An Afghan Peace Process on Life Support

by Ozer Khalid†

Pakistan and the Region`s Evolving Relationship with an Afghanistan in Transition*

*The views expressed herewith are academically researched in-depth points of view that neither necessarily reflect those of the author`s nor Criterion Quarterly`s editorial team. Those seeking to academically reference this article for their research may do so as follows: Khalid, Ozer (2021) An Afghan Peace Process on Life Support, Criterion Quarterly, 27 April 2021.

† The author is a Senior Consultant, a Geo-Strategist, a Trainer, a regular CQ contributor and a counter terrorism expert and can be reached at [email protected]

Abstract

(The U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan, though now delayed till September 11, 2021, spawns substantive clouds of uncertainty pertaining to Afghanistan’s stability and security and the regional and global community’s future engagement in Afghanistan. The American withdrawal unleashes more critical questions than it answers.

This piece focuses on how the endgame in Afghanistan is a delicate and difficult balancing act in a region on a knife`s edge. It dissects the latest issues shaping Afghanistan with a particular focus on how they affect Pakistan and, more broadly, analyzes which events are likeliest to unfurl in a post US-withdrawal scenario.

This research will analyze the conflict and convergence of foreign vested interests in Afghanistan that can simmer into a fever-pitched battleground for regional powers to pursue their financial, political and strategic pursuits in the already war-ravaged country.

Within this context, major “stakeholders, spoilers and sponsors” for peace in Afghanistan will be discerned in this research.

Recommendations will also be made for deeper multilateral cooperation and preconditions conducive to peace and prosperity in Afghanistan. Stability in Afghanistan is a harbinger for wider security and regional connectivity in South and Central Asia. – Author)

A Foreign Policy Analysis

International¹ and regional states have deep-seated political and commercial interests in the uncompleted conflict in Afghanistan which will persist even after America`s departure.

Regional and neighbouring states, to varying degrees, seek peace, co-existence, an inclusive set-up and stability in Kabul. Lasting peace prospects in Afghanistan are heavily dependent on international support for local² conflict-resolution efforts. However, the dilemma rests: how best to implement this? The feasibility of a workable peace pact is contingent upon the backing of regional states, most notably Pakistan.

All regional actors must enhance their investments. Afghanistan’s integration with China’s³ BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) may also help stabilize and enhance Afghanistan`s economy.

For Afghanistan itself, as well as for regional stakeholders, stability in Afghanistan remains key to unlock South and Central Asia`s key social and economic potential. The operationalization of the strategic Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI)⁴ gas pipeline, the Central Asia-South Asia power project⁵ and essential links between Chabahar Port⁶ and Gwadar Port trade hubs, all depend upon stability in Afghanistan and will offer fruitful outcomes⁷.

Regional entities and initiatives such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization⁸ can also play a pivotal role to safeguard long-term peace in Afghanistan. Building confidence through region-shaping linkages, connectivity and institutions bridging South and Central Asia into a new geo-economic force, yields promising outcomes, both for Afghanistan and the regional actors, and, in and of themselves, motivate overcoming hurdles to a fragile peace process⁹.

This also raises an added inquiry as to whether the pertinent regional stakeholders¹⁰ are basing their diplomatic commitment in Afghanistan on local interests within the wider region, or on geopolitical calculations vis-a-vis America. The co-operation and priorities of neighbouring regional nations like Pakistan, Iran and Russia are largely contingent upon Washington`s aptitude to clearly articulate a long-term blueprint for reforming, lasting peace¹¹ and commitment.

Moreover, the sustainability of peace in Afghanistan depends on the government`s capability in dexterously dealing with a multitude of challenges: tackling rampant corruption and ensuring that legally charged officials remain at bay from Afghanistan`s politics; cracking down on institutionalized crime, especially the narcotics and illicit arms trade; safeguarding inalienable human rights, especially for ethnic minorities, despite a charged sectarian environment; and curtailing a patron-client network that alienates a mainstream of Afghanistan`s citizens.

Pakistan, Iran, Russia and China¹² dread the spillover effects from an unstable Afghanistan: the spread of radical militancy, terrorism, and illicit flow of narcotics and extremists, refugees, etc. In addition, Pakistan and India are predictably engaged in curbing each other’s sphere of influence in Afghanistan.

Several competing neighbouring states will seek to capitalize on gains and fill the power vacuum generated by the drawdown of US and NATO troops. Numerous states apprehend that the Taliban¹³ is likely to take over the reins of power, including vast swathes of Afghanistan, either by might or via consensus-building with opposition factions; disintegrating the volatile state further. Afghanistan may quite possibly return to a reality analogous of the early 1990s.

Warring non-state actors (NSAs), including neighbouring states, could welcome and intensify the presence of their favored extremist outfits back into Afghanistan to wage proxy wars on their behalf. The state will, once again, devolve into an epicenter for militant terrorists. Owing to unpredictable volatility and shaky security, all future peace- keeping missions, UN observers and/or military personnel will be strong-armed to leave.

The US and NATO¹⁴ troop departure may well precipitate economic withdrawal from Afghanistan, undermining global financial assistance rendering it tougher for the international development and humanitarian sectors to conduct their well-meaning initiatives in a country mired by poverty and under-development.

Such a chaotic scenario would boost an unremitting flow of illicit narcotics, intensifying human and organ smuggling, kidnappings, brazen corruption and organised crime. With all this comes an inescapable possibility of Afghanistan turning into a larger safe haven and sanctuary for ISIS/Daesh, and other illicit regional actors, similar to what occurred in Libya, Iraq and Syria.

In such a scenario, states like Iran, Russia¹⁵ and China¹⁶ will augment their diplomatic outreach towards the Taliban, while simultaneously pursuing their own competing separate national agendas. Proxy wars will once again be the order of the day.

Countries with Strategic Interest in Afghanistan

Pakistan

Biden`s September 11 withdrawal is a moment of both exoneration and apprehension in Islamabad. As a corollary of the Islamabad Security Dialogue (ISD) and an orientation to a (bumpy) geo-economic reset, Pakistan`s foreign policy reorientation no longer views Afghanistan through the constraining lens of security- centered “strategic depth”.

An American departure entails that Pakistan would have to shoulder the largest burden of the cataclysm that analysts inevitably forecast.

Civil war is not ruled out and with it, the inexorable flow of refugees into Pakistan, once again, yielding to a humanitarian crisis.

The repercussions of a civil war in Afghanistan would be immense for Pakistan at a time when Covid-19`s third wave surges nationwide, resources are stretched to the brim, the economy is floundering¹⁷, inflation surges unabated¹⁸, Pakistan remains on the FATF grey-list, and Pakistan stays afloat on an IMF loan and Extended Fund Facility (EFF) with exigent strings attached, triggering exceptionally high volatility and downside risks.

Moreover, the Taliban are far from being a monolith. They have recently mounted illustrated streaks of dissent vis-à-vis Islamabad. Pakistan has to guard against instability in Afghanistan from spilling over the border. Though Pakistan’s eastern front with India is quiet for now owing to a ceasefire, however, post US pull-out, ceasefire violations are likely to recommence which is a key and understandable concern for Pakistan.

Pakistan has, therefore, played a quintessential role in bridge- building and brokering the Doha peace process. Pakistan supports an Afghanistan that is at peace with itself¹⁹.

