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Ceasefires, Kashmir and Emerging Rivalries of Great Powers in South Asia

A strategic foreign policy overview

by Özer Khalid*

*Özer Khalid is a Senior Consultant, a Criterion Quarterly Content Developer, a Counter-Extremism expert and Geo-Strategist. He can be reached at zzerkhalid@ gmail.com

Abstract

The opinions expressed in this essay are analytical and expert views offered    by field specialists who have been duly cited and referenced at length, and do not necessarily always overlap with this author`s nor with Criterion Quarterly Journal`s official stance.© Criterion Quarterly Publication and Özer Khalid. All Rights Reserved (2021). (Pakistan and India now have a unique historical opportunity to ride on the coattails of the cease-fire and aspire towards more meaningful cooperation. However, given the climate of mutual distrust, the Kashmir impasse, and strains of rivalry, both states are likelier to decide that it’s futile to pursue confidence-building measures when neither state is willing to concede on the “core issues”.

Logically, taking the ceasefire to its mature corollary requires bilateral political goodwill from both sides – this is where the delicate art of politics (an art of the possible) comes in with both parties having to make realistic concessions in good faith.

Building on the ceasefire (could just) help stabilize a nuclear-armed South Asia and bring peace to the broader Indo-Pacific region like never before—realistically though the Kashmir stalemate and regional volatilities of the relationship cause that window of opportunity to narrow.

What occurs after the ceasefire is entirely contingent on whether and if all stakeholders in South Asia, including China and a recently elected Biden administration, can agree to reframe relations and shift their foreign policy focus from geo-security to geo-economics, as recently articulated by Pakistan.

 The U.S. can ill-afford to miss a unique historic prospect of nurturing peace in South Asia (thereby bolstering its soft power diminished under Trump). America has implanted itself deep into the Sino-India-Pakistan triangular nexus,1 changing the contour of the regional order, pushing it toward a bipolar axis with China and Pakistan on one side and India, and, to an extent, itself on the other. – Author)

By accepting New Delhi’s unilateralism and attempting to prop it up as a regional hegemon, Washington may inadvertently be helping Beijing’s ascendance as a super-power in South Asia. The U.S. can ill- afford to miss a unique historic prospect of nurturing peace in South Asia (thereby bolstering its soft power diminished under Trump). America has implanted itself deep into the Sino-India-Pakistan triangular nexus,2 changing the contour of the regional order, pushing it toward a bipolar axis with China and Pakistan on one side and India, and, to an extent, itself on the other.

As Washington wraps up the “war on terror”3 and exits from Afghanistan4 (now determined to intensely compete with China), some in Islamabad are concerned that Pakistan might lose preeminence in terms of US foreign policy. A U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan — compels it to reassess and reset its foreign policy with Pakistan.

Despite the welcome development of a Joint Statement ceasefire announcement at the Kashmir LoC on Feb 25, 2021, the India Pakistan ceasefire is more form than actual substance. The ceasefire agreement is more a form of populist peace than a genuine attempt to terminate decades of antagonism and deeply ingrained mistrust in Jammu and Kashmir.

Historically, such ceasefires have led to violations and shelling across the LoC. History, in Hegelian5 terms, carries meaning, teaches lessons and is part of a greater narrative. The 2018 ceasefire did not prevent the Balakot aerial incursion. The LoC ceasefire announcement is not so much the thawing of ice but rather extinguishing a raging inferno. Over the long-haul, as Pakistan-India clashes are likely to re-emerge over disputed Kashmir, whilst Pakistan borrows billions of investment dollars from Beijing, Islamabad might pick even-closer ties with China.

For Islamabad, Beijing remains an already iron-clad, all-weather Pakistani ally and an influential UN Security Council (UNSC) Permanent (P5) member.

Islamabad has successfully leveraged Beijing`s clout to amplify its own interests. Such interests include, but are not limited to, FATF vote support, CPEC6 development and equitably resolving the hotly contested Kashmir dispute7. China has often spoken on Pakistan`s behalf when it comes to Kashmir.

Obviously, a closer rapport with China, now cemented by the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), does not imply a “zero-sum view” of Pakistan`s relations with America. Islamabad does not want a brewing US-Sino confrontation to affect its relations with either. This is easier said than done in lieu of a U.S. pivot to now parley India as a strategic counterweight to China and Modi’s8 BJP seems prepared to side openly with the US, especially in defence.

A concrete example of this is how the Indian army, navy9, and air force (IAF) are procuring thirty MQ-9 Reaper10(Predator B) armed guardian drones11 (unmanned aerial systems) for USD $3 billion12, an acquisition which comes prior to US Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin’s visit   to India in late March 2021. Austin’s visit is a likely precursor to the forthcoming meeting of the ‘Quad’ leaders — US, Australia, India and Japan — with one of its objectives being to counter China in the Indo- Pacific strategic theater.

Indian defence minister, Rajnath Singh13 and his US counterpart, Lloyd Austin, are building swift rapport.

India is expected to upgrade its air force and naval facilities, particularly in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (possibly a future conflict frontier of warfare between India and China) specifically to counter China. The Andaman and Nicobar14 Islands are a vital trade route between India and Myanmar. This move signals a further Chinese “sphere of influence” over Myanmar at Delhi`s expense.

As another response to China, India held a naval exercise with Russia at the Bay of Bengal near the Malacca Strait on 4 and 5 September 2020. However, Pakistan`s Aman naval joint drilling exercise in February 2021 was a master stroke of maritime diplomacy where Pakistan showed to the world that rivals such as U.S, China, Russia and Turkey can all coalesce, co-exist and ensure mutual peace and safety in the wider Indian Pacific region.

South Asian states, including Pakistan, may regret their economic rapprochement with Beijing as their trade deficits15 and loan balances soar16. However, Washington is making a strategic mistake by going too easy on BJP-RSS`s impulsive right-wing instincts. American politicos perceive India as a benevolent influence in South Asia and view its extraterritorial actions and unilateralism as “exceptions” to a policy of diplomacy and deterrence. However, such a perception is not shared by India’s neighbors who have a vivid memory of Indian bellicosity. As a result, they pivot to Beijing17 to balance New Delhi.

The Biden administration now enjoys cordial diplomatic relations with Islamabad and New Delhi. Washington is thus uniquely positioned to provide significant support to both nation-states towards a fairer, more balanced negotiated settlement to the Kashmir dispute beyond a temporary ceasefire.

India’s BJP nationalist government, emboldened by the Biden administration, risks turning aggressive very soon should Washington be unable to offer a more comprehensive Kashmir solution beyond a ceasefire thereby securing a long-term broader regional détente and deterrence policy.

Under the current arrangements of pitting India against China, India might not be able to “walk the walk” given the current power discrepancy between itself and China along with a deep-seated strategic synergy between Beijing and Islamabad.18

India and China’s de-escalation in Eastern Ladakh19 along the  LAC offers an exceptional promise and potential for New Delhi and Washington to examine unintended consequences and second-order effects of their policies, especially in unilaterally annexed Kashmir.20

Thucydides’s Trap

 Biden’s21 stance vis-à-vis Beijing is proven through his Senior appointments. His trade nominee, Katherine Tai22, is a long time China critic, and dubs China ‘both a rival and a partner’. The new Secretary of Defense, Lloyd J. Austin and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr Kathleen Hicks, have acknowledged as a top priority a requirement to “advance U.S. military capabilities needed to deter, to compete with and win in the face of Chinese military modernization.”23

The new CIA Director nominee, William Burns, stated on record that if confirmed to Virginia, Langley, competing with China and countering a “formidable authoritarian adversary”24 would be central to his tenure. Responding to such rhetoric, the Chinese foreign ministry stated that the US should abandon a “zero-sum mentality” and reassess US-Chinese bilateral relations with a view to reconciling differences.

In 2020 what commenced as a foreign policy pivot is now a full- blown China containment strategy.25 Under Biden`s administration, China is framed not just as an economic and military competitor, but also a civilizational and ideological one. America and China are at loggerheads in a heated competition over the future of the Indo-Pacific, though Pakistan`s recent Aman-21 maritime diplomacy type exercises can help both powers co-exist and build mutual goodwill in the Indo-Pacific. In Washington “managing the China challenge” remains the foremost primacy of US foreign policy. The coming decade for South Asia is likely to be forged by a broader America-China confrontation, with all the tumult and scheming this involves.

In strategic game-theoretic terms26, China and the US share broad common interests in a volatile, conflict-ridden, multi-polar world, yet it is natural for the US and China to have differences. The challenge for this generation is for Washington and Beijing to avoid a dreaded “Thucydides’s Trap”. The US-China need not be destined for war. Peace and co-existence is both a generational challenge and a civilizational calling.

