by Sahar Pirzada*
*The author is an educationist and editor of the journal.
Abstract
We have to understand the story that is being told by the jihadists and readily taken to heart by most. Stories and narratives are not just constructed through words; they are propagated through constructed scenarios. How are we responding to the jihadist prompt and contributing to the chapters being written? What is the impact of such responses? What is the alternate tale we must weave? So far we have no clue. We have no counter-narrative, no alternate story, no alternative course that can be sold to an emotional populace– Author.
An unfortunate truth is that the world in general has reset itself to extremism, hard-core insular self-preservation, anti-globalization ambitions, xenophobia and maybe even ethnic superiority. Right wing ideas are gaining momentum. A more rigid mindset is crossing borders. These ideas are in the air we breathe, in the thoughts we think and sometimes in the actions we take. Extremism is no longer the copyright of the ‘traditional’ terrorist. We have moved backwards in a reverse evolution of the human mind. The degree of separation between people might still be the proverbial 6 degrees in terms of the world being connected and becoming a smaller place but the degrees of separation between minds and ideas is growing exponentially and irreconcilably. Terrorism, hate(on either side) and distrust seem to be the emerging common language. And here we are in the middle of it all, confused about what to defend, what to attack, what to embrace or understand and what to push against. Sometimes the voices overlap creating a nebulous haze of coercive pulls and tugs, pushing us somewhere, but where? My bet is that we do not know ourselves.
We are outraged at global terrorism. We are outraged at its domestic twin. At the inconceivable horror of APS surpassing any Greek tragedy, of the Bacha Khan University heartbreak, of the calamitous massacre of almost the entire legal fraternity in Quetta and much more. And rightly so. As incomplete and impotent an abstraction as outrage might be, it is a good place to begin the journey towards the trifecta of understanding, containment and narrative change for the world in general and for us here in Pakistan in particular.
NAP-ing NACTA
Arching back slightly let us look at some of the main incidents that gained notoriety and became tipping points for public outrage and social media frenzy, which – despite the criticism about the medium being merely useless noise pollution – does at times galvanize the government into action. The beauty of a masquerading democracy is that public opinion can sometimes matter. The cataclysmic APS terrorist attack of 16th December 2014 was a tipping point and soon after the Prime Minister of Pakistan along with the Army Chief unveiled a new counter terrorism strategy called the National Action Plan or NAP which outlines the 20 points given below to solve the powerful existing terror equation.
20 Points of the National Action Plan
1. Implementation of death sentence of those convicted in cases of terrorism.
2. Special trial courts under the supervision of Army. The duration of these courts would be two years.
3. Militant outfits and armed gangs will not be allowed to operate in the country.
4. NACTA, the anti-terrorism institution will be strengthened.
5. Strict action against the literature, newspapers and magazines promoting hatred, extremism, sectarianism and intolerance.
6. Choking financing for terrorist and terrorist organizations.
7. Ensuring against re-emergence of proscribed organizations.
8. Establishing and deploying a dedicated counter-terrorism force.
9. Taking effective steps against religious persecution.
10. Registration and regulation of religious seminaries.
11. Ban on glorification of terrorists and terrorist organizations through print and electronic media.
12. Administrative and development reforms in FATA with immediate focus on repatriation of IDPs.
13. Communication network of terrorists will be dismantled completely.
14. Measures against abuse of internet and social media for terrorism.
15. Zero tolerance for militancy in Punjab.
16. Ongoing operation in Karachi will be taken to its logical end.
17. Balochistan government to be fully empowered for political reconciliation with complete ownership by all stakeholders.
18. Dealing firmly with sectarian terrorists.
19. Formulation of a comprehensive policy to deal with the issue of Afghan refugees, beginning with registration of all refugees.
20. Revamping and reforming the criminal justice system.[i]
Given the shoddy results and growing statistics of terror post–NAP within the country it can safely be said that NAP has not worked effectively to its perceived potential for reasons that will be detailed here. Since the APS attack in 2014 there have been an additional 34 significant incidents of terror as calculated till 24 October 2016 and in these incidents 657 lives have been lost.[ii] There are numerous factors for the perceived impotence of NAP. According to an Asia Report of the International Crisis Group the NAP “looks( more) like a hastily-conceived wish list devised for public consumption during a moment of crisis than a coherent strategy.” [iii]
In addition, NACTA (National Counter Terrorism Authority), under which NAP falls, needs funds to the tune of Rs 2 billion to fulfill the requirements of national security.[iv]
Though NAP is perceived to be an ineffective entity procrastinating on its mandate, there are those who believe that as a consequence of the army’s stepped up operations, Pakistan is winning the war on terror. Violence has dropped down three quarters in the last two years and the country is safer than it has ever been since George bush launched the War on Terror 15 years ago.[v] We are loath to thinking that NAP is a napping body, asleep and inconsequential.