Islamabad always sought a cordial rapport with governments in Kabul. Islamabad has undertaken a sensible decision of being a “neutral participant” in Afghanistan`s peace process by not standing with any particular party. Amidst countless gridlocks²⁰ between Afghanistan`s government and the Taliban at the Doha²¹ talks, Pakistan chose not to interfere. It officially recognized President Ghani as the bona fide President and articulated its commitment to work meticulously with Afghanistan`s government, even as an uncertain future beckons.

Such political goodwill and impartiality consolidate Pakistan’s credibility in the eyes of the international community²² as it guarantees to work towards a preferred result from the Intra-Afghan Negotiations. Moreover, improving bilateral diplomatic ties with Kabul is of chief consequence to Pakistan, with reference to the Indian rivalry also.

Pakistan`s goodwill in Afghanistan will face resistance, overtly and covertly, by regional “spoilers” and rivals seeking to downplay Pakistan`s role.

Pakistan`s diplomatic overture and engagement with Kabul include an amended draft of the Afghanistan–Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) which is now finalized by Afghan and Pakistani officials and will encouragingly boost bilateral trade, transport and connectivity; opening up geo-strategic vistas for Pakistan into Central Asia – a highly lucrative trillion-dollar economy.

Despite all this goodwill, the contemporary government in Afghanistan suffers from an identity crisis of insecurity, considering itself peripheral and alienated from the current peace process. Kabul`s government is beset by a legitimacy crisis and tainted with corruption. President Ashraf Ghani and his National Security Adviser (NSA) Hamdullah Mohib²³ have lately spewed verbal venom vis-à-vis Pakistan and especially its security and intelligence establishment. This more deeply reflects a psychological “projection” whereby Kabul projects its own frustrated insecurities onto Pakistan as an easy scapegoat.

The political paralysis in Afghanistan and malevolence towards Pakistan illustrates that some factions within the Afghan governing body seek to distract attention away from their own ineptitude and crippling corruption by needlessly blaming Pakistan. The Afghan NSA, Mohib, has a reputation for his negligent comments and ethically questionable past. He was banned from many meetings with U.S. delegates after his problematic remarks against the U.S. As the clock ticks closer to U.S. withdrawal and a peace process is in tatters, both Ghani²⁴ and his NSA are losing more credibility in Afghan society and critics reason that neither has any real interest in peace as both their families are based abroad. Both of them have been snubbed on multiple occasions by America and the global community for not playing their part to secure peace.

As per the auspices of the troop drawdown, Washington has pledged to pressure the Taliban to live upto its pledge, ensuring that Al Qaeda doesn’t threaten American and allied/NATO interests. However, if Afghanistan uncontrollably descends into civil war after a U.S. departure, and Al-Qaeda forge a pact with the Taliban, the consequence will be an irredeemably faltered state in the very heart of South Asia that will become a magnet for terrorism and will have far-reaching ramifications for the region.

This is an eventuality which Pakistan can simply not ignore, especially as Afghanistan`s terrorists will find ways to infiltrate into Pakistan. Islamabad cannot endure more counterattacks from the international community for not “doing enough” to curtail militancy. Pakistan has already diplomatically irked France which carries a heavy sway at the FATF which is head quartered in Paris.

Pakistan’s role in safeguarding a lasting peace deal in Afghanistan which simultaneously does not radicalize the country cannot be highlighted enough. It is possible, argue some, that the US and allies are holding the FATF card as a bargaining chip in return for Islamabad`s cooperation in Afghanistan, including America`s safe exit.

The future of peace and security in South and Central Asia is greatly contingent upon the responsibility Islamabad chooses to assume in the ongoing Afghan peace talks. All this also relies on the much-required cooperation from America and support offered by the incumbent government in Kabul, which at present seems to be at cross-purposes with Islamabad.

China

China²⁵ is expected to assertively seek to fill the power vacuum in Afghanistan left over by the U.S. Beijing will exert it`s influence in a more tacit indirect manner by using, amongst, other instruments of diplomacy and soft power, geo-economics. China supports Afghans resolving their problems themselves through talks.

The South China Morning Post on 16 April, 2021 interestingly reported²⁶ that even China is considering deploying peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan after the US troops leave. Beijing is wary that terrorist groups are likely to proliferate owing to a regional lack of stability, power vacuum and peace dialogue impasse, as the delays in Istanbul attest.

China stands to lose from an unstable Afghanistan²⁷, as it triggers negative repercussions on the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). A Taliban regime in Afghanistan could end up stirring unrest in China`s Western sensitive region of Xinjiang, home to the Uighur minority as well as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)²⁸ who are active, especially in Xinjiang`s Kashgar region.

China`s far western (separatist) region of Xinjiang shares a short border with Afghanistan. Beijing is already preoccupied with militancy in Xinjiang and will have concerns if Afghanistan is further radicalized.

Beijing has remained apprehensive regarding the ties between militant groups and the extremists operating out of Xinjiang, home to the mostly Muslim Uygur people. There is evidence of cross- border militancy, including the nexus between Chechen and Xinjiang extremists. Chinese special forces received counterterrorism training in Chechnya back in 2016.

On the orders of Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov, a delegation visited the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of China. Xinjiang remains the largest autonomous region of China where a strong separatist sentiment brews and attacks occur constantly with the support of Chechen militants²⁹. China`s Communist Party (CCP) wants to ensure that terrorists in Afghanistan (Al-Qaeda/Daesh/ISIS) do not further radicalize, arm, train or embolden Xinjiang`s separatists.

ETIM are radical separatist militants within China thirsting to establish their own mini-Caliphate in Xinjiang. In September 2018, the Afghan Ambassador to Beijing stated, in an interview with Reuters,³⁰ that China was ready to train Afghan soldiers on Chinese soil in an attempt to combat ISIS and Al-Qaeda terrorists seeking to lay inroads into Xinjiang via the northeastern border of Afghanistan, through the mountainous Wakhan Corridor.

Global intelligence agencies have widely circulated reports regarding the setting up of a Chinese military base in the Wakhan Corridor in Afghanistan`s North Eastern Badakhshan Province (close to Eastern Tajikistan). China officially refutes such claims.

Conversely, as an all-weather ally of Islamabad, Beijing will naturally play a larger role in Afghanistan and Central Asia post-U.S. withdrawal. To Beijing`s dismay, in October 2020, Mike Pompeo revoked the terror label for ETIM, which had been under UN Security Council sanctions since 2020.

Russia

Russia remains suspicious of NATO as well as of its former satellite states in Eastern Europe and the Balkans who acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty. Unsurprisingly, Moscow was concerned of the presence of so many NATO and US troops along its southern frontier in Afghanistan.

Kremlin`s main panic is that radical militancy will spread like a contagion throughout Central Asia. Such a concern has Russia wary of internal extremism, and initially Moscow sought the overthrow of the Taliban. However, Putin has now adopted a pragmatic approach of supporting the Afghan government and the political opposition as well as the Taliban. To curb militancy, Moscow acquiesced to America and her allies maintaining bases close to its borders in Central Asia.

Moscow takes a particularly keen interest in Afghanistan as the Kremlin is wary of mounting extremism coupled with separatist movements especially among the Chechens. Russia faced the debacle of North Caucus based “Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVE)”, many of whom went to fight for ISIS. The Boston marathon bombers were of Chechen origin also. The Kremlin views all such forces as menacing threats to state sovereignty. Moscow leveraged its participation in America’s “War on Terror” as an excuse for heavy-handedness in its crackdown on extremist separatist movements, especially in Chechnya.

