Dealing with Taliban 2.0

by Ozer Khalid*

*The author is a Senior Consultant, a Foreign Policy  &  Counter-Terrorism Expert, a regular Criterion Quarterly contributor and a global columnist. Email [email protected] Twitter verified @OzerKhalid

Abstract

The U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan, the sweeping Taliban take-over and their formation of a caretaker government in September 2021 plants the seeds of uncertainty and risk pertaining to Afghanistan’s stability, society, economy and security bearing regional and global implications.  American and NATO departure from Afghanistan unshackles more urgent queries than it answers.

This research dissects the Taliban’s recent government set-up. It asserts how “engagement” remains key (even without diplomatic “recognition”). It also examines how dealing with Taliban 2.0 in Afghanistan remains a delicate balancing act in a region increasingly on a knife’s edge of uncertainty. This paper elaborately explores future security, counter-terrorism and insurgency challenges and trends facing Afghanistan with a unique emphasis on how they reverberate over to Pakistan and, more broadly, the region. The essay investigates which events are likeliest to unfold with the U.S. gone and an interim government formed.

Recommendations have also been made for how the Taliban can better strategically reorient themselves to gain global credibility, the necessary reforms which must be undertaken, how best to kick-start a faltering economy. Strategic advice is offered to the global community on how best to “engage” with the Taliban through deeper multilateral cooperation and preconditions conducive to peace and prosperity in Afghanistan. Stability in Afghanistan is a forerunner for broader regional security, peace and economic connectivity in South and Central Asia, the Middle East and beyond. – Author)

The Taliban’s Interim Government

The Taliban`s provisional government announcement contradicts their previous announcements to global media which hyped up fair representation, diversity, inclusivity and gender equality. They have not even bothered to conceal their “iron-fist with any velvet glove”. If this caretaker government seeks genuine long-term international legitimacy, they need to strategically reorient themselves and deliver quick results.

The Taliban announced an all-male 33-member cabinet on September 7. This interim government is a highly limited one, whose members include fourteen officials from the 1996-2001 era, five former Guantanamo ¹ Bay detainees, and twelve second generation members of the movement. Dispassionately analyzing ground realities from the Taliban`s perspective; Taliban 2.0’s appointments suggest that they do not have faith, especially in the freshly capitulated factions.

The government is led by the “acting” Prime Minister, Hassan Akhund, a former emirate foreign minister and later deputy leader. He is also chief of the Taliban’s powerful decision-making body Rehbari Shura, or leadership council ² Akhund, who is on the United Nations sanction list, must strategically redirect himself as a responsible chief executive if he seeks any credible long-term legitimacy from the international community and Afghan people.

Akhund has called former officials who fled when the Taliban seized power in August 2021 to return to Afghanistan, saying that the Taliban will “guarantee their safety”. Akhundzada also guaranteed the safety of diplomats, embassies, aid agencies, humanitarian relief organizations, stating that Taliban II seek to establish robust relations with regional countries and beyond ³

Abdul Ghani Baradar, a co-founder of the Taliban, is the deputy Prime Minister. The nomination of Akhund and Baradar reinforce the reality that the Taliban seek to integrate and federate their iron-fist over power before welcoming broader segments from other Provinces.

The acting Interior Minister is the Taliban’s deputy leader, Sirajuddin Haqqani—a highly controversial nomination for the Western world. He is the head of the Haqqani network and listed as “wanted” by the FBI.

Most other titles are divided between Talib networks from the southern lowlands and the Loya Paktia highlands—strategic regions that included a time-honored bastion of Taliban support. Taliban`s key support in these regions is exemplified by the networks of founder Mullah Omar and Jalaluddin Haqqani. Omar’s offspring Yaqoob and Jalaluddin’s son Sirajuddin hold responsibility, respectively, as ministers for defence and interior. Omar’s brother, Abdul-Mannan Omari, and Jalaluddin’s sibling, Khalilur-Rahman Ahmad, also occupy power. Such appointments reveal nepotism and how key posts are reserved for tightly knit dependable loyalists.

Tactically, the appointment of Mullah Yaqoob, the offspring of Taliban founder Mullah Omar, as defence minister is a key decision that sustains integration within the militia’s rank and file.

Haqqani’s Najibullah and Abdul-Baqi are long-term loyalists of Jalaluddin’s network, so is Nur Jalal, recently promoted as Sirajuddin Haqqani’s second-in-charge at the interior ministry.

In a largely tribal society, as expected, tribal loyalties and clansmen have been awarded key posts, especially members from the Khairkhwah and Akhundzada clans with similar backgrounds.

Other younger Taliban members climbed the ropes but belong to similar backgrounds: Younas Akhundzada and Rahmatullah Najib served as field commanders before their rise to cabinet; Qari Fasihuddin, Badakhsan’s Tajik commander, led the Panjsher conquest and was predictably rewarded with a promotion; and acting foreign minister, Ameer Muttaqi, has been rewarded for his influential role in convincing previous opponents to step aside during the Taliban’s 2021 summer campaign as well as for his key negotiation skills at display during the Doha Accords.

Women candidates, and minorities like Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras are yet to make any influential inroads. The appointment of Tajik minister, Din Hanif, seems at best, a tokenism.

Though the caretaker set-up is a narrow coterie of loyalties – in all fairness, cabinets hardly exercised as much de facto authority in Taliban history as did the more strategically separated “Taliban council” led by a supreme leader or emir ul momineen: in quintessence, a government controlled by a powerful party.

Its ethnic limits – with 30 out of 33 appointees being Pashtuns – are (slightly) softened by the more ethnically and regionally diverse provincial governors and corps commanders, who can – if the past serves as a preface – play an instrumental role in current affairs.

Nonetheless, the crucial aspect upon which this interim set-up will be judged on is performance. Winning a war after two decades of fighting creates lofty expectations within rank and file, which is hard to meet. However, the current challenge of actually governing Afghanistan requires a totally different skill set as compared to leading an insurgency from the shadows.

Can Taliban 2.0 maintain unity within? Can they ensure law and order in a still lawless land, offer jobs in a market plagued by unemployment, implement female education, quell a crippling third wave of Covid-19, distribute basic amenities within Asia`s poorest country with a flailing economy worth only $ 19.807 billion, wean off opium dependency and most crucially counter terrorism? The latter being Taliban`s toughest task and monumental challenge.

