SUBSCRIBE

Sino-India Conflict 2020: A War India Lost Without Fighting

by Air Commodore (R) Khalid Iqbal TI (M)*

* Writer is a former Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Pakistan Air Force, and Founding Chair of think Tank, Pakistan Focus. Research for this article closed on October 31, 2020.

Abstract

In the name of counterbalancing and, one day confronting China, India had been, at least since the late 1950s, suggesting its willingness to take up this role for the US led anti-China alliance; and, on this pretext, grabbing all kinds of strategic advantages alongside a wide assortment of munitions and warfighting systems. However, actually, it never ever thought of fighting [another] war against China, especially after its humiliating defeat in its 1962 military misadventure. Realising that, on its own, it was no match for china, India had been bluffing the US since 1962, that it could do the heavy lifting in the America led anti-China bandwagon. Militarily, India has all along been focused on fighting Pakistan. Most of its munitions, personnel configurations and command and control structures are Pakistan specific. So, when the Chinese called the bluff in April 2020, the Indian military was not prepared — it lacked the requisite mountain warfare compatible wherewithal viz. clothing, munitions, and habitat, what to talk about combat training. Hence,   the political leadership had to capitulate, but, yet again blundered by going into a denial mode about its outright defeat and surrender. On September 10, the Russians brought together the Chinese and Indian foreign ministers for a joint statement, on the side-lines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) foreign ministers meeting. The joint statement, independently worked out by India and China, reflects Indian surrender. The space created by Indian capitulation was promptly filled-in by the US. Indian strategic pride drowned as the final nail of the US superiority over India was hammered during the October 27- 29, 2+2 meeting1. The US was able to cut corners2 and impose Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation (BECA)3 on India just a week before US elections. America had been pushing for BECA but India had been stalling it since 2002. BECA ostensibly focuses on sharing of sensitive satellite and map data by the US and India. Pakistan realized that the agreement will have serious repercussions for peace and stability in South Asia4.

 The Modi government, in its Sino-phobia, simply did not give thought to the implications that the signing of BECA will have on its war- preparedness5. It’s a defining moment for India. It begins India’s journey towards its total dependence on the US. Within a decade it will neither be able to buy non US-NATO munitions/machines nor fire the first bullet without an American nod—much like some of America’s smaller European military allies. Its dream of rising to super power status is no longer tenable, it is destined to be content with a middle power ranking for some time to come. Under the garb of interoperability, India will have to switch over to American war machines and operating systems at a fast speed. Currently India’s military inventory has 67 percent share of Russian origin munitions and equipment which has no place in evolving a seamless Indo-US interoperability. This journey would be expensive and painful for India. Indo-Russian relations would dilute rapidly, as Russia is unlikely to side with India, unconditionally, in its anti-China pursuits. China continues to occupy huge swaths of Indian territory—estimates varying from paltry 606 thru’ 10007 to a whopping 38000 square kilometres8. India’s image of a regional giant stands scattered. Even small players like Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are standing up to India. Notwithstanding India’s signing of BECA, the White House may reconsider India’s suitability for heavy lifting in the anti-China “quad” or “quad plus”. A tactical skirmish in Ladakh theatre, wherein no bullet was fired, has caused a huge upset to the Indo-US strategic applecart.

 This paper takes a look at the causes, occurrences and effects of China- India Ladakh tiff 2020, and endeavours to forecast ensuing trajectories. – Author) 

Introduction

 The China-India tiff in Ladakh shall remain an interesting case study in modern warfare9. War progressed while selectively combining shades of all Generations of Warfare10. Though application of First-Generation tactics of hand to hand scuffle between the competing columns of men going only up to bamboo sticks war shot to fame, comparatively lesser attention was paid to facets of the 7th Generation warfare, whereby it culminated into a war of competing narratives11. With regard to China, the Indian military suffered from error of judgement and courted complacency with a happy go lucky predisposition12; it never envisaged a confrontation with China would ever escalate beyond border skirmishes. The military leadership never read the mind of its Far-Right political masters, who had been vying to fight China, at least notionally, since 2014. The Indian political leadership never disclosed to the military its actual mission13—much like “Operation Parakram” against Pakistan in 2001-2. As a result, militarily India has all along focused on fighting Pakistan. Most of its munitions, personnel configurations and command and control structures have always been Pakistan specific14. The Indian military was, therefore, not prepared when the Chinese called the Indian bluff with regard to its anti-China rhetoric15.

The US sent its two aircraft carriers for a few days (USS Reagan, USS Nimitz) to patrol the South China Sea starting July 0416; the third carrier group, the USS Theodore Roosevelt, was also close-by in the Indo-Pacific waters17.

The Indian political leadership had to capitulate. However, yet again, they went into a denial mode. It’s an embarrassing moment for India. China has permanently acquired huge swaths of Indian territory. Even a buffer zone has been established inside Indian territory. A perpetual stalemate is likely to prevail, subjecting India to a state of helplessness.

As far as the tussle for regional dominance is concerned, India’s smaller neighbours, now, prefer to look up to China as their regional leader; most of them are also vying to join the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). America may also have concluded that its investment to employ India as a deterrent in the Euro-American “Contain China Calculus” has remained ineffective, at least for the time being.

India’s immediate lesson is: “China is here [breathing down the neck] and the US in there—far away—militarily and economically paralysed while struggling against Covid-19”. Even minus the Covid-19 factor, the US has no intention to fight India’s war; and India is well aware of that. Too many loose ends, vague expectations, and things left to chance were the signature tune of the Indian strategic thought process with regard to China-US dynamics.

Both warring sides chose to keep the conflict to themselves, neither was the United Nations (UN) approached by either side nor was any mediation effort accepted — highlighting the irrelevance of the UN in the contemporary conflict-ridden environment. Narendra Modi remained clueless on how to face China18, both militarily and diplomatically. New Delhi’s failure to confront Beijing diplomatically was glaring in its ineffectiveness19. At the end the Russians pushed their way for a joint statement in the side-lines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

China has the largest number of neighbours (14), with whom it shares 22000 kilometres of land borders20. Giving diplomacy a chance, China has settled its major border disputes with all its contiguous neighbours except India. India has an expansionist mind-set21. It has kept border and resource sharing disputes with all its neighbours active with a hope that it would, in due course, acquire these territories and resources, by hook or by crook and annex or grab them with impunity — there are numerous examples, the latest being the annexation of the Muslim majority Jammu and Kashmir state, for which it is under obligation to hold a plebiscite under the UN supervision22. There is tension between India and Bangladesh over the Citizenship Act, and it harbours an intent of conducting false flag operations against Pakistan. At the regional level, India is all out to impose itself as the leader of Asia. Due to a certain level of ego pumping from the west, it has actually begun to believe that it is already a superpower. Therefore, it is often seen copying American strategic terminologies for which it neither has the means nor the will.