Both Russia and China share deep concern over a future radicalized Afghanistan, especially as there are links between Chechen and Xinjiang militants. As mentioned earlier, Chinese special forces received counterterrorism training in Chechnya in 2016. On the orders of Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov, a delegation visited the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of China. It was headed by Daniil Martynov and Police Colonel Sharip Delimkhanov, Head of the Russian National Guard Forces in Chechnya.

The Kremlin is credibly concerned that extremism in Afghanistan could trickle its way across borders into Dagestan where there has been an ongoing, low-level insurgency, which became part of a larger Chechen War antagonizing Moscow. This conflict between the government and the armed Shariat Jamaat entity in Dagestan was aided and abetted by Chechen guerrillas³¹.

Moscow recently assumed the role of peacemaker in Afghanistan. However, after a conference in March 2021 comprising of Russia, America, China and Pakistan, along with Taliban and Afghan diplomats, a joint statement by the four principals stated that they did not support the establishment of an “Islamic Emirate”, leaving the Taliban deeply dismayed. Foreign Minister Lavrov`s recent rapprochement with FM Shah Mehmood Qureshi, and the strengthening of bilateral ties between Islamabad and Moscow translates into the Kremlin`s increasing role in Afghanistan, post-US drawdown.

A peaceful Afghanistan aligns well with Putin`s Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP), a fundamental plank of Moscow’s foreign policy. “The GEP relies on the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) which also converges with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)” where land-locked Afghanistan acts as a major geostrategic artery. Securing stability remains essential, both for the Kremlin and China`s Communist Party (CCP).

Iran

Iran shares borders with Pakistan and Afghanistan. Iran perceives active security threats from both³². A Taliban regime in Kabul augments such a security risk perception. What helps neutralize such a risk is that Afghanistan and Iran are important trade partners to one another, especially in construction materials, electricity, food and fuel³³.

Furthermore, the recent China-Iran rapprochement and trade, as well as Iran increasingly becoming part of the Belt and Road Initiative, (BRI) strategically stabilizes Tehran for both Islamabad and Kabul.

In March 2021, extremists belonging to a local Hazara³⁴ commander, Ali Pur, who is reportedly linked to the Iranian backed Fatemiyoun brigade³⁵, shot down an Afghan military helicopter, leading to the demise of nine crew members and security personnel in the Maidan Wardak province. This led to retaliatory action by the army.

Two weeks thereafter, another group of Hazaras purported to be the first overt representation of the Fatemiyoun militia in Afghanistan asserted their foothold in Central Afghanistan, with a commitment to retaliate against sectarian discrimination. This represents only the tip of a very complex iceberg that can unleash unending ethnic and sectarian strife among Afghans³⁶, coinciding with imminent U.S. troop withdrawal.

In the face of a perceived regional sectarian “existential threat,” Iran leverages any and all means to ensure its survival and promote its strategic interests. Loyal proxy militias, such as the Fatemiyoun Army, furnish Tehran with a cost-savvy method by which to counter stealthier adversaries, often through asymmetrical guerilla methods. Thereby, Tehran wields significant influence over the region’s affairs. Several analysts forecast that the Fatemiyoun Army is poised to become a second Hezbollah within Tehran’s proxy arsenal.

However, in April 2021, Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi and Iranian President Hasan Rouhani inaugurated the Pishin-Mashad crossing along the Pakistan-Iran border to enhance trade. Bolstering bilateral and barter trade through this new commercial gateway tremendously benefits the citizens of Balochistan, reducing smuggling routes whilst also nudging Tehran closer to Islamabad`s interests in Afghanistan.

The recent Islamabad, Istanbul, Tehran rail route is another essential confidence building measure between Tehran and Islamabad, helping to ensure that Pak-Iranian interests in Kabul will become better aligned in the future. Establishing trade epicenters along the Pakistan-Iran border seemingly displeased New Delhi.

Iran, with deep religious, cultural and linguistic links to the Hazaras in Afghanistan, has intelligently (of late) played all sides, hosting the Taliban³⁷ as well as Ashraf Ghani. Despite the mutual hostility and the theological sectarian divide between Kabul and Tehran, Iran opened channels to the Taliban a few years ago, and recently, even hosted a Taliban delegation at Tehran.

Iran`s ongoing co-operation with the US in Afghanistan is also contingent on the concessions the U.S offers Iran in Vienna`s ongoing JCPOA nuclear talks, which have re-commenced since Biden assumed tenure.

Post-U.S. departure, Afghanistan`s power vacuum could make it into the next “Great game” where power contests emerge between India, China³⁸ and even Russia or Iran via their Liwa-Fatimiyoun militia brigades.

Therefore it is in the Taliban`s own vested interest to forge peace with multiple parties, including other Pashtuns but, especially with non-Pashtuns such as the Tajiks, Hazaras (who are primarily loyal to Iran), Uzbeks, Aimaqs, Turkmen, Baluchis, Ismailis, Pashai, Nuristanis, Gujjars, Brahuis, Qazilbash, Pamiris, Kyrgyz, Sadat and others.

Afghanistan`s major fault-line is ethnic and ensuring that all or, at the very least, a majority of the above-mentioned ethnicities get politically inclusive representation and participation is the way forward for a prosperous Afghanistan.

India

Post-US exit from Afghanistan, India stands a lot to lose if it carries on conducting its foreign policy in a zero-sum strategic game³⁹. New Delhi enjoyed sanguine relations with the Karzai and Ghani governments, and, under a Taliban government, would find its influence curtailed in Kabul.

India`s BJP government aspired to be part of the Blinken initiative and remains most wary of the US withdrawal. New Delhi remained on the sidelines of Trump`s drive to exit Afghanistan that catalyzed the Doha Agreement, and hesitatingly remains (at best) lukewarm to the “intra-Afghan talks” between the Taliban⁴⁰ and Afghan government.

It was reported that New Delhi also attempted to engage the Afghan Taliban but, unlike Iran, Indian leaders evaded tête-à-tête diplomatic sessions with the Taliban. A senior Taliban spokesperson reportedly stated that New Delhi is planning to propel its troops to Afghanistan⁴¹ after the American troop departure.

If Afghanistan descends into anarchic civil-war post U.S. departure, India may perceive the deteriorating peace and security as an opportunity to unveil a malevolent campaign against Islamabad, swiftly labelling it as a state which sponsors terrorism. This would prove to be an unnerving trial for Pakistan’s reputation which has been hard earned due to its key role as an architect and negotiator in the Intra-Afghan Dialogue.

The Taliban assume that New Delhi commenced diplomatic overtures with Islamabad of late because the BJP government and Indian intelligentsia do not want Islamabad to counter India`s presence in Afghanistan. New Delhi does not want the Taliban to mount an offensive vis-à-vis its future deployed troops in Afghanistan, ignoring the reality that the Taliban never consent to any foreign boots on their soil.

Although New Delhi may not be a proactive partaker in the peace plan, it has its own vested interests in Afghanistan’s stability. India has continuously enjoyed sanguine ties with Afghanistan’s elected governments. Its geopolitical interests in Afghanistan are primarily to use its territory to checkmate Pakistan’s regional sphere of influence.

By maintaining a resilient rapport with both Afghanistan`s government as well as the Taliban, Islamabad diminishes new Delhi`s commercial, political and security clout in Afghanistan. Therefore, many in Islamabad wish for a coalition government in Kabul. A Taliban-led set-up would discernibly tilt towards Pakistan, though Pakistan may not want them to have unfettered power. A 1990s Afghanistan on Pakistan’s western front will be inimical to Pakistan’s interests as this could revive cross-border extremism and militancy in the region by emboldening terrorist entities.

