by S. Mushfiq Murshed
On 6 September 1995, a mob of a few thousand, “instigated by the ruling Junta”—the Rabbani regime who had lost its legitimacy—set ablaze and ransacked the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul. The ambassador, defence attaché, other diplomats and embassy personnel were injured and a sanitary worker, mistaken for the ambassador, was killed. Islamabad, however, showed restraint and did not break diplomatic ties with the regime in Kabul. It has remained Islamabad’s policy to recognize the ‘entity’ that controls Kabul as Afghanistan’s legitimate government. In 1996 there was a slight delay, however, ultimately the outcome remained the same. Islamabad recognized Mullah Omar’s Government nine months after they had captured Kabul.
Almost 20 years later the Taliban are back and, with them, the options to recognize, engage or isolate have resurfaced on a global scale.
Taliban victories and the concomitant ease with which the Ghani regime and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) collapsed perplexed the world. When asked, what will follow; global leaders and experts fell back on two phrases: “We are still processing the developments” and “the situation is fluid”. Thereby, subtly admitting that they do not know. Nonetheless, a certain level of engagement by the international community is required. If for nothing else other than to assuage global concerns regarding the proliferation of terrorist safe havens in Afghanistan with transnational agendas.
With most of its foreign reserves frozen, the new regime in Kabul does not possess the means to alleviate the economic plight of its citizens.
A lack of international support will not only accelerate the downwards spiral towards a failed state and exponentially increase the burdens and miseries of Afghanis, but also enhance the hold that drug lords, warlords and terrorist organizations have over the new, post-Doha Agreement, dispensation.
As it is, the implementation of the relevant points in the Doha Agreement in the form of a national policy will be next to impossible due to the socio-political dynamics that are specific to Afghanistan. Afghan history is replete with instances of the central government’s effort to impose its authority over tribal chiefs. For Afghanis, however, tribal affiliation outweighs any national sentiment. Therefore, attempts by the center to institutionalize the army and bureaucracy and converge tribal loyalties into one unified national sentiment have, to-date, remained unattainable. In the present scenario, unless the social, political and economic gains of provincial and central government synchronization sufficiently outweigh the monetary benefits associated with drug trafficking and allowing safe havens, the views of the skeptics of the Doha Agreement will be vindicated by what ensues.
Victory in Panjsher may consolidate Taliban’s control of Afghanistan, however, genuine legitimacy is a different matter; for that, all segments of Afghan society need representation and a broad-based multi-ethnic government remains the only solution. Interestingly, the Taliban (1996- 2001) “had appointed eleven non-Pashtuns as governors, some of them in Pashtun provinces, and included four or five members of the minority ethnic groups in the cabinet.”
The current Taliban leadership has assured the world of its commitment to establish an inclusive government (which is not apparent with the recent appointment of the cabinet), to eradicate all extremist militant elements with transnational agendas, and to address human rights violations, in particular pertaining to gender discrimination. Skeptics consider this rhetoric as a mere smokescreen. They argue that the underlying ideology that influenced the Taliban of the 1990s remains the same. They may have a point and recognition, at this time, may embolden the interim regime and encourage them to remain complacent regarding the policy changes that the world expects from them.
‘Engaging’ with the new regime remains the only option. Isolation on the pretext of perceived threats and violation of human rights will be disastrous for the people. The international community must show patience. Historically, most revolutions are radical and extremist in nature in the beginning. Moderation comes with time.
As far as global terrorism is concerned, based on the theocratic ideology of the Taliban regime under Mullah Omar, no matter how nefarious, generally maintained a domestic agenda rather than transnational ambitions. There is a letter dated 6 September 1999 that was written by Mullah Omar to President Bill Clinton. The letter was published in a book authored by the late S. Iftikhar Murshed, titled, ‘Afghanistan: The Taliban Years’ (which is also the main source of reference for this article). Aline in the letter supports the above-mentioned point: “Whatever we are—even if we are as you say fundamentalists— we are far away from you and we do not intend to harm you and cannot harm you either.”
The Taliban were, however, complicit to the extent that they allowed the proliferation of safe havens for extremist militants within their borders to plan and execute their transnational terrorist attacks. Some analysts/experts believe that if the world had engaged with the previous Taliban regime, then they would eventually have found their way towards moderation. That did not happen, and global consequences of that isolation are more than apparent.
The Biden administration is now looking at an “over-the horizon’” strategy for Afghanistan as its focus tilts towards the Asia Pacific region. As donor fatigue slips in and Afghanistan no longer holds centerstage in the headlines of global media, the US’s western allies may also shift their attention and abstain from long term commitments and engagement with the convenient excuse that the Taliban have not upheld their end of the bargain regarding human rights, in particular gender discrimination.
It will, therefore, be up to the countries whose borders are contiguous with Afghanistan to engage for the socio-economic well-being and progress of the country. Their geographic proximity will not allow them to be bystanders to whatever occurs in Afghanistan—a spillover effect is guaranteed.
It is difficult to break a mindset. In the context of Afghanistan and the region, the perceived threats from the recent ascendancy of the Taliban remain similar, to a certain extent, to those from 1996.
These are: 1) the export of Taliban extremist ideology; 2) influx of refugees; 3) safe havens for militants with foreign agendas; and 4) minority rights and inclusion in government.
However, as the senior Taliban officials from the 1996-2001 regime that remain in the cabinet of Taliban 2.0 may recall, these regional countries were not innocent bystanders. The ethnic minorities (Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmen, and Shias) in Afghanistan were not considered as Afghanis but as an extension of the dominant ethnicity of the neighbouring country. Under the pretext of perceived threats and the protection of their respective ethnic groups, these countries meddled in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.
The animosity between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, for instance, was displayed by the Uzbek and Tajik turf wars in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Iran’s attempt to maximise Shia representation in any power sharing mechanism in Afghanistan was based on enhancing its influence in the country. It was also speculated by analysts in the late 90s, that unrest in Afghanistan for a few more years suited Tehran as this would ensure that the Central Asian Republics had no option but to rely on trade routes via Iran, as opposed to Pakistan. Pakistan’s attempt to maintain a neutral stance was not accepted after Islamabad recognized the Taliban government in 1997. The two countries of the region that remained comparatively neutral in their foreign policy towards Afghanistan were China and Turkmenistan. However, a tilt towards the Taliban was apparent after the 1998 collapse of the Northern Alliance. As such, the ground reality in 1996-2001 was the exact opposite to the perceived threat of the Taliban interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.
The region has been given another opportunity. Engaging with the present Taliban setup is needed, otherwise, ‘nature abhors a vacuum,’ and there are multiple extremist militant organizations with global agendas (ISIS-K, Al Qaeda, TTP, ETIM, etc.) that will thrive from the chaos and instability that will ensue. On the flipside, genuine engagement with the Taliban will ensure stability and economic prosperity to all in the region.