But here is the bigger question that arises. Is a ‘you hit us and we hit back harder’ policy the answer to a deep rooted and complex problem or is it just a short term solution? Granted that at the time the army needed to assert its military might and to push back a growing, tangible threat, however, success accrued through such means is only ephemeral and might result in a more severe and multi-faceted backlash. A shoot-to kill modus operandi ends up sowing the seeds for further resurgence with legends of martyrdom to add to the cause. The military has now accomplished the tough part of the job but this cleansing of militants has now left a vacuum in the areas that were engaged in Operation Zarb e Azb. A crucial task now falls on the civil government. It needs to follow through, build civil structures and bridge the gap between the rest of the country and the disenfranchised malcontents who resultantly fall into extremism in the absence of support from the government. The civil government needs to now decapitate the possibility of a resurgence and direct narrative change by putting in mechanisms like schooling, improved sanitation and housing and rejuvenating the local economy for social uplift. Now that the civil government has been handed a blank canvass by the army it needs to develop and implement socio-economic welfare projects for real – beyond the standard projections on paper. The hard work and successes of the Army must not be in vain. The government must capitalize on these gains.
It was necessary, at the time, for General Raheel Sharif to use this strategy because the course of history was to be directed through aggressive, decisive military action and a strong message needed to be sent to the jihadists in spite of the regressive policy implications for civilian governance of such a sanction. The perception of the previously demonstrated lackadaisical approach to the militant issue and an ambivalent state policy towards them had to be tuned up and made more potent and immediate. The army successfully led this change forward and the General put his foot down, so to speak. In the public eye the man dwarfed the mission, proving correct Thomas Carlyle’s view that the “history of the world is but the biography of great men.”
Aggressive military responses and policy redirection, though necessary, remain a short to medium term solution. For long term effectiveness we need to develop a different discourse; an alternate narrative for the thousands of jihadists, jihadist supporters and potential jihadists – the common men or women who may turn towards the stories we are being told and what we see unfolding before our own eyes, globally and within narrower spheres.
Narrative Implications & Design
We have to understand the story that is being told by the jihadists and readily taken to heart by most. Stories and narratives are not just constructed through words; they are propagated through constructed scenarios. How are we responding to the jihadist prompt and contributing to the chapters being written? What is the impact of such responses? What is the alternate tale we must weave? So far we have no clue. We have no counter-narrative, no alternate story, no alternative course that can be sold to an emotional populace. There is nothing, except for the cacophonous, bellowing cries of the liberals who vociferously project the ‘westernized-us’ and ‘barbarian-them’ constructs. This is immediately rejected by the people they are meant to address simply because the majority cannot relate to such alienating and derogatory distinctions, especially in the context of Islam. The ‘otherization’ between the west and Islam that Reza Aslan speaks of is being propagated in a similar fashion by liberals and the ever-present social media evangelists within Islam.
How do we decide which side of the fence to sit on? Are the Taliban good or bad? Is rejecting a fight pedalled in the name of Islam sinful? Does that mean we are succumbing to the might of western social and religious influence? Does that make us bad Muslims? Do we need to support the likes of Qadri to prove we are loyal to Islam and its Prophet (PBUH)? Who is telling the truth, them or us? Does it even matter? When the curtain is drawn which side do we want to be aligned with, God’s or the other side, whatever that might be. These are some of the questions weighing on the collective consciousness of the Muslim polity, whether we like to accept it or not.
Crimes & Shrines
The counter narrative to this awareness needs to be developed with a wider base of issues. It is perhaps because of this empty space between extremism and true Islam that resting places of people like Qadri turn into shrines. It is not that all religious people are crazed or irrational in their Islamic fervor but one must try and understand what propels such choices. And there is a reason because all action takes place within a context and it is no longer enough to label them with the dismissive moniker of ‘fundo’. Labels placate our perturbed minds but contribute nothing towards an understanding of the situation with intent to improving it.
It is here that ‘reductionism’ comes in handy.
