Pak–Saudi Relations: the Rough Road Ahead

Muhammad Azam Khan*

*The author is accomplished researcher with wide ranging contributions in foreign magazines and journals.

Abstract

(Recent developments in Saudi-US-India relations have put Pakistan’s long held and steely ties with Riyadh in a flux. Though these could     be marginally reset by the new Biden administration, the trilateral relationship has emboldened Modi and his controversial policy in Indian Held Kashmir. This has created a sense of discomfiture in Islamabad. Establishment of diplomatic ties between UAE, Bahrain and Israel has meanwhile put a question mark on Pakistan’s ideological stance of not recognizing Tel Aviv. The enduring cold war chapter of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) as Pakistan’s strongest economic backer and ally in the Sunni Muslim world now appears to be coming to a close. With geo-economics overtaking geo-strategy, the nuclear and conventional military potential and a large Saudi revering population in Pakistan has become irrelevant to Riyadh. The Kingdom’s economy is showing signs of fatigue. The windfall profits from oil are fading into history. This comes at a time of strong geopolitical undercurrents and shocks occurring in the Middle East, South Asia and the surrounding regions. Israel is now emerging as a dominant player in Middle East politics. The US’ brokered “Abraham Accord” and reordering of foreign policy by KSA has left Pakistan with fewer choices. – Author)

Nations, like businesses, seek opportunities for furthering their commercial ends or profitability. In international relations it is called ‘interest’ and involves much more than just dollars and cents, friends or foes. Relations amongst states are never permanent. They are inherently based on interest. The August 5, 2020 statement by Pakistan’s Foreign Minister (FM)¹ followed by a quid pro quo reaction from Riyadh was no small geopolitical upheaval.² These two Sunni majority states were in close embrace for decades. During these years their interests converged. Over time, the world around them has changed and they too are looking for newer and more lucrative opportunities. The latest episode happened at a time of unprecedented realignments occurring in the Middle East (ME) and across Asia Pacific. Such developments extend all the way to Ladakh and the South China Sea.

A Pak-Saudi realignment was long in the making. Occasional fissures kept surfacing in the past. Pakistan’s refraining from sending military troops to fight in Yemen was returned in coin by UAE, Saudi Arabia’s closest ally. As it happened, Abu Dhabi extended an invitation to India for the “inaugural plenary of the foreign ministers’ conclave” of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) in March 2019.³ It turned out to be the first time that India was invited to a meeting of the 57 member Saudi led grouping of Islamic countries. Historically, Pakistan was instrumental in blocking Indian participation in the OIC or awarding membership status to New Delhi since the organization’s establishment in 1969. It was, however, different this time. Now it seems a matter of time before India is conferred an “observer status” in the OIC, if not a full membership. The deafening silence of OIC over Indian brutalities and Human Rights violations in Indian Held Kashmir (IHK), despite Pakistan’s exhortation, is perceptible. The threatening tone adopted by UAE following Pakistan’s refusal to send troops to fight in Yemen also provided a taste of things to come.⁴ 

Contextualising

Recent developments in bilateral relations have the potential to become a full blown diplomatic, economic, and military predicament for Pakistan. The country is already mired in deep domestic, economic and external security problems. Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) are Sunni majority Muslim states with ties that run deep. Riyadh has been a major foreign donor to Pakistan – some say perhaps the third- largest after the US and China.⁵ Traditionally, Saudi financial support to Islamabad was not restricted to official channels or oil on deferred payments alone. Thousands of Deobandi seminaries, formally funded by Riyadh in the past, still receive hand-outs from Saudi citizens. Some of these seminaries have spawned extremism and provided foot soldiers to hard-line militant outfits like the Taliban. Lately, however, Pakistan adopted legislative changes to regulate these seminaries as part of an effort aimed at the removal of the country’s name from the “grey list” of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).⁶

A huge segment of Pakistani society is emotionally tied to KSA. Despite being a closed authoritarian tribal monarchy, the custodians of the two most holy places for the Muslims are revered in Pakistan. A profound adoration for the Holy cities of Makkah and Medinah runs across the spectrum of society. In addition, there are over two million Pakistani workers (diaspora) in Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom is a principal source of remittances by overseas Pakistanis.

Military ties are also important. Joint military exercises are held occasionally while a sizeable number of Saudis avail training facilities in military institutes of Pakistan. An unintended consequence of this relationship has been the deep religo-cultural and sectarian makeover that has shaped society in Pakistan. This is also the repercussion of an embrace that began during the cold war with the Pakistani-Saudi-US backed operations against the Soviet army in Afghanistan.