International diplomatic recognition and legitimacy is, therefore, essential for the Taliban to access global funds and international aid to counter these daunting challenges and keep Afghanistan’s economy and society afloat.

The Taliban’s Urgent Challenge – Rehabilitating an Economy on Life Support

The Taliban government’s most pressing challenge, in addition to consolidating power, is to avert an economic collapse. Foreign- currency and Central Bank assets were frozen by the U.S. and funding from the IMF and World Bank is suspended. Afghanistan is teetering on the razor’s edge of bankruptcy. Former rulers left nothing in the kitty. Afghanistan must be brought back from the brink.

This requires essential financial lifelines. The Chinese, contrary to popular belief, will not immediately rush in with billions of Yuan. They are playing a cautious game of “wait and watch” until the dust settles, and security is guaranteed. Time is on Beijing’s side who is in no rush. With many Western governments unwelcoming to the idea of releasing frozen funds and international lending organizations clogging the drains of international aid, reviving the economy will be a Herculean task for the Taliban.

Such a financial crunch further compounds a humanitarian crisis. As an ensemble, these could trigger a state collapse with perilous regional implications.

Though the Taliban are sitting on cash cows as we will see below, this amount is unlikely to “trickle down” to Afghanistan’s most needy and destitute. The Taliban are most unlikely to distribute their existing (clandestine) cash reserves and are going to preserve their informal black-market money and undeclared “bounty” for proverbial rainy days.

According to the BBC ⁴ , many sources feed the Taliban`s war chest, including private citizens from other countries that offer financial aid/ foreign donations. The Taliban currently earn an estimated $500 million per annum through individual contributions. In addition, the Taliban’s estimated “annual earnings from the Illicit drug economy range from $100m-$400m.” This includes taxation ⁵ on opium farmers, laboratories where opium is converted to heroin and traders who smuggle the drugs. Drug revenue is laundered via a network of individuals, companies, entities and numerous charities and foundations.

Now that the Taliban control border crossings they can extract more sources of revenue from imports and exports, especially export markets via links and relationships with wholesale export businesses of products ranging from coal and salt to precious stones, including rubies and emeralds. China and the United Arab Emirates are said to be the biggest buyers of Afghanistan’s raw materials. ⁶ The Taliban also tax large scale projects from infrastructure to construction.

A detailed NATO report offered a breakdown of Taliban revenues: they made $464 million from mining, $416 million from drugs, $240 million from foreign countries and individual donations, $240 million from exports, $160 million from taxes, $80 million from real estate and $2 million from billing electricity consumers. ⁷

Afghanistan’s existing mining industry is worth $1 billion annually. The Taliban extorted money from mining operations including coal, gold and especially precious stones like Lapis, rubies, and emeralds. Illegal mining operations earned them $10 million per annum in Southern Helmand Province, according to the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring team.⁸

As expected, the US and NATO departure caused a financial freeze over Afghanistan. Jake Sullivan, Biden’s Security Advisor, even spoke of possible “sanctions”. This “economic withdrawal” from Afghanistan undermines global financial assistance, rendering it tougher for the international development and humanitarian sectors to conduct their well-meaning initiatives in a country mired by poverty and under- development.

Such a chaotic scenario would boost an unremitting flow of illicit narcotics, especially through poppy cultivation, refined into highly addictive heroine, in Afghanistan’s high-volume drug transaction areas in the southern regions like Kandahar and Helmand which produce high percentages of the world`s illicit opium.

This must be of particular concern for Pakistan as addiction rates have skyrocketed. Helmand and Kandahar are on the border with Pakistan and narcotics smuggling routes typically flow from Helmand through Pakistan onto Iran, eventually making their way to Europe, the Middle East and the U.S.

Afghanistan’s much hyped $1 trillion endowments like barite, copper, iron, lithium, rare earth elements like cerium, lanthanum, praseodymium and neodymium (essential for magnets used in motors for hybrid and electric cars), cobalt (like the Aynak ore body), mercury, bauxite, uranium and chromium are vast, but the scientific understanding of such resources is still at an exploratory stage. Elements like lithium are especially useful in batteries, electronic vehicles, microprocessors, other consumer electronics and military equipment, yet they are unlikely to reap quick dividends.

Source: United States Geological Survey: A Map of Afghanistan’s Mineral Resources.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) announced in May that global supplies of lithium, copper, nickel, cobalt and rare earth elements had to increase markedly otherwise our planet would fall short of its endeavours at mitigating the climate emergency.⁹

Though Afghanistan has vast mineral resources, it will encounter steep challenges to tap them. Mining wisdom holds that what’s under the ground is less important than what’s above. Market realities, security concerns, onerous contract terms, dilapidated infrastructure, bribing corrupt warlords to get to the mines and environmental issues matter more than sheer abundance.

In addition, a recent CNN ¹⁰ report, ¹¹ found that exploiting lithium and rare earth minerals requires much greater investment and technical know-how, and ample time. The IEA realistically estimates that it takes 16 years on average from the discovery of a deposit for a mine to start production and for the Afghan citizens to (eventually if at all) reap the rewards of such wealth.

While there has been some extraction of copper, gold and iron, at present, minerals offer Afghanistan a paltry revenue of $1 billion per annum. Out of this, analysts estimate that 30% to 40% get siphoned off to corrupt cronies by Taliban warlords who control small mining projects.

Most Afghans, currently living below the UNDP defined poverty line of $2 a day, do not have the luxury of waiting sixteen years. Lack of Taliban funding implies human and organ smuggling, drug trafficking, kidnappings, brazen corruption and organised crime will proliferate. Afghanistan would then be a hellscape turning into a safe haven for death cults like ISIS/Daesh, TTP, BLA, LeT, JeM, ETIM/TIP, Al Qaeda in the Indian Sub-Continent (AQIS) and other regional terrorists. In such a scenario, proxy wars and “A Great New Messy Game” will once again be the order of the day.

The Taliban cannot allow such a power and security vacuum. They must rapidly turn a new page, abide by international commitments, ensure women, minority, and human rights, establish a more inclusive regime, and urgently help the Afghan people address genuine economic and humanitarian grievances.

The global community, especially Afghanistan’s neighbors, are concerned if the country’s new Taliban government will be able to assert the state’s writ, nurture peace and stability, kick-start a floundering economy, assert and, most of all, fulfil the aspirations of their deserving citizens. The international community need to lift asset freezes to restore hope for the Afghan people, especially as neighbouring countries tighten their borders on migrants and refugees.