 India has learnt the hard way, many times over, that bluffing does not always serve the purpose and cannot survive fact check in the long run in this digitalized information age. The latest humiliating lesson was delivered by Pakistan Air Force (PAF), through its operation Swift Retort to the Indian Air Force (IAF) — five times its size — within 24 hours; when it carried out attacks within Indian territory, shot down two of its fighter aircraft and captured a pilot, Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, on February 27, 2019. A day earlier, at 0330 hours on February 26, twelve Mirage 2000 fighter planes of IAF violated Pakistan’s air space and dumped their load in the woods, near Balakot and claimed the destruction of a seminary alongside the death of its 300 plus students23. “Only 4 trees and one crow were the [actual] casualties in the Balakot Strike!” 24 India also projected a claim of shooting down one F-16 of the PAF — again incorrect — besides the PAF, a strong rebuttal came from the US official, declaring, after a count, that the entire inventory of the PAF F-16 fleet was intact and duly accounted for25. Effects of this single mission air skirmish were devastating for India: Firstly, Pakistan made it clear to the World that it refuses to acknowledge Indian air superiority over its air space; Secondly, the PAF had the capability of engaging targets inside India, at a place and timing of its own choosing; thirdly, India did not have the will to militarily escalate beyond a sub-tactical level.

India’s response to the Chinese military action was also based on denial and lies26. Prominent Indian strategist Pravin Sawhney tweeted after the “All Parties Conference” convened by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in which Modi said that neither China had intruded into nor occupied any area:

“June 19 marks landmark day in India’s military history when PLA won both battle & war without firing a shot. My congratulations to China on its well planned & executed strategy leading to its stunning & deserved victory. Long live India-China friendship. Jai Hind.”

Major Drivers and Contributing Causes

The often-floated concept of 21st century as the century of China’s rise as a World economic superpower raised concerns in America as they have grown accustomed to their unipolar dominance since the end of the cold war. A dominant factor of their foreign policy, therefore, is a containment strategy for China. India, being a trigger-happy country of foolhardy strategists where elections are contested on anti-China and anti-Pakistan sentiments – which is a bipartisan malice in India – coupled with a pathological desire to be a major power proved to be suitable candidate for the Americans to engage in the implementation of their containing China strategy.

India’s expansionist policies in the region are becoming a threat to its neighbours. Currently India is in a perpetual standoff with three of its neighbours — Pakistan, China and Nepal. All three disputes are borne out of India’s hubris.

Due to a rise of the Far-Right in India to political power in 2014 – coinciding with rise of this phenomenon almost World-wide since 2010 – India’s hubris has become unmanageable27 as it is perpetually itching to under take untenable adventures. Encouraged by successfully intimidating some of its smaller neighbours, it abrogated its constitutional provisions (Articles 370 and 35A) that had guaranteed special autonomous status to Jammu and Kashmir.  Moreover,  it threatened to occupy portions  of Jammu and Kashmir under Pakistani and Chinese control — Aksai Chin; and Azad Jammu and Kashmir & Gilgit Baltistan respectively28.

A report authored by a senior figure of an influential Chinese think- tank linked the 2020 tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to India’s move last year [August 05, 2019] to abrogate Article 370 that changed the status of Jammu and Kashmir – a decision that China had voiced opposition to. The report, for the first time, described the move as a joint challenge to China and Pakistan, stating that the move had “posed a challenge to the sovereignty of Pakistan and China”. The article was authored by Wang Shida, who is the Deputy Director of the Institute of South Asian Studies at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)29.

Ananth Krishnan, in his piece for The Hindu (June 12), captioned: “Beijing think-tank links scrapping of Article 370 to LAC tensions”, reported: “Mr. Wang noted that the Chinese Foreign Minister had conveyed China’s strong opposition to the move to External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar during his visit to Beijing [August] last year [2019], following the abrogation of Article 370 and the establishment of Ladakh as a Union Territory. The week before the [Indian Foreign Minister’s] August 2019 visit, Home Minister Amit Shah had spoken in Parliament about taking back “Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and China controlled Aksai Chin”. Mr. Jaishankar conveyed to Beijing that the move was an entirely internal matter that did not impact India’s external boundaries or the LAC with China. China had opposed the Ladakh map for including Aksai Chin”. The article stated the move had “posed a challenge to the sovereignty of Pakistan and China” and “made India-Pakistan relations and China-India relations more complex.”

Senior PLA Colonel, Zhu Bo, a familiar figure in the Chinese information war circuit and an honorary fellow in the PLA Academy of Military Sciences wrote an article for South China Morning Post    in 2017, in the wake of Doklam crisis. According to Zhu, India would be the net loser of the [Doklam] crisis, because “the disputed border was not on China’s strategic radar” till the Doklam standoff. The PLA had since reconsidered its assessment of the strategic importance of  the Sino-Indian border30. The Doklam crisis was Modi’s test balloon. China remained steadfast and refused to talk to India, until it pulled back its troops. India’s pulling out of troops led to the “Informal Wuhan Summit”, producing the much touted “Wuhan Spirit”.

A number of former Indian military officials and diplomats told Reuters that New Delhi’s construction of roads and airstrips in Ladakh were the most likely reason for drawing Beijing’s ire and the outbreak of the China-India crisis 2020. Narendra Modi’s government had pushed for improving connectivity and by 2022, 66 key roads along  the Chinese border would have been built. One of these roads is near the Galwan valley that connects to Daulat Beg Oldi air base, which was inaugurated in October 2019. “The road is very important because it runs parallel to the erstwhile LAC (Line of Control) and is linked at various points with the major supply bases inland,” said Shyam Saran, a former Indian foreign secretary. “It remains within our side of the LAC. Its construction along this new alignment which appears to have been challenged by the Chinese.” Another former Indian foreign secretary, Nirupama Rao, said, “Today, with our infrastructure reach slowly extending into areas along the LAC, the Chinese threat perception is raised”. Indian observers believe that India’s objective to open/construct roads is to monitor Chinese movements, though New Delhi claims that the road is to facilitate pilgrims.

As in 2017, the trigger of the conflict this time also appears to be India’s own actions in the disputed area. Indian action is comparable to the Nazi concept of ‘Lebensraum’, that comprised of policies and practices of settler colonialism. India’s aggressive policy towards its neighbours is putting regional peace at stake. Tensions rose between Chinese and Indian militaries as both sides were working to fence a contested border region in the Himalayas. Beijing and New Delhi officials are accusing each other of trespassing over the disputed border31. Earlier, similar accusations had triggered a brief but bloody war in 196232. India suffered a humiliating defeat in that war33.

The issue, however, stretches far deeper and connects to Modi’s destabilising politics in the region. In a bid to bolster his strongman image before his voters, Modi’s regime has taken a rash approach to regional politics34. At the peak of the crisis, the billion dollar question was: What happens next? In case India backs down (like in Doklam) and just absorbs humiliation in order not to look the Dragon in the eyes, things could settle down. In case India steps up, there are chances of serious consequences – maybe even a military conflict35. So far India has taken the former course. It may change its mind after acquiring compatible military capabilities within 3-5 years. India’s signing of BECA with the US is a first post crisis move in that direction.

China-India Strategic (Im) Balance

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China and India took second and third place in global defence spending for the first time in 201936. The US retained the top slot. China spent an estimated $261 billion last year and India an estimated $71.1 billion. The US spent $732 billion. The American defence budget grew by 5.3 percent, the Chinese by 5.1 percent and the Indian by 6.9 percent37.

China has the capability of algorithmic multi-domain and cross- domain warfighting. The Indian military leadership has not even started conceptualizing this kind of war. They are not yet able to come out of the mesmerising illusions of the conceptually stale cold war era war fighting strategies such as Hybrid Warfare.

China remains the winner as long as PLA remains camped on the Indian side of erstwhile LAC. The PLA had the requisite capability to end the war decisively on its own terms without the loss of its soldiers. No credible analyst expected the PLA to start a shooting war with India. Modi’s victory claims, contrary to satellite imagery, were a carefully scripted drama to fool the domestic audience.