In the wake of the statements on OIC from Pakistan, the Saudi leadership’s vindictive response is evident. Reflecting the mind-set of the current leadership, Riyadh swiftly terminated loan and oil supplies to Pakistan. Islamabad was also asked for the premature return of $1bn loan besides demand for repayment of another $1bn. This budgetary support was part of a $6.2 billion package announced by Riyadh towards the end of 2018. It included a total of $3.2 billion oil credit facility and $3 billion to help the balance of payment crisis.⁷

Replacing the Old Guard

ME politics, like elsewhere, are in a state of flux. Pakistan did not appreciate the changes taking place in its zone of interest. In Saudi Arabia, King Suleman is the last of the sons of King Abdul Aziz Ibn-e-Saud who would become king. The seven brothers, starting from King Fahd, were known as Sudairi Seven. Likewise, after the passing away of Sheikh Zayed bin Nahyan, a new generation of rulers has taken the leading role in UAE. They are not as connected to ideology or religion as were their predecessors. To them, what matters most is their own national interest. Gone are the days when these Arab states were financing large hospitals and airports in remote areas of Pakistan. Though they still come to Pakistan as hunters of protected Houbara Bustard⁸ and a red carpet is laid out for them, they are no longer inclined to mitigate problems and unending difficulties of Pakistan. They live in the world of real politics.

The new younger leadership replacing the old guard in Saudi Arabia will soon be led by the 35-year-old mercurial Mohammad bin Salman (MBS).⁹ This new leadership has a different model and priorities for the Kingdom — internally as well as externally. A paradigm shift and an unsparing bent was on full display during the war against Houthi rebels as well as naval and air blockade of Yemen by the Saudi led coalition. The assassination of Saudi journalist, Khashoggi is not forgotten so  far. Convening of a large-scale international investors’ conference in Riyadh last year too illustrates a new business plan. It illustrated the new business disposition to market brand Saudi Arabia by its potential leadership. This approach aims to showcase Saudi Arabia as a new open market for overseas  investors. The  conference  also  attempted to underline the country’s geostrategic significance. In displaying its progressive approach, some relief has been provided to women as  well. A few cinema theatres were also opened. Yet there has been the rounding up of some of the wealthiest and most powerful men, including members of the Saud family, without due process. In late 2017, they were ignominiously locked up in Riyadh Ritz Carlton in what was said to be an attempt to “crackdown on corruption.”¹⁰

Demographically, Saudi Arabia is no longer the same country as it was three decades back. Out of a population of roughly 34 million, two thirds are below 30 years. This generation is more interested in jobs, employment, education, while urge for female empowerment is fairly high. Except for Shia Iran, the issue of Palestine or any other Arab cause does not stir the interest of young Saudis. The era of black gold and an ideological bent of mind hasrun its course. The Saudi economy is no longer the same as it was in the 70s. No attempt was ever made to diversify it either. The country’s “oil reserves are shrinking, and its GDP growth has declined from 10 per cent in 2011 to 3.5 per cent in 2015 and 1.6 per cent in January 2017.”¹¹ “Close to 90 per cent of Saudi revenues currently come from oil.”¹²

If there was some energy left in the Saudi economy, the hopeless war in Yemen has sucked the last drop out of it. Interestingly, the once overwhelming dependence of the US on Saudi oil has come to an end. It too has effects on Saudi Arabia — economically as well as politically. The US presence in the ME is for reasons other than Saudi oil. There are ominous signs of internal unrest brewing. The House of Saud knows it all too well. If the Kingdom is to avert an Arab Spring, it needs to reform and do it fast.

Why India Matters to the Saudis

India has made deep inroads globally, including in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region. The Arab world, in particular, looks at India favourably. It is India’s soft power and commercial, technological, financial investments on top of defence ties that are drawing attention. Indian engagement with Gulf countries has seen an unprecedented surge in PM Modi’s watch. The Arab states find in New Delhi a huge, commercially diverse market. New Delhi offers a colossal reservoir of technologically oriented Human Resource (HR) with over 185 million Muslims, strong state institutions and a relatively stable political order. India is also seen as a country that is gradually assuming the status of a major stakeholder in international order. Reinforcing the Indian image is the country’s current strategic ties to the US.

Washington’s deep-seated opposition to Iran, spurred on by policy support from the Trump administration has reenforced the Saudi led Sunni camp in the Middle East. It flawlessly mitigates Israel’s security concerns as well. The large Indian diaspora in the Gulf States and elsewhere in the world cannot be overlooked by the Arab world either.

There are roughly 4 million Indians in UAE and 1.5 million in Saudi Arabia. The only problem appears to be cultural integration. This may prevent establishing a large number of Hindu temples in Saudi Arabia if not elsewhere in the Arab world. Nonetheless, a Hindu temple recently opened its doors to worshippers in the UAE.¹³

Turkey and Malaysia

According to a commentary by London based RUSI, the increasing “Turkish and Malaysian influence on Pakistani Prime Minister” did not go “unnoticed in Riyadh”. PM Imran Khan has repeatedly stated that his “political heroes are Turkish President Erdogan and Malaysia’s former Prime Minister Mahatir.”¹⁴

Ever since the fateful years of the Afghan war, Riyadh cultivated its Wahabbi hard-line version of Islam to reshape society in Pakistan. In this effort, the military regime of former military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq kowtowed to the Saudis. Unfortunately, the previous colonial secular progressive model of liberal Islam is almost history.   A comprehensive hard-line religious bent, intolerance and disapproval of any liberal thoughts, is all pervasive. Yet the Saudis may not object to Pakistan-Turkish ties. What they perhaps find distasteful is Ankara’s “regional meddling in Arab affairs.”¹⁵

