Pakistan’s Regional Foreign Policy

by Özer Khalid *

*Özer Khalid is a Senior Consultant, Counter-Extremism expert and Geo- Strategist. He can be reached on [email protected] or Twitter followed on @ozerkhalid

This is an attempt to take a more holistic foreign policy view of the region and to examine the fluid ever-changing regional foreign policy alliances and the implications these are likely to bear on Islamabad. One of the key foreign policy objectives of the Modi’s regime was to “isolate Pakistan internationally”. Such uncharacteristic hubris monumentally backfired as India has managed to alienate its neighbours. China lays claim to Ladakh and Shaksgam, Nepal has soured relations with Delhi and seeks the territories of Lipulekh, Limpiyadhura and Kalapani, Dhaka is disgruntled with Delhi over CAA, Bhutan has stopped Indian water. Islamabad, therefore, may be able to galvanize support from SAARC this time.

Pakistan, must also increasingly assert herself and reap geopolitical, diplomatic, investment and financial benefits from forging close ties with alternative emerging regional alliances and blocks other than SAARC ¹, such as the ECO² which strategically links East and West, (in which Islamabad has taken an exemplary lead) the SCO ³ and availing the CAR’s via the TAPI ⁴ pipeline. Closer ties with vocal Kashmir advocates such as Turkey and Malaysia will also strengthen Pakistan’s global standing.

Furthermore, a successful Sino-Pak relationship is re-configuring the political geography of South Asia. This brings in China as a permanent security partner for Islamabad.

CPEC provides landlocked Western China with better access to the sea. Islamabad gave the green light to a 6.8 billion dollar upgrade to a rail line in the region as part of CPEC. Also, in August 2019, Beijing announced the opening of a 118 km stretch of road from Thakot to Havelian as part of a larger road project that runs from Islamabad to Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang region.

Interestingly, the new road courses close to India’s westernmost territorial claims in Jammu and Kashmir. Once completed, the “Friendship Highway” will pass through areas of Kashmir in the Pakistan-administered region of Gilgit-Baltistan (G-B), reinforcing Islamabad`s hold in the region.^5,6

Beijing has proven to be Islamabad’s steady ally, at the FATF, at the UNSC, the UNGA, at ASEAN meetings ⁷ and also exhibited goodwill by extending Pakistan’s loan repayment grace period from 8 to 20 years, as well as initiating a Phase 3 trial vaccine for one-third of Pakistan’s population.

Admittedly “debt diplomacy” is not the wise way forward for a self- sustaining political economy, however, these measures act as a potential harbinger for national social security and economic recovery.

As Pakistan’s pivot to China solidifies, Islamabad might gradually drift away from the US owing to D.C.’s diminished interest in Afghanistan post-troop withdrawal. Bilateral ties between Pakistan and the U.S., however, have also simultaneously improved. A personal chemistry between two media savvy personalities, albeit of very different temperaments, Trump as well as Imran Khan, fostered closer cooperation with the US greasing the wheels for peace brokerage in Afghanistan.

Donald Trump’s offer to mediate between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and the US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo’s, official acknowledgement of Pakistan’s role in US–Taliban talks can be categorized as diplomatic victories.

Pakistan has also managed to rejuvenate its ties with the Gulf states, most notably Saudi Arabia, while also positively engaging with Iran⁸ which has severed the umbilical cord with India of late, vis-à-vis the Chahbahar project. Tehran now gravitates more towards Beijing. All this augurs well for Islamabad.

Geopolitical interest alignment drives engagement between the People’s Republic and Pakistan. As Chinese influence ascends with security partnerships in Central Asia (notably with Iran), infrastructure in South Asia, energy deals in Western Asia and the Middle East and investments in Africa, China seems to be well on its way in safeguarding not just CPEC but the entire Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Rapprochement between Nepal, Bangladesh (Chittagong port), Sri Lanka (Hambantota port) along with Chinese deals with Iran (now likely) increasingly render Central Asia a ‘Chinese Plateau’. With the US planning to depart Afghanistan, Beijing is likely to play a supportive role there as well, bearing far-reaching implications from the Indian Ocean to the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia.

Deepening strategic ties between India and the Gulf countries⁹, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, prompted Pakistan to edge even closer to Beijing. The Saudis and Emiratis have edged closer to New Delhi, reinforced in 2019 by Saudi Mohammed bin Salman’s (MBS) visit to New Delhi. MBS penned projects worth $20 billion with Pakistan while he offered to invest a staggering $100 billion in India¹⁰.

Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have a multitude of reasons to prioritise their strategic partnership with China¹¹ more than their newfound love for India¹². While annual trade between India and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries stands at circa $120bn, GCC-China bilateral trade is worth more than $170 billion¹³. China is Saudi Arabia’s¹⁴ largest and the UAE’s second-largest trading partner and both countries have been labelled as “comprehensive strategic partners” – by China’s Communist Party.