New Delhi has geo-strategically pivoted towards the QUAD, as it remains threatened by China`s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and is wary of Moscow`s Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP), both of which augur well for Islamabad and Kabul. India therefore may play the role of a “spoiler”. India and Pakistan remain at cross-purposes in terms of Afghanistan.

To maintain political capital and goodwill with Kabul India is at present a key international aid donor to Afghanistan. In particular, humanitarian aid (supplying high-protein biscuits to two million children, 2,50,000 metric tons of wheat, free medical consultation, and medicines to 30,000 Afghans monthly), constructing key infrastructure (Zaranj-Delaram highway, Salma dam and Pul-e-Khumri transmission line), community development, healthcare, education (reconstruction of the Habibia School, offering five hundred annual scholarships) and capacity building.

THE PEACE PROCESS

Peace Negotiations as a continuation of “war by other means.”

The Afghan forces, the Taliban and proxy “spoilers” by neighbouring country`s militias operating via militants from within Afghanistan are exploiting the peace process, extending it into a Clausewitzian war by other means. These stakeholders, with their own vested interests, combine negotiation with insidious combat, threats, and coercion; misusing negotiation as a façade for waging an ongoing war.

Many so-called peace deals often nose-dive in an effort to cultivate short-term stability. They catalyze temporary political compromises to “contain” the immediate insurgency but fail to lay the long-term foundations for nation-building and to address the actual root-causes of conflict. They falter in creating significantly stable “institutional memory” and infrastructure, transparent governance, economic enhancement, and the rule of law to de-escalate conflict and build a resilient state over the long-haul.

Peace deals frequently falter when the final outcome is to usher in a state replete with internal contradictions. Such “peace” eventually evolves into a preface for new insurgency and violent conflict⁴² which is the case in Afghanistan.

Skeptics also reason that the Afghan peace negotiations are actually a “cover” for smooth US withdrawal. They observe that the U.S. drawdown deadline of September 11, 2021 was not accompanied with any conclusive definition of specifically what peace with the Taliban should comprise of. Washington gave much more importance to full withdrawal over fourteen months than it did on creating the conditions for successful peace negotiations.

The US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan may have placated his Afghan counterpart Hamdullah Mohib with terms such as “inclusive” and “partnership”. The words, however, at this particular juncture, do not match the deeds.

A divided Afghan government was largely short shrifted from the negotiating procedure. The peace process established no clear conditions for a broad ceasefire nor for reaching an actual peace settlement. It did not define how the negotiations would take place, nor propose a practical power-sharing formula between the government and Taliban.

Critics observe that America did not prepare or lay-out the requirements that would compel the Taliban to even implement a “cosmetic peace settlement”. The Afghan forces are also not suitably prepared for what may come after the troop withdrawal.

There was not even the hollow shell of a perceived effective election in Afghanistan. The Afghan central government was not even trying to showcase a cosmetic unity until it was coerced into an agreement in May 2020, and much of the war-torn state which allegedly was under government control is de facto controlled by indigenous warlords, insurgents and local power brokers⁴³.

A moral conundrum: Exiting a failed and fractured state

In all fairness, there were legitimate reasons for Washington to set a deadline for departure, even if they themselves could not succeed in brokering peace. The Afghan political structure, which America assisted in developing post-2001, is divided at the top by bitterly competing ethnic and tribal cliques and split nation-wide by power brokers, war lords and insurgents under Taliban`s control.

Multilateral institutions and publications from the United Nations, to the World Bank, the Economist Intelligence Unit and Transparency International observe that the Afghan central government is where corruption and fraud is the rule, rather than the exception. A consensus to commence a peace process was initiated when Senior officials of the Afghan government were so deeply divided that Washington excluded many members of the ruling government from the preliminary negotiating procedure.

Plenty of over-optimistic claims are made regarding Afghan progress in governance, education, women`s empowerment, human rights, healthcare and the rule of law where much is left to be desired. Much more reform is also required in poverty mitigation, anti-corruption, arms licensing and monitoring and a crackdown on an over-bloated narcotics and opioids industry – a huge source of the country`s exports.

Global donors and development institutions made it patently clear that no Afghan government can subsist without huge external donor aid, even if Afghanistan`s central government and the Taliban reach a peaceful consensus. The World Bank estimates that international grants fund seventy-five per cent of Afghanistan’s public expenditures, America being the largest donor of those grants.

The Afghan central government’s total civil and security budget currently stands at eleven billion US dollars per annum, whereas Afghanistan`s national revenues are only US dollars two and a half billion, reflecting a huge schism between revenue and expenditure.

Adding fuel to the flames, there is no trustworthy manner to forecast Afghanistan’s forthcoming socio-economic and development/ humanitarian requirements if the current government and the Taliban refuse to reach a peaceful consensus.

Any wartime savings in security will be offset by a requirement to absorb, integrate, mobilise and fund Taliban fighters while also ensuring that the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) employees remain employed long enough to forge a transition into the civil economy. If insurgents are not swiftly absorbed and intelligently integrated into Afghanistan`s reformed law enforcement institutions, they risk defecting and forming their own militias.

Remember, it was Saddam Hussein`s (as well as some of Bashar Assad`s) unemployed law enforcement agents and former army officers who, once unemployed, became bitter and vengeful and helped create one of the deadliest terror groups in modern living memory: ISIS.

As for security, it is brutally clear from SIGAR⁴⁴ and reporting by the Lead Inspector General of the Department of Defense (LIG) in 2020 that Afghan security forces need far more help to develop as a force that can truly stand on their own. The central government is still losing ground and the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) cannot survive without U.S. combat airpower and forward-deployed train and assist support.

The U.S. has not set any conditions for U.S. security guarantees if the peace process fails, if the Taliban keep fighting, or if the Taliban violate the terms of a peace which it previously agreed to.

Refusing the Pentagon’s penchant for a “conditions-based” drawdown, Biden acknowledged that a lingering of US military posturing in Afghanistan served no purpose.

A timely and phased US exit makes even more sense in the age where diplomatic engagement should be a default position rather than kinetic brinksmanship or strategic strong-arming. A US drawdown is further legitimized given the staggering costs of war (both human and financial view our images hereunder) as well as in an age of the Pandemic where finite resources are more judiciously applied on the domestic U.S. front given soaring Covid-19 costs, unemployment, a bearish volatility-riddled economy and overall financial constraints.

Doha`s goodwill swiftly dissolving

Momentarily the goodwill from Doha⁴⁵ seems to swiftly be dissolving. Witness the increasing number of civilian casualties, including women and children⁴⁶, at the hands of the Taliban. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)⁴⁷ confi that though the number of civilian casualties in 2020 fell below ten thousand for the very fi instance since 2013, violence perpetrated vis-à-vis civilians escalated after the commencement of Intra-Afghan Negotiations (IAN) in September 2020.

From the Taliban`s negotiation intransigence to the all-round corruption of some incumbent government officials (shady private contractors as well as deliberate media leaks to outlets by those who favour the status quo) to the stipulated ambitious terms and conditions of the U.S peace proposal, all prove that the path to peace ahead will be anything but simple.

Even prior to Biden’s September 11 withdrawal statement, the Taliban had announced that they would not partake in the Istanbul Heart of Asia conference and warned of “consequences” if the May 1 deadline was prolonged. Therefore, the Taliban had pre-anticipated and calculated such a delay.