During the cold war era, the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) between Iran, Turkey and Pakistan was a natural alliance. Culturally, these nations’ pair with Urdu, the national language of Pakistan. The language is over seventy per cent a mix of Turkish and Persian. The poetry of Pakistan’s national poet is mostly in Persian language, while the Masnavi by Maulana Jalal-ud-Din Rumi, the thirteenth century Muslim mystic poet and jurist, was popular amongst earlier generations of Pakistanis.¹⁶

The Saudi Kingdom was angered when an attempt was made by Pakistan along with Turkey and Malaysia to raise an alternate forum of Islamic countries to counter what is usually termed as“Islamophobia”. The ensuing summit in Kuala Lumpur in 2019, the first “outside the realm of the OIC”, was taken by Riyadh as an affront to its long-held leadership position in the Sunni Muslim world.¹⁷ The presence of the Iranian President and Emir of Qatar,¹⁸ the two established former arch enemies of the Saudis at the Kuala Lumpur summit proved to be the straw that broke the camel’s back. It was the beginning of the end of  an asymmetrical relationship held on oil and remittances from workers in return for blanket military reassurance from Pakistan.The Pak-Saudi relationship has thawed for now. This will remain intact but may never enjoy the vigour it once had in the 70s and 80s.

Damage Repair

Pakistan’s top General, Qamar Bajwa, travelled to Riyadh for damage control. Bajwa was able to meet the Saudi Chief of General staff and Vice Minister of Defence. But he was unable to see the Crown Prince.¹⁹ The Indian media was euphoric. It maintained that Riyadh has not accepted an “apology” from Islamabad and that the Chief of Army Staff returned empty handed. On August 25, 2020 Pakistan’s FM “rejected the impression of a breakdown in Pak-Saudi ties, saying they were long-standing and people centric.”²⁰ Regardless, behind this veneer of diplomatic thaw, it cannot be said with certainty that all is well or will be possibly glowing in the future. Pakistan has already returned US$ 2 billion out of a $3 billion loan it secured from the Kingdom.²¹

The Interplay of Geography and the Retribution

The geography of Pakistan has both been a blessing and a bane. During the cold war the foreign policy trade-off for geography was to act as a bulwark against the Soviets. It later morphed into becoming a “Major Non-NATO ally” during the War on Terror, following 9/11. The Afghan war of the 80s duly aided and abetted by the CIA, was lavishly funded by the Saudis. This was also the time when Saudi money and influence began to corrode the culture and politics of Pakistan. It was to turn Pakistan’s historical liberal identity on its head.²² There was some economic relief and military assistance in return for participation in the so-called Jihad. In reality, this assistance came at a huge cost to the country, both in blood and treasure. It set about a major societal alteration in Pakistan. The religious right, previously on the side-lines, became a major stake holder in mainstream politics. It also gave a phenomenal rise to the culture of “tableegh” (religious preaching) and “dawah” (invitation to embrace every ritual of Islam). There was a mushroom growth of seminaries of all strands, Sunnis and Shias.

Such strategic choices also brought the curse of the Saudi-Iranian sectarian war to Pakistan. Al-Qaeda was born and baptised in Peshawar (KPK) in the 80s. It was to become a global monster later. As former director of CIA James Woolsey said in 1993, “We have slain a large dragon, but we now live in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. And in many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of.”²³ But for Pakistan perhaps the worst part was to come much later. The belief that a ragtag of Mujahideen (Islamic warriors) had brought down an empire soon became widespread. There was little realisation that the demise of the Red army became possible only throughcopious funding by the Saudis and support in arms, intelligence and recruitment of footsoldiers by the US-CIA.²⁴ The nature of the Afghan region’s history and its society were also overlooked.

Lack of Fresh Thinking

Pakistan’s society and, in turn, its strategic culture suffers from a lack of fresh thinking. The country has barely developed any incubators of thought or innovation. The religious right has successfully supressed free thinking in Pakistan. Society is largely “status quo” driven. With the military ruling directly for over three decades and keeping civilian set-ups on a tight leash, the democratic culture is tenuous at best. Mainstream political parties have myopic and corrupt leadership. Parties are mostly dynastic and revolve around families who run their parties as personal fiefdoms. The parties are considered nests of corruption, totally devoid of any democratic values. There is complete absence    of issue centric political discourse on subjects like foreign policy. The only narrative that sells is anti-India and (or) religious blasphemy. The country’s foreign policy towards the US, India, Afghanistan or Saudi Arabia (including Saudi satellites like UAE, Bahrain, etc.) is a no-go area for political or public discussion. And unless something blatant occurs at the international level, like operation “Neptune Spear” that took out Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad, nothing is ever shared or heard in public. The relationship with the four countries mentioned is truly a province of the military.

Extreme right leaning political parties like, the Jamaat-i-Islami with considerable influence and ability to shape public opinion are fervently pro-KSA. It applies even to the centre right wing parties. Top leadership of Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), an opposition party next in Parliament only to the ruling Tehreek-i-Insaf, strongly endorse friendly ties with the Kingdom. In the acerbic exchange between Islamabad  and reaction by Riyadh last year, the Nawaz League denounced FM- Qureshi’s remarks as “irresponsible”. It went on to strongly condemn the sitting government²⁵ of Tehreek-i-Insaf.