Fareed Zakaria pointed out in a Washington Post op-ed that “China is not rising in a vacuum but in a region with other major countries such as Japan and India and Australia. Every action Beijing takes should be considered in relation to the reaction it causes in those nations’ capitals. Thanks to its actions over the past few years under Xi, China today finds itself in the same strategic situation as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War — surrounded by countries that are growing increasingly hostile to it.”38

According to Pravin Sawhney, “China’s Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) is a superpower vis a vis India. PLA understands future software driven warfare. Instead of trying to [linearly] match the US military, it is leapfrogging in certain areas. India oblivious – believes 74 percent FDI [Foreign Direct Investment] in defence will get it [‘s] tech [nology] to match PLA”. Indian calculations are wrong. China even controls India’s digital payments platforms.

China is as advanced as Russians and Americans in many aspects. China will run away with victory even before India thinks that it can put up a fight39. “Geographically, China impinges directly on India’s geopolitical landscape in multiple ways. Rise of China, militarily and economically, has only exacerbated its [impingement] intensity”40.

The US knows this, and that’s why it chose to offer to arbitrate41; both parties of the conflict declined the offer42. Prime Minister Narendra Modi rejected President Donald Trump’s mediation offer for resolving the stand-off. Reiterating his offer, Trump said, “Modi is not in a good mood about the ongoing big conflict with China”43. Earlier, Trump had tweeted on May 27 offering to help resolve growing border tensions. Trump described the situation as a “now raging border dispute.” Even though Trump’s words were hyperbole, they reflected the seriousness of the crisis44.

There may have been some trivial early signs of US-China financial decoupling, but it would not be practical to presume that the US armada would ever come to fight alongside Modi’s boys45. Realising that, India opted to go into denial mode and extricate itself out of the situation by giving away over 1000 square Kilometres of territory46, including many patches of strategically important land.

When the Chinese came, projections of India as a great power failed the test. A great power is self-sufficient with war machines and munitions alongside combat ready personnel. The Indian military had none, forcing their Prime Minster to first ask Russia, US, Israel and France to fast-track already ordered war materiel47 for its troops in Ladakh theatre to match PLA numbers, and then to accept a humiliating surrender.

On the side-lines of the Victory Day Parade, India reiterated to the Russians the need to expedite delivery of Fighter planes, S-400 Missile system and other already ordered war munitions48. Russia conveyed to India that it would be difficult for Russia to out-rightly side with India in its conflict with China. Even if S-400 is delivered to India in 2021,  it would require at least a year to get operationalized and be ready for war.

China would certainly take note of Israel’s keenness by offering its own, operating, air defence system as an interim measure to fill in for the Russian S-400 air defence missile system49.

According Pravin Sawheny, “On 5 Aug 2019 I said China will not accept it. China has changed facts on ground, so has Nepal. And, so, will peace loving tiny Bhutan. PLA’s Nakula intrusion has bypassed Indian defences from West & East in Sikkim leaving Bhutan to itself. Expect Bhutan to join BRI in a year.”50

In an interesting development, the US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, cited the Chinese threat to India and Southeast Asian countries, like Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines, and the South China Sea51, as one of the reasons the US is shifting its troops from Europe. He said this while responding to a question when he spoke at the Virtual Brussels Forum on June 25. He added that the US military is “postured appropriately” to meet these “challenges of our time.” According to Pompeo, President Donald Trump’s administration had carried out a fundamental relook at the threats it faced and how it should allocate its military resources, including intelligence and cyber52. Speaking about the Chinese threat, he cited the violent border confrontation with India, China’s increasing activities in the South China Sea, and its predatory economic policies as evidence53. Of these, the US is actually more concerned about the economic part.

On October 27, Pompeo once again raised the China issue as a reason for signing the BECA agreement with India. Pompeo, who arrived in New Delhi along with Defence Secretary Mark Esper, said after talks with their Indian counterparts, Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, that the two countries had to work together to confront the threat China posed to security and freedom. “Big things are happening as our democracies align to better protect the citizens of our two countries and indeed, of the free world54.” Pompeo added, “Our leaders, and our citizens, see with increasing clarity that the Chinese Communist Party is no friend to democracy, the rule of law, transparency, nor to freedom of navigation, the foundation of a free and open, prosperous Indo-Pacific”.55

According to Pravin Sawhney, “In the current fit of nationalism, there is a clamour that all Chinese products should be banned in India. This populism overlooks two critical issues: One, so entrenched are Chinese products in global supply chains that banning them will hurt India more than China, whose overall trade with India is two per cent of its global trade. And two, in the event of cascading effects owing to prolonged stand-off, a total ban on imports from China would kill Indian Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, MSMEs, disrupt the pharmaceutical industry and ruin the local economy in the hinterland”.56

As the China-India conflict entered a pause, Pompeo remarked on July 08 that China took an “incredibly aggressive action” that aligned with President Xi Jinping’s “behaviour throughout the region and, indeed, throughout the world.”

Will the US send its armada to fight India’s war? Even Trump      is not reckless enough to start a direct military confrontation with China. Neither will India fight America’s war against China. Modi is not Nehru. China will also not start an all-out war with any country. Choosing India as a nuclear proxy to counter a stronger and bigger nuclear power is a mistake. The Indo-US strategic clock is stuck somewhere in the 1960s57.

For India, “the good news is that China does not want war with India in the near future for two strategic reasons. One, its principal adversary — the United States — needs to be tamed first in the western Pacific theatre through ASEAN as the pivot. Instead of challenging  US military power, Beijing has unleashed its economic power on the ASEAN through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)”58.

According to Manosh Joshi, “Betting on a quick return to status quo ante would be hazardous security.” The dispute is more likely to herald a new and nervous era.

War Operations: Sub-Tactical Battlefield Events Leading to Strategic Effects

Tensions rose between Chinese and Indian militaries, as both sides began working to fence a contested border region in the Himalayas. Earlier, similar accusations had triggered a brief but bloody war in 1962; India suffered a humiliating defeat. That time defeat came after putting up a fight; this time it was embraced without firing a bullet; the will to fight was just not there.

During the 2020 crises, in the military domain, the Indian Chief of Defence Staff, General Bipin Rawat, grossly messed up the handling of the China-India tiff to the extent that, according to Pravin Sawhney, it was interesting to observe that “most of retired Indian generals wanted war with China and most of serving ones wanted to retire before that war.” The war was already over before Rawat knew that it had begun.

Beijing and New Delhi officials accused each other of trespassing over the disputed border areas. India and China have a 3,500 kilometres long un-demarcated border which is generally a very difficult and mostly undemarcated terrain59. During May 2020, the Indian press began reporting that “Chinese army brigades comprising thousands of soldiers have crossed into Indian territory to setup tents and trenches at key points near the Himalayas”.60 And that “In response, India’s army has deployed reinforcements”. The Economist reported that New Delhi and Beijing have activated a high-level diplomatic channel to diffuse tensions. And China’s ambassador to India, Sun Weidong, struck a calming tone, telling reporters, “We should never let differences overshadow our relations.”61

Reuters reported on May 27: “India left red-faced after its troops were briefly detained by China in Ladakh”. NDTV quoted a senior Indian bureaucrat as saying, “The situation became very volatile when a scuffle between Indian personnel and the Chinese resulted in detention of some of our jawans (soldiers) but later they were released.” Chinese authorities also seized their weapons. “But eventually weapons were handed back and our jawans also came back.” For India, it was a loss of face.