Major Taliban operations in southern Afghanistan in late 2020 and early 2021 displaced tens of thousands of innocent civilians, causing Afghan forces to abandon an estimated two-hundred checkpoints in Kandahar province in December 2020 alone, prompting the United States to conduct airstrikes in support of Afghan government forces.

Biden’s administration desires that by announcing a definitive and “unconditional” deadline for its exit, the Taliban would approve. However, the Taliban stuck to their guns, quite literally and metaphorically, retaining a tough posture and retorting to the U.S President’s delay by rearticulating their stance that such a drawdown prolongation reneges on Doha`s promise and that “necessary counter- measures” would be initiated.

Despite glitches and snags vis-à-vis the Istanbul Conference, parallel diplomacy is taking place. Motivating this initiative with urgency was America, hoping to hasten peace discourse prior to its withdrawal date. Intensified regional shuttle diplomacy by special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, both overtly and covertly, ramped up, with a desire to influence negotiating partners to attend the Istanbul Conference igniting the spark toward peace.

A Biden Administration drawdown delay till September 11, opens up a Pandora’s box replete with urgent questions and dilemmas. Has the Istanbul peace conference undergone a total miscarriage? Can a peace process be brought back to life?

If so, can traction be reached for a political settlement prior to American withdrawal? Will the US leave without a peace deal? Will the Taliban wait for the departure of American and NATO troops to tighten their grip and bargaining position for peace negotiations thereafter? Though ISKP (ISIS) Afghanistan’s role is diminished, what kind of fresh challenges will they mount to counter the Taliban? If internecine civil war persists, what strategic implications will this bear for neighbouring countries, especially Pakistan, whose “geo-economic” pivot toward Central Asia⁴⁸ rests upon a stable and peaceful Afghanistan? Last but not least, what role will “spoilers” (other neighbouring countries) inflict to delay/stall an already fragile peace process?

The replies to all the aforementioned now primarily depend upon the Taliban’s cooperation and also how much infl and strategic incentive America has to ensure and promote the peace initiative. Signals are that the U.S. will persist with diplomatic initiatives and Washington D.C. is solemnly and sincerely seeking a durable peace deal or, at the bare minimum, meaningful mileage towards peace prior to their exit. Commencing and continuing a win-win peace process post- Istanbul Conference remains quintessential for Biden`s administration in terms of diplomatic face-saving for Washington D.C whilst also facilitating an orderly, organized and honourable withdrawal.

This is exactly why back-channel diplomacy and behind the scenes dialogue with the Taliban aspire to achieve a ninety-day Reduction in Violence Plan (RIV)⁴⁹. As for geopolitical clout and influence—whereas the efficiency of strong-arm tactics is fading, given the ongoing U.S drawdown—United Nations sanctions, building upon/complementing UNSC Resolution(s) 1373 (2001) and 1267 (Al Qaeda, Taliban) remains a source of “lawfare leverage”, just as terrorist delisting remains one of the Taliban’s key negotiation requirements.

Maintaining and reinvigorating the multi-stakeholder political goodwill to renegotiate such terms and conditions is what can bring all stakeholders promptly back to the negotiating table.

However, the “carrot-and-stick approach” is more judicious. Come what may, the Doha Agreement mandated the U.S. to begin negotiating such terms as part and parcel of the intra-Afghan talks. The U.S. and the global community/multilateral institutions/donors can also utilize economic inducements by pledging donor aid/assistance post- September. This is the expectation anticipated and articulated by both Pakistani and American decision-makers.

The Taliban, whilst maintaining an altogether macho stance, have nevertheless retained the space and maneuverability for engagement and substantially abstained from proclaiming a spring offensive. The strategic calculus among some top-brass military cadres is that the Taliban must wait for America to withdraw and that it makes little sense to partake in peace dialogue where they will be strong-armed to make concessions and accept allowances.

That being said, other Taliban cadres perceive that they will benefit more by continuing peace talks instead of forsaking them, especially since they do not seek to give up the global limelight, recognition and acceptability they now cherish and enjoy vis-à- vis world powers. Remember: the Taliban are not a monolith but a mosaic. Internally there is Taliban fragmentation⁵⁰ with factions competing and contesting which makes the peace process all the more cumbersome and complex.

The release of Taliban prisoners, terror de-listing and an end to UN sanctions (their core demands) will best be ensured via official diplomatic outreach. Here Pakistan`s role remains key. After gruesome decades of blood-letting and military misadventure, the Taliban naturally envisage an opportunity to finally pursue their objectives through negotiated settlement, a choice that will support them stimulate global cooperation required in a post-U.S. Afghanistan and essentially provide a brighter opportunity at securing durable peace.

The Uphill Struggle for peace in Afghanistan: a surge in escalating violence

At present, the Afghan peace process is on life support and requires urgent resuscitation. This peace process is painfully in perpetual limbo amid endless political wrangling between sparring stakeholders. Some reasons for the fragility of the peace process include: the Taliban`s intransigence, their inability to declare a ceasefire, vested neighbouring and regional foreign interests seeking to derail the peace paradigm, delays and dithering tactics by the Taliban leading to a diplomatic stalemate at the stalled Istanbul Conference, the Afghan government unnecessarily pinning the blame on Islamabad, American delays in troop withdrawal and much more. All such roadblocks are a detriment to any smooth and orderly transition in Afghanistan.

As the Taliban and Afghan government dither, delay and play unending power politics, violence gruesomely escalates. Afghanistan`s government troops have mounted sorties and air offensives against the Taliban whereas the latter have seized a district in southern Helmand province and mounted assaults in their strongholds of Ghazni and Helmand as of May 2021.

The Taliban also gained control of districts in Maidan-e-Wardak, a province a stone`s throw away from Kabul, in northern Baghlan (around its capital Pul-e-Khumri) and Logar provinces as they persist applying violent pressure on Kabul`s government.

The Taliban’s control inched ever closer to Kabul, the capital of the embattled Laghman province, after capturing crucial security garrisons around the city on May 23, 2021. The Taliban have achieved key territorial gains in Laghman, tightening their iron grip over Dawlat Shah district, greasing the wheels for the Mehtarlam offensive.

Afghanistan`s national security troops are locked in heated battles with Taliban insurgents to prevent them from attacking the eastern provinces as American and NATO troops drawdown from an increasingly tormented country in flux.

Though the Afghan government and the Taliban observed a short- lived cease-fire during Eid al-Fitr in May, this was a meaningless token as attacks ensued immediately thereafter. Clearly the ceasefire between the Taliban and international troops after Doha’s February 2020 deal is dead in the water.

Up until now, the Afghan army has been significantly reliant on Washington for operations, maintenance, training and combat air support to counter the Taliban.

The Biden administration’s diplomatic initiatives are trying to influence both the Afghan warring stakeholders to swiftly broker a peace deal and end the country’s endless war. Easier said than done.

The intra-Afghan negotiations (IAN) have encountered a real diplomatic stalemate. Both the Taliban and Afghan government finger- point at one another for deploying delaying techniques to scupper the peace process.

Interestingly, ever since the Doha Agreement was signed, America reports that neither any of their own nor foreign/NATO troops were killed. The Taliban took a dim view of Biden’s troop withdrawal delay from May 1 to September 11, 2021.

Despite the Taliban`s scathing critique that the Biden administration has blatantly breached the Doha agreement and purposely delayed the troop withdrawal deadline, the Taliban have carefully and calculatedly not conducted any attacks on foreign troops, even though unbridled fighting and violence persists against Afghan forces.