The “Thucydides’s Trap” is a term popularized by political scientist Graham T. Allison,27describing a tendency towards war when an emerging power (China) threatens to displace an existing super-power (USA) as the international hegemon. Diverting a “Thucydides trap” will help avert a brewing Sino-U.S. cold war, de-escalate a world on the knife`s edge, bring international relations back from the brink, and reduce hostilities in an increasingly polarized multi-polar world order.

Ceasefire – Implications on Pak, U.S and India Relations

Pakistan and India`s Directors-General Military Operations (DGMO`s hereafter) issued a joint statement, declaring a ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC) (similar to the lines of the 2003 ceasefire) commencing midnight 24-25 February 2021. Both parties agreed to address “core issues” that might undermine peace and stability.28

Both states agreed on reinstating existing mechanisms — hotline contact and flag meetings — for dealing with “any unforeseen situation or misunderstanding”.

The February 25th, 2021, LoC Ceasefire is the “first military-to- military” joint statement since the 2003 understanding and the first Pakistan-India engagement since the July 2015 SCO29 brokered UFA30 joint statement as well as the March 2019 statement on the Kartarpur Corridor.31

Ironically, the February 25 “ceasefire agreement”(if that’s what it can be called) was announced while Pakistan was still busy celebrating the second anniversary of “Operation Swift Retort,” in which the Pakistan Air Force conducted six airstrikes at multiple locations in Indian- occupied Jammu & Kashmir.

In multiple tweets unintentionally accentuating “the irony of peace”, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan “congratulated the entire nation” on that victory over the Indian Air Force (IAF), praised the Pakistan Armed Forces (PAF) for their war preparedness against the eternal nemesis (India), and simultaneously welcomed the “restoration of the ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC).”

Pakistan’s Foreign Office Spokesperson, Zahid Hafeez Chaudhry, added further to the mixed messaging by saying that “aggressors will be met with same response in case of any misadventure.”

India, meanwhile, observed the second anniversary of the Balakot strikes by vowing to continue its counterterrorism operations against regional (read: Pakistan) sponsors of terrorism.

As it stands, there is no formal legally documented written agreement or treaty of the recent ceasefire (a real drawback according to this author)nor any Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) beyond a short February 25 joint statement that agreed to “strict observance” of all previous “agreements, understandings and cease firing”.

Till today, gunfire retorts are celebrated on both sides of the border and retaliations are similarly glorified. Ceasefire violations, therefore, not only reflect institutionalized Indo-Pakistani animosity but also propagate it at a popular level.32

Neither is this the first ceasefire, nor will it be the last.

Certain insiders believe that the recent 25th February ceasefire may, in the future, act as a concession to integrate AJK (Kashmir) and Gilgit Baltistan as Pakistan`s fifth and sixth provinces, but nothing “more than that”. This is not what the Kashmiris desire. The ceasefire does not resolve India’s unilateral stripping of Article(s) 370 and Article 35 in August 2019, with Modi`s imprimatur seeking to demographically alter the population in Occupied Kashmir with Hindutva “forced settlements.”

Pakistan`s government engaged with India despite setting the pre- conditions that it would not do so unless India cancelled the annexation of occupied Kashmir and ceased human rights violations. This ceasefire is therefore a considerable compromise by Pakistan.

The intuitive preface to this ceasefire may have been back in October, 2020, when Moeed Yusuf, the Prime Minister`s National Security Advisor (NSA), conducted an interview with Karan Thapar33, where Yusuf expressed a desire for talks. Another prelude to this ceasefire was when the Army Chief, Gen Qamar Bajwa, in February 2021 made gestures to resolve bilateral strains. Speaking at the PAF Academy, he declared: “It is time to extend hand of peace in all directions”.

The LoC ceasefire announcement, whether by coincidence or design, came on the eve of the second anniversary of India`s February 2019 Balakot skirmish (Operation Swift Retort), a case of aerial coercion gone awry after the Pulwama34suicide bombing débâcle.35

Operation Swift Retort was the first time since 1971 the now nuclear- armed powers had launched airstrikes against each other.

In the fog and friction of the Balakot escalation, an Indian Mi-17 helicopter36 with six soldiers aboard was also accidently shot down by an Indian air defense unit. Tensions escalated as India reportedly threatened missile strikes where Indian naval nuclear assets may have also been activated.37

Since the culmination of the Cold War, the U.S. has been a key crisis manger in South Asia, however, during Balakot, it was good fortune and not U.S. crisis management that salvaged the day. The Trump administration`s “America first” mantra implied that it was mostly missing in action. The pilot (Abhinandan) survived and his capture paused the escalatory cycle. His prompt return38 and ambiguity over the damage extent led to a face-saving de-escalation by both states, however, deadly shelling39 erupted in the Kashmir valley40 after Abhinandan`s release.

Both sides have internalized perilously over-optimistic take-aways from Balakot. The “new normal” in nuclear-armed South Asia is not risk averse. The assumption that escalation is “easy to control” has gained tacit credibility.41

Soon after the 2019 crisis, Modi was electorally rewarded with      a landslide42, owing to a hyperbolic nationalistic  security  agenda. New Delhi enjoyed the geopolitical rewards of unchecked power and international diplomatic support as political pressure ratcheted up on Islamabad. Policy-makers in Islamabad now envisage an opportunity as the United States is once again reliant on Islamabad to drive the Afghan peace process while India (despite de-escalation) appears embattled and stretched with a “second front” since the summer 2020 border standoff with China.43

India may have benefited from 2020`s border skirmishes. New Delhi now sees a new Biden administration come to its rescue, broker ceasefires via back-channel diplomacy, empowering New Delhi to convince Beijing and Islamabad to de-escalate.

For India the 2021 de-escalation talks with China and now the February 25, 2021 LoC ceasefire with Pakistan takes off the scorching heat from the Kashmir crisis, offering the BJP-RSS breathing space, allowing Modi to focus on multiple domestic challenges such as Covid-19, a fledgling economy, the nation-wide farmers protests,44 the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA)45, Delhi riots,46 etc.

Modi might have dangled a diplomatic carrot to the Biden administration or vice versa47, as echoed by Mike Pompeo48 himself, suggesting a resumption of 4G telecom services as well as an LoC ceasefire with Pakistan, in return for letting the BJP retain Kashmir`s abrogated union status quo. Some might consider this a (temporary) diplomatic triumph for Modi who gets to keep the abrogated status of Article(s) 37049 and 35A intact, revoking the special status of Jammu and Kashmir50, demographically and constitutionally annexing Kashmir into a “union territory.”51

Will such a diplomatic overture be enough to assuage Biden`s administration remains to be seen. Seven decades of prior history proves that ceasefires in the sub-continent do not last; spawning indiscriminate shelling with unprecedented casualties at the cost of innocent Kashmiri lives.

The cease-fire may not necessarily enhance bilateral ties, but rather prove a damp squib that falters to advance an already stressed relationship on a razor`s edge. A healthy dose of skepticism is called for.

Interestingly, according to some, China influenced the India-Pakistan LoC ceasefire. During the second informal summit between Modi and Chinese Xi Jinping in October 2019 in Chennai, Xi reiterated the need for trilateral ties between India, Pakistan, and China for regional peace, trade and connectivity.

The ceasefire helps (temporarily) reduce a prospect of India`s “two- front war”which realistically still remains a long-term affront for New Delhi.

Pakistan army chief, General Qamar Bajwa, reassured New Delhi that Rawal Pindi won’t take advantage of the border skirmish with Beijing. Similarly at a virtual seminar, India’s COAS, Gen Manoj Mukund (MM) Naravane52 reportedly said “With our continuous engagement with Pakistan, we will be able to prevail over them (for border peace)…as unsettled borders help no one.”

Modi`s Machiavellian Masterstroke?

Islamabad had not factored in that New Delhi may cross certain escalatory thresholds owing to the risk that it might spawn with a nuclear arch-rival. Pakistan`s conclusion was logically legitimate: India’s military, though substantially larger, is not in a more superior posture to seize territory from Pakistan than it was when the two endured war in 1965. Furthermore, Islamabad had calculated that New Delhi has a far more prominent adversarial army to contend with in the shape and form of the People`s Liberation Army (PLA).

Meanwhile, Modi and his far-right theocratic hawks, with pristine Machiavellian53 manipulation, were charging forward with a conviction to position India on the geopolitical map54 as never before. Fittingly, they deduced that Islamabad`s retort to sudden surprise escalations will be defensive, rather than retaliatory.

Modi and his acolytes took into consideration that Pakistan was torn with numerous internal struggles. It had only just militarily contained the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan55 (TTP)56 in the north-western tribal belts flanking Afghanistan. A conclusive counter-terrorism operation in a restless Balochistan57 (a province under the shadow of foreign funded militant outfits since decades) was fiercely raging. And the PTI government and military were internally immersed in an immensely disruptive power tussle.

In India the 2019 general elections58 loomed over an uncertain political horizon whereby the Modi government’s approval figures dwindled implying that his ruling BJP Party might scuffle to obtain a majority.

