by Ozer Khalid*
*The author is a Senior consultant, geo-political strategist and Criterion Quarterly contributor. He can be reached on [email protected]
US airstrikes on March 18, 2021 targeting Taliban fighters actively attacking ANDSF security forces positions in Laghman and Kandahar renders the fragile Afghanistan peace process ever-more arduous. America requires an operationally resilient ANDSF to prevent the burgeoning of terrorist sanctuaries within Afghanistan. As a USFOR-A spokesperson, Col Sonny Leggett, reiterated, “The US continues to defend ANDSF in accordance with the US-Taliban agreement.” Such strikes on the Taiban, admitted Joe Biden`s officials, cast a shadow of doubt on the 1st May U.S. troop withdrawal deadline.
The February 25, 2021 India-Pakistan LoC ceasefire favours a Biden administration seeking to ensure that Islamabad remains focused more intently on the Afghan peace process, without getting log-jammed by border strains with New Delhi. A stable India-Pakistan rapport remains a strategic US interest.
This is a fragile Afghan peace process in limbo due to political wrangling, fraught with “spoilers” from the TTP terrorists to Baloch separatist insurgents to ISIS-Khorasan Province chapter based within Afghanistan.
A negotiated political settlement in Afghanistan is now also contingent upon Iran. Tehran will use Afghanistan as a negotiation lever vis-à-vis the Biden administration and is unlikely to lend it`s support unless Biden makes concessions and re-starts the terms for a re- engagement of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA cannot conceptually be divorced from a durable settlement in Afghanistan. Iran holds sway over the Hazara community, especially those residing along the Koh-i-Baba mountains on the Western fringe of the Hindu Kush range in central Afghanistan. Several Hazaras view Tehran as a counter-weight to the Sunni Taliban. Iran`s Liwa Fatemiyoun brigade remain active in Afghanistan.
In the run-up to the March eighteenth Moscow conference involving key stakeholders, Pakistan has on numerous occasions restated its commitment to the peace process, both as a neighbor and a United Nations participant dedicated to peace in Afghanistan. For instance, Pakistan and Afghanistan have launched “Track-II Bilateral Dialogue on Shared Peace, Security & Prosperity.” The Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad & Heart of Asia Society are also holding a plethora of dialogues.
Whereas many initiatives are afoot, Islamabad, however, premised on previous experience, has expressed a set of clear terms and conditions.
Pakistan remains steadfast to the enablement of a political settlement in Kabul. Islamabad reiterates the imperative to support the sacrosanctity of the Doha Process and retain an inclusive, participatory dialogue – even though, as stated above, a realistic deadline revision of an American troop withdrawal now becomes inevitable. Pakistan aspires towards a responsible withdrawal under the Doha auspices, agreed upon by all pivotal participants.
Pakistan`s PTI government has unequivocally also set the following terms and conditions: no UAVs, drones or physical military presence/ action on or from Pakistan`s territory. Islamabad will also not digest any gratuitous coddling of India in Afghanistan. This is a sensitive imperative for Pakistan; something that the country’s administration anticipates the allies will be sensitized toward.
However, in Afghanistan, India and Pakistan are at cross-purposes; whereas, Islamabad seeks to include the Taliban, New Delhi rejects them.
Pakistan’s emphasis is now on economic security and connectivity intimately aligned to peace in Afghanistan. More so, Pakistan is perhaps the only state – owing to its geographical contiguity and strategic closeness – that can help Kabul rise like a phoenix from the ashes and bolster its economy by nurturing investment possibilities between Kabul, Islamabad, Washington D.C, Beijing, Tehran and, increasingly, the Central Asian Republics such as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.
The aforementioned Pakistani pre-conditions were highlighted by Pakistan`s head of army, General Bajwa to the American Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, to Zalmay Khalilzad in Islamabad and during General Bajwa’s Bahrain trip, where he interacted with pivotal Afghan counterparts like Hamdullah Mohib, the Afghan National Security Advisor (NSA). Significant during the Bahrain meeting was the attendance of General Nicholas Patrick Carter – Chief of Defence Staff in the UK Army, and Dr. Christian Turner – British High Commissioner to Pakistan.
Such a diplomatic overture by Khalilzad is due to the reality that America now seeks an exit from Afghanistan, seeking instead to focus on domestic issues like the alarming Covid-19 figures, a dwindling economy, and repositioning itself in the Indo-Pacific theater to counter China. The Biden administration reasons that, after nearly two decades, military triumph in Afghanistan is a far-fetched fantasy. Biden`s administration now seeks a measured withdrawal from Afghanistan, yet not all stake holders in the State Department espouse to this view.
By engaging in overt liaison with Pakistan, Biden`s government flouts counsel from traditional lobbyists and a majority of Washington`s entrenched think tank intelligentsia; many of them are advising Biden to delay a withdrawal from Afghanistan by numerous months, a probability which President Ashraf Ghani also wagers his bets on. Many at the White House and the State Department desire a US exit from Afghanistan owing to numerous domestic social and economic challenges. Covid-19 induced realities accelerated apprehension, ushering a sense of urgency, stimulating Washington to forge a peace process via Istanbul that should give birth to an interim government set-up in Afghanistan.
All this points to a sense of immediacy within Biden`s government, which has simultaneously kick-started a new chapter of diplomacy whereby Afghan stakeholders will journey to Moscow and then to Istanbul, thereafter, in April. The GRU, Russia`s foreign military intelligence, by getting involved, will cultivate its own patronage networks in Afghanistan with a view to curtail drug trafficking, keep tabs on IS presence in Afghanistan and monitor threats aimed at its Central Asian allies. Welcoming the Kremlin into the Afghan peace talks empowers Putin to widen Moscow`s regional influence over Central Asia, especially Tajikistan, which borders Afghanistan.
Islamabad endorses the participation of Moscow, Istanbul and Beijing. All seek to minimize Taliban violence for fruitful negotiations. The Taliban, however, are hesitant since they seek a release of their prisoners and they still remain on the UN terror list as per UNSC Resolution 1267.
The key for now is for these stakeholders to steer these maximalist foreign policy positions and make all of Afghanistan`s decision-makers gravitate toward the middle—a mutual common ground— in the broader interest of Afghanistan`s people. Stealth diplomacy and scrutiny in Kabul and Doha respectively may have worked till now. However, broader concerns remain, emanating from competing geostrategic vested interests. Other than dexterous diplomacy, a self-effacing quest for peace by Afghan stakeholders remains pivotal to forge an inclusive journey forward.
Islamabad has drawn a clear line in the sand. The Biden administration can no longer utilize Islamabad’s shoulders to claim a victory in Afghanistan and pull-out with the medal all by itself, without sharing and acknowledging the heavy-lifting Pakistan has and is conducting.
With many more actors now involved in the peace process, Islamabad expects a reasonable recognition of its role and responsibility in the ongoing negotiations.