 Foreign Policy magazine highlighted two clashes between Indian and Chinese soldiers, on May 5 and May 9, at separate border areas in India’s east and north. While no one was killed in those hand-to-hand combat skirmishes, more than 100 soldiers were injured. Then, soldiers from both sides camped out in Galwan Valley. According to Reuters “About 80 to 100 tents have sprung up on the Chinese side and about 60 on the Indian side where soldiers are billeted”62.

India’s The Print reported that Chinese troops had moved as far as three kilometres into India’s side of the Galwan Valley. Quoting sources ‘in the know’, the online publication said that Beijing was also moving men into ‘finger areas’ of Pangong Lake while boosting its forces on its side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Both sides had thousands of troops stationed on either side of the ceasefire line. Over three Divisions of Indian Army rushed to the Ladakh theatre. There were cross theatre movements of troops as well. During the coming winters, keeping these troops in the Ladakh area with habitat and logistics provisioning coming only through air lift would imply nightmarish challenges for India. While the PLA could swiftly amass troops at other pressure points along the LAC.

Brahma Chellaney in a July 09 piece for The Hindustan Times, captioned “China may win, without fighting” wrote: “Instead of insisting on status quo ante, India has helped create a new status quo. Beijing is smiling.” “It [China] has changed the South China Sea’s geopolitical map without firing a shot or incurring any international costs”. While establishing a border settlement, the PLA is expected to give some face- saving concessions to India in Pangong Tso only, having no tactical importance. India has accepted the Chinese viewpoint. So, the LAC has ceased to exist, and India has ceded significant strategic concessions during the diplomatic level talks, to buy face saving peace — at least for the time being.

On June 28 Prime Minister Modi declared victory over China. His June 19 statement had already hinted at an all-pervasive preservation of sanctity of the Line of Actual Control (LAC); that according to him had not be disturbed. His “Victory Declaration” was pegged around “20 brave soldiers” giving a “befitting reply” and claiming that India had won the tactical battle. In fact, the Chinese never envisioned or fought a tactical battle. It is interesting that, according to Modi’s earlier statement, there was a Chinese incursion across the Indian side of the LAC.

India was indulging in hate mongering against China if there had been no Chinese incursion; Modi’s act of banning over 59 Chinese Apps added to the earlier frenzy of public images of breaking Chinese TV sets. Most Indians live in delusion. Such gimmicks were aimed at strengthening such public delusions — for a perceptive win.

PM Narendra Modi realized the consequences and, therefore, began his damage denials. It seemed as if he was in a state of mental paralysis. During one of the National Security Adviser level meetings with China, India agreed to disengagement in Ladakh on Chinese terms, thereby accepting the 1959 Chinese Claim Line as the new Line of Actual Control (LAC).63 The new LAC would, in fact, be the Cease Fire Line.

A retired Lieutenant General of the Indian Army, H S Panag, in his July 09 piece for The Print captioned “Modi, Xi are strong leaders, but for lasting peace at the LAC both need to make compromises” stated that “if India and China don’t make compromises, then a limited war  is inevitable, which neither side wants… Modi and Xi cannot afford   to lose face. It has to be a win-win situation for both the countries, and their leaders.”

Prime Minster Narendra Modi, through the state and selected privately owned but government subsidised media, undertook to portray the humiliating event as a grand victory. There were, however, powerful fact narrating individuals and institutions that considered it as a total surrender. Independent Indian analysts are under tremendous pressure to give up their independent but factual conclusions.

With the demise of the 1993 LAC alongside the 1993, 1996, 2005, 2012, and 2015 agreements, the LAC’ has become null and void. China decided to go beyond even its 1960 claim line in Ladakh. Hence, the PLA will not vacate the territories it has come to occupy in Galwan, Depsang, Hot Springs and Pangong Tso.

Modi still  hopes  to  overcome  these  complications  by  creating a perception in India that the LAC remains inviolable and no Indian territory has been lost to the PLA. It’s another matter that no one bothered to ask which ‘Line’ he was referring to — the 1993 LAC, China’s 1960 claim line or the one that is going beyond that.

The Indian Army is in low morale and is in no mood to fight. It transported Bofors Artillery with its Israeli Copper tipped shells, without realising that there are no corresponding targets for it. The Indian Air Force was not fit for war, and the Indian Navy was no factor.

The Indian army’s proficiency was found lacking during an ambush type mission in Ladakh. CDS General Bipin Rawat likes to call such gimmicks “Surgical Strike”. On June 16, a contingent of 35 men along with their Commanding officer crossed over to the Chinese area during the night, ostensibly to evict Chinese from some of the tactically important features. In a  hand  to  hand  fight  that  ensued, the Indian expeditioners suffered heavy casualties. Alongside 22 deaths, including the commanding officer, ten combatants were taken prisoner. The prisoners were released soon after. The Indian side did not have weapons and the PLA knew this. Since the fiasco, the Indian leadership, at the highest level of authority, is lying. Bipin came under pressure and sent unarmed soldiers on a dangerous mission to oblige his political master while hoping to still maintain zero escalation. India blamed the clashes on “an attempt by the Chinese side to unilaterally change the status quo”, while China said that Indian soldiers crossed the border.

This episode of unarmed yet deadly combat triggered an interesting debate in Indian military circles as to: Why did the contingent go “Unarmed” to the Chinese side to force them to vacate the area? As per Military drill, the personnel should have carried personal arms. In all probability, the political leadership had made it clear to the Indian Army that it did not want an escalation. Apparently, because India was not prepared for the consequence of the first bullet being fired — even accidentally.

Azaan Javaid, in his June 20 piece for The Print, titled: “Ladakh, scenic Himalayan desert at the centre of most fierce India-China conflict in 53 yrs”, reported that: “When the United Nations Security Council held a discussion on Kashmir on 16 August last year…Security officials began to discuss how the diplomatic tussle would translate or manifest on the ground. The speculations ended with death of 20 Indian soldiers, including a Colonel”. Modi may be sailing smooth for now, but history won’t be kind to him.

Indian observers went overboard to draw comparisons with the 2017 standoff between India and China in Doklam and with the Pakistan-India standoff in Kargil in 1998; both approaches were as erratic as comparing apples with oranges.

War Outcomes

 It’s fatal for a state to declare someone else as a country’s primary military threat, while actually preparing for war against some other country. If ever there is a confrontation with the one ostensibly declared as the primary threat, then the state with the false declaration will have no option but to capitulate.

India is no match to China, and this status is likely to further accentuate in short to medium timeframe. According to Manosh Joshi, “Betting on a quick return to status quo ante would be hazardous security”.64

India’s  expansionist policies in the region are becoming a threat  to its neighbours. Currently, India is in a standoff with three of its neighbours — Pakistan, China and Nepal65. All three disputes are borne out of India’s hubris.66.

India has learnt its latest lesson the hard way: “China is here and the US is there — far away”.

China, being more powerful, controls the dynamics of crisis termination, while India has no choice but to keep ceding space.

Likely the end-state of this crisis will be: There would be no worthwhile war. The territory taken by China will stay with China, and the 1993 LAC alongside all agreements signed in 1996, 2005, 2012, and 2013 would not be worth the paper each is written on.

And the voluntary vacating of Siachen by Indian occupation forces will only be a matter of time. The longer the crisis prolongs, the more precarious will India’s position be in the Siachen.