Like clockwork, as soon as opportunity knocked on the door, in the form of a deadly suicide blast killing 40 Indian CRPF troops in Pulwama (Kashmir), Modi sent Indian warplanes to Balakot.

By so doing, Modi accomplished three objectives at the heavily discounted price of a rickety old MiG-21 Russian aircraft which the Pakistan Air Force promptly shot down.

Within two years, India’s military positioning went from relaxed to reactionary to retaliatory to retributive to a warhead59 falling an inch short of nuclear war.

Pakistan was still reconciling to a grim reality where the BJP sprung the gargantuan surprise by revoking Indian-occupied Kashmir of its special constitutional status.

One cannot overemphasize the absolute audacity of this geopolitical gamble. Modi and his inner circle managed to keep this machination/ coup clandestine, and that, along with the looming threat of a ballistic missile rejoinder to any Pakistani military reprisal is what explains Islamabad’s lack of reaction.

Obviously, Modi did not possess all the cards and, like any large-stack intimidators, his antics were only effective until a bigger (unanticipated) dragon, China, bore its sharp teeth in Ladakh where you then had two nationalist leaders (Modi and Xi) face off with little room to give.60

However, by instantaneously negotiating de-escalations along India’s disputed territories with China and Pakistan, Modi has erected a strategic shield. For now, the arrangement suits all stakeholders– except of course the hapless Kashmiris61, who still contend with existing in one of our world`s most repressive open-air prisons under a draconian clamp down compounded by a Covid-19 lockdown .

Meanwhile, China and America have bigger fish to fry: each other. Neither India nor Pakistan wants to become a frontline proxy62 for either great power.63

U.S. stance on the February 2021 ceasefire

 In its first statement on occupied Kashmir, Biden`s administration urged India and Pakistan to hold “direct talks” on the Kashmir issue, and welcomed the mutual ceasefire and de-escalation along the Line of Control (LoC), stated the US State Department spokesman, Ned Price.64

Journalists asked Price “To what extent, did the U.S. play a role   in brokering this new ceasefire agreement”? Price replied: “The U.S. supports direct dialogue between India and Pakistan on Kashmir and other issues of concern.”65

Ned Price reemphasized how the Biden administration had been urging India and Pakistan to reduce searing tensions along the LoC since Jan 20, 2021 returning to the 2003 ceasefire agreement and he also emphasized that “We condemn the terrorists who seek to infiltrate across the LoC.”66

Queried about how America`s effort to “stay neutral” between India and Pakistan would affect the Biden administration’s policies towards Islamabad, Price replied: “Pakistan is an important partner with whom we share many interests.”67

De-escalating from a “hot war” to a “cold peace”

 Does the February LoC ceasefire translate into a far-reaching peace agreement? Ground-realities conspire to suggest otherwise as ceasefires have irredeemably been breached. The ceasefire, rather than representing a light at the end of the tunnel, might just be another freight train.

For instance, Pakistan and India`s November 2003 ceasefire witnessed persistent violations in 2008 and thereafter68. A sharp spike in the LoC violence was witnessed especially since 201469 when Modi assumed70 power71 after which smart border fencing was laid.

In May 2018, after numerous weeks of consistent ceasefire violations that reportedly killed 30 civilians on the Pakistani side, both sides’ Directors General of Military Operations (DGMOs) agreed to “talk” and “resolved” to fully implement the 2003 understanding.

By 2019, there were about 7,000 ceasefire violations on both sides. In 2020, that number jumped to over 8,000.72,73

For a more detailed analysis of Ceasefire violations (CFV`s) view hereunder:

Graph attributed to: Thomson, Julia (2015) The Dynamics of Violence along the Kashmir Divide, 2003-2015.

Graph attributed to: Thomson, Julia (2015) The Dynamics of Violence along the Kashmir Divide, 2003-2015.

The recent declaratory ceasefire, a step in the right direction, (by itself) is an insufficient paper tiger, as Pakistan-India clashes over disputed Kashmir are likely to persist as the aforementioned data attests. Clashes will occur until the occupied Kashmiris are offered a UN mandated and moderated plebiscite.

This ceasefire (by itself) does not constitute a substantive peace agreement. At the same time, however, no amount of bloodshed spilled at the LoC brings the self-determination of Kashmiris even an inch closer, and never will. Certain observers contend that the LoC escalation was primarily from India’s side, and its agreeing to observe the ceasefire (it repeatedly violated to the extent of targeting a UN vehicle74 and denying Pakistan’s attempts at UN talks75) seems an acknowledgement that New Delhi’s LoC shelling76 didn`t yield the desired results.77

India might have over-estimated its military maneuvering in Occupied Kashmir. It had estimated that it could sustain a lid on the situation after it`s illegal annexation yet that did not transpire. The indiscriminate use of force further alienated the Kashmiri citizenry. Even politicians sympathetic towards New Delhi are cognizant that, without the restoration of the state’s autonomy, they have no future with occupied Kashmiris.

Skeptics reason that the  presiding  Indian  government,  headed  by theocratic hawks who suborn foreign policy to domestic political compulsions and ideological impulses, has no credible commitment to peace.

Islamabad communicated to India that the restoration of occupied Kashmir to its pre-annexation status is a prerequisite to formal dialogue, yet such talks are a distant dream, given the de facto ground-realities, wherein it seems politically unimaginable for the BJP government to renege on such a pivotal policy plank. The contemporary ceasefire therefore is far from enduring peace. One swallow does not make for spring, what we have now, at best, is a de-escalation from a “hot war” to a “cold peace.”78

Chinese dragon vs. Indian tiger

In March 2021, multiple rounds of talks between India and China led to a disengagement process agreed by India`s Minister for External Affairs, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, and his counterpart, the Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China, Wang Yi,79 whereby, a hotline between India and China was also established.

This disengagement occurred mainly  since  both  the  BJP  and  the Biden administration are wary of how over-stretched and under- resourced the Indian military is compared to China.80

Despite the welcome recent de-escalation, realistically New Delhi will still have to “hard-man” the LAC for the foreseeable future where Sino-Indian mutual suspicion is the “new norm”.

Irrespective of the disengagement talks, New Delhi knows that the LAC is now a perpetual liability. Recent reports suggest that it has had to reorient one of its strike corps, 1 Corps81, to the north82. Two infantry divisions of that corps will now be operating along the LAC. That necessitates budget addition, renewed logistical readiness, operational plans for the infantry divisions, capacity-building and much more.

Pravin Sawhney, a former Indian army veteran and seasoned defence analyst, believes that the recent de-escalation constitutes an Indian surrender. The Chinese PLA was insistent that the Indian Army vacate the heights on the Kailash range. With the Pangong disengagement underway, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, on February 10, conveyed to the Parliament that other (future) friction areas remain like the Hot Springs, Gogra, Demchok, and especially Depsang.83

Even though India and China have disengaged from frontline positions in Pangtong Tso, recent open source intelligence (OSINT) based satellite imagery of the Gogra hot springs illustrate the next frontier and challenge for both militaries where deployments remain unaltered and troops actively remain stationed in 2021.

What makes this territory so sought after and contested, in addition to control of strategic water routes, is that it is a critically important region near an almost completed highway that serves as a crucial communication nerve-center between China and Pakistan.

Indian intelligentsia were wary of a two-front war vis-à-vis China and Pakistan. With the possibility of a two-front war challenging Modi, the Indian government might have bent under pressure.

This is a strong possible explanation for an Indian haste to decrease conflict. The BJP party decided to relinquish the only strategic bargaining chip it had in Ladakh – the Kaelash range in southern Pangong overseeing the PLA’s Moldo garrison which was previously seized by the Indian army.

At present, China has surpassed its goals in Ladakh. It not only controls the land according to its 1959 LAC boundary but also has made the Indian government concede that India had persistently breached China`s sovereignty, by adhering to the 1993 line, which never existed in the Chinese historical description.

China is fully cognizant that the Modi government has sought “transitory reprieve” through a tactical de-escalation and has no desire to collaborate with Beijing, especially in Ladakh, where it is powerless to reach a geostrategic bargain with the PLA.

Modi is now likelier to silently distance himself from the 2019 Sino- Indian Wuhan entente, hoping that the Indian army gains respite for war preparedness which has already commenced as Uncle Sam comes to the rescue. There are intelligence reports of Indian army formations being forever moved away from the Pakistan front towards the Chinese front, something which augurs well for Pakistan.

The Indian army is seemingly gearing up for year-long tasking on the LAC and the Indian Air Force is enhancing its skills against a nimble and agile PLA Air Force (PLAAF). Indian paramilitary forces, acting as a first line of defence, are also being reinforced and rationalised.84

Defence analysts affirm that the PLAAF have certain distinct advantages over the IAF, especially since it received a remarkable enhancement in its number of army aviation and special forces – both in terms of personnel and equipment – whilst its long-range artillery, electronic warfare and cyber competencies have also developed substantially.