On another note, except for sporadic attempts, there has never been any serious democratic exercise to determine the cost benefit analysis of recognizing Israel. Political parties and even the military are hesitant to discuss the matter fearing backlash from reactionary forces. Despite established sympathy for the legitimate Palestinian cause in Pakistan, there has never been a political debate on why Israel should not be recognised, even though it is here to stay. The Palestinian cause, which should be closer to the Arabs, happens to be much dearer to the natives of Pakistan.

Islamabad’s persistent refusal to recognise the Jewish state has caused Israel to align and close ranks with India. Almost the entire Sunni Arab world’s absolute as well as constitutional monarchies have formally established diplomatic ties with Israel. Lately, UAE, Bahrain and Sudan have overtly acknowledged their relationship with Israel.²⁶ Saudi Arabia, Oman and Kuwait and some others are also considering peace deals with Israel.²⁷ Saudi Arabia, while fully supporting the process, may officially withhold formal recognition. But it doesn’t matter; they are still hand in glove. Accordingly, even without official ties, all these countries have, in a spiritual sense, ended their hostility with the Jewish state.²⁸

How does Pakistan fit in this entire Saudi led and US backed secret and not so secret²⁹ realignment? Will Biden’s victory upset the applecart in the ME for KSA and Israel? Does Pakistan’s standpoint on Palestinian cause remain tenable anymore? What would Pakistan do once Saudi Arabia accords formal recognition to Israel?³⁰ What options might be on the table with Pakistan if India is formally conferred “observer status”, followed by “permanent membership” status in OIC? Despite looming clues, there is still a deafening silence on the subject in Pakistan.

Economic Plight and Bilateral Relations

Despite Pakistan’s efforts to raise the Kashmir issue in the international fora and urge OIC for a voice, success has eluded it. The nuclear and military potential as well as the geostrategic significance of the country are intrinsically important. But for Pakistan, these strengths proved of little consequence in furthering national interest. Islamabad could not elicit any desirable response, internationally or otherwise, not even from OIC. A sterling lesson of this setback is that “religious bond in international relations will be relevant only when coupled with strong economy,”³¹ potency of domestic manpower and driven by commonality of interests.

According to a recent report in Brookings, bilateral trade between India and Saudi Arabia is close to $27 billion, whereas Pakistan-Saudi trade is a paltry $3.6 billion.‘The Saudi Prince MBS has offered to invest a staggering $100 billion in India.’³² The implication is that Saudi Arabia will not want to annoy India by asserting itself on Kashmir”.³³ This being “realpolitik”, must be the starting point if Islamabad seeks softening of ties with Riyadh. “Between July 2019 and April 2020, overseas Pakistani workers sent about $18.78 billion back home. Of this amount, $4.4 billion was remitted from Saudi Arabia alone”, according to a statement issued by the State Bank of Pakistan.³⁴

With the country’s external debt soaring to a whopping USD 112 Billion and Covid-19 crippling the economy further, Pakistan remains at the mercy of International Financial Institutions. The government announced its budget for 2020-21 according to which Rs.1,289 billion have been allotted to the defence sector. Increasing tensions between India and Pakistan, post-Pulwama and the Kashmir issue, are cited     as reasons behind the surge in defence spending.³⁵ “Regardless, the country’s Prime Minister has stated that the burden of pensions is fast becoming unsustainable”. “An increase of 57 per cent was witnessed in military pensions during five years from 2016-17 to 2020-21.”³⁶ A frail economy, inability to meet revenue collection targets, low crop yield, excessive reliance on external borrowings and the much hyped India’s grey-zone hybrid war against Pakistan may not allow the country to completely detach itself from Saudi Arabia.

On Military and Bureaucracy

The three military services of Pakistan were at the vanguard of laying the foundation for the defence forces of Saudi Arabia. Successive generations of Saudi officers acquired training at the army, navy and air force academies of Pakistan. In middle order ranks, Command and Staff College, Naval War College, and Air War College have hosted staff courses and military studies training. The country’s top military academy, the National Defence University also offers regular courses to Saudi officers in senior cadres. The number of trainee officers varies each year but has ordinarily grown over the years. Military to military contacts and field exercises between land, air and naval forces of the two sides take place every now and then. A large number of Pakistani military officers are also deputed in Saudi Arabia in key military positions.

KSA and India have fairly advance defence ties too. Manifested through high-level visits by defense chiefs, training activities, delegation- level interactions, joint military exercises and expert exchange programs – their defense collaboration is growing. The areas of mutual interests inter alia include cyber security, regional maritime security, and joint defense manufacturing.³⁷ India also signed a defence and technology agreement during PM Modi’s visit to UAE in 2017. Riyadh has fairly advance military technology support coming fromTelAviv as Most recently, Israeli Prime Minister and Defence Minister stated that Israel will not oppose US’ sales of specific weapons systems to the UAE. This was an apparent reference to the sale of the advanced stealth jet fighters, F-35 warplanes sought by Abu Dhabi.³⁸ There is convergence of strategic military interests when it comes to a common nemesis, Iran. All three, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Israel with strong ties to India constitute a Quadrilateral nexus. This network was fully backed by the Jared Kushner in the previous US administration who is said to have been behind the strategic shifts³⁹ in the ME that included the“Abraham Accord”⁴⁰ and the moving of the US Embassy⁴¹ to Jerusalem.