Regional stability is crucially contingent to what transpires in Afghanistan. As such, its neighbours share a common stake in its peace and stability. However, the alarming pace with which events unfurled in Afghanistan implies that there has been scarce regional diplomatic consensus and traction for countries to agree upon exact “specifics”, share views and evolve a multilateral consensus for a promising path forward.

Pakistan’s Decision to Recognize or Engage

Although there is no formal announcement yet, the fact that Pakistan maintains its diplomatic mission in Kabul proves that there is already a de facto recognition of the Taliban government.

Being a key neighbouring nation, Islamabad has no alternative but to work with the Taliban`s interim set-up, irrespective of who is at the helm. It was precisely due to this reason that Islamabad endeavoured very hard to reconcile all differences with the previous Afghan government, despite their open antagonism vis-à-vis Pakistan.

The rationale underpinning Pakistan’s decision relates to fears that any instability or antagonism in Afghanistan will have cataclysmic spillover effects on Pakistan`s Western border. The reasons for this move are as follows:

Firstly, if Afghanistan is left on its own, as it was the last time around, there will be a monumental economic and humanitarian catastrophe, resulting in mass migration.

Secondly, the economic and humanitarian crises will create a security vacuum within Afghanistan that will be filled by radicalized militants and will further imperil Pakistan and regional neighbours.

Thirdly, even though Islamabad believes that the Afghan Taliban have changed since the last time they governed, and, although they still have a lot to prove through their conduct, the best method with which to move forward is to “engage” with the new interim set up in Kabul.

Fourthly, Pakistan intuitively knows that keeping the Taliban engaged offers strategic leverage to the world over the new rulers of Afghanistan.

Pakistan is banking on key regional stakeholders such as Moscow, Beijing and Tehran, who have also retained a diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, to move with pragmatic realism. Pakistan has already launched a diplomatic charm offensive to persuade other states, who are currently unsure about whether to work with the new interim set-up in Kabul.

Islamabad has announced, to particularly the Western world, that while they can calculatedly “wait and see” if Taliban 2.0 live up to their lofty promises, resorting to any “sanctions” and “aid freezes” only hurts Afghanistan`s most vulnerable citizens suffering from a deadly third wave of Covid 19 in a country beset by chronic health infrastructure deficiencies. Two-thousand donor funded clinics could shut their doors within days, denying Afghans access to basic healthcare, leaving a tiny fraction of Afghanistan’s Covid-19¹² isolation beds operating. Sanctions only further radicalize the targeted states.

Islamabad is actively lobbying Washington D.C. to “unfreeze” the $9.5 billion Afghan foreign assets. The humanitarian predicament in Afghanistan is so detrimental that every third Afghan does not know if he/she will be able to eat their next meal, according to the special UN envoy on Afghanistan.

For America, Afghanistan’s chapter is over for now, but for Pakistan, the Afghan challenge is only just beginning.

Regional Intelligence, Counterterrorism and Security Concerns.

Against the backdrop of the Taliban’s interim government announcement in Afghanistan, on 11 September 2021, Pakistan hosted intelligence chiefs of regional allies like Russia, Iran, China, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in Islamabad to focus on stability, security and counterterrorism (CT) in Afghanistan.

Hosting a strategically timely and crucial meeting involving heads of prominent regional intelligence agencies is a vivid illustration that Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries acknowledge that the best way to counter terrorism is for all responsible neighbours to forge a common coordinated CT and security strategy.

There has been a flurry of visits initiated by foreign ministers and intelligence chiefs to Pakistan, a country which still, for the foreseeable future, remains a key non-NATO ally in the combat against terrorism. Earlier, American CIA chief and British MI6 head also travelled to the region, making dual stopovers in Islamabad and New Delhi.

This recent meeting hosted by the ISI chief demonstrates Pakistan’s tireless defence and intelligence diplomacy in seeking to forge consensus on the way forward in Afghanistan. Earlier, Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi also hosted a virtual meeting of regional foreign ministers on the Afghanistan crisis. Pakistan is encouraging the global community to internalize an innovative approach vis-à-vis Afghanistan. Islamabad wants the world to put away their old lenses and craft a newer strategy, better representing the ground realities in Afghanistan.

Islamabad also insists that the policy of intimidation and coercion has failed in Afghanistan and hence international engagement, opposed to international isolation, is the best way forward.

Pakistan, at all and any costs, seeks to thwart an economic meltdown in Afghanistan whose by-product is a security vacuum allowing extremism to rear its ugly head. The best way to nip militancy in the bud is through “engagement”. The UN secretary general similarly warned that an economic crisis in Afghanistan is a gift for terrorists.

The meeting of regional intelligence heads is also noteworthy in lieu of the negative impact that an unstable Afghanistan would have on its neighbours. Pakistan, Russia, China, Iran and Central Asian states are most concerned that intensified instability in Afghanistan imperils the whole region with a security menace and a cross-border militancy backlash:

Pakistan: The Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan ideologically awakens the outlawed anti Pakistan Taliban known as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Al-Qaeda ¹³ in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), Daesh or Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), Jamat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and other insurgents linked to the TTP, including smaller splinter, residual and escapee networks banned in Pakistan.

Under Noor Wali Mehsud’s leadership the TTP rekindled ties with Al-Qaeda and swore bayat (allegiance) to the Afghan Taliban chief, Haibatullah Akhundzada. 2,300 TTP militants were released from prisons since the Taliban take-over. TTP, loosely affiliated with Afghanistan’s Taliban, harbour sancuatries in Afghanistan’s Eastern insurgent provinces of Paktika and Paktia.

In addition, the TTP extremist, Maulana Faqir Mohammad, released from prison by the Taliban, pledged close ties to Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al Zawahiri. “ISIS-K was established by former members of the TTP, Afghan Taliban and Islamic movement of Uzbekistan.

ISIS-K has been weakened due to the Taliban, US and Afghan air power offenses against this group. However, they went underground in Eastern Nangarhar and Nuristan. Some relocated to the Kunar region, bordering Pakistan. Their present objective is to recruit, gain strength and plan/execute high-scale terrorist attacks so that they can remain relevant.

China: China’s main concerns stem form the Uighur militants and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement’s (ETIM) presence in Afghanistan. ETIM militants have broadcasted videos documenting their presence in Afghanistan.