China got its way in Ladakh, forcing India to accept the 1959 LAC boundary. Yet still, Beijing is unlikely to ease its pressure on India.

One reality remains: the deployment of a significant number of Indian troops along the Line of Actual Control depletes and diverts Indian attention and resources,85 entrapping both nations (and all of South Asia) in a state of perpetual paranoia and vigilance.86

Beijing`s foray into Eastern Ladakh and Galwan87,  sought  to  reign in an increasingly hegemonic India as well as capitalize upon a leadership vacuum in South Asia. China was also assertively88 posturing to its neighbors that it is evolving as the region’s supreme contender. However, it is erroneous to reflexively align China`s incursion along the LAC89 to a broader policy of Chinese hegemony. In reality, Beijing was partially retorting to Indian unilateral measures made last year.

One trigger for China’s move into Ladakh,90 igniting a skirmish91 with India, was geo-political. China, akin to Pakistan, has opposed Modi’s decision in August 2019 to revoke Article 37092 of the Constitution (granting Jammu and Kashmir autonomous status) annexing the disputed territory and abolishing J&K as a state, thereby, turning it into “union territories”. New Delhi dichotomized  the  former “state” into two distinct territories: “Jammu and Kashmir” and “Ladakh,” the latter being both the venue of Chinese ingress and home to territory sought after by China.

Under Trump`s Presidency, India and America both strategically miscalculated how China will react to Kashmir`s annexation. Whereas American geo-strategists deemed India`s annexation as an endeavour to institutionalize the status quo, they ignored statements by Indian officials – including Interior Minister and shrewd Modi loyalist, Amit93 Shah94 (BJP`s Chanakya mastermind of Modi wave 2.0) — inferring that India would extend its writ to pockets of Kashmir under the control of China and Pakistan, seeking to render China a “lesser” party to the trilateral territorial dispute.

Come what may, the Chinese threat to India is now permanent.95

Recommendations for resolving the Kashmir dispute – Towards a permanent ceasefire

 Over the long-term, Kashmiris remain a key stakeholder to the dispute and nobody can sweep this reality under the tapestries of temporary ceasefires.

Beijing`s pressure at the LAC96 and Pakistan`s pressure at the LoC along with the US behind-the-scenes influence is likely to have nudged India to broker de-escalation and ceasefire with Pakistan. Any reduction in violence is welcome, but after the DGMOs truce, Pakistani vigilance must heighten, not lessen. Some intelligence analysts believe that New Delhi could (eventually) use the LoC ceasefire as a punitive device against the people of Jammu and Kashmir and cement their August 5, 2019 annexation.

The Modi government must find a way to reverse August 5. The sole way to realistically accomplish this might be via the Indian Supreme Court.97

The Supreme Court case of Prem Nath Kaul v State of Jammu and Kashmir98, having considered numerous issues, held that Article 370 was temporary in nature, however, a subsequent judgment of Sampat Prakash v. State of Jammu and Kashmir99 reversed the aforesaid verdict, recognizing Article 370 as a “permanent provision” giving recurrent power to the President to regulate the relationship between the Union of Kashmir and the State.100

Numerous cases challenging the legality of Article 370`s annexation are already before the court. A more recent case, inter alia, being Shah Faisal vs. Union of India on 2 March 2020. India`s Supreme Court has been dragging its feet over the issue.

If there is to be any real movement to return the region to normalcy, we should see the Indian SC become more active in fairly and justly dealing with petitions appealing for the reversal of the August 5th unilateral (politicized) verdict. If judiciaries engage in divisive politics they compromise their very independence and raison d`etre.

Constitutionally and legally reversing the 370 and 35A verdicts would actually open up real diplomatic space for coming back to the negotiation table with a view to truly resolving a myriad of disputes between India and Pakistan.101 Or else the 25 February 2021 ceasefire will be deemed a “temporary truce” rather than a substantive peace agreement.

Pakistan`s Foreign Ministry can make the current ceasefire strategically contingent on a set of concretely measurable actions by India: such as rescinding the “demographic engineering” masked as a domicile law divisively allowing non-Kashmiris to settle in the region, reappraising the status of Articles 35A and 370, immediately ceasing human rights violations, the release of (innocent) political prisoners held in Occupied Jammu and Kashmir, making Kashmiris key stakeholders to the negotiations, requiring a UN mandated plebiscite for self- determination, etc.

Such measures would bring Kashmiris steps closer towards self- determination and contribute in resolving the issue in a dignified and peaceful manner, as per the aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.

Pakistan’s stealthy diplomatic retort to all this so far has correctly centered on human rights violations vis-à-vis Kashmir’s Muslim- majority population by India’s Hindutva BJP government.102 These violation include restricting travel103 and freedom of movement104, censoring105 broadband internet access, imposing curfew and a draconian security lockdown since August 2019.

Islamabad can intensify the regional momentum and bring even more attention to occupied Kashmir now as global celebrities, social media, international press and UN bodies have begun to take increasing note of both the situation in Occupied and Illegally annexed Kashmir as well as flagrant rights abuses across the Indian mainland with regards to the farmers protest.

Whereas Clausewitzian realpolitik106 and self-interests have shielded India from being overtly censured, large state actors are increasingly nudging New Delhi (privately) to shore up goodwill as the current stalemate and insecurity cannot persist.107

A U.S Perspective: Future diplomacy, détente and de-escalation

America will have to become more creative with future détente and de-escalation initiatives in the sub-continent. Insiders reason that future de-escalation tools could include diplomatic pressures and deterrence, financial sanctions (FATF is a sore case in point) withdrawing intelligence sharing, or suspended/renewing customized military training and assistance (IMET).108

If under a Biden administration the Pentagon fortifies India`s annexation of Kashmir, it unduly heightens domestic pressures for Islamabad.109, 110

America, by looking “the other way”and diverting congressional111 oversight over the draconian clampdown112 and curfew, offered its tacit endorsement of India’s Kashmiri annexation, thinking that this might stimulate regional economic affluence.

The US State Department’s recent communiqué used the wording of “India’s Jammu and Kashmir”, rather than referring to its “disputed” rank. Pakistan`s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) urgently expressed its “disappointment” at the State Department’s choice of wording, stimulating an explanation that US policy over Kashmir had “not changed”. The Biden administration might be more sensitive/prudent in the future. With the ceasefire in place it is now for India, PM Imran Khan tweeted, to create an “enabling environment” for peace.

A comprehensive mutually agreed (both by India and Pakistan), rather than a one-sided, Kashmir resolution is imperative. Empirical research over decades illustrates that South Asia is acutely prone to false optimism, miscalculation, and conflict escalation, even to the nuclear level. India and Pakistan`s geographical proximity compresses time  for decision-making in crises and incentivizes swift (often knee-jerk) responses.

Conventional, precision-strike capabilities at standoff distances are at the ready and falsely lure officials into thinking punitive or retaliatory strikes can be easy and clean with intensified nationalism and fervour. The nuclear and radiological threat matrix increases as both countries also appear to be embracing more aggressive113 nuclear  doctrines.114 The Biden administration will have to carefully calibrate how not to create “perverse incentives” — e.g., “too nuclear to fail”. The Biden Presidency continues to hold a major stake in how the crises unfold/are mitigated in South Asia.115

While Washington placed a strategic wager on New Delhi to reap rich dividends for U.S. competition versus China, it retains a vested interest in safeguarding that future South Asian crises’ do not spiral out of control and risk (even) a limited nuclear exchange – of which there was a (slight) possibility during the Balakot escalation.

A nuclear detonation would trigger a humanitarian crisis, a staggering loss of life, devastate economies, jeopardize water  and food supplies, contaminate the environment, decommission India from power status, etc. The U.S knows all too well that such an India would then neither counter China nor be able to play any anchoring role in the Indo-Pacific that the Biden administration envisions. There are many thorny issues in South Asia still to test the Biden administration to its limits.

Any future India-Pakistan skirmish (or limited war) runs anathema to not just U.S. interests but an entire South Asia already on a knife`s edge. If the 2019 Balakot incursion has taught us anything, it is that being a bystander,116 limiting the ambit of US peace mediation, or “turning the other cheek” is not a sagacious option.

Policy-makers mount concern about the more intimate ties between Modi and Biden. Biden`s administration is likely to deem   the Indian-Chinese border stand-off as “chaos and an opportunity”117 for further rapprochement between India and the U.S. This will bear broad implications on Pakistan`s ability to pre-empt and defend itself against an increasingly assertive, opportunistic and unpredictable BJP government and Indian army.

Yet the US is likely to intensify its promotion and support of India via the Quad – signaled by US defence secretary Lloyd Austin`s visit  to India and other Quad members in March 2021 – through the transfer of technology, Covid diplomacy, capability building, defense ties118, development and intelligence sharing.