Alongside this, cooperation between the US, Israel, KSA, UAE and India is likely to grow in the future. This could be detrimental to the internal security and regional interests of Pakistan.With only China left as a powerful strategic and military backer, what could Pakistan possibly do in case the gulf with KSA widened? Would Pakistan stand as the world’s only country refusing to recognise Israel; how would Pakistan avert India’s entry into OIC?

Vying for a Leadership Role

 The influential thinker of “realist school”, Hans Morgenthau maintains that, “the idea of interest is indeed of the essence in politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place.”⁴² Thucydides’ statement is born of the experiences of ancient Greece that, “identity of interests is the surest of bonds whether between states or individuals”⁴³ could well be rearticulated as, “the absence of all clashing interests” between states.”⁴⁴ The common denominator or so called “interest”  in the case of Pak-Saudi relationship was the “Sunni sect” of Islam. The two cultures are worlds apart. Pakistan’s previously predominant Barelvi strand of Islam, a softer (mystic) version had little commonality with Saudi “Wahabbi, or Salafist”  puritanical  version  which  calls for strict implementation of “sharia”. This led to a promotion of the related “Deobandi” brand instead in the country. In addition, a culture of “intolerance”, “religious coercion” and “politicisation of Islam” for vested interests has continued to expand since the days of the Afghan Jihad. And after a series of suicide attacks by the Pakistani Taliban on shrines of saints and other holy places revered by Barelvis a few years back, the latter took to fighting back groups of the opposing side. In recent years, under a hate and violence preaching cleric, Khadim Hussain Rizvi of Tehreek-i-Labaik Pakistan (TLP), the Barelvis have tried to take power back from Deobandis. TLP now enjoys immense street power. The party returned with a large following in the 2018 elections.

During the past six years there has been a significant deterioration of Pakistan’s relations in the Gulf region, especially with UAE and Saudi Arabia”, notes an Indian columnist.⁴⁵ Since the Islamic revolution in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Tehran have vied for leadership and control of the Muslim world. This came with a concurrent contest for geopolitical influence in ME — other states taking sides as dictated by their strategic interests. But in a purely religious sense, it has been a competition between Sunni and Shia dominance. The Vanguard role of Sunni Muslim majority countries or “ummah” was once held by Egypt. This was under President Jamal Nasser. After Egypt suffered defeat in the 1967 war against Israel, the mantle was taken over by Saudi Arabia.

A new entry and claimant now seems to be Turkey where the incumbent authoritarian President has initiated a drive to “Islamise” a modern secular society modelled by the nation’s founding father, Kemal Ata Turk. Closely following for an important status in the Muslim world is Malaysia. In one group are Iran, Turkey and Russia. The group is pitted against US-KSA-UAE and other minor Gulf states. Pakistan lies somewhere in the middle of the two sides. It’s neither here nor there, more like “running with the hare and hunting with the hounds”. China remains focused on geo-economics but continues to develop strong military as well as cyber and space capabilities. Beijing is central to Pakistan’s foreign policy. China’s political system has proved to be more effective than western liberal models producing leaders with warped minds. The new political leadership of China’s Central Party is drawn on merit from the best, highly educated and erudite reservoir.⁴⁶

In the first week of September 2020, high-level delegations from Israel and UAE signed the historic US-brokered peace deal at   the White House. Bahrain’s FM attended the event and signed its own agreement to normalise relations with Israel.⁴⁷ Last October the FMs  of Israel and UAE visited the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin during their historic meeting. It was their first face-to-face meeting since their countries set aside decades of enmity and signed a US backed deal in mid-September.⁴⁸

After the end of the Muslim Brotherhood and its short lived flirtation with democracy, Egypt, under General Sissi, is now firmly in Saudi grip, politically and economically. As and if asked, Egypt would deliver to KSA what Pakistan could not or has not. If Kashmir is all important to Pakistan, so is Yemen to Saudi Arabia. If Islamabad declined to become part of a war in Yemen, so has Saudi Arabia in the case of Kashmir  and for its own interests and political ends. Nature abhors a vacuum.  A widening Pak-Saudi chasm will have reverberations going far beyond South Asia and ME. The major beneficiaries could be India and Israel, if not others. Yet, under pressure Pakistan might move closer to Turkey, Russia, China and Iran. Additionally, EU could assume greater importance for Pakistan as a trading partner. However, long before that a Saudi revering society in Pakistan will have to be primed for the change.

Since centuries, Arabs have been living under the protection of foreign powers and strategists – Turks, the command of Lawrence of Arabia, the British and French empires, US and now Israel. The strategic dependence of Arabs on India and Israel would unfold sooner than later. The Gulf states are not resilient enough to sustain a long war or battles of attrition as proved in Yemen and the Sunni insurgencies in Iraq and Syria.⁴⁹ Middle East is witnessing an alarming rise of Israel. With United States largely withdrawing, the Gulf monarchies, unable to bear the strategic influence of Iran, have finally acquiesced to the military strength of their former archrival.⁵⁰ Israel will soon be the dominant power in the Middle East. Combined with Saudi Arabia, India and UAE, it could bring massive overt and covert influence on Pakistan, militarily, economically and if required, in destabilizing Pakistan further.