The China-Gulf rapprochement is catalyzed primarily by petro- politics and economic rationale¹⁵, however, one must remember that there is an eight million-strong Indian diaspora in the Gulf, forming a solid foundation for New Delhi¹⁶.

Unsurprisingly, the BJP is trying to capitalize upon a recent rift between Riyadh and Islamabad. To nip this in the bud, and in an exercise of swift damage limitation diplomacy, in August 2020, COAS and DG ISI flew to Saudi Arabia to soothe sentiments and revitalize relations.

Riyadh has rendered consummate financial contributions to Pakistan. Islamabad understands very well that aid from Saudi Arabia comes with “strings attached” yet it remains loyal to the Kingdom, reciprocating goodwill in the form of military training¹⁷.

Pakistan’s recent disappointment with the Gulf states and the OIC, other than normalization of ties with Israel, is because the Arab states maintain a relative silence on Kashmir, which remains Pakistan`s most vital foreign policy plank.

Gulf states are similarly well aware that if they do not pay heed to Kashmir and do drift away from Islamabad, Pakistan could embrace their rivals Turkey, Iran and Qatar in a tit-for-tat retort, which neither bloc desires at present.

A more menacing spectre for the Gulf states might be if Islamabad trumpets the prominence of a Pakistan-Iran-China alliance formed for the successful enactment of China’s Belt and Road projects in the region¹⁸.

If Islamabad maintains its momentum in stealth PR, diplomacy and lobbying, it is likely that over the coming months, China will further nudge Saudi Arabia on the issue of Kashmir¹⁹. China`s foreign ministry has publicly called out India over the latter’s military movements along the Pakistan border even as New Delhi and Beijing are entangled in a separate border standoff.

Back in 2018, the Indian Chief of General Staff, Bipin Rawat²⁰ was already quaking in his boots regarding a two-front war versus Pakistan and China, but did not inculcate counter-measures to thwart such an outcome. Rawat stated that despite all three countries possessing nuclear arms, “warfare lies within the realm of reality” along India’s northern and western borders with China and Pakistan²¹.

Rawat declared that it was a ‘myth’ to assume that nuclear-armed rivals such as India on one side and Pakistan and China on the other would not go to war. “Credible (nuclear) deterrence does not take away the threat of (conventional) war,”²².

On September 3rd, 2020, Bipin Rawat threatened Pakistan with “severe consequences” if Pakistan tried to take the opportunity presented by the China-India faceoff²³. This incendiary macho proclamation conceals a deeper insecurity, that India is now facing a possibility for a two-front war. Details of the latest fracas are still incoming, and the Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) acknowledged escalation thereby raising the spectre of India facing a perpetually hot second front:²⁴ with Pakistan across the Line of Control and versus the PLA in eastern Ladakh²⁵

On August 26, foreign minister S. Jaishankar said the border situation along the LAC was the most serious after 1962²⁶. India, at its own peril, has escalated the situation ominously along the LAC from mere border management deployment to ‘forces-in-being’, in effect significantly upping the ante on the conflict escalation ladder.

Small skirmishes can domino into larger disasters, just like a spark in a jungle that can turn the entire forest into ashes if it spreads. The three nations enmeshed in the Kashmir dispute are nuclear armed. It, therefore, becomes vital to deescalate regional border strains, which have been hampering socio-economic advancement for decades. However, an intransigent BJP government pays no heed to this reality.

Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) President, Sardar Masood Khan, in fact stated that the China-India clash in Ladakh was not the real issue; instead, the Kashmir conflict is the root cause of all problems in the region. The Sino-Indian standoff at Ladakh give credence to Pakistan’s claim that Kashmir is indeed “disputed”²⁷.

China’s move on Ladakh has, to a certain extent, put on ice Modi’s plan to integrate J&K into the Indian union as intended via Article 370`s revocation. By annexing J&K – a disputed territory as reaffirmed in numerous UN Security Council resolutions including Security Resolution Number Resolution 47²⁸– PM Modi, unwittingly, has placed Kashmir back under global scrutiny, and has also decisively brought China into the picture.

This September, PM Imran Khan will address the 75^th UN General Assembly (UNGA) session as the sixth speaker and will accentuate the atrocious human rights violations in Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK) as well as seek global consensus-building, international mediation and scrutiny on the issue.

Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK) is momentously gaining much overdue attention and traction, recently in the Gulf`s GCC states. On the 1^st of September 2020, the UN called for probes into forced disappearances and unmarked mass graves²⁹ in Indian occupied Kashmir. Nine UN rapporteurs³⁰ asked New Delhi to reconsider the controversial closure of the State Human Rights Commission (SHRC)³¹.

Recommendations also include reopening a truly independent Human Rights Commission (HRC) and establishing an independent body to aid the investigations. India will, as usual, be tone deaf to such demands.

However, intense global visibility and awareness in the age of social media is now irreversible. It is high time for the international community to step up, for prompt, thorough and impartial investigations into Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK) and an urgent need to restore normalcy to that valley of despair, including revoking/abolishing of the draconian Jammu & Kashmir Armed Forces Special Powers Act [AFSPA] of 1948 which grants impunity to the Indian armed forces.