A catch-22 dilemma – Getting caught in the cross-hairs?

 As China’s close friend and India’s historical foe, “Islamabad seeks to avoid getting in the crosshairs of US-China rivalry,” declared Maleeha Lodhi119, a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN, US and UK. “And though it seeks a better relationship with the US, it is obvious to Islamabad that Pakistan’s strategic future lies with China.”

Islamabad might be losing priority billing in US foreign policy for the first time since the September 11 al-Qaeda attacks, as the “war on terrorism” no longer occupies D.C.’s international schema.

The US (gradually but determinedly) retreating its forces from Afghanistan and war zones in the Middle East has been replaced by a great power rivalry between Beijing and Moscow who readily fill in the power vacuum. Pakistan has felt the thrust of this policy permutation since 2018, when Trump`s administration engaged in populist economic nationalism120 imposing punitive tariffs121 on Beijing122 and launching     a diplomatic coup de force against the Belt and Road123 Initiative (BRI)124. The Belt  and  Road  Initiative  is  China`s  New  Silk  Road  to the Mediterranean, a vital Eurasian transit bridge that has forever reconfigured geo-strategic power dynamics in international relations.

Moeed Yusuf, Prime Minister Imran Khan’s national security adviser, has repeatedly echoed Pakistan’s uneasiness at being depicted as a spoiler by D.C. as it seeks to convince New Delhi to abandon its customary foreign policy mantra of non-alignment and join forces against Beijing. “Pakistan wants bilateral US-Pak relations that are not clouded by hyphenating the relationship with US policy towards other countries in the region,” Yusuf stated.125

Interestingly — despite India-China`s126 heightened tensions at the LAC, the Galwan deaths, Chinese Foreign Direct Investment block, Chinese mobile apps banned in India (TikTok, Shareit, Kwai, Baidu map, Shein and many more) — behind-the-scenes, as reported by the Business Standard127, China became India`s largest trading partner in the first nine months of FY 2021, with China enjoying a trade surplus with India whilst the U.S. has a trade deficit with India.

China`s imported goods worth USD $ 15.3 billion from India and exported goods worth USD $ 45.4 billion to India, leveraging a surplus of USD $ 30.1 billion during April-December. Empirically validated and proven by the Indian Commerce Department`s official trading bar graph statistics hereunder.

Ceasefires, Kashmir and Emerging Rivalries of Great Powers in South Asia


Image courtesy of the Indian Commerce Department (2021) India`s Trading Partners till December 2020.

CPEC – Strategic Vantage Point and Regional Security Concerns

Islamabad has been under pressure from Washington D.C. to scale down the estimated US$60 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

CPEC provides landlocked Western China with better access to  the sea and can (in the future) further act as a potential ground-based bilateral line of communication between Pakistani and Chinese armies and intelligence.

Since its inception, CPEC has been key to the construction of power generation plants and regional connectivity infrastructure along China’s only territorial link to the coveted Middle East via the strategic port of Gwadar that it operates along Pakistan’s coast.

Gwadar is now dubbed as a future regional trading epicenter, which promises to lure millions of dollars in transit trade, even rivalling it    as a regional commercial hub with Dubai.129 The port of Gwadar is strategically nestled outside the Gulf of Oman near Iran, along vital Persian Gulf shipping lanes.

Pakistan revived CPEC in 2020 by penning contracts for innovative hydropower projects in the portion of Kashmir that it administers. Such lucrative contracts incensed India, which administers the other half    of disputed and occupied Kashmir. All this partially triggered India`s military stand-off with China in the Eastern Ladakh portion of the disputed region.

In the initial official commentary on CPEC by a high-ranking U.S. official under Biden`s administration, the US Central Command (Centcom) chief, General Keith McKenzie Jr, recapped the Pentagon’s stance of Pakistan being a major facilitator of China’s mounting role in the Middle East and South Asia.

“China uses its Belt and Road Initiative and the CPEC to expand Chinese influence and presence,” McKenzie stated as a keynote speaker to the Middle East Institute in Washington dated February 8130.

Despite this, CPEC remains Islamabad’s “overriding priority”, stated H.E. Lodhi.“CPEC is emblematic of China’s aim to strengthen Pakistan, economically and strategically,”131 she said. Lodhi also stated that Pakistan did not think the Biden administration would adopt a “zero- sum” view of Pakistan’s ties with China as these were “a stabilising factor for the region”.

“Indeed, there may be regional convergences between the US and China as for example in seeking peace and stability in Afghanistan where Pakistan’s interests align with both countries,”132 she posited.

Islamabad gave the green-light to a USD $ 6.8 billion dollar upgrade of a rail line in the region as part of CPEC. Also in August 2019, Beijing announced the opening of a 118km stretch of road from Thakot to Havelian as part of a larger road project that runs from Islamabad to Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang region.

Interestingly, the new road courses close to India’s westernmost territorial claims in Jammu and Kashmir. Once completed, the aptly titled “Friendship Highway” will pass through areas of Kashmir in the Pakistan-administered region of Gilgit-Baltistan (G-B), fortifying Islamabad`s hold in the region.133,134

Gazing into the future

 A key question on everyone`s mind is what comes after the ceasefire.

Both states now have a unique historical opportunity to ride on   the coattails of the cease-fire and aspire towards more meaningful cooperation. However, given the climate of mutual distrust, the Kashmir impasse, and strains of rivalry, both states are likelier to decide that  it’s futile to pursue confidence-building measures when neither state is willing to concede on the “core issues”.

Logically, taking the ceasefire to its mature corollary requires bilateral political goodwill from both sides – this is where the delicate art of politics (an art of the possible) comes in with both parties having to make realistic concessions in good faith.

Building on the ceasefire (could just) help stabilize a nuclear-armed South Asia and bring peace to the broader Indo-Pacific region like never before—realistically though the Kashmir stalemate and regional volatilities of the relationship cause that window of opportunity to narrow.

What occurs after the ceasefire is entirely contingent on whether and if all stakeholders in South Asia, including China and a recently elected Biden administration, can agree to reframe relations and shift their foreign policy focus from geo-security to geo-economics, as recently articulated by Pakistan.

Any realistic  rational  mind  would  not  hold  their  breath  on  this happening. A shift towards solely geo-economics, requires an unparalleled geopolitical emphasis on connectivity in the midst of the deadliest pandemic the world has witnessed in over a century.

China is unlikely to ease pressure on India. Beijing will continue its military coercion along what is now a re-inforced one-front from west to east. Here the US is going to offer India full support. Thereby a Biden administration singularly focused on intensifying a Sino-U.S rivalry, risks of losing Pakistan as the latter increasingly gravitates towards China due to geopolitical realities.

With no change in their antagonistic rhetoric or deeply ingrained culture of mutual mistrust, the February 2021 ceasefire may usher in a temporary interval from decades of border skirmishes but is unlikely to yield lasting peace in a hotly contested Jammu and Kashmir.

Ever since 2003, when a still-existing ceasefire agreement was first announced for the so-called Line of Control, both sides have committed literally thousands of violations of the declared suspension of conflicts.

Concomitantly, thousands of people, both civilians and soldiers, have died on both sides. With such a long history of miscarriage, skeptical minds wonder why the two sides even bother to declare yet another “ceasefire”, dismissing it as paper tiger.

The media in both nation states have promptly attributed the ceasefire to the “Biden impact”, meaning that both India and Pakistan seek to cultivate cordial ties with the US in a post-Trump era.

New Delhi aspires towards enhanced trade and strategic alignment with Washington; Islamabad seeks to geo-strategically hedge its growing financial reliance on China.

Yet, both states retain their hostile nationalist rhetoric and world- view since the supposed new deal was announced. This reflects that there is still not sufficient political goodwill, neither in India nor Pakistan to disrupt the wave of mistrust and reproach.

How such ideologies are arrogated  and  replicated  is  witnessed in the way even ceasefire violations and civilian casualties are often instrumentalized to reflect the other state as the one violating the agreement.

Whereas Beijing and the “Biden impact” have played instrumental roles in the most recent ceasefire, ongoing domestic political tumult in both India and Pakistan lend probably larger explanatory influences.

India’s months-long farmers’ protest, to date, represents the most substantial challenge Narendra Modi has confronted yet.

In Pakistan, the Pakistan Democratic Movement’s (PDM) street protests ignited months of instability as the PTI’s coalition government showed signs of fracture; witness the recent vote of confidence where political sacrifices had to be made and settled. Reducing border hostilities, therefore, makes political sense for both governments, providing each with diplomatic respite at a time when they endure rising domestic political challenges. Modi and Imran Khan seem to be in Darwinian survival mode. The present ceasefire could therefore be construed to be constructed on precariously unsteady ground.

The swiftness of the ceasefire declaration illustrates the reality  that there has been no discernible or substantial change in the existing state of affairs in Occupied Kashmir. Nor does it signal any willingness (especially from India) to accept any third-party mediation, which a Biden administration could broker.