The tragic reality of an overdrawn seemingly never-ending US- NATO war is the stomach-churning violence where precious Afghan civilians perish daily, including a recent bone-chilling car bomb explosion killing at least sixty school girls about to break their Ramadan fast from the Sayed al-Shuhada school in the Shia dominant Kabul suburb of Dasht-e-Barchi where books and body parts were strewn and precious blood spilled in what chillingly reminds many of the unconscionable 2014 Army Publish School attack in Peshawar which also mercilessly targeted children.

Such grim ground realities leave the already fragile peace talks fraught with uncertainty and security risks. Peace talks for an all- inclusive negotiated political settlement has been an uphill struggle and will certainly not transpire overnight.

What next?

First and foremost, the Afghan peace process must be Afghan- driven and Afghan-led. Local leadership and ownership is what will ultimately lend genuine legitimacy to Afghanistan in her long-term aspiration and struggle for nation, state and institution building. Foreign imposed regime changes have proven non-tenable and inorganic the world over.⁵¹

After the full withdrawal of troops, the Taliban are likely to see the war, which they believe they have already won, to its completion. The recently published US Threat Assessment Report, an annual US intelligence briefing, said prospects for a peace deal are dim, the Taliban are confident of victory in the battlefield, and the Afghan government will struggle to hold them at bay.

According to the Long War Journal (a project of the US-based Foundation for the Defense of Democracies), of Afghanistan’s 325 districts, the Taliban are in control of 76 or 19%, and government forces 127 or 32%. The remaining are contested. According to the Council of Foreign Relations, the Taliban are stronger now than at any point since 2001, when US forces invaded Afghanistan.

However, if an ethnically diverse, all-inclusive interim government representative of the wider population is not set up, the Taliban are realistically expected to encounter tough resistance by Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen, and Hazara ethnicities led by experienced leaders. The Taliban, for its own long-term survival and interest should, therefore, be flexibly open to offering some concessions and accommodating various ethnicities and sects into an inclusive interim set-up: this is a great challenge as well as opportunity for Afghanistan.

That being said, out of Afghanistan’s thirty-four provinces, Ashraf Ghani`s government is in control of 65 percent of the population with over 300,000 strong Afghan National Defence and Security Forces. This constitutes a robust opposition.

If the intra-Afghan negotiations regarding future power sharing between Afghans is not achieved, a protracted civil war will ensue.

Pakistan and the surrounding regional states must be prepared for such a destabilizing geopolitical reality. Regional actors such as Pakistan, Iran, China, India and Russia must form an alliance for Afghan peace sans which the aspiration of Afghan peace will remain wishful thinking.

Peace in Afghanistan is now at a critical defining juncture. With all the competing and converging foreign interests in Afghanistan, realistically, peace is likely to remain elusive until and unless neighbouring states firmly commit to refrain from “foreign meddling”. A commitment to non-interference by all regional states must be inked and implemented, till then peace in Afghanistan will remain a distant mirage.

Selected Bibliography

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Clausewitz, C., Howard, M., Paret, P. and Brodie, B., (1989) On war. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press

Long War Journal and Associated Press (2021) Afghanistan areas of control as of April, 2021.

Coll, Steve (2018) Directorate S: The CIA and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Penguin Press), 2018, pp. 1-368.

Mir, Hamid (2021) Enough is enough, Pakistan not happy with Afghan Taliban, The News International, Jang Group, April 28, 2021.

George, Susannah and Sharif Hassan (2020) “Faced with the prospect of formal peace talks, Afghans consider what they’re willing to concede,” Washington Post, June 7, 2020.

Gibbons-Neff Thomas and Zabihullah Ghazi (2021) “Foes in Afghan War See Common Threat of Islamic State’s Return,” New York Times, March 22, 2021.

D’Souza, M. (2019). The limits of India’s soft power in Afghanistan. Fair Observer: 18 March, 2019.

International Monetary Fund (2021) Pakistan Country Report No. 2021/073, April 8, 2021.

Rehman, N. (2019) Understanding key stakeholders in Afghan peace process. Balochistan Voices, 10 April, 2019.

UNAMA (2020) “Afghan Peace Talks Fail to Slow Civilian Casualty Toll,” October 27, 2020

UNAMA (2020) “Afghanistan Third Quarter Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 2020,” October 27, 2020.

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) (2021) Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2020, February 2021.

Pakistan Today (2019). Pakistan supports an Afghanistan that is at peace with itself, says FM Qureshi, 22 June, 2019.

Khan, A. (2019) The Afghan peace process and the role of Moscow. An Issue Brief by the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, edited by Najam Rafique. 26 February, 2019.

Watkins, Andrew Watkins (2020) “Taliban Fragmentation: Fact, Fiction, and Future,” U.S. Institute of Peace, March 2020.

Iqbal, A. (2019) US, Russia, China recognise Pakistan’s role in Afghan peaceprocess. Dawn, 13 July, 2019.

Kopplin Zack and Margaux Ben (2021) How Afghanistan`s President helped his brother secure lucrative mining deals with a U.S contractor, OCCPR, 28 April 2021.

Rashid, A. (2019) Is an Afghan peace deal finally within grasp? Al-Jazeera, 13 March, 2019.

Coban, Samet (2019) Positions of Stakeholders in the Afghanistan Peace Process, Beyond the Horizon, July 10, 2019.

Sharan, Timor and Andrew Watkins (2021) All quiet on the Eastern front? Iran`s evolving relationship with an Afghanistan in transition, Policy Brief, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2021.

Jan W. (2019) China’s role in brokering peace in Afghanistan. Pakistan Today, 31 January, 2019.

Khan, Tahir (2021)Taliban attach conditions to Istanbul Conference Participation, Voice of America, May 25, 2021.

Mitra, J. (2018). Should India talk to the Taliban?TRT World, 2 November, 2018.

Chugtai, Alia and Shereena Qazi (2020) The Intra-Afghan Talks, AJ Labs, Al- Jazeera, September 12, 2020.

Council, S. (2019) Success of Afghanistan peace process will depend on international support for local efforts, Special Representative tells Security Council. Relief Web. 11 March, 2019.

Smith, Saphora and Ahmed Mengli (2021) “Wave of killings target Afghan women judges, journalists, intellectuals,” NBC, January 24, 2021.

Hadley, E., and Kolenda, C. D. (2018). Political process in Afghanistan: What role for international partners? Conciliation Resources, June, 2018.

Putz, Catherin (2016) “World Bank Tries to Answer CASA-1000 Criticisms” The Diplomat. 11 May, 2016.

Pir-Mohammad Mollazehi (2016) The Coast of Makran: An Arena for Rivalry among Powers, Iran Review, 28 May 2016.

Idrees, M., Naazer, M. A., & Rehman, A. U. (2017). Conflict and conflict management in SAARC. Liberal Arts and Social Sciences International Journal (LASSIJ), 1(2): pp. 1-12.

Kaura, V. (2018). Understanding the complexities of the Afghan peace process. ORF Occasional Paper No. 151, Observer Research Foundation, April, 2018.

Waldman, M. (2010). Tough talking: The case for negotiations with the Taliban. The RUSI Journal, 155(6), pp. 59-67.

The Frontier Post (2019) NATO, allies support Afghan peace process, 25 March, 2019.

Jan, W. (2019) China’s role in brokering peace in Afghanistan. Pakistan Today, 31 January, 2019.