For years Beijing has protected its thin Wakhan border with Afghanistan and Taliban 2.0 has assured its neighbours that it will not allow Afghanistan to become a base for extremists. Whether the Taliban will have the necessary influence over their firebrand provincial commanders to ensure that their policies are implemented remains to be seen.

Till Beijing is satisfied that their civilians and interests are not targeted within Afghanistan and, across the border, in North-Western Xinjiang, a certain level of inward skepticism will remain, despite its outward display of optimism.

In addition, a matter of mutual concern for Islamabad and Beijing remains the targeting of Chinese interests in Pakistan by the BLA and TTP. Islamabad has registered its complaint with the Taliban that the TTP is using Afghan territory to plan cross-border terrorist attacks.

Russia & CARs: Moscow expressed concern over Chechen rebels and their possibility of seeking sanctuary in Afghanistan.

In 2021 the Kremlin undertook a relentless militant crackdown. Putin`s hard man in Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, in January 2021, killed six suspected Chechen militants, taking out a warlord, Aslan Byutukayev, accused of organizing the 2011 suicide bombing attack at a Moscow ¹⁴ airport. Byutukayev and his Chechen militants swore allegiance to ISIS.

ISIS is alive and kicking in Afghanistan which most concerns the Russians who have witnessed sporadic Chechen attacks as well as extremism grow in other regions of Russia`s North Caucuses. The Kremlin is concerned that the Taliban will struggle to keep control over Northern Afghanistan, potentially triggering ISIS-K or Al Qaeda cells ready to attack Central Asia. Moscow is fully determined to keep it`s Southern flank secure.

Russian Security Council’s deputy chairman, Dmitry Medvedev, warned the world that tens of thousands of members of the militant Islamic State (IS) group were based in Afghanistan’s provinces close to borders with the Central Asian Republics (CARS) that are referred to as Russia’s “near abroad” and with whom Russia has a military alliance: the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

Uzbekistan, in particular, is concerned with the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). In this regard, what worries Tashkent is of equal concern to Islamabad since the IMU, over the years, have focused their extremism fighting towards Pakistan forces in the tribal belt as well as Afghan and NATO forces. IMU ¹⁵ are intimately allied to Al Qaeda in the Indian Sub-continent (AQIS).

A peaceful Afghanistan aligns well with Putin`s Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP), a fundamental pillar of Moscow’s foreign policy prowess. The GEP relies on the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) which simultaneously converges with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) where land-locked Afghanistan acts as a major geostrategic artery. Securing stability remains essential, both for the Kremlin and China`s Communist Party (CCP).

Iran: With the hope to curtail ISIS-Khorasan and not allowing Daesh to gain a foothold into Iran`s border from Afghanistan, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) established military training centers for the Taliban in Birjand, capital of Iran`s South Khorasan Province and in the Khorasan-e-Razavi Province near Herat—the two Provinces located at the Iran-Afghan border. In their joint counter-terrorism aim to quash ISIS-K, Tehran enabled the Taliban to operate their office, known as the Mashhad Shura, and run training centers in Kerman, Zahedan and Tehran. Together, Iran ¹⁶ and the Taliban managed to dismantle most ISIS-K cells in western Afghanistan, which, ideally, should act as a template for future CT, CVE ¹⁷ cooperation.

As expected though, the Iran-Taliban honeymoon was temporary and relations soured again once the Taliban announced a non-inclusive government in Kabul. Iranian officials stated that ISIS-K was a “common enemy” of both Afghanistan and Iran.

Iran has endured a low-intensity insurgency by the disgruntled Sunni community in Sistan and Baluchistan Province for multiple years and Iranian leaders are very wary of the threat. They fear that ISIS-K can exploit the Sunni-Shia sectarian fault-lines and take wrongful advantage of the Iranian Sunni minority’s grievances in Sistan and Baluchistan.

Taliban Take-Over Intensifies Multilateral Defence Diplomacy

Regionally, especially under a Taliban government, if militancy is not contained in Afghanistan, expect to witness an increasing role by the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) a military alliance of Russia and Central Asian Republics (CARs) promoting the collective defence of any member that comes under external aggression. CSTO endeavours to coordinate efforts against terrorism, threats, illicit drug trafficking, and transnational crime, all of which constitute credible threats if Afghanistan is not stabilized and on the road to economic recovery.

China and Russia both remain more immediately concerned on security and counter-terrorism threats from Afghanistan as opposed to economic prospects, which for them represent the “longer-game”.

The ten thousand troop Zapad/Interaction 2021 bilateral military drills between Russia and China in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region dealt with managing threats to the stability of Central Asia arising out of Afghanistan. ¹⁸

The August 2, 2021, Russian and Uzbek joint military exercises conducted a Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) ¹⁹ drill involved 1,500 troops in Termez, close to the Afghan border. This was followed by the August 5 trilateral Harb-Maidon training ground in Tajikistan ²⁰ (twenty kilometers from the Afghan- Tajik border) involving 2,500 troops from all three countries. This saw Russia moving Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters from Novosibirsk to the Gissar Air Base (or Ayni Air Base) near Dushanbe for land tactical assault troops and to offer essential air cover. This was pre-emptive counter-terrorism contingency planning as well as a warning signal to all extremists within Afghanistan. This is all to tactically curtail any potential spillover of “radical fanaticism” from Afghanistan into the region.

The CSTO is gaining sway within the context of regional security frameworks. Russia’s Defense Minister, Sergei Shoigu, has recently heightened the profile of the security alliance, pledging to toughen counter-terrorism and intelligence interfacing within the bloc. Moscow has interestingly also placed the citizens of CSTO member-states on par with Russians when it comes to Russia-led evacuation flights out of Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s regional intelligence chiefs meeting on September 11, the CSTO, along with routine China-Tajik anti-terrorism collaborations such as the 18 August Dushanbe military drills ²¹, reinforce a regional beacon for stability. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) can also lead the way towards a more prominent role as a regional security mediator and guarantor, as all its member-states are keen and concerned about regional stability and containing terrorism since the Taliban’s ascent.

September 11, 2021, also marked the inauguration of the SCO’s two-week long annual anti-terror drills, titled: “Peace Mission 2021.” ²² Now that the Taliban are at the helm, expect the SCO to play a more prominent role in regional intelligence, counter-terrorism and multi- lateral defence diplomacy.