Whereas possible mediators, including the US and UK, played a vital part in the (still-standing) 2003 agreement, the fact that the US and West have incrementally withdrawn from South Asia’s geopolitical theater in recent years underscores the recent agreement’s lack of diplomatic and political substance.135

What is required is to pursue a genuine and lasting peace in Jammu & Kashmir rather than time-tested political posturing and signaling.

History attests that Pakistan and India will clash again after this momentary ceasefire interval since Modi is unlikely to budge an inch on Kashmir – followed by another diplomatic round of détente.

Nevertheless, stranger events have unfolded of late, from the Abraham Accords136 of Arabs and Israeli breaking bread together to a security confluence of two seas, with the creation of an Indo-Pacific strategic theatre.137

References:

 

  1. Schmidt, D. (2020) Introduction: India and China in Comparative Perspective— Emerging Asian and Global Powers. In: Kim YC. (eds) China-India Relations. Understanding China. Springer, Cham
  2. Schmidt, D. (2020) Introduction: India and China in Comparative Perspective— Emerging Asian and Global Powers. In: Kim YC. (eds) China-India Relations. Understanding China. Springer, Cham
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  4. Ali, Idrees (2021). “U.S. troops in Afghanistan now down to 2,500, lowest since 2001: Pentagon”. Reuters. 15 January, 2021.
  5. Dive deeper into Hegelian dialectic with:Hegel, G. and Hartman, R., (1953) Reason in history. New York: Liberal Arts Press as well as  Hegel,  ,  (1837) General Introduction to the Philosophy of History by Hegel and Hegel, G., Hoffmeister, J., Nisbet, H. and Forbes, D., 1975. Lectures on the philosophy of world history. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press.
  6. CPEC is a $62 billion connectivity initiative linking China’s landlocked Xinjiang province with Pakistan’s Arabian Sea ports.
  7. Hussain, Syed Rifaat (2009) “Resolving the Kashmir Dispute: Blending Realism with Justice.” The Pakistan Development Review 48, no. 4 (2009): 1007-035
  8. Swain, Ashok (2020) “Narendra Modi is clueless about facing China”, Gulf News, October 19, 2020
  9. India` s navy already possesses US Sea Guardian drones on lease from the US firm General India`s navy is the lead agency for procurement of HALE (High Altitude Long Endurance) UAVs, will seek the Acceptance of Necessity (AON) from India`s Defence Acquisition Council (DAC).
  10. The MQ-9B has an endurance of 48 hours and a range of over ix thousand nautical miles. It comes equipped with nine hard-points, capable of carrying sensors and laser-guided bombs alongside air-to-ground missiles, with a maximum payload of two tonnes.In short, the payload is the weight a drone or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) can carry.
  11. Under India`s drone program also analyse‘Project Cheetah’ an initiative to modernize India`s ‘Heron’ medium-altitude long-endurance drone fleet for the Navy, army and air force.
  12. Snehesh, Alex Philip (2021) Navy, Army and IAF finally agree to procure armed drones from US in $3 bn deal, The Print, 8 March, 2021.
  13. Who presides over India`s Defence Acquisition Council.
  14. Andaman and Nicobar is an Indian union territory with a population of circa 450,000, the strategic archipelago intersects the sea lanes leading from the Malacca Strait to the Indian Ocean.
  15. Pillay, P. K. (2020). Cooperation not confrontation: Changing the rules of the China game. The Economic Times.
  16. For a deeper understanding of Pakistan and China`s trade relations rigorously review: Khan, R., Shaikh, A. S., Masood, H. (2019). Impact of Pak-China Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on Trade and Industry of Electronic Research Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities 1 (IV), 1-33
  17. Sansa, N. A. (2020). Analysis of the Influence of the China Industrial Policies to the Digital Economy. Electronic Research Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities. Volume 2, Issue II, pp. 71-83
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  19. Panda, A. (2020). A Skirmish in Galwan Valley: India and China’s Deadliest Clash in More Than 50 Years. The Diplomat. Retrieved June 16, 2020 as well as Philip, S. A. (2020). Why the remote Galwan Valley is a flashpoint between India and China. The Print. Retrieved June 16, 2020
  20. Ali, S., Saeed, A. (2019). Kashmir Dispute and Challenges to the National Security of Pakistan: An Analysis. Electronic Research Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities 1 (II), 61-77.
  21. During the Obama Presidency as VP, Biden enjoyed a sanguine relationship with Pakistan, where in 2009 a Hilal-e-Pakistan award was conferred to Biden who deems Islamabad a vital partner in the war in Afghanistan.
  22. Katherine Tai will be more assertive with China for proof see Garver, Rob (January 29, 2021). “Biden’s Trade Representative Expected to Be Assertive with China”. VOA. January 29, 2021 and Franck, Thomas (2020). “Biden picks longtime China critic Katherine Tai as top U.S. trade official”. CNBC. December 10, 2021..
  23. As stated verbatim in the very first tweet by the S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr Kathleen Hicks (2021) on her twitter timeline which can be accessed at @ DepSecDef
  24. As reported by Macias, Amanda (2021) CIA nominee calls China an ‘authoritarian adversary,’ vows to intensify competition with Beijing, CNBC, 24 February, 2021.
  25. Likely to invite Chinese counter-measures: Liu Xuanzun (2020) “Rare gathering of US aircraft carriers ‘to be met with Chinese countermeasures”,’ Global Times, June 14, 2020.
  26. For insights on game theory and the world of game theorists scrutinize: Erickson, Paul (2015) The World the Game Theorists Made. Chiacago: University of Chicago Press, pp 1-385.
  27. Allison, Graham (2017) Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017.
  28. Sajjad, Baqir (2021) Pakistan, India agree on LoC ceasefire, Dawn, February 26, 2021
  29. The Shanghai Cooperation (SCO) is seen by some as a counter to NATO.
  30. The SCO brokered UFA Joint Statement between India and Pakistan, being the first prime minister-level joint statement in which Kashmir was not even specifically mentioned. Kashmir was specifically mentioned in the Shimla Agreement of 1972, the joint statement in New York in 1998, the Lahore Declaration of 1999, the draft Agra declaration of 2001, and the joint statement in Islamabad in 2004. However not in Ufa. For more on the Shimla Agreement scrutinize: Ministry of Exernal Affairs: Government of India (1972) “Shimla Agreement”. Ministry of Exernal affairs: Government of India the Agreement can be accessed at http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateraldocuments.htm?dtl/5541/  Simla+Agreement. For more on the Lahore Declaration probe: Ministry of External Affairs: Government of India (1999) Lahore Declaration February, Ministry of External Affairs: Government of India. The Declaration can be accessed at http://mea.gov.in/in-focusarticle.htm? 18997/Lahore +Declaration+ February+1999.
  31. The Kartarpur Corridor illustrated Pakistan`s goodwill, whereby a Visa free border crossing and corridor was created connecting the Gurdwara Darbar Sahib in Pakistan to the Indian border. However Pakistani Sikhs are unable to use the border crossing, and cannot access Dera Baba Nanak on the Indian side without first obtaining an Indian Visa or unless they work there. Dera Baba Nanak is a shrine so near, yet so far. A shrine where prayers travel across borders, however Pakistani Sikh pilgrims cannot.
  32. Sheikh, Salman Rafi (2021) India Pakistan ceasefire more form than New agreement more populist peace than genuine bid to end decades of hostilities and entrenched mistrust in Jammu and Kashmir, Asia Times, March 8, 2021.
  33. The full text of the interview is available at Thapar, Karan (2020) Full Text: Interview with Imran Khan’s National Security Advisor (NSA) on Kashmir, Uighurs, Jadhav, Terror and Talks. Yusuf said that India has sent a message expressing a desire for talks with Pakistan. The Wire, 15 October, 2020.
  34. Premised on empirical evidence, many in Pakistan believe Pulwama to be an Indian “false flag” operation.
  35. Wayback Machine (2019) Pulwama attack: UN chief urges India, Pakistan to defuse tensions Al Jazeera, 21 February 2019.
  36. Agence France Press staff writer (2019) India admits friendly fire downed Mi-17 helicopter in Kashmir, Washington, DC: The Defense Post, 4 October, 2019.