Credible analysts have been consistently conveying to the US to not bet on India in its anti-China drive. India is not a stallion, it is an ailing mule. India had disappointed President Donald Trump twice during  his presidency67. Let’s hope the US leadership draws its policy level conclusions correctly and does not keep pumping strategic advantages into India at the cost of India’s smaller neighbours.

Yet, signing of BECA indicates that the US has decided and may be, though ironically, India has reinforced its thinking of not going beyond grabbing strategic advantages which the US may offer, to fight another war with Pakistan. Both India and the US would continue to happily live with their divergent perceptions and wish lists.

Pakistan needs to go beyond protest and formally approach the US for a guaranteeing frame work to ensure that BECA and its associated agreements do not become India’s weapons against Pakistan.

China strongly thinks  that  India has  violated the  “Wuhan Spirit” — cooperation — by participating in a number of US led anti-China ventures like: subscription to the Indo-Pacific concept; pushing ahead with the quadrilateral dialogue and now a Quad Plus anti-China alliance; signing a deal with Australia to get access to each other’s military bases to pave the way for more military exchanges and exercises in  the Indo-Pacific; signing of “The Logistics Exchange Memorandum  of  Agreement (LEMOA)” with the US; criticizing China for being the deliberate originator and spreader of Covid-19; encouraging relocation of American and European led Multinational industrial units from China to India, etc.

Signing of BECA on October 27, 202068 will further enable the US to share advanced satellite and topographical data for long-range navigation and missile-targeting; it follows India’s signing of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in 2002, the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016 and the Communications, Compatibility and Security Arrangement (COMCASA) in 201869.

Ironically, during the recent China-India crisis, President Donald Trump, offered only mediation. This, he did twice – on May 27, 2020, and on September 5, 2020 – and all the while when India looked for more help, Trump offered mediation the third time70.

Furthermore, on September 30, 2020, while US President Trump and Biden debated in the run-up to November 2020 polls, Trump placed India with its nemesis Russia and China. Along with Russia and China, Trump also accused India of hiding the actual figures of the number   of deaths in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, India eventually succumbed to becoming the US frontline ally against China by hurriedly signing BECA71.

China is said to have occupied 38,000 square km72 of Indian land in Ladakh, as acknowledged by India’s defence minister Rajnath Singh in parliament on September 17, 202073, and has also started reiterating its longstanding claims over Arunachal Pradesh – which according to China is its South Tibet – as well as over Himachal Pradesh.

The US has always wanted India to counter China, but India considered Pakistan as its primary foe. This stance had been a source of disappointment for the US. By signing BECA, India finally become a customer to the US weapon industry74.

COVID-19 has added another dimension to the global body politic. All countries are left to fend for themselves; none has spare quality time to observe in detail what is happening, especially in distant parts of the world. Everyone is trying to avoid any additional crises, what to talk of fighting someone else’s war. India missed a face-saving exit opportunity from its Ladakh standoff with China — President Trump could have done it for India. However, out of arrogance, Modi chose to reject Trump’s mediation offer. Moreover, Trump got consumed in America’s domestic racial quagmire, with only one thing on his mind – the 2020 elections. Even containing China became a distant second on his agenda.

China and Pakistan bashing has never solved any of India’s problems, nor is it likely to mitigate India’s difficulties in the future. Elections are contested in India by creating an anti-China and anti-Pakistan frenzy75. Both mainstream parties suffer from this malice; it’s only a difference in shade. This has raised the Indian public’s expectation about their governments’ ability to deliver severe blows to China and/or Pakistan. Likewise, in the US there is a bipartisan mistrust towards China.

The Indian media, consumed by a nationalistic frenzy, went into overdrive to further raise public expectations that the Indian military could quickly drive the Chinese out of the recently “occupied territories.” While in reality the Indian military did not have the wherewithal to prove equal to the Indian political leadership’s tall talk. The negative fallout of this strategic folly has been that India is now stuck with a two nuclear fronts’ nightmare. This is of India’s own making.

The Ladakh debacle has cost India enormously and it seems that this pattern will continue indefinitely. Having lost its credibility as a regional power, even small neighbours like Bhutan and Nepal are now standing up to India. The US and its allies are now aware of India’s limitation in their anti-China calculus. India is also no longer involved in any of the Chabahar port related projects. While making an effort to encircle Pakistan, India now stands caged by China. Events triggered by India’s Doklam folly have landed it into an ever mushrooming catastrophe.

Indeed, it’s a sorry and embarrassing moment for India. But there are no signs of self-reflection. The far-right government in India thinks that it can get over this situation through sheer denial. This is not likely to happen.

Of late, India’s former foreign secretary Nirupama Rao has been sharply critical of the Indian government’s overall communication on the India-China situation. Rao said that India has ended up with “a compounding of confusion.” During an interview with Karan Thapar, Rao talked about the impact of the India-China tussle on India’s image in the South Asian neighbourhood. Calling it “a very dark hour”, she said the outcome was “a great blow to our prestige in the neighbourhood”. She distressingly added: “I grieve for India”. Rao said India needs to rethink its neighbourhood policy which, at the moment, she said was  in “shambles”. She said “we need to be more generous, more giving”. Rao put a lot of stress on the need to improve relations with Pakistan. She said there was a need “to reopen the channels for communications”. She added that they needed to “dissect what went wrong in our Pakistan policy”. Rao said that government communication must be “more precise and less ambiguous”. She added, “every word is weighed carefully”. As she put it, it’s “masticated, there is no doubt about what is being said, there is no ambiguity”. Rao, said the PMO must clarify what it means by the phrase “across the LAC (Line of Actual Control)”. Rao criticised calls to boycott Chinese goods as well as the public breaking and throwing of Chinese television sets.

India’s Home Minister’s empty rhetoric to reclaim parts of Chinese territory, meant for home consumption, led to pre-emptive action by China. By “inventing” a rhetorical position around the issue of Aksai Chin, a territory India may never have intended to take back by force from China, New Delhi aggravated the existing Chinese sensitivities about it. India ignited the matter by annexing its already occupied portion of Kashmir on August 05 and bifurcating it into two union territories.

The clouding of reality by India led to wrong choices with serious geopolitical and military implications, starting with the narrowing down of India’s options.

However, two issues came up in the way of the outright acceptance of the victory perception. First, the fact that the Chinese had invaded, and India was unable to roll back the Chinese intrusions. Second, Chinese refusal for an early dis-engagement of opposing forces standing eyeball to eyeball.

At least domestically, India seems to have won the perception war against China. But what the prime minister cannot explain is that if indeed no Indian territory has been lost, then what have the talks with China at various levels for the restoration of the status quo been all about? And, if indeed no territory was lost, then why had India broadened the ambit of the conflict from the Ladakh theatre to economics?

Also, regional and global perceptions of the end state of the conflict are at great variance from India’s domestic perception. South Asian, Central Asian and East Asian countries are now clear that India is no match for China. It was the US aircraft carrier that did a show of force, patrolling in the conflict zone whereas the much-touted Indian Navy – projected as the provider of security net in the Indian Ocean – did not reach the contested waters. In fact, the IN aircraft carrier was not yet adequately equipped with its air component as its MIG-29 K aircrafts are still being manufactured in Russian factories.