The live action drills that commenced on 12 September will provide an opportunity for SCO member states to learn from each other to enhance their training level in combat preparedness, remarked Major General Zhao Kangping, the Chinese director-in-chief of the drill.

The SCO counter-terrorism and military drills deepen Chinese, Russian and Pakistani kinetic cooperation and army exchanges along with other SCO counterparts. With America’s significantly diminished regional presence heralding new security paradigms in hotly contested operating theatres, this will reinforce regional security coordination.

Realistically Analyzing Pakistan-U.S. ties after a Taliban Take-Over

In their initial post 9/11 meeting, Pakistan’s upper echelon strongly advised their U.S. allies not to invade Afghanistan. Rather, they argued, contemplate specific action against al-Qaeda. Pakistani decision-makers warned American leaders that military action would not function. The U.S. needed to discern between al-Qaeda, a terrorist entity criminally responsible for the terror attacks, and the Taliban, who must be “engaged”.

The Bush administration did not listen. Two decades later, when the U.S. finally exited from Afghanistan, it had learned the hard way how to end its longest war. Doing so required negotiating a deal with the Taliban, but this came many years after al-Qaeda had been crushed.

Even though strategic American-Pakistani security and intelligence coordination managed to severely undermine al-Qaeda networks, the seemingly never-ending Afghan war frayed Pak-U.S. relations, already in an uneasy limbo, as Islamabad hoped that a military strategy would pave the way for a negotiated political one, whereas the U.S. administration believed that America’s military, supported by NATO allies, would stamp out the Taliban.

America continued the war while pressuring hesitant decision- makers in Islamabad to “do more”. The U.S overlooked how the chaos had intensely trickled over to disrupt Pakistan and usher in a calamitous socio-economic upheaval. Pakistan lost approximately 83,000 civilians in the War on Terror that cost Pakistan’s economy $126 billion dollars. Also factor in the unconscionable terrorist attacks targeting everyone from school-going children to hospital-patients.

As the forever war failed, the pressures in relations increased as a trust deficit seeped in. Pakistan, preparing for all possible contingencies, kept its lines of communication open with the Taliban, intuitively knowing deep down that there would come a day when the world would have to deal with them.

Meanwhile, the U.S. raid in Pakistan under Operation Neptune Spear, that took out Osama bin Laden ²³ in Abbottabad deteriorated relations. Public outcry volcanically erupted in Pakistan, and irritation metastasized. However, although politicians in Pakistan outwardly protested vociferously over Operation Neptune Spear, the same officials were inwardly comforted at bin Laden’s removal.

It took years for tensions to soothe but the “transactional” nature of the bilateral relationship remained. Pak-U.S. ties were driven by U.S. prerogatives in Afghanistan, and were not premised on deeper shared values.

Pakistan’s ongoing rapport with the Taliban over the years enabled it to play an instrumental role when Trump finally wanted a way out of the “forever war” and asked for assistance in cajoling the Taliban to the negotiating table. Thus dawned the Doha pact in February 2020, and the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Even prior to the U.S. departure, geopolitical winds were shifting as China enhanced its diplomatic overture and economic engagement, launching its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and as Russia started acting more decisively. Regional countries, including Pakistan, were intuitively sensing a fading of both U.S. interest and influence.

Donald Trump’s “America First” foreign policy implied a regional disengagement.

In parallel, Islamabad’s strategic links with Beijing grew more intense. Pakistan’s instrumental role in the BRI embodied this, as did the subsequent significant Chinese investment in Pakistan’s infrastructure and development projects. Increasingly, the U.S. was viewed as a luke-warm partner as well as a hesitant regional participant. China, on the other hand, was viewed as having enough interest, money and rising international clout for a more meaningful and enduring relationship.

Even though China is Pakistan’s strategic priority, Islamabad’s leaders seek a steady rapport with the U.S. The United States, to this date, remains Pakistan’s largest export market and a superpower with ample global influence, notably over global financial institutions whose ongoing assistance Pakistan’s brittle and battered economy urgently requires. Pakistan seeks to avoid, at all costs, getting into the crosshairs of a U.S.-China conflict.

The U.S. has objections over the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor—an ensemble of Chinese-funded infrastructure and energy projects (aligned to the broader BRI) in Pakistan. Decision-makers in Pakistan have also realistically reduced their expectations of ties with the U.S. After America’s exit from Afghanistan, the superpower will no longer be needful of Islamabad to back its operations there. Pakistan’s oldest arch-rival, India, is now seen as America’s strategic regional partner of choice.

Nevertheless, the risky situation in Afghanistan opens unprecedented avenues for further co-operation, although within a more restricted framework. U.S. officials reached out to Pakistan for security, counter- terrorism collaboration and intelligence-sharing, recently when the CIA director, William Burns, visited Islamabad. Pakistan shares American apprehensions over terrorist organizations based in Afghanistan which include ISIS-K (or ISKP), the ashes of al-Qaeda and other extremist entities. For Pakistan the largest threat emanates from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), recently regrouped and responsible for deadly attacks in its border region.

Pakistan’s top brass are on the same page with the global community on the view that the Taliban must not allow Afghan territory to be exploited as a base for exporting terrorism. All of Afghanistan’s neighbours share apprehensions about any cross-border trickle-over instability. China, Russia ²⁴, Iran, Turkey, the Central Asian States and even the broader Middle East, all have stakes, to varying degrees, in Afghanistan’s stability and believe in engaging the Taliban.

The future of Afghanistan rests mainly on whether the Taliban can govern. Public expectations there are very distinct now, compared to when they previously held the reins of power in the 1990s. Their most pressing challenge, other than consolidating power, is to thwart a financial collapse. Foreign-currency assets are frozen, IMF and the World Bank loans have halted and the United Nations has relocated to Kazakhstan.

Sanctions and financial freezes hurt Afghanistan`s most vulnerable citizens, especially during a deadly third wave of Covid-19. Such vulnerable citizens will then feel the need to flee their hearth and home. Sanctions simply do not work. Sanctions are not a feasible “strategic lever”, they merely serve to further radicalize society.

Afghanistan’s financial collapse could spawn a humanitarian crisis and trigger state collapse with its unsavoury side-effects spilling over to an entire region already on the brink. Global recognition, credibility and legitimacy are prerequisites for the Taliban to access funds and assistance to keep the country’s society and the economy afloat. They, therefore, must honour their commitments to run an inclusive government, quell terrorism and safeguard human rights. The recently appointed interim government is far from inclusive and leaves much to be desired.