  37. Lalwani, Sameer (2021) “America can`t ignore the next Indo-Pakistani crisis”, War on the rocks, February 26, 2021.
  38. Slater, Joanna; Constable, Pamela (2019) “Pakistan captures Indian  pilot  after shooting down aircraft, escalating hostilities”. The Washington Post. 27 February, 2019.
  39. Jeffrey Gettleman; Hari Kumar; Samir Yasir (2019) “Deadly Shelling Erupts in Kashmir Between India and Pakistan After Pilot Is Freed”, The New York Times, 2 March, 2019
  40. Amy Kazmin (2019) “India and Pakistan engage in a high-stakes game of brinkmanship”, Financial Times, 1 March, 2019
  41. Lalwani, Sameer (2021) “America can`t ignore the next Indo-Pakistani crisis”, War on the rocks, February 26, 2021
  42. Malik, Aman (2019) “Elections 2019: PM Modi returns with bigger mandate, faces growth challenge”. VCCircle. 23 May, 2019.
  43. Lalwani, Sameer (2021) “America can`t ignore the next Indo-Pakistani crisis”, War on the rocks, February 26, 2021
  44. For more perspectives into the farmer`s protest discerningly review Chand, Sakshi (2021) “Outnumbered, but not outdone: Injured cops recall Republic Day horror”. The Times of India. 28 January, 2021 as well as Kaur, Pawanjot (2020-12-25). “A Month on, Farmers Remain Resolute Over Repeal of Farm Laws”. The Wire, 25thDecember, 2020.
  45. Mohan, Geeta (2020) “UN human rights body moves Supreme Court over CAA, India hits back saying citizenship law internal matter”. The India Today. 3 March, 2020
  46. Ellis-Peterson, Hannah; Azizur Rahman, Shaikh (2020), “‘I cannot find my father’s body’: Delhi’s fearful Muslims mourn riot dead”, The Guardian, 6 March, 2020. For insights into the Delhi riots in French consult: Landrin, Sophie (2020), “Attaquescontre les musulmans à New Delhi : “ J’aipensé que j’allaismourir “ Trois joursd’attaquesmeurtrièresperpétrées par les nationalisteshindous dans le nord de la capitaleindiennelaissent des vies dévastées.”, Le Monde.
  47. Iqbal Khan (2020) “Is America jumping into China-India fray?: No way!”, The Frontier Post./ June 30, 2020.
  48. “Mike Pompeo says US shifting military to face Chinese threat to India, Southeast Asian nations” (2020) Financial Express, PTI Jun 26, 2020.
  49. For deeper insights into the revocation of Article 370 and the unrest it caused: Gettleman, Jeffrey; Raj, Suhasini; Schultz, Kai; Kumar, Hari (2019) “India Revokes Kashmir’s Special Status, Raising Fears of Unrest”. The New York Times. 5 August, 2019. View also Venkataramanan, K. (2019). “Explained | How the status of Jammu and Kashmir is being changed”. The 6 August 2019as well as “The importance of Article 370”. The Hindu. 15 October 2015.
  50. For a historical overview of Jammu and Kashmir: Osmańczyk, Edmund Jan (2003). “Jammu and Kashmir”. In Mango, Anthony (ed.). Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements. 2: G–M (3rd ed.). Taylor & Francis.
  51. Prabhu, Sunil (2019) Sanyal, Anindita (ed.). “Already, Rajya Sabha Clears J&K As Union Territory Instead Of State”. NDTV. 5 August, 2019.
  52. “Interesting facts about Lieutenant General Manoj Mukund Naravane who is becoming the new army chief”.(2019) Business Insider.
  53. For more on the theories of Machiavelli: Machiavelli, N., Marriott, W., Fuller, N. and Hobbes, T., (1955) The prince. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica.
  54. Hussain, Tom (2021) India`s cunning de-escalation after setting Kashmir alight, TRT World, 4 March, 2021.
  55. Zia ur Rehman (18 April 2019). “Pakistani Taliban: Between infighting, government crackdowns and Daesh”. TRT World and Franz J. Marty (2018) “Afghan-Pakistani Cross-Border Terrorism Cuts Both Ways. The Diplomat. 9 April, 2018
  56. The TTP glean their ideological world-view from al-Qaeda.
  57. Balochistan remained restless despite pro-Pakistani campaigns such as Aghaz-e- Huqooq-e-Balochistanas well as integration initiatives such as the’Balochistan Peace Program’ and ‘Youth Mobilization Campaign’which were undertaken to weaken support for militant outfits and sought to reverse a pervasive anti-state narrative.
  58. Malik, Aman (2019) “Elections 2019: PM Modi returns with bigger mandate, faces growth challenge”. VCCircle. Retrieved 23 May, 2019.
  59. Kenneth Waltz (1981) “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons:  More  May  Better,” Adelphi Papers, Number 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies).
  60. Meyers, Steven Lee; Abi-Habib, Maria; Gettlemen, Jeffrey (2020) “In China- India Clash, Two Nationalist Leaders With Little Room to Give”. The New York Times. 17 June, 2020.
  61. Hussain, Tom (2021) India`s cunning de-escalation after setting Kashmir alight, TRT World, 4 March, 2021.
  62. Hussain, Tom (2021) India`s cunning de-escalation after setting Kashmir alight, TRT World, 4 March, 2021.
  63. Meyers, Steven Lee; Abi-Habib, Maria; Gettlemen, Jeffrey (2020) “In China- India Clash, Two Nationalist Leaders With Little Room to Give”. The New York Times. 17 June, 2020.
  64. Iqbal, Anwar (2021) US urges India, Pakistan to hold direct talks on Kashmir, welcomes joint statement on LoC ceasefire, Dawn, February 26, 2021.
  65. Economic Times (2021) US welcomes Indo-Pak move for ceasefire along LoC, 26 February, 2021
  66. Press Trust of India (2021) US welcomes India-Pakistan joint statement on ceasefire, 26 February, 2021.
  67. Ibid.
  68. Saikat Datta (2014) “Heard-earned ceasefire gains being shot through since 2010”, Hindustan Times, October 9, 2014.
  69. The Pakistani government reports ceasefire violations along the LoC and Working Boundary, reporting 24 violations in 2012; 59 in 2013 See the National Assembly of Pakistan`s http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/questions/1380265407_732.pdf and 243 in 2014 as well as http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/questions/1421070881_526.pdf  The Islamabad-based Jinnah Institute compiled reports of ceasefire violations along the LoC and Working Boundary from media sources and found 86 in 2011; 230 in 2012; 414 in 2013; and 224 in 2014 for more browse http://jinnah-institute.org/loc-in-crisis-2
  70. Sanjay Kumar (2014) “New Delhi Cancels India-Pakistan Talks,” The Diplomat, August 20, 2014,
  71. Aditi Malhotra (2014) “India’s Changing Pakistan Policy,” South Asian Voices, October 22, 2014.
  72. Sheikh, Salman Rafi (2021) India Pakistan ceasefire more form than New agreement more populist peace than genuine bid to end decades of hostilities and entrenched mistrust in Jammu and Kashmir, Asia Times, March 8, 2021.
  73. For instance in July 2020 Islamudin Sajid reported to Trukish media: Sajid, Islamuddin (2020) India violated ceasefire 1,595 times in 2020, Anadolu Agency, 7 July, 2020.
  74. An issue over which Islamabad summoned the Indian chargé d’affaires. For more on this grueling denouement read: Siddiqui, Naveed (2020) Indian troops target UN vehicle from across LoC in “new low”, Dawn, December 18, 2020.
  75. Sandeep Dikshit (2013, “India Shoots down Pak talk of UN probe,” The Hindu, January 16, 2013.
  76. Mostly from India`s side.
  77. Khuhro, Zarrar (2021) A cold peace? Dawn, March 1, 2021.
  78. A phrase conceptually borrowed from Khuhro, Zarrar (2021) A cold peace? Dawn, March 1, 2021
  79. To better gauge Wang Yi`s personality take a glance at: Ford, Peter (2013) “The new face of Chinese diplomacy: Who is Wang Yi?”. Christian Science Monitor. Beijing. 18 March, 2013.
  80. Lt Gen H S Panag (retd) (2020) “India’s Fingers have come under Chinese boots. Denial won’t help us” The Print, June 04, 2020
  81. Haider, Ejaz (2021) The choice is India`s, The Friday Times, February 26, 2021
  82. Raghavan, S. (2009), Civil–Military Relations in India: The China Crisis and After. Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 32, Issue 1, pp. 149-175.
  83. Sawhney, Pravin (2021) How India played into China`s hands on the border dispute, The Wire, 1 March, 2021
  84. Sawhney, Pravin (2021) How India played into China`s hands on the border dispute, The Wire, 1 March, 2021
  85. Sawhney, P. (2020). Here’s Why All’s Not Well for India on the Ladakh The Wire.
  86. Schmidt, D. (2020) Introduction: India and China in Comparative Perspective— Emerging Asian and Global Powers. In: Kim YC. (eds) China-India Relations. Understanding China. Springer, Cham
  87. Bhaumik, A. (2020). What made China covet Galwan Valley again after six decades. Deccan Herald as well as Chaturvedi, A. (2020). Face-off between India and China in Galwan valley: Here’s what we know. Hindustantimes.
  88. Ramachandran, Sudha (2020) “Beijing Asserts a More Aggressive Posture in Its Border Dispute with India”. Jamestown Foundation. 15 July,