What Must Pakistan Do

Pakistan must take a profound look at its strategic priorities. The country needs to recognize that foreign policy is a dynamic instrument, not a dogma. It needs to be examined and discussed with open minds and at highest national fora. Policy changes to prepare and adjust to a shifting environment are always needed. A shift from geostrategic to geo-economics has become an indispensable need.

A 2018 study discovered that Islamabad’s Foreign office diplomats were demotivated because of political appointments in the department at higher ranks.⁵¹ A career diplomat in Riyadh  was  recently  shown the door before the end of his term and replaced with a retired three- star, Lieutenant General.⁵² It signifies the Pakistan army’s ‘urgency in bringing the country’s Middle East policy under its control’, says Ayesha Siddiqa, a London based defence analyst. More importantly, it is about managing relations with the US via the Middle East.⁵³

Pakistan may have been the only non-Arab country to have participated in real combat during the Arab-Israeli wars first in 1967 and, later 1973.⁵⁴ But that was then. The story lives only in pages of history and is relatively insignificant to the present day leadership of the Arab world. “It would be mistake, a mistake often made by the country, to suggest that the advantage of Pakistan’s location is geo-strategic or geo- political. This, if it existed is now only peripheral. The true advantage is geo-economic.”⁵⁵ A regional integration and lifting of trade barriers alongside efforts to improve ties with Iran and Afghanistan is the crying need of the hour. Saudi Arabia is a distant ally and, although friendly ties are needed, in the new geo-political calculus, financial and oil reliance on Riyadh must be reduced. Such a relationship must not come at the cost of neighbours. Iran has shown its resolve. It expelled India from Chabahar port project. Now that China has signed multibillion dollar economic agreements with Tehran, improved relations with neighbouring Iran could substantially help advance the cause of Pakistan in the early maturing of CPEC. Likewise, Pakistan must reconsider its old, recycled and regurgitated, India-Kashmir centric foreign policy. The result of several wars, both direct and indirect, unlimited skirmishes and destruction of the Himalayan glacier at Siachin offer a lot of food for reflection and rethinking.

With a galloping population, (which in demographic terms is nearly 64 per cent below 30 years), improvement in economic governance and reduction in inflation can play a significant role in internal security. A new all-inclusive political charter to help stabilise domestic politics    is in order. Trade and commerce with neighbouring countries should  be prioritised. The EU market must also be explored. Pakistan has a preferential tariff arrangement with EU. Its extension must be sought. But above all, a public debate on establishing diplomatic relations with Israel must begin in earnest. The ground realities today are quite different from Pakistan’s earliest stance that came in the wake of the creation of Israel.⁵⁶

To begin the process of reformation, Pakistan needs a hard and profound look at the state-citizen contract. Citizens must have a stake in the state. If any such covenant currently exists, it has sorrowfully failed to be visible to the people. Human Resource Development must be prioritized as a national endeavour. The bulk of Pakistanis working in Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries are “unskilled labourers”. This trend served well in the 70s when desert states needed to construct skyscrapers – not anymore. The Arab market now needs skilled manpower. The Indians have captured key financial, commercial, science & technology, medical and banking sector positions in Gulf Arab states.

Early commercial operationalization of Gwadar port must be made top priority. Pakistan has perennially invested in hard military power cruising on US and Saudi provided hardware and economic succour. Pakistan has to realign its security and foreign policies with new global dynamics. This, combined with investment in soft power and human resources, may provide sustainable solutions to Pakistan’s unending problems.

References:

1. “Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi in an unusually sharp warning asked Saudi Arabia-led Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to stop dilly- dallying on the convening of a meeting of its Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) on Kashmir”, see, Daily Dawn August 6, 2020. dawn.com (accessed 20 February 2021)
2. Madiha Afzal, “The Pakistan-Saudi Relationship Hits a Bump in the Road,” Brookings, August 24, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/08/24/the-pakistan-saudi-arabia-relationship-hits-a-bump-in-the-road/ . (accessed 9 November 2020).
3. “In a First, India Invited to Islamic Cooperation Conclave as Guest of Honour,” Times of India, February 23, 2019.
4. In 2015, Pakistan’s parliament decided against military involvement in the Saudi- led coalition fighting Houthi rebels in Yemen after days of debate. This angered Riyadh and Abu See, “Yemen conflict: Pakistan rebuff’s Saudi coalition”. BBC News April 10, 2015. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia (accessed 21 February 2021).
5. See, “Yemen conflict: Pakistan rebuff’s Saudi coalition”. BBC News April 10, 2015. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia (accessed 21 February 2021).
6. In late October this year, FATF gave yet another lifeline to Pakistan and retained it on grey list until February 2021 for six out of 27 unmet action points. See, Fayyaz Hussain, “‘To Remain on Grey List’: FATF Urges Pakistan to Complete Action Plan by Feb 2021,” Dawn, October 24, 2020, https://www.dawn.com/news/1586624/to-remain-on-grey-list-fatf-urges-pakistan-to-complete-action- plan-by-feb-2021 . (accessed 22 November 2020).
7. “Pakistan’s PM Khan Plays down Differences with Ally Saudi Arabia,” Al Jazeera, August 19, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/08/19/pakistans-pm-khan-plays-down-differences-with-ally-saudi-arabia/ . (accessed 26 November 2020).
8. “UAE Royal Family Granted Hunting Permit For Houbara Bustard”, Nation Bytes January 26, 2021. https://nationbytes.com/royal-family-allowed-houbara-bustard-hunt-pakistan (accessed 21 February 2021 )
9. Ben Hubbard, “MBS: The Rise of a Saudi Prince,” New York Times, March 21, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/21/world/middleeast/mohammed-bin- salman-saudi-arabia.html . (accessed 26 November 2020).
10. Ibid.
11. Ejaz Hussain, “Jolted, but Not in Jeopardy,” News, August 16, 2020.
12. Ibid.
13. Naazir Mahmood, “Realignments in the Middle East,” News, October 5, 2020
14. Kamal Alam, “Saudi Arabia and Pakistan: Unease and Reassurance Amid Changing Regional Realities,” RUSI, August 25, 2020, https://rusi.org/commentary/saudi- arabia-and-pakistan-unease-and-reassurance-amid-changing-regional-realities. (accessed 16 November 2020).
15. Alam, “Saudi Arabia and Pakistan: Unease and Reassurance Amid Changing Regional Realities.”
16. Masnavi is a poetic compendium which richly draws from Quran, Bible and other religious scriptures. It is in the Masnavi that Persia’s place between the spiritual cultures of Asia and the ME is substantiated. Rumi, a great Islamic scholar, “did not feel confined to the faith; he saw spiritual value in a range of disciplines, and asserted that the light of Prophet Muhammad’s prophecy does not leave faithful Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians or other denominations behind”.Maulana Jalalu- ’d-din Muhammad Rumi, The Masnavi I Ma’navi of Rumi, E. H. Whinfield (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2017), p. Back cover.
17. Alam, “Saudi Arabia and Pakistan: Unease and Reassurance Amid Changing Regional Realities.”
18. In January 2021, Saudi Arabia announced reopening its embassy in Doha following an agreement that ended three year old dispute between four Arab countries- Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt- and Qatar. Earlier in June 2017 Saudi Arabia and its allies imposed a diplomatic, trade and travel embargo on Qatar that included closing airspace to the country over claims it worked to support “terrorism” and was too close to See, “Saudi Arabia to reopen Qatar embassy in coming days”, Al-Jazeera News, 16 January 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news  (accessed 20 February 2021)
19. Afzal, “The Pakistan-Saudi Relationship Hits a Bump in the Road”
20. “FM Rejects Impression of Rift in Pak-Saudi Relations,” Dawn, August 25, 2020.
21. Shahzad Rana, “Pakistan Pays Back $1b Saudi Loan,” Express Tribune, August 6, 2020, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2258238/pakistan-pays-back-1b-saudi-loan . (accessed 7 November 2020).
22. Nadeem F. Paracha, “My Name Is Pakistan and I’m Not an Arab,” Dawn, July 28, 2013. www.dawn.com
23. “Grey Zone and 5th Generation Warfare”, Lecture by Prof David J. Kilcullen US DoD, Talk Delivered at Australian Defence College, Defence & Strategic Studies Course,” August 21, 2020.
24. The enrolment was done by CIA indoctrinating school children books produced and printed in Dari and Pashtu languages at the University of Nebraska, the school primers were filled with violent images, talk of jihad and featured drawings of guns, bullets and mines. Between 1984 and 1994, CIA spent $51 million to produce such textbooks. Not to be left behind, the Deobandi seminaries led by Saudi trained clerics trained foot soldiers in Pakistan for ultimate jihad in Afghanistan. See,David B.Ottaway Joe Stephens, “From U.S., the ABC’s of Jihad,” Washington Post, March 23, 2002, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/03/23/from-us-the-abcs-of-jihad/d079075a-3ed3-4030-9a96-0d48f6355e54/ .(accessed 26 November 2020). Also, Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (US: Yale University Press, 2001), 129–30.