Looking back at Qadris funeral in Rawalpindi, one recollects an ocean of people beyond where the eye could see. What inspired such a popularly endorsed reaction and support? Also, it was probably the only such procession of this numerical strength that took place without incident or violence. That being a rarity in itself cancels the assumption that religious fervor by default inspires violence from people. It was not that Salman Taseer was such a hated man, in fact the contrary is true. It was not that he defended Asia Bibi. But the media reports were never clear on what had actually transpired. What had Salman Taseer done that had driven such a response from people? Was the reaction out of a bias that he supported Asia bibi, a Christian woman, or was it because he defended a woman accused of “Tawheen –e- Risalat”? The entire argument was pitted against respect for the Holy Prophet(PBUH) and a man who defended someone who, it was popularly assumed, did not. If this is where the argument rests perhaps a majority of Muslims do not have a choice. It was not as a Huffpost put it, “a struggle between reason and bigotry.”[vi] Neither was it an argument about whether we may kill someone we are hired to defend or kill someone who said something against the Prophet(PBUH). This never came up. Wasn’t there a mass of people in the times of the Prophet(PBUH) himself who spoke ill of him? The ‘Sahaba’ or ‘Companions’ did not take it upon themselves to kill those people. Neither did the argument that the blasphemy laws in Pakistan need to be addressed. There are varying versions of why Salman Taseer was a target with little clarity on whether Salman Taseer had actually shown his support for ‘Tawheen –e- Risalat’ or just Asia bibi because that is the exact point where the connection was made on the issue in popular understanding. When dealing with such emotionally potent subjects in the context of religion, perspicuity is often lost. Even in a recent discussion held with peers there is little consensus or clarity on the trigger, just a popular enveloping anger over the incident. In such an event heroes, false or true, are born and on the opposing end ubiquitous outrage is bred. Obscenities and hatred is screeched out; incongruous assumptions and non sequitur arguments are pitted against each other; and shrines take birth as a response to an emotional impulse, not fact or rationale. As Jeyn Roberts put it, “there are three sides to every story, yours, mine and what really happened.”
Such emotional trials and sentencing by the public and media are not uncommon or limited to the Muslim world. Where emotions are aroused, the public tries and sentences or crowns people regardless of the crime. The trials are hinged on the perceptions of abused humanity or other such emotional trigger points. Look at the case of ‘Phoolan Devi’ or ‘The Bandit Queen’ of India. She suffered a life of abuse in her early years but then turned to a life of crime. “She was charged with forty-eight crimes, including multiple murders, plunder, arson and kidnapping for ransom.”[vii] But these crimes meant nothing in the mind of the public and later gained her sympathy enough to acquire the “respectful sobriquet ‘Devi’ which was conferred upon her by the media.”[viii] Not only that, but she was elected to the ‘Lok Sabha’, not once but twice. Glorification only needs justification in the mind. Qadri’s glorification perhaps also rests on such vindications, of an attack on the office of Prophethood muting out all other nuances and implications of the act and garnering such mass sympathy. It had become a case of man versus Prophet. It was no longer Salman Taseer versus an armed guard.
And the media must take some responsibility. In an absence of clarity one must remember the words of Thomas Carlyle, “Popular opinion is the greatest lie in the world.” It does not matter which side of the opinion war you are on.
Missing Heroes & Iconoclasty
Then there are other unfortunate realities, like the absence of icons and heroes. It would also be useful to remember that one man’s hero is another man’s terrorist. Most recently Lal Masjid’s Maulana Abdul Aziz has endorsed the already glorified status of Osama bin Laden to other religious zealots by naming the Lal Masjid library after him.[ix] This is the same man who openly showed support for Daesh and “called for jihad against the government.”[x] Lal Masjid has its woes with the government inter alia for the shootout-confrontation with the military known as ‘Operation Silence’ in 2007 in which hundreds of militants were killed. To ensure their survival they joined hands with allied Pashtun and Punjabi militants eventually forming the TTP under Baitullah Mehsud after they launched a relentless retaliatory suicide bombing campaign.[xi] Two lessons can be drawn from this. First that the use of force on its own only results in an exacerbated militant response and unity. Second, there is a dire need for contemporary heroes for young jihadists and the general population to look up to.