  89. ET (2020b). India-China standoff: How the situation suddenly aggravated at Line of Actual Control. The Economic Times.
  90. Ravi Agrawal (2020) “Why India and China Are Sparring”, Foreign Policy, May 28, 2020.
  91. Ethirajan, A., Pandey, V. (2020). China-India border: Why tensions are rising between the neighbours. BBC News.
  92. “No Article 370 for Jammu & Kashmir, historic move by Modi govt”. (2019) India Today. 5 August, 2019.
  93. For more on Amit Shah`s role in the Sino-Indian border skirmish: Lt Gen H S Panag (retd) (2019) “Amit Shah’s political aim to recover PoK is not backed by India’s military capacity”, The Print, September 19, 2019.
  94. Singh, Akshay Pratap; Gaur, Gaur (2019) “Second to None: Amit Shah’s Political Engine”. Quint. 30 May, 2019 as well as Dutta, Prabhash K (2019) “From sticking bills for BJP to managing Union home ministry: Rise and rise of Amit Shah”. India Today. 31 May, 2019.
  95. Pillay, P. K. (2020). Cooperation not confrontation: Changing the rules of the China game. The Economic Times.
  96. The Line of actual control over which India and China are disputing.
  97. For prodigious legal and historical insights into Article 370 see the ingenious Noorani, A. (2011). Article 370: A constitutional history of Jammu and Kashmir. Oxford University Press. For a more contemporary and concise take: Sampathkumar, M. (2019). What is article 370? The Kashmir crisis explained. Fortune.
  98. Legal citation: 1959 AIR 749, 1959 SCR Supl. (2) 270.
  99. Legal citation: 1970 AIR 1118, 1970 SCR (2) 365.
  100. Importantly also legally consult: Shah Faesal v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 263, verdict rendered on 02.03.2020 and relatedly also consult Manohar Lal Sharma v. Union of Indiaa Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 129/2016 14-09-2016.
  101. Haider, Ejaz (2021) The choice is India`s, The Friday Times, 26 February, 2021.
  102. Special Correspondent (2019) “Current situation in Kashmir not good and not sustainable, says Angela Merkel,” The Hindu, 1 November 2019
  103. Loveena Tandon (2019) “British EU MP’s Kashmir visit invite reportedly cancelled after he asks to travel freely,” India Today, 29 October 2019.
  104. Express News Service (2019) “Restore freedom of movement in Kashmir: EU ambassador,” The New Indian Express, 11 December 2019.
  105. Haroon Siddique (2019) “’Divisive tactics’: WhatsApp messages urge Hindus to vote against Labour,” The Guardian, 8 November 2019.
  106. To gain additional understanding and analyze the concept of realpolitik and Clausewit`s theories further research: Coker, Christopher J (2017) Rebooting Clausewitz: On War in the 21st Century, Oxford University Press, 2017 and additionally review Colson, Prof. Dr. Bruno, and Lecturer Dr. Christophe Wasinski (2011) “Tailoring Ends to Means: Clausewitz in Belgium,” pp. 31-43 in Clausewitz Society [Clausewitz Gesellschaft, Hamburg], Reiner Pommerin, ed. Clausewitz Goes Global: Carl von Clausewitz in the 21st Century. (Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Clausewitz Society.) Berlin: Carola Hartmann Miles Verlag, 2011.
  107. Haider, Ejaz (2021) The choice is India`s, The Friday Times, 26 February, 2021
  108. Lalwani, Sameer (2021) “America can`t ignore the next Indo-Pakistani crisis”, War on the rocks, February 26, 2021
  109. PTI (2019) “Kashmir Article 370: UK expresses concern, reiterates calm,” India Today, 8 August 2019.
  110. Lalwani, Sameer and Gayner, Gillian (2020) India’s Kashmir Conundrum: Before and After the Abrogation of Article 370, United States Institute of Peace, August 5, 2020.
  111. For more on U.S. Congressional proceedings pertaining to the 2019 annexation of Kashmir consult: Sadeque, Samira (2019) “At US congressional hearing on Kashmir, call to end lockdown”, Al Jazeera, 15 November 2019
  112. Parker, Claire (2019) “India’s clampdown on Kashmir Here’s what you need to know”, The Washington Post, 13 August 2019
  113. Numerous high-ranking (now retired) Pakistani military officers have made this argument, such as Brigadier General Saeed Ismat, SJ. See Ismat, SJ (2007) “Strategy for Total Defense: A Conceptual Nuclear Doctrine.” Officers have discussed “low yield, high radiation nuclear weapons” as well as a counter- value of attacks for war-fighting purposes (as a last resort). For more consult see Hoyt, “Pakistani Nuclear Doctrine and the Dangers of Strategic Myopia,” 961 and Ishtiaq Ahmad (2009) “New Nuclear Order!” (Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad).
  114. Norris and Kristensen (2009) “Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces”.
  115. Lalwani, Sameer (2021) “America can`t ignore the next Indo-Pakistani crisis”, War on the rocks, February 26, 2021
  116. Lalwani, Sameer (2021) “America can`t ignore the next Indo-Pakistani crisis”, War on the rocks, February 26, 2021.
  117. Mukherjee, Rohan (2020) “Chaos as opportunity: the United States and world order in India’s grand strategy.” Contemporary Politics 4 (2020): pp. 419- 439.
  118. To witness the already deep US-India ties take a glance at Tellis, Ashley J. (2020) ‘The Surprising Success of the S.-Indian Partnership: Trump and Modi Have Deepened Defense Cooperation Against the Odds’. Foreign Affairs 20, February 20, 2020.
  119. Ambassador Dr Maleeha Lodhi (2021) said this in a wide-ranging presentation via an interactive Zoom address to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) at 61, Whitehall, Westminster, London SW1A 2ET, United Dr. Maleeha Lodhi ranged over a wide canvas describing the geo-political trends that shape Pakistan’s foreign policy choices and regional dynamics that present imposing challenges.
  120. Schoenbaum TJ, Chow DCK (2019) The perils of economic nationalism and a proposed pathway to trade harmony. Stanford Law & Policy Review 30:115– 195
  121. Haas R (2019) How a world order ends. Foreign Affairs 98(1): 22:30
  122. Petersmann, EU (2018) The 2018 trade wars as a threat to the world trading system and constitutional Trade Law and Development 10(2):179– 225
  123. Chaisse, J, Matsushita M (2018) China’s ‘Belt and Road’ initiative: Mapping the world trade normative and strategic dimensions. Journal of World Trade 52(1):163–86.
  124. Hussain, Tom (2021) As US plays off India and China, it risks losing a nuclear-armed ally: Pakistan, South China Morning Post, 20 February, 2021.
  125. Wilson Center (2021)U.S.-Pakistan Relations in the Biden Era: A Conversation with Moeed Yusuf, January 21, 2021.
  126. Bajpai, Kanti, Selina Ho, and Manjari Chatterjee Miller, eds. (2020) Routledge Handbook of China–India Relations, Routledge, 2020.
  127. Dhasmana, Indivjal (2021), China becomes India’s biggest trading partner in first 9 months of FY21, The Business Standard, February 24, 2021
  128. Commerce Department (2021) India`s Trading Partners till December 2020.
  129. Khalid, Ozer (2019) “Balochistan bleeds: the Ormara onslaught”, Express Tribune, April 26, 2019.
  130. Middle East Institute (2021) Keynote Adress by General Kenneth F. McKenzie Junior, dated 8 February, 2021
  131. Ambassador Dr Maleeha Lodhi (2021) viaa an interactive Zoom address to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) at 61, Whitehall, Westminster, London SW1A 2ET, United Kingdom.
  132. Ibid.
  133. Agence France Press (2020) The “Friendship Highway” runs from Pakistan’s capital Islamabad to Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang region. Photo: AFP, August, 2020.
  134. Babones, Salvatore (2020) The Next Front in the India-China Conflict Could Be a Thai Canal,India is beefing up its island defenses as Beijing seeks a quicker route to the Indian Ocean. 1stSeptember, 2020.
  135. Sheikh, Salman Rafi (2021) India Pakistan ceasefire more form than New agreement more populist peace than genuine bid to end decades of hostilities and entrenched mistrust in Jammu and Kashmir, Asia Times, March 8, 2021.
  136. To gain added perspectives on the Abraham Accords consult: Makovsky, David (2020). “How the Abraham Accords Look Forward, Not Back”. Washington Institute. 16 September, 2020 as well as Tahmizian Meuse, Alison (2020) “Israel inks twin Arab treaties with UAE, Bahrain”. Asia Times. 16 September, 2020
  137. For more on this emerging theater analyse: Sundararaman, Shankari (2017) “Indo-Pacific economic corridor: A vision in progress”. Observer Research Foundation. February, 10, 2017 and Yhome, K.; Chaturvedy, Rajeev Ranjan (2017) Emerging Trans-Regional Corridors: South and Southeast Asia. Observer Research Foundation

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