Indian neo-colonialism was given illegal impetus in August 2019 when the Indian government unilaterally revoked Kashmir`s special status antagonistically dividing the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir into two union territories. State engineered anxiety and shocks, illegal detentions, curfews and unprecedented communications blackout was imposed quelling the voices of legitimate dissent.

In the context of the unending and unprecedented human rights violations imposed on the people of Kashmir, Pakistan`s foreign policy stands on the right side of history.

Reference

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) whose members are Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka.
The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) comprises of ten member states such as Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Pakistan, Turkey, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
The SCO currently comprises eight Member States (Pakistan, China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan).
Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India Pipeline (TAPI), also known as Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline, is a natural gas pipeline with participation of the Asian Development Bank.
Agence France Press (2020) The “Friendship Highway” runs from Pakistan’s capital Islamabad to Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang region. Photo: AFP, August 2020.
Babones, Salvatore (2020) The Next Front in the India-China Conflict Could Be a Thai Canal, India is beefing up its island defenses as Beijing seeks a quicker route to the Indian Ocean. 1^st September 2020.
To be held later in 2020 in Vietnam.
Karim, Umer (2020) Imran Khan`s Pakistan and it`s strategic relevance for the UK, Global strategy and commitments, RUSI, 10^th August, 2020
For more on India`s relations with Gulf countries view: Jha, Ravi (2019) “India’s Economic Resilience Impresses Mohammed”. Khaleej Times and Gulf News (2019) «UAE and India sign crucial investment protection pact». 30 August 2019 as well as Siyech, Mohammed Sinan «India Gulf Counter Terrorism Cooperation». Middle East Institute. 21 December 2017.
Miglani, Sanjeev (2019) Saudi prince expects investment worth more than $100 billion in India, Reuters, February, 2019
Saudi Gazette (2019) “Saudi Arabia strikes $10bn China deal”. Saudigazette. 22^nd of February, 2019.
Shan, A. Zain (2020) What Pakistan`s pivot to China means for India-Gulf ties, The New Arab, 4^th September, 2020.
Samir Salama, Associate (2018) “President Xi’s visit a milestone in UAE-China ties, says Chinese ambassador”. GulfNews. 13^th July, 2018
Arab News (2019) «Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman visits Great Wall of China». Arab News. 21^st of February, 2019
CNBC (2019) «The UAE signed a massive, $3.4 billion deal with China — and that ‹isn›t a surprise›». CNBC. 29 April 2019.
Shan, A. Zain (2020) What Pakistan`s pivot to China means for India-Gulf ties, The New Arab, 4^th September, 2020.
Hassan, Syed Raza; Johnson, Kay (February 16, 2018). Macfie, Nick (ed.). “Pakistan to send troops to Saudi Arabia to train and advise”. Reuters. February 16, 2018.
Shan, A. Zain (2020) What Pakistan`s pivot to China means for India-Gulf ties, The New Arab, 4^th September, 2020.
Shan, A. Zain (2020) What Pakistan`s pivot to China means for India-Gulf ties, The New Arab, 4^th September, 2020
At a seminar in the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) in Delhi in September 2017 Rawat acknowledged the possibility of a two-front war.
Rajat Pandit ( 2018). “Two-front war is a real scenario, says General Bipin Rawat”. The Economic Times India. 13 July, 2018.
Rajat Pandit ( 2018). “Two-front war is a real scenario, says General Bipin Rawat”. The Economic Times India. 13 July, 2018.
As reported by the Hindustan Times on the 3^rd of September, 2020.
Bedi, Rahul (2020) With New China faceoff India`s nightmare of a two-front war may be coming true. The Wire. 31 August, 2020.
There are circa three additional Indian Army divisions of 70,000 supplementing 20,000 troops from the Leh-based 3 Division tasked with minding the LAC in eastern Ladakh against the PLA. These formations are backed by over 120-odd T72M1 and T90S main battle tanks, BAE Systems M777 155mm light weight howitzers, varied missile batteries and associated systems.
Banerjea, Aparna (2020) Most serious situation after 1962: S Jaishankar on India-China border clash. Livemint. 27^th August, 2020.
Notezai, Akbar, Muhammad (2020) What does the India-China standoff in Ladakh mean for Pakistan, The Diplomat, June 24, 2020.
Legally promulgated on the 21^st of April, This Resolution specifically also concerns the resolution of the Kashmir conflict.
As per the Kashmir-based Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons or APDP — that looks after the families of forcibly disappeared people — there are at least 8,000 Kashmiris allegedly disappeared by Indian forces reported Turkey`s Anadolu Agency.
At least four UN special rapporteurs requested the Indian government to investigate the alleged torture and custodial killings of several Kashmiri Muslim men since January 2019 but to no avail.
Anadolu Agency (2020) UN calls for probe into rights violations in Occupied Kashmir, 3^rd September, 2020.