Narratives

 According to Pravin Sawheny, “the Ladakh crisis has two narratives— Indian and Chinese”. Modi’s version emanated out of his two victory speeches in which he “unmistakeably said that the battle  of Galwan has been won”. With the exception of the Congress and the Communists, other political parties appear least bothered about the imbroglio. “The majority in the media is happy parroting the official line”. “Retired military officers, with few  exceptions,  are cheering the government from the side-lines. Those contesting the official line are being labelled “anti-national”. Modi knows that another border skirmish will not be weapons free since the government of  India has changed the rules of engagement. Even “if one shot is fired, an escalation is assured”, which will be controlled by the PLA, being militarily stronger. “Eventually it could lead to war, bringing India face to face with reality”.

Modi misled his political colleagues during an online all parties’ conference on June 19. He denied Chinese incursion into Indian territory. If India maintains that the 1993 Line of Actual Control (LAC) is the de- facto border between China and India, at least in the Ladakh area, then the Chinese are deep inside Indian territory. Though from a Chinese perspective they are still well inside the Chinese Claim Line (CCL). India abdicated its claim with regard to the LAC without fighting.

India’s Leadership Crisis

 Indian PM, Narendra Modi, was seen running from pillar to post to salvage his political career. He may soon be sent packing by Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) — the real political power broker ostensibly branded as Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Unprecedented humiliation has befallen on India in the wake of its military’s inadequacies in Ladakh; betraying its earlier projections to the World alongside its half-baked assertions in the neighbourhood regarding its self-styled elevation as global power. Quite the opposite was apparent as India ran around in its attempt to acquire war materiel to face the Chinese military.

For the domestic tier, it would sooner than later come forth that Nehru was Nehru, and Modi is Modi. Notwithstanding, at a personal level, much like Nehru, Modi will also not be able to survive the psychological impact of humiliation that struck India under his watch. To offset this effect, Modi could plan a limited war with one of India’s smaller neighbours.

Some serving and retired senior Indian diplomats are suggesting the strengthening of partnerships with the Quadrilateral nations (US, Japan and Australia), alongside France, South Korea and Taiwan. However, recent events have shown that India is not up to the task of countering China and these alliances and countries may no longer be as keen to cosy up with India, especially in an anti-China role.

 In India, these are rough times for sane voices. India’s jingoistic media strategy is in disarray, it continues to make rash and irresponsible calls for teaching China a lesson. Their government is striving to construct a fake narrative through anchors on retainer-ship and doesn’t want anyone to challenge it. Those attempting to put up a factual position are being coerced. Satirically, Indian media is being nicknamed as “Indian Modia”.

Since Modi’s arrival to the PM House, every crisis has two sides: perception — India wins; reality — the other side wins. In reality, the myth of India’s military muscle has been shattered between Balakot and Ladakh.

An India politician and columnist, Sudheendra Kulkarni, who helped former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee write his speeches has recently commented that “After thousands of lives lost with Pakistan, soldiers and civilian together, in so many years we couldn’t take an inch from them, how do you see India taking Aksai Chin Back [from China]?” India’s Balakot misadventure supports this argument.

On June 19, while addressing an all-party meeting, India’s Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, had said: “Neither is anyone inside our territory nor are any of our posts captured”. Amongst the Indian people, this deception has been taken as Modi’s unconditional surrender to China.

In his reaction to Indian humiliation in Ladakh, former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said, “PM must be mindful of implications of words”. He added that China was brazenly and illegally seeking     to claim parts of Indian territory such as the Galwan Valley and the Pangong Tso Lake. “We cannot and will not be cowed down by threats and intimidation nor permit a compromise with our territorial integrity. Disinformation is no substitute for diplomacy or decisive leadership”. “At this moment, we stand at historic cross-roads. Our government’s decisions and actions will have serious bearings on how the future generations perceive us”, Manmohan added.

 War against China was not an options for Nehru either, in 1962. According to Shekhar Gupta “Nehru took a decision (“I have told my army to throw out the Chinese”) that might have looked brave, but was divorced from reality. History has judged him harshly. Not as a brave, tough leader who took on a stronger adversary, as, politically and physically, he never recovered from that decision.

In 1962, China was not a nuclear power, and linear battle was called war. Today, the PLA can activate land, space, cyber, air, missiles, Electro Magnetic Spectrum even in a limited war. The politics and strategies – philosophical and ideological thought which Modi and his ideological and political parents, RSS and BJP, have constructed – are founded on not being like Nehru. In 2020 Modi has had many advantages. The opposition is weak, parliament is no threat and the Indian armed forces are in an enormously better state than 1962; though no match to the PLA’s post modernisation status.

He [Modi], however, shares one weakness with Nehru: “A larger than life public image, and a thin skin. That is what Xi has seen as an exposed flank”. From Chumar to Doklam to Pulwama, the Chinese have noticed how vital a factor appearance is for Modi in his domestic politics. There is a compulsion to look strong, decisive and a risk-taker who starts something and then concludes it in a way that he can claim victory. There is no easy option to achieve that against China — not even against Pakistan.

Disengagement Strategy Brings Perpetuity to the Conflict

On 10 September, the Indian foreign minister, S. Jaishankar, met with China’s State Councillor and foreign minister, Wang Yi, on the side-lines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow76. China and India declared in a joint statement on September 11, 2020 that “they had agreed to de-escalate renewed tensions on their contested Himalayan border and taken steps to restore “peace and tranquillity” following a high-level diplomatic meeting in Moscow77.

The two sides reached a five-point consensus regarding the current situation after a full, in-depth discussion78: First, they needed to follow guidelines given by the two leaders in June 2017— the informal Wuhan Summit, after the Doklam crisis. And that differences should not become disputes; Second, the current situation is in no one’s interest, hence they needed to disengage; third, all protocols and agreements needed to be followed to ensure that there is no escalation; Fourth, two special representatives should continue to discuss border areas’ settlement, implying that the term LAC has ceased to exist alongside all agreements about LAC management; Fifth, there is a need for new Confidence Building Measures, implying that the existing ones are not effective and thus null and void.

There are three take away points from this meeting: there will be no war; Indian demand of restoration of the April 2020 status quo ante has not been agreed, thus India ceded territory occupied by China since April 2020, India will vacate the areas that it transgressed during August 28-30; and according to the Status quo ante agreed on Chinese terms, LAC, alongside all agreement referring to LAC, stand replaced by the grossly vague term “Border Areas”79.

India’s statement80

  1. The two Ministers agreed that both sides should take guidance from the series of consensus of the leaders on developing India-China relations, including not allowing differences to become
  1. The two Foreign Ministers agreed that the current situation in the border areas is not in the interest of either They agreed therefore that the border troops of both sides should continue their dialogue, quickly disengage, maintain proper distance and ease tensions.
  1. The two Ministers agreed that both sides shall abide by all the existing agreements and protocol on China-India boundary affairs, maintain peace and tranquillity in the border areas and avoid any action that could escalate matters. 
  1. The two sides also agreed to continue to have dialogue and communication through the Special Representative mechanism on the India-China boundary They also agreed in this context that the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China border affairs (WMCC), should also continue its meetings.
  1. The Ministers agreed that as the situation eases, the two sides should expedite work to conclude new Confidence Building Measures to maintain and enhance peace and tranquillity in the border areas.

