by M. Saeed Khalid*
*The Author of this book review is a former Ambassador of Pakistan.
Syed Abrar Hussain’s Urdu book “Mullah Umar se Ashraf Ghani tak” (from Mullah Umar to Ashraf Ghani) carries the essence of his diplomatic career in Afghanistan, first as Consul General in Kandahar, and, years later, as Pakistan’s Ambassador in Kabul. He has had two opportunities, spanning five years, to observe firsthand, the power dynamics of Afghanistan in the turbulent times till the departure of the last US soldier from Kabul in August 2021.
Abrar Hussain took charge as consul general in Kandahar in May 1999. At that time the city was the country’s de facto capital by virtue of being Mullah Umar’s residence and seat of power while Kabul remained the country’s official capital. The author recalls his first meeting with the Taliban head, Mullah Umar. He assessed Umar to be stubborn in nature which ruled out any compromise in political and diplomatic dealings.
The year 1999 was marked by Pakistan’s strong push to bring the civil war between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance to an end by the formation of a coalition set up in Kabul. Mulla Umar was at first opposed to any deal with the “dishonest” opposition as this could dilute his strictly Islamic regime. After months of efforts by the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and facing the prospect of UN sanctions, Umar showed a degree of flexibility towards power sharing with the Northern Alliance. The process came to a halt with the military coup of October 1999 in Pakistan, toppling the Nawaz government. According to the author, the Taliban wanted to pursue reconciliation, but the Musharraf regime seemed unsure of playing an active role in its early days.
Abrar Hussain recalls the dramatic events connected with the hijacking of an Air India flight from Kathmandu to New Delhi in December 1999. The aircraft finally landed in Kandahar where complex negotiations were held between the hijackers and Indian officials. The affair raised questions about Indian involvement in the drama which remained unexplained. The hijacking ended with the release of Maulana Masood Azhar, Umar Saeed Shaikh and Mushtaq Zargar from Indian prisons. The plane was released on arrival of these three at the Kandahar airport. India’s foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, traveled to Kandahar with the three prisoners and flew back with the passengers of the hijacked plane.
This book provides testimony to Mullah Umar’s uncompromising character. The Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Turki al Faisal, had travelled to Kandahar to convince the Taliban chief to hand over Osama bin Laden to Saudi Arabia, as agreed in his previous visit. The Mullah flatly denied having made such a promise. On Turki’s insistence, Umar went out to empty a vessel of cold water on his head to cool down. The meeting ended in extreme tension. The Saudis followed up by withdrawing their Charge d’ Affaires from Kabul.
Mullah Umar was impervious to reactions of the international community to his extreme steps. He ignored the flurry of messages not to destroy the historic Bamyan Buddhas in 2001. Pakistan’s interior minister, Moinuddin Haider, visited Kandahar in March 2001 to make a detailed presentation to Mullah Umar for saving the pre-Islamic buddhas carved in Bamyan’s hills. The Pakistani minister’s arguments against demolishing the statues had no effect. At his comment that the buddhas had been spared by every Afghan ruler for fourteen centuries, Umar said the structures were too strong to be destroyed unless dynamited. And that is how the Taliban proceeded to demolish the historic statues measuring 53 and 35 meters.
The author would return to Afghanistan as Pakistan’s ambassador in April 2014, just weeks before the presidential election. The principal contenders of this election were Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah. The first round of the election proved inconclusive as no candidate could obtain the required fifty percent votes. The second round was held on 14 June 2014. Abdullah, having received the highest number of votes in the first round, was perceived as the front runner but, as days passed, the margins between the candidates diminished. Ambassador Abrar had multiple meetings with the two candidates to reaffirm that Pakistan was prepared to work with either one of them once the Afghan people had decided.
President Hamid Karzai’s departure in 2014, after thirteen years at the helm, was followed by greater instability, as the result of the second round of presidential elections was tainted with both Ghani and Abdullah claiming victory. It resulted in a tenuous arrangement with Ghani assuming office of the president and Abdullah as chief executive. It was a highly unstable order as the new president lacked credibility for being a nonresident Afghan and American puppet.
In retrospect, Washington could not have chosen a more unsuitable candidate than Ashraf Ghani to head the setup in Kabul. “From Mullah Umar to Ashraf Ghani” reveals that he was an ill-tempered expat who was reportedly given a two-month course on anger management before assuming office as president of the country. His position became progressively weaker with the reduction in US and NATO forces, and more areas coming under Taliban control.
The termination of the UN mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) on 28th December 2014 proved to be a game changer in a highly volatile situation. The US and NATO allies replaced it with their Resolute Support Mission to train and guide the Afghan National Army. As announced by President Obama, the number of American troops was cut down to 9,800 by end 2014 but their further reduction or complete withdrawal remained elusive. Obama left office in January 2017 with Afghanistan in turmoil. His successor, Donald Trump, came up with his own plan of winding up the forever war. Trump would leave four years later with American troops cut down further and the Taliban take-over of Kabul only a matter of time.
In the end, Ashraf Ghani proved unreliable as his escape from the capital in the face of advancing parties of Taliban proved in August 2021. The vice president, Amrullah Saleh, who had vowed to continue the fight, also retreated to Panjshir valley and eventually fled to Tajikistan, bringing to an end any organized resistance to the Taliban.