Pakistan has a key interest in a peaceful, prosperous, forward- looking, economically engaged and stable Afghanistan. Pakistan has the most to gain from peace having borne the brunt of forty years of war and endless foreign military occupations in Afghanistan, which left the country with 3 million (documented) refugees, radicalized its border areas and rolled back economic progress. An unstable Western frontier compounds Pakistan’s security concerns amidst ongoing tensions on the Eastern front with India.

One corollary of this is that new vistas open for Beijing and Moscow in their attempt to widen their spheres of influence. Another impact is that regional powers are likely to look increasingly within instead of former allies from beyond the region to resolve challenges and conflicts. This explains a burgeoning of regional trade blocs and pacts.

Connectivity and economic regional trade are the new game in town and a powerful incentive to eventually engage Afghanistan and deradicalize their more firebrand constituents.

The U.S., through the auspices of the New Quadrilateral arrangement can partake in some of these regional initiatives. Other avenues for future Pak-U.S. cooperation could include economic, cultural, vaccine, health and climate diplomacy as has been repeated time and again by Islamabad.

As for the U.S., Biden’s administration, having taken the courageous initiative of ending its war in Afghanistan, must now recognize that diplomacy and respecting other countries’ sovereignty and imperatives is the best way to gain traction and influence in the 21st century. Military might and sanctions do not yield dividends where soft power, engagement, trade and investment can do the job.

Pakistan’s Increasing Significance in a Newly Emerging Multi-Polar World Order

Owing to the forces of demography, geography, history and realpolitik, Pakistan is strategically positioned at the crossroads and confluence of intimately intersecting conflict fault-lines and power contests that will heatedly play out over the coming years.

Crucially, Pakistan bridges South and Central Asia. It remains the geo-strategic gateway into Afghanistan, a land-locked country that strategically sits on the crossroads of lucrative minerals, resources, energy, trade and transit corridors at the dawn of a “geo-economic” era.

Pakistan is becoming the diplomatic center of gravity amidst a “New Great Game” being waged in the “playground of empires”. Islamabad’s diplomatic outreach is being witnessed in full force. There is a continuous spate of global dignitaries coming to Islamabad to engage in dialogue over optimal outcomes and solutions in Afghanistan. Admittedly, this intense diplomatic focus is driven more by anxious apprehension than by hope.

Pakistan is and will remain thrust into the limelight as a central artery for regional security, counter-terrorism, connectivity, trade, dialogue and on how to help ensure that Afghanistan’s new set-up prioritizes peace, for the relief of the Afghans, whose third generation has been born into endless conflict and misery.

Pakistan, has led the diplomatic charge by offering crucial humanitarian and relief packages witnessed by the C-130 air sorties to Khost and Kandahar with food, medicine and other life-saving aid. Pakistan hosts millions of Afghan refugees and its domestic air carrier, PIA, has also recommenced commercial passenger flights to Kabul, the first commercial air service since the Taliban seized power last month.

Pakistan convened a virtual summit with five neighboring countries, an essential diplomatic milestone for regional buy-in. Special representatives from China, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan ²⁵ took part in this virtual meet-up led by Ambassador Mohammed Sadiq, Pakistan’s special representative for Afghanistan. Cross-border counter-terrorism and security, refugee influx, trade and transit, illicit narcotics and a host of other pressing issues were discussed at the September 5 regional electronic meeting.²⁶ All regional stakeholders agreed that the Taliban should be “engaged” with maximum co-operation extended to thwart an economic and humanitarian crisis.

Future similar summits should include Taliban representatives (without formal recognition for now). If the next step can be to widen the group’s membership to include Afghanistan, it will make such regional discussions infinitely more meaningful and substantive.

Such ongoing diplomatic outreach efforts by Pakistan could prove highly time-sensitive, especially in light of the unique trials brought about by the recent events in Afghanistan. And in a post-US epoch it is now incumbent upon regional neighbours to lead the peace and security initiatives within their own neighborhood.

Furthermore, Pakistan’s Central and South Asia connectivity is exemplified through Eurasian geo-economic connectivity, the Tashkent- Kabul-Peshawar and the Islamabad-Tehran-Istanbul railway networks. These ventures can meaningfully engage the Taliban government in connectivity based “economic peace” rather than avoidable wars. Islamabad is strategically intent on forging partnerships of peace.

The New Quadrilateral arrangement (New Quad) involving the U.S., Pakistan, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan can enable Pakistan to lure U.S., and other Western investments into Pakistan over to a mineral rich Afghanistan through to an energy, oil and gas rich Central Asia via the Tashkent-Kabul-Peshawar railway, economic diplomacy, Preferential Trade Agreements and Special Economic Zones. Thereby, strategically offering the U.S. and Western governments access to literally billions (if not trillions) of dollars trading potential eventually.

Such trade activities complement, rather than contradict, trilateral U.S., Chinese and Russian regional interests and help to eventually reconcile differences between the Great Super Powers by avoiding future Cold or Hot Wars, provided all stakeholders proceed in good faith.

Underscoring that an economically engaged, peaceful, prosperous and stable Afghanistan is vital for Pakistan and regional stability, PM Khan insisted that the international community has the responsibility to stand by and “incentivize” the Afghan government and people and support them economically as well as to help rebuild the country.

The alternative is an unstable Afghanistan becoming yet another playground for a “New Great Game”, with the U.S. deeply motivated to checkmate China’s ascent as a global superpower and Beijing responding in kind, challenging America’s influence in a multipolar world order a scenario that very few can control.

Foreign ministers of the UK, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Qatar visited Pakistan in the first week of September 2021 to discuss the way forward and collaboration on the Afghanistan situation.

Western governments may eventually take cues from Pakistan’s strategy and forge a “softer approach” vis-à-vis the Taliban, as hard bargaining tactics risk alienating Afghanistan. Western governments must increasingly engage with Islamabad using “soft power” as the War on Terror rhetoric and tough talk no longer “sells”.

If Afghanistan settles down and lasting law and order materializes, unique historical opportunities for increased trade and economic connectivity emerge that are mutually beneficial for the region per se.

Pakistan’s chief security risk emanates from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) which mercilessly persists with lethal cross border attacks against it. For Beijing, the biggest risk is from militants of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Tehran`s apprehensions entail Afghanistan’s Shia citizens, who suffered egregious human rights violations under the former Taliban regime. For Central Asia, the threat is from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The Kremlin is very wary of ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) and Chechen rebels who may eventually seek safe sanctuary in Afghanistan to train, recruit and equip themselves.