The icons, role models and heroes in Pakistan are the likes of the esteemed Quaid-e-Azam, Allama Iqbal, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and their contemporaries or from further back in history, people like Muhammad bin Qasim, etc. As revered and lofty in stature as these heroes are, they belong to a time long gone. The social and political milieu in which they lived was different; the issues they struggled against were different and bore barely any semblance of commonality with the issues present today. Young people respect them but do not relate to them regarding their own struggles today. There is no connection between the past, the present and the contemporary challenges they face. In modern times we look for icons and find them, if at all, in either actors or entertainers with a voice and a liberal outlook, or in the army. To the liberals these people are indeed heroes but to those of a slightly conservative tilt of mind they are certainly the opposite. It is with this scenario as the backdrop that conservatives find themselves surrounded by iconoclasts who attack the images of their contemporary idols. Due to a lack of relatable and contemporary heroes, they turn to the pull of heroes on the opposing militant end. This is how Osama Bin Laden becomes the role model that a library is named after. On the part of Abdul Aziz this is not just an act of defiance or provocation, but shrewd strategic planning. We should utilize his strategy and, instead of simply being iconoclasts of the jihadist world, we must offer them new heroes and less extreme alternatives.
The jihadists are telling their story better. Their heroes are contemporary and live in the current socio-political context engaged in a struggle that the youth can relate to. Pakistan, Palestinian oppression, the IDP issue, the collateral damage victims of military operations in parts of Pakistan are all issues that impact them and which they might even be victims of. We need to develop a counter narrative to neutralize the iconization of people that fit their reality better. An important step in the counter- narrative development effort should be the shaping of new heroes and new icons to celebrate, follow and be inspired by. Heroes are born through relatability , not ideas taken off a wish list.
Dropping Secularism
Words, like symbols, have power. Reza Aslan explains, in an interview with the Harvard Business Review,[xii] that though one often hears a case being made for secular states where religion should not play a part in politics, one often confuses the distinction between secularism and secularization, especially in a democratically elected government. He does not agree that Islam is more political than other religions, rather, he believes most religions around the world are more a matter of identity than belief. Religion defines the relationships between creator and creation and other aspects of people’s identity like their life goals, ethnicity, culture, their social and political views, their social and sexual orientation. “The notion of a political religion is a misunderstanding of what religion is. If religion is about how you see the world then of course politics plays a role in that…the unconsidered but completely understandable plea to remove religion from politics is really impossible especially in a democracy.”[xiii] Religion is inextricably linked to people as part of a communal experience and a democracy is built on the notion that a person can freely vote for an individual who represents their beliefs best, and that includes the part religion plays. It might be the case, according to him, that Islam might need to enter into a political debate on its own terms and challenge the structures and assumptions of a Western import of the idea. That too is fine because democracy is “malleable” and an “ongoing phenomenon” in a world where one third of its 1.6 billion Muslims already live under democracy, albeit different versions of it. “Even the United States is still defining what it means to be a democracy….and there are Muslim states that are doing a fine job of how to reconcile religion in society.”[xiv] Here is where he demarcates the difference between secularization and secularism. We seem to be trapped in the idea of secularism and the belief that we cannot move forward without it . “Secularism is an ideology predicated on the notion that religion should have no role to play in society.” And by this definition no society, not even the United States is a secular society. “The United States on the contrary, is a society in which we encourage the use of religion in government, in society, in politics. The process we are referring to is secularization, the process whereby the political authority is transferred from the hands of the religious authorities and put into the hands of civic authorities. And what we see in Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey is the process of secularization not secularism. Secularism is not a necessary ingredient to democracy. So it is incorrect and absurd to say that the reason these Muslim-majority nations are successful is because they are secular. They are not secular. They are secularizing, and that is a necessary requirement but secularism is not. ”
Therefore, in any counter-narrative that Pakistan might want to develop an important step would be to drop the banner of wanting a secular state. This poses an immediate threat to the mass sentiment of a conservative population who assume that supporting this idea will be the beginning of the end of a way of life defined by their religion and will propagate values alien to their traditions. Once this threat is removed and the distinction between secularization and secularism is explained trust might be renewed with their elect to safeguard their views and their religion which is inextricably linked to who they are. In fact, if it is the power of the word that detracts from consensus why not just drop the word and find another?
The State, the intellectuals and think tanks working on directing policy need to understand that for any social experiment to be successful people cannot be alienated from their beliefs and thus, must develop a counter narrative accordingly, one that embraces rather than alienates. If such a political system were developed and a better quality of life were delivered regarding basic human rights, life opportunities, health, education etc half the battle would be won from the word go.
