and not persons, accountability, control of corruption, and transparency. Governance and state capacity are also closely related. Capacity of tax collection i.e. tax-to-GDP ratio is taken as a proxy variable in empirical literature for the capacity of the state. Against this yardstick, we have a weak state. Our tax-to-GDP ratio is the lowest in South Asia. We cannot collect due taxes. We rely more on indirect taxes and cannot bring the tax evaders to book. Public health and education systems do not deliver. Dispensation of justice to the poor and powerless has become a nightmare because the state cannot enforce its laws and provide prompt and cost-free justice. It is not possible to improve governance unless state capacity is improved. How can the universal right to education be honored if the teachers do not show up to teach? How can the basic health delivery be ensured if the doctors are absent from the hospitals and basic health units? How can the proper taxes and duties be collected if those responsible to run the state machinery do not feel obligated to pay taxes?
Poor governance is as big a source of instability as exclusionary policies are. “That governance in Pakistan is far from perfect is evident in many ways. Relations between the state and the people in Pakistan are weak. Service delivery to people is poor, if they exist at all, institutions are weak and law and order precarious. Various parts of the state cannot seem to work with one another. Poor governance increases frustration and reduces state legitimacy in the eyes of the people. It creates space for alternative ideologies. Many instances can be cited in Pakistan where weak governance result in frustration. There is some evidence to show that lack of governance is also a factor in the spread of extremism”29.
Pakistan has persistently scored low on various indices of governance. For example, in the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators30 (WGI) index which measures the performance of a country against six indicators i.e. voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption, Pakistan’s score is persistently in the negative as is evident from the following tabulated data.