China’s statement81

  1. Wang noted that it is normal for China and India to have differences as two neighbouring major countries. What is important is to put these differences in a proper context vis-a-vis bilateral relations. The key to that is to take guidance from the strategic consensus between the Chinese and Indian leaders that China and India are not competitive rivals or each other’s threats, but cooperation partners and each other’s developmental opportunities.
  1. Wang stressed that as two large developing countries emerging rapidly, what China and India need right  now  is  cooperation,  not confrontation; and mutual trust, not suspicion, Whenever the situation gets difficult, it is all the more important to ensure the stability of the overall relationship and preserve mutual trust.
  1. Wang said that China-India relations have once again come to a crossroads. But as long as the two sides keep moving the relationship in the right direction, there will be no difficulty or challenge that can’t be overcome.
  1. Wang outlined China’s stern position on the situation in the border areas, emphasizing that the imperative is to immediately stop provocations such as firing and other dangerous actions that violate the commitments made by the two sides. It is also important to move back all personnel and equipment that have The frontier troops must quickly disengage so that the situation may de-escalate.
  1. The Chinese side is willing to support enhanced dialogue between the frontier troops on both sides to resolve specific issues. The Chinese side will stay in touch with the Indian side through diplomatic and military channels and be committed to restoring peace and tranquillity in the border areas.
  1. Jaishankar noted that the Indian side does not want tensions to escalate in the border areas. India’s policy towards China has not changed. The Indian side believes that China’s policy towards India has not changed either.
  1. The Indian side does not consider the development of India-China relations to be dependent on the settlement of the boundary question and India does not want to go backwards. The truth is, India-China relations have made steady progress over the years. The Chinese and Indian leaders have met several times and reached a series of important consensus on the development of bilateral relations.
  1. The Indian side is prepared to work with China to ease tensions on the border through dialogue and negotiation and to restore and maintain peace and tranquillity in the border areas.
  1. The two sides reached a five-point consensus regarding the current situation after a full, in-depth discussion.

Conclusions

Strategists, the world over, waited with abated breath as Sino-India tensions began to evolve into a conflict in April 2020. The two most populous countries were face to face. Of the two, one was an almost accomplished superpower in its own right while the other was a middle order power eager to be acknowledged as major power, at least. The Indian leadership was put to the test. The September 11th statements by the two sides do not offer a logical ending of the crisis. The Hard line far right government of India will not be able to digest this outright humiliation; some offset (mis)adventure is certain, not necessarily against China, but more likely against one of India’s smaller neighbours.

India has signed BECA. India’s  painful journey of replacing its  67 percent Russian inventory of military equipment with US-NATO compatible systems has already begun. This would constraint India’s economic growth.

Chinese and Indian statements, of September 11, could have multiple interpretations, which are more likely to perpetuate the tensions rather than bringing them to a close. At an opportune time, India will be asked by its allies to step up and play its role in countering China which may even involve a “quick short war”. At least till that time, Pakistan has to stay vigilant regarding India’s Pakistan specific machinations.

Finally, the conflict is not over, it has become larger in perspective and only its timeline has been altered.