Pak-Afghan relations
The writer traces the trajectory of Pak-Afghan relations, particularly from 1999 onwards. The Karzai period following 9/11 saw the rapid development of Kabul’s relations with Delhi which included close ties between their secret services to coordinate subversion against Pakistan. All that happened as Afghanistan and India kept up virulent propaganda blaming Pakistan for helping the Taliban. The book recalls that, under President Karzai, Indian advisers could be found in almost every department. India also bankrolled the Afghan media to carry out anti Pakistan propaganda.
In the run up to the 2014 presidential election, both Ghani and Abdullah assured Ambassador Abrar of improving ties with Pakistan once in power but succumbed to Indian pressure after assuming office. President Ghani visited Pakistan in November 2014 and held extensive meetings with the civil as well as military leadership. He urged Pakistani leaders to help start negotiations with the Taliban. Bilateral relations received a boost with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to Kabul in May 2015.
As a result, relations saw considerable progress in the economic, trade and aid spheres. However, there was a setback in the reconciliation efforts after the first round of talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban in July 2015 in Murree. Afghan elements opposed to reconciliation threw a spanner by announcing the death of the Taliban leader, Mullah Umar, resulting in a breakdown of negotiations.
Ashraf Ghani spared no effort to malign Pakistan for the Taliban’s successes after the termination of foreign forces’ combat operations. It was only a matter of time that the Americans would be willing to negotiate with the Taliban. Ghani’s plotting against Pakistan, with India’s help, was a suicidal path, as time would show. One particular episode showed his shifty and unreliable nature as it brought out his venom against Pakistan.
Ambassador Abrar recounts that President Ghani, who was leading the Afghan delegation to the 6th Heart of Asia Conference in Amritsar, India in December 2016, had a meeting with Advisor Sartaj Aziz, representing Pakistan, prior to the inaugural session. Sartaj Aziz had, among other things, confirmed the $500 million assistance Pakistan planned to extend to Afghanistan.
This was followed by a meeting between Ghani and Prime Minister Modi who was hosting the event. The result was a venomous attack on Pakistan. Pointing to Aziz, Ghani angrily said his country did not need the assistance and the $500 million should be spent in eliminating terror bases in Pakistan. However, Aziz kept calm, and, in his address, he advised against holding any single country responsible or linking it to a single reason. Ghani also sent a threatening message to Islamabad through his former World Bank colleague, Shahid Javed Burki, whom he had specially invited to Kabul.
Ghani warned Pakistan to refrain from helping the Taliban, failing which Afghanistan would support Pushtun and Baloch nationalists in Pakistan. India and its intelligence agency, RAW, played a key role in increasing terrorist acts in Pakistan with the active collaboration of Afghanistan’s secret service NDS. However, there were occasions when Ghani would demonstrate bonhomie toward Pakistan when it suited his interests.
Mullah Mansour, who succeeded Umar as head of the Taliban, was interested in pursuing negotiations with Kabul but was killed by a drone attack in May 2016, leading to a collapse of the negotiations under the Quadrilateral Coordination Group comprising of Pakistan, Afghanistan, China and the US. However, contacts with Taliban representatives continued through governments as well as under the auspices of Canada’s Pugwash Conference. These exchanges eventually led to direct meetings between the US and the Taliban with the cooperation of Qatar in its capital Doha.
The author was Pakistan’s ambassador to Afghanistan when the horrendous terror attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar in December 2014 took place. Of all the attacks claimed by the Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) this was the deadliest as it resulted in 149 deaths, including 132 students. It led to a vast anti-terror operation in Pakistan and strong demands for Afghanistan and the US to take action against the TTP leaders sheltered in Afghanistan. The leaders were eventually taken out in operations by the US forces, including drone attacks, in what the author terms as a move by the US to improve cooperation with Pakistan.
For readers interested in economic and trade relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan, this book contains chapters with valuable information highlighting opportunities as well as obstacles in trade. It gives details of the considerable project aid provided to the war- torn country over the years. Ambassador Abrar says that the total aid from Pakistan touched a billion dollars.
The revised second edition of “From Mullah Umar to Ashraf Ghani” that came out recently contains vital information about the Doha peace process that led to a complete withdrawal of American and other foreign forces by August 2021. It also identifies how the second part of the deal to set up a coalition of the Taliban and other parties, including the rulers in Kabul, proved to be a non-starter. Ashraf Ghani continued to assert himself as a genuine democratic ruler, dilly dallying over the release of Taliban fighters taken as prisoners. The Taliban persevered with their demand of prisoners’ release and reaffirmed their position, demanding the departure of Ghani to clear the way for negotiations to establish a broad-based government in Afghanistan.
Ambassador Abrar narrates how the controversial presidential election of 2019 had weakened Ghani’s position, and his disproportionate ambition to keep ruling the country led the Americans to conclude that no political solution was on the horizon with Ghani at the helm.
The book’s second edition was published prior to the Taliban’s final push to control maximum territory, helped by a lack of resistance from the Afghan National Army and finally Ghani’s escape from the capital with reportedly $160 million of public money. The writer intends to add a new chapter in a future edition of the book to cover the dramatic events marking the end of America’s longest war.