Currently the state is either unable to provide for these people and are in fact, sometimes responsible for their strife for example loss of life, property, access to health, education and then additionally if the state comes along and threatens to take their belief away from them it is obviously an invitation to an extreme or a violent reaction. Providing safe havens, basic amenities and a chance to prosper to people will help change their perceptions and give the state control of the narrative that it must script.
Religious Discourse & Sufism
Though this wave of global extremism, as mentioned earlier, has landed at our doorstep there are measures that can be taken to change the narrative even within the application of religion in our lives. Towards this end during a visit in 2010 of PM Yousaf Raza Gillani to the US he proposed that the US support Sufi Islam in Pakistan.[xv]
Islam was spread in the subcontinent through imminent Sufis who encouraged a more liberal version of Islam while staying within the tenets of true Islam itself. Though there is a wide diversity even in this realm they are more pluralistic than puritanical in their interpretations of Islam as opposed to the Wahabist militant movements dominant within the current Pak- Afghan landscape.
Sufi Islam is diametrically opposed to the orthodox, militant strain of Wahabist or Salafist Islam as launched by Saudi Arabia in the 1970s that runs through the fabric of Pakistani society currently, as funded by the varied interest groups in Pakistan & abroad. “Salafis and Wahhabis are relentless enemies of traditionalists and Sufis. Whenever radical Islamist movements have gained power they have sought to suppress the practice of traditionalist and Sufi Islam, as in the well-known destruction of early Islamic monuments in Saudi Arabia. Because of their victimization by Salafis and Wahhabis, traditionalists and Sufis are natural allies of the West to the extent that common ground can be found with them.”[xvi] But even Sufi Islam itself is a very diverse spectrum and is practiced differently in different countries. A diffused version of Sufi-influenced Islam is practiced in Indonesia, Bosnia, Syria, Iran, Kazakhstan while in countries such as Morocco, Turkey, India, and Malaysia Sufism exists in a disciplined, organized form. In rare instances Sufi Islam has manifested radical tendencies and supported militant groups, but by and large Sufi groups fall on the moderate side of the divide and oppose political activism and the use of violence.
Though Pakistan needs an alternate religious narrative there is no guarantee that Sufism is the answer. This alternative may lack clarity in implementation and there is no surety that it can counter orthodoxy and a literal interpretation of sharia. Another hurdle in this proposition is that Sufi Islam is not equipped with modern tools for communication such as internet propaganda and hash-tag campaigns in the way that the extremist elements are in its use.
Change in religious discourse comes with its perils. A case in point being Fetullah Gulen of Turkey. He, for long, emphasized Sufi Islam and was opposed to a relationship between government and Islamic law. He emphasized the compatibility of Islam and democracy, [xvii] yet, as it turned out, he was allegedly behind the recent failed military coup in Turkey. Though moderation still remains relevant in his stance, credibility and trust is lost. Such an allegation, if proved correct, along with the assumption that it is supported by the West creates a trust deficit with other Islamists. This is an important aspect to look at when developing a counter narrative. Alliance with or funding by Western interest groups decimates credibility and influence within target groups for the project.
Cyberspace & Education
Militancy finds border-less, un-patrolled space on the internet. It recruits, uses its propaganda machinery, trains and finds funding on the web. Though the internet is not a beast that can be reigned in, the state can at least try to stay in the race by better countering what is being built in cyberspace. If it is so easy to recruit people towards death, surely they can be recruited towards prospects of a happy and prosperous life. But here is where the State needs to put its money where its mouth is and provide alternatives and options to pliable minds. At least it needs to start a discussion with the same people. At present a majority of the discourse on the net from the liberal end is abuse and hatred for jihadists. Whoever won an ally by spewing contempt? The power of the internet must be understood. What is meted out is more aggression towards jihadists, hate versus hate and two versions of hate do not make a right. This must stop for it is making the jihadists job really easy for them. Any attempt for dialogue with the Taliban or similar bodies even outside of cyberspace are shot down and viewed as defeat and a giving in to the ‘mullah-brigade’ or the clergy – a term which in the public mind has become synonymous with regressive. No one wants discussion, including the liberals. Everyone wants war but “war does not determine who is right, only who is left.”[xviii] And this is no way to write a script.
Our counter narrative must also include an education overhaul. Since the results of such actions do not become visible quickly, no government takes them on. The need is not just for the government to regulate and modernize religious seminaries but develop its own educational infrastructure to meet the requirements of Pakistan’s growing population. More than that, it needs to focus on curriculum content. Thinking is shaped by what we learn in school. What is included and how it is presented determines the next generation’s mindset and choices. This is the power of what is called a ‘hidden curriculum’ which is present in all education systems.