All regional stakeholders’ are thus motivated to “engage” with, if not yet diplomatically “recognize”, the Taliban to extract assurances that terrorist groups will not be given safe havens in Afghanistan to mount attacks on others from Afghan soil.

Other than violent extremism, multiple challenges which preoccupy neighbouring regional countries include: border management, trade and transit issues, cross-border refugee and Covid-19 influx and narcotics smuggling. International humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan with UNHCR involvement must be ramped up to mitigate the unfolding disasters. Here again, Pakistan is the main conduit and co-operation source for such endeavours.

Engagement without diplomatic recognition – A carrot and stick approach

The international community wields the powerful card of isolating or recognizing the Taliban regime; a delicate balance that will affect average Afghans and regional stability alike.

Existing US restrictions on the Taliban also present monumental challenges. The Taliban have not (yet) been officially designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the United States. However, the organization was placed on a US Treasury Department list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists and a Specially Designated Nationals list. This makes diplomatic recognition much tougher, the Taliban would technically have to be removed from such lists. Such designations also place immense restrictions on business, mining, exploration and any future commercial activities by U.S/Western countries.

The U.S. and the West, however, should not isolate the Taliban regime, it would prove counter-intuitive and spawn regional instability, becoming a threat to Western security. Paradoxically, the West cannot recognize the Taliban without enforcing conditions on the political and social composition of governance in a new Afghanistan.

The initial (predictable) reaction to the Taliban’s interim government indicates that America, Britain and the EU will not diplomatically “recognise” the Taliban, however, they maintain contacts and “engagement”.

“Recognition” aside, improper “engagement” with Taliban 2.0 risks turning Afghanistan into a failed state, a terrorist sanctuary and a battlefield for influence by regional powers.

The ideal measure for the global community is to actively remain “engaged” with the Taliban government, offering them emergency humanitarian ²⁷ assistance and giving them space to make good on their promises.

Pakistan has not diplomatically “recognized” the Taliban de jure, but intends to do so de facto, as it has very little other options. Islamabad actively encourages the world to “engage” with the Taliban. This is smart diplomacy. “Engagement” allows the dialogue to mature and move forward and simultaneously not diplomatically “recognizing” them offers the world leverage over the Taliban to initiate urgent reforms from granting ethnic and sectarian minorities full rights to female empowerment, and fulfilling their commitments on counter-terrorism.

Engagement without diplomatic recognition is walking a tightrope, a delicate diplomatic balancing act and a wise “carrot and stick” approach required at every high-stakes negotiation.

The crucial question remains: will the world, particularly the West, eventually diplomatically “recognise” the Taliban government?

Diplomatic recognition entails seats at the United Nations (ironically many of the Taliban government members are still UN sanctioned). The UN itself has, for now, largely relocated activities from Afghanistan to Kazakhstan. Official recognition also implies the setting up of embassies (many countries have totally evacuated their diplomatic staff from Afghanistan). Crucially though, Pakistan, China and Russia retained their embassies and diplomatic staff present in Afghanistan.

Global diplomatic recognition of the Taliban government appears to be premised on inclusivity, representation and granting women and minority rights; and not allowing the use of Afghan territory against other nations.

Yet, the Taliban’s sincerity on the aforementioned can be questioned. They can make all the right noises about inclusion and counter-terrorism but the level of real control the Taliban’s Kabul and Kandahar central command have over their more firebrand Provincial commanders is not clear.

The Taliban have quickly earned a reputation of not keeping their word: they stated they would form an inclusive government, they did the opposite.

They have also exhibited glaring inconsistencies regarding women and minority rights. Amnesty International’s report about nine Hazara men being executed in Ghazni province ²⁸ undermines all previous declaratory rhetoric by the Taliban. Insubordination is no acceptable excuse.

Taliban’s top brass must undertake urgent remedial action to stem the tide of such killings; not doing so will only increase internal instability, undermine its own rule over the long term and increase militancy, especially by the Fatemiyoun Brigade crusaders backed by Tehran.

Despite grandiose statements ²⁹ by the Taliban promising women’s rights, the world witnessed women banned from entering their workplaces, ³⁰ and the Taliban’s stance on female education remains dicey and questionable. After Herat fell, the Taliban sent back girls that attempted to attend class.

Some more hard-liner Taliban members tacitly believe that if the group displays “flexibility” towards women and minorities and departs from its retrogressive philosophies, many of its fighters will defect to more extremist groups like the TTP, AQIS, ISIS-K. That is a risk the Taliban will have to be willing to take.³¹

They cannot cling to their ultra conservative hardliner Emirate’s hierarchy. International “isolation” would take the Taliban (and therefore the Afghan people) back to the 1990s, when, despite their attempts at gaining U.N. and U.S. recognition, they were cast aside as pariahs on the global arena. This implies that sooner rather than later the Taliban must devise a more “inclusive” government formula as their non- inclusiveness will forever haunt them.

The Taliban’s rejection ³² of early elections proposed by Ghani indicates that even in the future they do not intend to deploy elections to govern. Rather, a Supreme State Council with a greater degree of women and minorities from all over Afghanistan can fit the inclusivity criterion. The Afghan “Republic” had already entertained the creation of a Supreme State Council,³³ which was shelved due to differences of opinion.

The current caretaker cabinet notwithstanding, the council can serve under the Emir (Head of State) and advise him on matters of the state along with a more representative and diverse jurisprudence council as proposed by US Special Envoy to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad.³⁴ The Supreme State Council would implement the tasks mandated by the jurisprudence council.

The Taliban, in the future, can gradually allow democratic institutions such as the Parliament and Senate to co-exist within their own Emirate’s governmental structure (think of Qatar and the current elections and reforms it is undergoing), though, it is likely that the authority of such structures would be circumscribed, as seen in Iran, especially during the victory of President Raisi. The Emir and the council could ratify legislation promulgated by bicameral houses of Parliament.

Over the medium term, maintaining even the facade of “the will of the people” being reflected in government would bolster the Taliban`s quest for credibility and legitimacy. This constitutes a compromise on the Taliban’s part and heightens the possibility of gaining international legitimacy.