25. Imran Mukhtar, “FM’s Statement on Saudi Arabia’s Role in OIC Irresponsible: PML-N,” Nation, August 7, 2020, https://nation.com.pk/07-Aug-2020/fm- s-statement-on-saudi-arabia-s-role-in-oic-irresponsible-pml-n. (accessed 26 November 2020).
26. “Sudan-Israel Relations Agreed, Donald Trump Announces,” BBC NEWS, October 23, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54554286. (accessed 23 November 2020).
27. Robert Kaplan, “The Middle East’s New Map,” National Interest, September 24, 2020.
28. Kaplan, “The Middle East’s New Map.”
29. “Out of the Close,” Economist, August 22, 2020, p. 8.
30. Israeli Prime Minister’s recent ‘undisclosed’ meeting with Saudi Crown Prince raises the “tantalizing prospect” of the kingdom joining the new alliance of Gulf Arab states with Israel. See, Jonathan H. Ferziger, “Secret Flight Shows Netanyahu and Mohammed Bin Salman Joining to Face Biden,” Foreign Policy, November 23, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/23/netanyahu-bin- salman-israel-saudi-meeting/ . (accessed 26 November 2020).
31. Muhammad Amir Rana, “Strategic Shift?,” Dawn, June 14, 2020. dawn.com
32. Sanjeev Miglani, “Saudi Prince Expects Investment Worth More than $100 Billion in India,” Reuters, February 20, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asia-saudi-india-idUSKCN1Q90M9 . (accessed 13 November 2020).
33. Afzal, “The Pakistan-Saudi Relationship Hits a Bump in the Road”
34. Khurshid Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Remittances from Saudi Arabia Remain High despite Economy Slowdown”,” Arab News, May 12, 2020.
35. Sher Bano, “Pakistan’s Military Spending and Defence Budget 2020-21,” Modern Diplomacy, July 14, 2020.
36. Mushtaq Ghumman, “PM Says Pension Burden Becoming Unsustainable,” Business Recorder, August 28, 2020.
37. “Strategic Partnership Is a New High in Saudi-India Ties,” Arab News, January 26, 2020, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1618176/saudi-arabia (accessed 26 November 2020).
38. “Israel Won’t Oppose US Sale of ‘Weapons Systems’ to UAE,” Aljazeera, October 23, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/23/israel-will-not-oppose-us-sale-of-f-35-to-uae . (accessed 11 November 2020).
39. “Trump Announces ‘peace Deal’ between Bahrain and Israel,” BBC NEWS, September 11, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-54124996. (accessed 11 November 2020).
40. “Israel, UAE Agree to Visa-Free Travel as Ties Deepen”
41. Mark Landler, “Trump Recognizes Jerusalem as Israel’s Capital and Orders U.S. Embassy to Move,” New York Times, December 6, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/06/world/middleeast/trump-jerusalem-israel-capital.html  . (accessed 11 November 2020).
42. Foreign Policy,” in Pakistan Army Green Book (Rawalpindi: GHQ, 2017), p. 43.
43. Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), p. 4–15.
44. “Foreign Policy,” p. 44.
45. Raja Mohan, “Indian’s Geopolitical Interests Are in Close Alignment with Moderate Arab Centre,” Indian Express, August 18, 2020. Indianexpress. com/article/opinion/columns/narendra-modi-arab-gulf-countries-middle-east- relations-c-raja-mohan-6558876/ (accessed 23 February 2021)
46. Farrukh Saleem, “The China Model,” News, November 15, 2020, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/744013-the-china-model . (accessed 26 November 2020).
47. Jeremy Bowen, “Five Reasons Why Israel’s Peace Deals with the UAE and Bahrain Matter,” September 14, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-54151712  . (accessed 26 November 2020).
48. “Israeli, US Officials Arrive in UAE on Historic Trip to Finalise Accord,” Dawn, August 31, 2020.
49. Alam Brohi, “Is the Middle East bracing for further turmoil?”, daily, Daily Times, February 19, 2021. https://dailytimes.com.pk/725517/is-the-middle-east-bracing-for-further-turmoil   (accessed 21 February 2021)
50. Alam Brohi, “Is the Middle East bracing for further turmoil?”, daily, Daily Times, February 19, 2021. https://dailytimes.com.pk/725517/is-the-middle-east-bracing-for-further-turmoil (accessed 21 February 2021). Pakistan needs to take a hard look which side of history it wants to be on.
51. Ayesha Siddiqa, “Pakistani General as Riyadh envoy brings Middle East policy under army. Eyes on Israel”, The Print January 25, 2021. https://theprint.in/opinion/pakistani-general-as-riyadh-envoy-brings-middle-east-policy-under-army-eyes-on-israel/590624 (accessed 20 February 2021)
52. Ayesha Siddiqa, “Pakistani General as Riyadh envoy brings Middle East policy under Eyes on Israel”, The Print 25 January 202. https://theprint.in/opinion/pakistani-general-as-riyadh-envoy-brings-middle-east-policy-under-army-eyes- on-israel/590624 (accessed 20 February 2021)
53. Ayesha Siddiqa, “Pakistani General as Riyadh envoy brings Middle East policy under army. Eyes on Israel”, The Print 25 January 2021. https://theprint.in/opinion/pakistani-general-as-riyadh-envoy-brings-middle-east-policy-under-army-eyes-on-israel/590624 (accessed 20 February 2021)
54. “Why Pakistan won’t recognise Israel”, Webinar with Senator Mushahid Hussain, 26  December  2020.  https://www.youtube.com/watch   (accessed  20  February2021)
55. “Foreign Policy,” p. 44.
56. The country’s founding leader, Mohammad Ali Jinnah refused to recognise Israel since it deprived Palestinians of their rights.“When’s It a Good Time to Recognise Israel?,” Business Recorder, November 19, 2020, https://www.com/news/40033691/whens-it-a-good-time-to-recognise-israel . (accessed 26 November 2020).