Concluding Analysis
We are all sitting witness to a right –wing ideology that is gaining ground in Pakistan through both terror tactics and emotional conditioning. Some of it is our fault. Partly because in the past we have used religion since the birth of Pakistan for political expediency,[xix] partly because we participated in proxy wars without foresight of future consequences, in part because we have no clear strategy on how to counter jihadist fervor and presently deal with situations on an incident to incident basis. In some measure we the people, the military and the state are also unclear about how we really feel about the Taliban and thus underestimate the power of latent radical attitudes which are growing unabated.
Through it all, we must consider the mindset of a large mass of the population. Point of view distorts facts so it is imperative to look at what shapes point of view before we can tinker and tune emotionally potent issues to derive the desired effect. We need to then develop a counter narrative to the one that exists in Pakistan currently as a result of jihadist successes in the physical battlefield, in ideological constructs and in cyberspace. We have yet not thought clearly of a counter strategy that can be set in kinesis. We need movement, but by deliberate design, as an alternative to reactionary action which only reaps short term results. Will alternate strategies work? One does not know but with Goethe’s wisdom in mind, “Courage is the commitment to begin without any guarantee of success.” Movement alone cannot be associated with progress but a lack of it is a step backwards.
The right wing political and militant entities are putting their story forward better than the state. The unfolding socio-religious scenarios are of their construct. If the state built civic infrastructure and focused on the plight of the marginalized and disenfranchised segments of society perhaps a different national narrative would take shape silencing internal conflicts and addressing external consequences. Right now it is just the jihadists who are speaking and winning recruits to their ideology while we silently scamper to keep up so as the ancient proverb goes, “till the lion learns to write, the story will always glorify the hunter.”
Remember, “history is always written by victors”[xx] so it’s time to start winning. If you want to change the way the story ends start with changing the way it is being told. Tweak the narrative. And this is something the state has the power to do.
Our narrative should un-romanticize war and suggest to a right-wing audience other ways to live a life within the righteous and superb religion of true Islam and work for it in other ways than through violence, territorial usurping and terror. If we may allow ourselves to imagine it what we are telling them is to “Close their Byron and open their Goethe.”[xxi]
It is our story, let the state shape up and not allow the extremists to tell it any longer.
Reference
i. NAP 20 points http://www.nacta.gov.pk/NAPPoints20.htm
ii. As calculated by the author from the NACTA Official site listing significant incidents http://www.nacta.gov.pk/Downloads/10.Significant%20Incidents%20(25102016).pdf
iii. International Crisis Group Asia – Report N°271 22 July 2015 http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1002_1437645706_271-revisiting-counter-terrorism-strategies-in-pakistan-opportunities-and-pitfalls.pdf
iv. Reactivation of NACTA http://www.nacta.gov.pk/updates.htm#News3
v. http://www.spectator.co.uk/2016/12/pakistan-is-winning-its-war-on-terror/ by Peter Oborne and Sabin Agha – Pakistan is winning its war on terror – 31st December 2016
vi. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/taseer-will-live-as-an-icon-for-a-sane-just-pakistan_us_586c7e5de4b014e7c72ee4d8 by Raza Rumi – 4th Jan 2017
vii. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phoolan_Devi
viii. ibid
ix. https://www.dawn.com/news/1304835/blight-of-extremism Dawn newspaper – 28 Dec 2016
x. ibid
xi. https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00937552/document – Pakistan’s Counter-terrorism Strategy & its implications for domestic, regional and international security by Naeem Ahmed 28th Jan 2014
xii. http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=7702 The Protestantization of Islam in the West by Reza Aslan November 11, 2014 The Harvard Business Review
xiii. ibid
xiv. ibid
xv. http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/4349~v~Pakistans_Counterterrorism_Strategy__Separating_Friends_from_Enemies.pdf by Ayesha Siddiqa Washington Quarterly Winter 2011
xvi. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG574.pdf/ RAND Corporation Monograph – Building Moderate Muslim Networks by Angel Rabasa, Cherly Benard, Lowell H Shwartz and Peter Sickle.
xvii. ibid
xviii. Bertrand Russell
xix. Criterion Quarterly (Volume 11 Number 2)– Blaming Gravity by Sahar Pirzada
xx. Winston Churchill
xxi. Thomas Carlyle