Fazly, H. (2016). The deadlock of Afghan peace process. Master Arts Thesis, International Institute of Social Studies, Semantic Scholar, The Hague. December, 2016.

Saifullah, M. (2019). Were Afghan peace talks in Qatar a success? DW. 9 July, 2019.

Faridullah Hussainkhail (2015) Hamdullah Mohib the New Afghan Envoy to US, TOLO news, September 18, 2015.

Gul, A. (2019). Ghani seeks Pakistan’s support for Afghan peace talks with Taliban. VOA, June 28, 2019.

Ali, R. Ali, I. & Shaukatullah (2019). Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a passage to regional security: Future developments and opportunities for Pakistan. Liberal Artsand Social Sciences International Journal (LASSIJ), 3(1), 19-29.

Jadoon, Amira, Nakissa Jahanbani and Charmaine Willis (2018) “Challenging the ISK Brand in Afghanistan-Pakistan: Rivalries and Divided Loyalties,” CTC Sentinel, Volume 11, Issue 4, April 2018.

Rehman, A. U., Hakim, A., Khan, K., & Khan, I. U. (2018). Role of CPEC in development of trade, transport, and economy of Pakistan.Romanian Journal of Transport Infrastructure,7(1), 77-92.

Jan, W. (2019) China’s role in brokering peace in Afghanistan. Pakistan Today, 31 January, 2019.

Ghiasy, Richard (2017) “Opinion: why Afghanistan’s stability is so important to China,” South China Morning Post, 22 May 2017.

Dr. Abdullah: Abdullah, Abdullah (2014) “Dr. Abdullah Abdullah: In His Own Words”. National Coalition of Afghanistan. June 12, 2014.

Jianing, Y. (2016) Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, Tajikistan issue joint statement on anti-terrorism. August, China Mail.

The Guardian (2016) “Afghan Taliban appoint Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada as new leader”. 25 May 2016.

Anthony H. Cordesman (2020) Afghanistan: The Peace Negotiations Have Become an Extension of War by Other Means, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), October 2020.

Kinross, S., (2004) Clausewitz and Low-Intensity Conflict. Journal of Strategic Studies, 27(1), pp.35-58.

Fair, C. Christine (2018) In Their Own Words: Understanding Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Oxford University Press (2018)

SIGAR (2020) Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 30, 2020.

Institute for the Study of War (2020) Pakistan building Afghan border fence, Wall Street Journal, 2020.

Zhang, Rachel (2021) China may send peacekeeping force to Afghanistan after US troops leave, observers say, South China Morning Post, 16 April, 2021.

Keleman, Barbara (2020) “China’s Economic Stabilization Efforts in Afghanistan: A New Party to the Table?” Middle East Institute, January 21, 2020.

Syed, Baqir Sajjad (2021) “Pentagon chief praises Pakistan’s role in Afghan peace process,” Dawn, March 23, 2021.

The Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs (2021) U.S. costs to date for the War in Afghanistan, Brown University, May 2021.

U.S Air Forces Central Command, Department of Defence (2020) Key Numbers behind the war in Afghanistan, Long War Journal, Statista, February, 2020.

Behravesh, Maysam (2019) “What Does Iran Want in Afghanistan?”, Aljazeera, 4 February 2019.

O’Donnell, Lynne; Khan, Mirwais (2016) “Afghan Taliban Appoint New Leader After Mansour’s Death”. ABC News. 25 May 2016

Majidyar, Ahmad (2017) “Iran Recruits and Trains Large Numbers of Afghan and Pakistani Shiites,” Middle East Institute, Jan. 18, 2017.

Mashal, Mujib and Faizi, Fatima (2017) “Iran Sent Them to Syria. Now Afghan Fighters Are a Worry at Home”. The New York Times, November 11, 2017.

Gertz, Bill (2016) “U.S. Identifies Nine Training Camps in Iran for Afghans,” The Washington Free Beacon, Jul. 1, 2016.

Gul, Ayaz (2021), “Iran Hosts Taliban to ‘Exchange Views’ on US-backed Afghan Peace Process”, Voice of America, 26 January 2021.

“China says it is helping Afghanistan with defense, counterterrorism,” (2018) Reuters, 30 August 2018.

Jadoon, Amira, Nakissa Jahanbani and Charmaine Willis (2018) “Challenging the ISK Brand in Afghanistan-Pakistan: Rivalries and Divided Loyalties,” CTC Sentinel, Volume 11, Issue 4, April 2018.

Watson Institute (2018) Human Costs of U.S. War on Terror, Brown University, Associated Press Image.

Mashal, Mujib (2020) “Violent attacks plague Afghanistan as peace talks in Doha slow,” New York Times, Sept. 19, 2020.

Chan, Minnie (2018) “China is helping Afghanistan set up mountain brigade to fight terrorism,” South China Morning Post, 28 August also consult.

Financial Tribune (2018) “Iran Biggest Trade Partner of Afghanistan in 2017-2018”, Financial Tribune, 8 April 2018.

Statista (2020) Number of deaths in Western coalitions forces, February 29, 2020.

Al-Jazeera (2020) Breaking down the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan.

“Mullah Baradar released by Pakistan at the behest of US Khalilzad,” (2019) The Hindu, February 9, 2019.

Ghiasy, Richard (2017) “Opinion: why Afghanistan’s stability is so important to China,” South China Morning Post, 22 May 2017.

New York Times (2021) U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan

Hamidzada, Humayun and Richard Ponzio (2019) Central Asia’s Growing Role in Building Peace and Regional Connectivity with Afghanistan, United States Institute of Peace, August 2019

The Global Times (2021) The human cost of Afghan war. Media reports.

Sharif, Amiry (2021) “Taliban 3-Month RIV Plan Shared With US: Naeem,” TOLOnews, March 22, 2021.

Sharif, Amiry (2021) “Khalilzad Pitched ‘Participatory Government’ to Afghan Leaders: Sources,” TOLOnews, March 3, 2021.

Mir, Hamid (2021) Enough is enough, Pakistan not happy with Afghan Taliban, The News International, Jang Group, April 28, 2021.

Wayback Machine (2015) Lashkar-e-Taiba, Wayback Machine, Federation of American Scientists Intelligence Resource Program, 23 July 2015.

Hong, Zhao (2013) “China’s Afghan Policy: The Forming of the ‘March West’ Strategy,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs 27, No. 2, p.13.

Mehdudia, Sujay (2010) “TAPI project will be the new Silk Route, says Deora”. The Hindu. 11 December, 2010 and Tanchum, Micha’el (2015) “A Fillip for the TAPI Pipeline”. The Diplomat. 3 December, 2015

Daniels, Rorry (2013), “Strategic Competition in South Asia: Gwadar, Chabahar, and the Risks of Infrastructure Development”, American Foreign Policy Interests, 35 (2): pp. 92–101.