What the Taliban must now achieve in 2021 and Beyond

Taliban 2.0 are now pushed to a tight corner, as centrifugal forces are giving them a harder time than anticipated. The impulsive reawakening of terrorists like ISIS-Khorasan Province (ISKP or ISIS-K), the Tehreek- e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-Continent (AQIS) is posing an imminent threat to the triumphant militia.

Obviously, Taliban 2.0 are equipped to combat such extremists militarily and kinetically, however, this time the Pashtun rulers are, ironically, in the “responsible” side of the divide. The Taliban now have a historic opportunity to prove themselves by conducting responsible statecraft, initiating good governance and protecting human rights, in particular, those of minorities and women.

Taliban 2.0 are now destined to govern a volatile and fractured Afghanistan, and that too with a compassionate social contract which they had promised, especially to women ³⁵ and minorities. They cannot afford to be internationally isolated. The ball is now in the Taliban’s court. How they chose to play it is at their discretion. This unique historical opportunity is now theirs to make or squander. Time is of the essence.

Taliban 2.0 need to carefully and responsibly conduct themselves now that the world’s gaze is obsessively fixated on them. They must tread carefully with regional and foreign powers, without ruffling any more feathers than they already have. They need to generate innovative and more comprehensive counter-insurgency (COIN) and counter-terrorism (CT) security strategies and, as such, take regional stakeholders into confidence. In this regard, Taliban 2.0 should, just like Islamabad did last week, organize regional intelligence meetings to logistically coordinate action plans on how to corner and take out militants from within their own territory.

In the Panjshir valley, as the last remaining bastion of anti-Taliban resistance also eventually caves in, the Taliban must meaningfully engage with the Northern Alliance ³⁶ and other peaceful political dissenting voices to induct this new administration with inclusive legitimacy – offering the Taliban a broad-base security shield.

If, and only if, the Taliban fulfil their social contract will they be able to claim an Afghanistan for the Afghans ruled by the Afghans. All Afghans not just the Pashtun majority.

References

1. Also known as the ‘Forever prisoners’ 39 detainees still remain incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay 20 years after 9/11, including some who have never been charged. Biden hopes to close the military prison in Cuba. For more: «Taliban appoints former Guantanamo detainee as acting defense minister, Al Jazeera says». Thomson Reuters. 28 August 2021 .
2. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/7/taliban-announce-acting-ministers-of-new-government
3. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/8/acting-afghan-pm-calls-on-former-officials-to-return-al-jazeera
4. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-46554097
5. A ten per cent opium cultivation tax is levied by the Taliban especially from farmers in opium producing provinces like Helmand and Kandahar. Drug trade constitutes an average 60% of Taliban`s annual revenue according to the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR).
6. https://www.rferl.org/a/exclusive-taliban-s-expanding-financial-power-could-make-it-impervious-to-pressure-secret-nato-report-warns/30842570.html
7. Ibid.
8. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-46554097
9. https://edition.cnn.com/2021/05/05/business/climate-crisis-metals-shortage/index.html
10. Horowitz, Julia (2021) The Taliban are sitting on $1 trillion worth of minerals the world desperately needs, CNN Business, 19 August, 2021
11. https://edition.cnn.com/2021/08/18/business/afghanistan-lithium-rare-earths-mining/index.html
12. Ruttig, Thomas (2021) “COVID-19 in Afghanistan (9): COVID-19 in Afghanistan into the third wave, Afghan Analysts Network and view also Bill Byrd (2021) “COVID-19 in Afghanistan (8): The Political Economy Repercussions of COVID-19 and the Aid Response,” Afghanistan Analysts Network.
13. Kube, Courtney (2021) “Potential Al Qaeda resurgence in Afghanistan worries U.S. officials”. NBC News. 12 August 2021.
14. Moscow’s Domodedovo arrivals area of the airport where 37 victims were killed.
15. https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-movement-uzbekistan
16. Gul, Ayaz (2021), “Iran Hosts Taliban to ‘Exchange Views’ on US-backed Afghan Peace Process”, Voice of America, 26 January 2021.
17. CVE stands for Countering Violent Extremism and PVE denotes Preventing Violent Extremism.
18. https://www.rferl.org/a/china-russia-military-cooperation/31401442.html
19. The CSTO held a high-level  delegation  meeting  dated  August  23,  2021  on  analyzing  swiftly  unfolding  developments   in   Afghanistan,   with   Putin forging closer security liaison with Central Asian
20. Global Defence Corporation (2021) “Russia sends troops to Tajikistan, establishes a military base”. Global Defense Corp. 17 July 2021.
21. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202108/1231799.shtml
22. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3146369/china-russia-agree-work-together-prevent-security-risks?module=perpetual_scroll&pgtype=%20article&campaign=3146369
23. Coll, Steve (2004). Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, Penguin.. pp. 1-291.
24. Khan, A. (2019) The Afghan peace process and the role of Moscow. An Issue Brief by the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, edited by Najam Rafique. 26 February, 2019
25. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Pakistan (MOFA, 2021) Government of Pakistan – Curtain raiser: Foreign Minister`s visit to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Iran, 24-26 August, 2021.
26. http://www.radio.gov.pk/05-09-2021/pakistan-calls-for-evolving-regional-approach-to-address-common-challenges
27. Joly, Josephine; Sandford, Alasdair (2021) “Fears for humanitarian disaster as Taliban overrun key Afghan cities”. Euronews. 13 August, 2021.
28. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/08/afghanistan-taliban-responsible-for-brutal-massacre-of-hazara-men-new-investigation/
29. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58250607
30. https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20210814-afghan-women-girls-fear-return-to-dark-days-as-taliban-poised-to-take-kabul
31. Rasmussen, Yaroslav Trofimov,  Nancy    Youssef  and  Sune  Engel  (2021) “Kabul Airport Attack Kills 13 U.S. Service Members, at Least 90 Afghans”. Wall Street Journal. 26 August, 2021.
32. https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/taliban-rejects-afghan-president-s-proposal-for-new-election/31167135.html
33. https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-172371
34. Sharif, Amiry (2021) “Khalilzad Pitched ‘Participatory Government’ to Afghan Leaders: Sources,” TOLOnews, March 3, 2021.
35. Belquis Ahmadi (2019) “Afghanistan Talks: No Women, No Peace,” United States Institute of Peace, March 1, 2019
36. Roggio, Bill (2021) “Former headquarters of Northern Alliance falls under Taliban control”. FDD’s Long War Journal, 10 August, 2021.