References

Hadley, E., and Kolenda, C. D. (2018). Political process in Afghanistan: What role for international partners? Conciliation Resources, June, 2018.
Council, S. (2019) Success of Afghanistan peace process will depend on international support for local efforts, Special Representative tells Security Council. Relief Web. 11 March, 2019.
Jan W. (2019) China’s role in brokering peace in Afghanistan. Pakistan Today, 31 January, 2019.
Mehdudia, Sujay (2010) “TAPI project will be the new Silk Route, says Deora”. The Hindu. 11 December, 2010 and Tanchum, Micha’el (2015) “A Fillip for the TAPI Pipeline”. The Diplomat. 3 December, 2015 and
More commonly referred to as CASA-1000, a $1.16 billion project currently under construction that will permit the export of surplus hydroelectricity from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Consult: Putz, Catherin (2016) “World Bank Tries to Answer CASA-1000 Criticisms”. The Diplomat. 11 May, 2016.
The Chabahar sea port is strategically situated in southeastern Iran, on theGulf of It serves as Iran’s only oceanic port, and consists of two separate ports named Shahid Kalantari and Shahid Beheshti. Chabahar itself is located on the Makran Coast of the Sistan and Baluchestan province of Iran and is officially designated as a Free Trade and Industrial Zone. For more: Daniels, Rorry (2013), “Strategic Competition in South Asia: Gwadar, Chabahar, and the Risks of Infrastructure Development”, American Foreign Policy Interests, 35 (2): pp. 92–101 as well as Pir-Mohammad Mollazehi (2016) The Coast of Makran: An Arena for Rivalry among Powers, Iran Review, 28 May 2016.
Idrees, M., Naazer, M. A., & Rehman, A. U. (2017). Conflict and conflict management in SAARC. Liberal Arts and Social Sciences International Journal (LASSIJ), 1(2): pp. 1-12.
Ali, R. Ali, I. & Shaukatullah (2019). Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a passage to regional security: Future developments and opportunities for Pakistan. Liberal Artsand Social Sciences International Journal (LASSIJ), 3(1), 19-29.
Rashid, A. (2019) Is an Afghan peace deal finally within grasp? Al-Jazeera, 13 March, 2019.
Rehman, N. (2019) Understanding key stakeholders in Afghan peace process. Balochistan Voices, 10 April, 2019.
Kaura, V. (2018). Understanding the complexities of the Afghan peace process. ORF Occasional Paper No. 151, Observer Research Foundation, April, 2018.
Jianing, Y. (2016) Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, Tajikistan issue joint statement on anti-terrorism. August, China Mail.
Waldman, M. (2010). Tough talking: The case for negotiations with the Taliban. The RUSI Journal, 155(6), pp. 59-67.
The Frontier Post (2019) NATO, allies support Afghan peace process, 25 March, 2019.
Khan, A. (2019) The Afghan peace process and the role of Moscow. An Issue Brief by the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, edited by Najam Rafique. 26 February, 2019.
Jan, W. (2019) China’s role in brokering peace in Afghanistan. Pakistan Today, 31 January, 2019.
Pakistan`s economy underperformed at –0.4 percent in FY 2020 (July–June), though it is expected to recover to 5 percent in FY 2021. Source: International Monetary Fund (2021) Pakistan Country Report No. 2021/073 dated April 8, 2021.
Owing primarily to supply-side driven spikes in food price.
Pakistan Today (2019). Pakistan supports an Afghanistan that is at peace with itself, says FM Qureshi, 22 June, 2019
Fazly, H. (2016). The deadlock of Afghan peace process. Master Arts Thesis, International Institute of Social Studies, Semantic Scholar, The Hague. December, 2016.
Saifullah, M. (2019). Were Afghan peace talks in Qatar a success? DW. 9 July, 2019.
Iqbal, A. (2019) US, Russia, China recognise Pakistan’s role in Afghan peace process. Dawn, 13 July, 2019.
Faridullah Hussainkhail (2015) Hamdullah Mohib the New Afghan Envoy to US, TOLOnews, September 18, 2015.
Gul, A. (2019). Ghani seeks Pakistan’s support for Afghan peace talks with Taliban. VOA, June 28, 2019.
Jan, W. (2019) China’s role in brokering peace in Afghanistan. Pakistan Today, 31 January, 2019.
Zhang, Rachel (2021) China may send peacekeeping force to Afghanistan after US troops leave, observers say, South China Morning Post, 16 April, 2021
Ghiasy, Richard (2017) “Opinion: why Afghanistan’s stability is so important to China,” South China Morning Post, 22 May 2017.
ETIM was founded by Hasan Mahsum, an Uyghur from Xinjiang’s Kashgar region, who was shot dead by Pakistani soldiers in 2003. The militant outfit also kidnapped foreign journalists, tourists and athletes during the 2008 Olympics. The ETIM also recruits and trains blood-drenched suicide bombers.
Sidorkova, Inna (2016) Training for Chinese special forces in Russia beyond. December 19, 2016.
“China says it is helping Afghanistan with defense, counterterrorism,” (2018) Reuters, 30 August 2018 also consult Hong, Zhao (2013) “China’s Afghan Policy: The Forming of the ‘March West’ Strategy,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs 27, 2, p.13.
Sidorkova, Inna (2016) Training for Chinese special forces in Russia beyond. December 19, 2016.
Behravesh, Maysam (2019) “What Does Iran Want in Afghanistan?”, Aljazeera, 4 February 2019.
The main exports are electricity, construction materials, food and See Financial Tribune (2018) “Iran Biggest Trade Partner of Afghanistan in 2017- 2018”, Financial Tribune, 8 April 2018.
Majidyar, Ahmad (2017) “Iran Recruits and Trains Large Numbers of Afghan and Pakistani Shiites,” Middle East Institute, 18, 2017.
Mashal, Mujib and Faizi, Fatima (2017) “Iran Sent Them to Now Afghan Fighters Are a Worry at Home”. The New York Times, November 11, 2017.
Gertz, Bill (2016) “U.S. Identifies Nine Training Camps in Iran for Afghans,” The Washington Free Beacon, Jul. 1, 2016.
Gul, Ayaz (2021), “Iran Hosts Taliban to ‘Exchange Views’ on US-backed Afghan Peace Process”, Voice of America, 26 January 2021.
For added insights on China`s participation in Afghanistan consult: Keleman, Barbara (2020) “China’s Economic Stabilization Efforts in Afghanistan: A New Party to the Table?” Middle East Institute, January 21, 2020.
D’Souza, M. (2019). The limits of India’s soft power in Afghanistan. Fair Observer: 18 March, 2019.
Mitra, J. (2018). Should India talk to the Taliban?TRT World, 2 November, 2018.
Mir, Hamid (2021) Enough is enough, Pakistan not happy with Afghan Taliban, The News International, Jang Group, April 28, 2021.
Anthony H. Cordesman (2020) Afghanistan: The Peace Negotiations Have Become an Extension of War by Other Means, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), October, 2020.
Clarke, Jeffrey J. (1988), United States Army in Vietnam: Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965–1973, Washington, D.C: Center of Military History, United States Army.
SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 30, 2020.
Mashal, Mujib Mashal (2020) “Violent attacks plague Afghanistan as peace talks in Doha slow,” New York Times, 19, 2020.
Smith, Saphora and Ahmed Mengli (2021) “Wave of killings target Afghan women judges, journalists, intellectuals,” NBC, January 24, 2021.
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) (2021) Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2020, February View also UNAMA (2021) Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2020, February 2021.
For more on the promise and potential of Central Asia: Hamidzada, Humayun and Richard Ponzio (2019) Central Asia’s Growing Role in Building Peace and Regional Connectivity with Afghanistan, United States Institute of Peace, August 2019
Sharif Amiry (2021) “Taliban 3-Month RIV Plan Shared With US: Naeem,” TOLOnews, March 22, 2021.
For more on the Taliban`s internal fragmentation: Watkins, Andrew Watkins (2020) “Taliban Fragmentation: Fact, Fiction, and Future,” S. Institute of Peace, March 2020.
Downes, A.B., Monten, J. (2013) ‘Forced to be Free? Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization’, International Security, 37(4): pp. 89–132.