Reference

  1. Devirupa Mitra, “New Defence Agreement Done, Trump Administration Sees in India an Ally on China”, The Wire, October 28, 2020. https://thewire.in/ diplomacy/india-us-ally-trump-china
  2. Ibid.
  3. Pravin Sawhney, “Why India’s Latest Defence Agreement with the United States May Prove a Costly Bargain”. The Wire, October 27, 2020. https://thewire.in/ security-security/beca-india-usa-comcasa-defence-data-sharing
  4. Kamran Yousaf, “US-India military pact threatens regional peace, warns Pakistan”, Express Tribune, October 28, 2020. https://tribune.com.pk/story/2270117/us-india-military-pact-threatens-regional-peace-warns-pakistan
  5. Ibid.
  6. Joe Wallen, Sophia Yan Beijing and Ben Farmer, “China annexes 60 square km of India in Ladakh as simmering tensions erupt between two superpowers”, Telegraph, 12 June 12, 2020. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/06/12/china-annexes-60-square-km-india-ladakh-simmering-tensions-erupt/
  7. Vijaita Singh, “China controls 1,000 sq. km of area in Ladakh”, The Hindu, August 30, 2020. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/china-controls- 1000-sq-km-of-area-in-ladakh-say-intelligence-inputs/article32490453.ece
  8. Haider Abbas, “Why US-India ‘BECA’ Pact Can Douse Border Fire With China But Engulf Pakistan In Flames?”, Eurasia Times, October 15, 2020, https://eurasiantimes.com/why-pakistan-must-prepare-for-a-war-with-india-after-delhi-signs-beca-pact-with-the-us/
  9. BBC News, June 16, ” India-China clash: 20 Indian troops killed in Ladakh fighting”, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53061476
  10. William MottIV, Jae Chang Kim, “The Philosophy of Chinese Military Culture Shih vs. Li”, (2006: Springer Nature Switzerland AG ISBN : 978-1-349-53326- 8,). 215-234. https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057%2F9781403983138. [“Two main themes dominated ancient Chinese military strategic thought. One was the idea that power dwelt among the people—Shih. The other was the strategic principle that the essence of military art lay in deceiving the enemy— intent-based operations. Beyond military strategy, they have influenced China’s political decisions to use force and Chinese strategic decisions not to use force.1 Although the strategic context has changed, China’s strategic culture has preserved these two themes at its heart and soul for nearly three millennia”.]
  11. Farman Kakar, “Social media, a weapon or voice”, The News On Sunday, January 27, 2019. https://www.thenews.com.pk/tns/detail/567134-war-competing- narratives
  12. Maria Abi-Habib, “After India Loses Dogfight to Pakistan, Questions Arise About Its ‘Vintage’ Military”, New York Times, March 3, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/03/world/asia/india-military-united-states-china.html
  13. Pravin Sawhney, “BJP govs unique – don’t tel Army why it is being In Dec 2001 Op Parakram, Vajpayee did not tell army chief, Gen Padmanabhan that it was not for war, but coercion (which failed). Same with Modi gov in Ladakh – army occupied heights Aug 29/30 when June 19 had settled matter!”, https://twitter.com/PravinSawhney/status/1306179588284874752
  14. Christopher Clary, “Deterrence Stability and the Conventional Balance of Forces in South Asia”. Stimson, https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/Clary_-_Deterrence_and_Conventional_Balance_of_Forces_in_South_Asia_1.pdf . [A short summary of this research appeared in the spring 2012 edition of the MIT Center for International Studies newsletter Précis].
  15. Iqbal Khan, “Indian military caught with pants down”, Pakistan Observer, July 15, 2010 https://pakobserver.net/india-military-caught-with-pants-down/
  16. By Alastair Gale, “U.S. Sends Two Aircraft Carriers to South China Sea for Exercises as China Holds Drills Nearby”, The Wall Street Journal, July 3, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-sends-two-aircraft-carriers-to-south-china-sea-for-exercises-as-china-holds-drills-nearby-11593816043
  17. Liu Xuanzun, “Rare gathering of US aircraft carriers ‘to be met with Chinese countermeasures”,’ Global Times, June 14, 2020. https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1191544.shtml
  18. Ashok Swain, “Narendra Modi is clueless about facing China”, Gulf News, October 19, 2020. https://gulfnews.com/opinion/op-eds/narendra-modi-is- clueless-about-facing-china-1.74656497
  19. Ibid.
  20. Wenwen Shen, “China and its Neighbours: troubled relations”, EU-ASIA CENTRE 1 March 2012. http://www.eu-asiacentre.eu/pub_details.php?pub_ id=46. [“As the most populous country in the world and third largest in area, China also has the largest number of neighbours (14) sharing its 22,000km land borders namely: North Korea, Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam. China has had, or still has, border issues with some of its neighbours. The biggest outstanding border issue is with This paper reviews the origins of China’s border disputes with its neighbours, the current state of development, and discusses what can be done to overcome the challenges China is facing in the region”.]
  21. “Modi’s expansionist mind set remarks riles Chinese media”, Times of India, September 02, 2014. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Modis- expansionist-mindset-remark-riles-Chinese-media/articleshow/41537182.cms
  22. Hussain, Syed Rifaat. “Resolving the Kashmir Dispute: Blending Realism  with Justice.” The Pakistan Development Review 48, no. 4 (2009): 1007-035. Accessed October 28, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41261362
  23. “Morphed Image Used To Claim IAF Mocked Pak Over Balakot Deaths” Quint, October 26,2020. https://www.thequint.com/news/webqoof/morphed-image-used-to-claim-iaf-mocking-pakistanis-on-balakot-deaths#bypass-sw
  24. Ibid.
  25. “US debunks Indian claims of shooting down PAF F-16”, Express Tribune, April 05, 2019. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1943995/1-us-fleet-count-debunks- indian-claims-shooting-paf-f-16
  26. Lt Gen H S Panag (retd), “India’s Fingers have come under Chinese boots. Denial won’t help us” The Print, June 04, 2020. https://theprint.in/opinion/ indias-fingers-have-come-under-chinese-boots-denial-wont-help-us/435145/
  27. Meraj Hasan, “Why is the world embracing right wing politics?, Express Tribune, January 21, 2020. https://tribune.com.pk/article/93205/why-is-the- world-embracing-right-wing-politics
  28. Lt Gen H S Panag (retd), “Amit Shah’s political aim to recover PoK is not backed by India’s military capacity”, The Print, September 19, 2019. https://theprint.in/opinion/modi-govt-claiming-pok-is-great-for-diplomacy-but-wont-mean-much- militarily/293751/
  29. Ananth Krishnan, “Beijing think-tank links scrapping of Article 370 to LAC tensions”, The Hindu, June 12, 2020. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/beijing-think-tank-links-scrapping-of-article-370-to-lac-tensions/article31815266.ece
  30. Jyoti Malhotra, “How India lined up US, Russia on its side of LAC and China was forced to return friendless”, The Print, July 07, 2020. https://theprint.in/opinion/global-print/india-lined-up-us-russia-on-lac-and-china-forced-to-return- friendless/455919/
  31. “Chinese Reply to Doklam”, Pakistan Focus, June 04, 2020, https://pakistanfocus.org/chinese-reply-to-doklam%EF%BB%BF/admin/2020/06/04/2445/
  32. Ibid.
  33. Ibid.
  34. Iqbal Khan, Fallacy of Indian Muscle: The Reality is in Ladakh, Balochistan Express, June 12, 2020. https://bexpress.com.pk/2020/06/fallacy-of-indias-muscle-the-reality-is-in-ladakh/
  35. “India-Nepal-China explosive triangle: a loss of face for India”, Daily Times, May 27, 2020. https://dailytimes.com.pk/617574/india-nepal-china-explosive- triangle-a-loss-of-face-for-india/
  36. Ankit Panda, “China and India Top Asian Military Spending, Figure in World Top 3 With US”, The Diplomat, April 28, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/ china-and-india-top-asian-military-spending-figure-in-world-top-3-with-us/
  37. Ibid.
  38. Fareed Zakria, “China has been bungling its post-coronavirus foreign policy”, Washington Post, June 26, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/china-has-been-bungling-its-post-coronavirus-foreign-policy/2020/06/25/5beac38c-b71b-11ea-a8da-693df3d7674a_story.html
  39. “India-China border tensions Live: World wants to know who India’s braves are, says PM Modi”, Deccan Herald, July 03, 2020. https://www.deccanherald.com/national/india-china-galwan-valley-live-updates-army-pm-narendra-modi-chinese-army-ladakh-border-tensions-850184.html
  40. Harsh V. Pant, Pushan Das, “China’s military rise and the Indian challenge”, ORF Online, April 19, 2018. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/china-military-rise-indian-challenge/
  41. Doina Chiacu, Sanjeev Miglani, “Trump offers to mediate ‘raging’ India-China border dispute”, Reuters, May 27, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-china-usa-idUSKBN2331N0
  42. Ibid.
  43. “Donald Trump says PM Modi not in good mood over big border conflict with China, reiterates offer to mediate”, India Today, May 29, 2020. Donald Trump says PM Modi not in good mood over big border conflict with China, reiterates offer to mediate
  44. Ravi Agrawal, “Why India and China Are Sparring”, Foreign Policy, May 28, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/28/why-india-china-sparring-border-clashes-conflict/ .
  45. Iqbal Khan, “Indian Hubris invites Chinese Fury”, The Frontier Post, June 2, 2020. https://thefrontierpost.com/indian-hubris-invites-chinese-fury/
  46. Pravin Sawhney, “India has lost 1000sq KM”, Defence, September 11, 2020. https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/india-has-lost-1000sq-km.684317/
  47. Akshay Narang, “ France, Russia, Israel and US – All move forward to help India in its war against China”, TFIPOST, June 29,2020. https://tfipost.com/2020/06/france-russia-israel-and-us-all-move-forward-to-help-india-in-its-war-against-china/
  48. Minnie Chan, “After deadly border clash with China, India wants Russia to hurry up and deliver its S-400 air-defense system”, South China Morning Post, June 26, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/after-border-clash-with-china-india-urges-delivery-russian-s400-2020-6
  49. Ibid.
  50. Pravin Sawhney Twittered, https://twitter.com/pravinsawhney/status/1271630037108719617
  51. “Mike Pompeo says US shifting military to face Chinese threat to India, Southeast Asian nations”, Financial Express, PTI Jun 26, 2020. https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/us-to-deploy-troops-to-india-southeast-asia-to-counter-growing-threat-from-china-mike-pompeo/2004477/
  52. “Is America Jumping into China-India Fray? : No Way!”, Pakistan Focus, July 01,2020 https://pakistanfocus.org/china-india-stand-off-is-america-embracing-or-abandoning-india/admin/2020/07/01/2463/
  53. “Mike Pompeo says US shifting military to face Chinese threat to India, Southeast Asian nations”, Financial Express, PTI Jun 26, 2020. https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/us-to-deploy-troops-to-india-southeast-asia-to-counter-growing-threat-from-china-mike-pompeo/2004477/
  54. Kamran Yousaf, “US-India military pact threatens regional peace, warns Pakistan”, Express Tribune, October 28, 2020. https://tribune.com.pk/story/2270117/us-india-military-pact-threatens-regional-peace-warns-pakistan
  55. Ibid.
  56. Pravin Sawhney, “With India’s Options in Ladakh Crisis Narrowing, the Way Forward is High-Level Dialogue”, The Wire, July 06, 2020. https://thewire.in/security/with-indias-options-in-the-ladakh-crisis-narrowing-high-level-talks-are-the-way-forward
  57. Iqbal Khan, “Is America jumping into China-India fray?: No way!”, The Frontier Post./ June 30, 2020. https://thefrontierpost.com/is-america-jumping-into-china-india-fray-no-way/
  58. Pravin Sawhney, “With India’s Options in Ladakh Crisis Narrowing, the Way Forward is High-Level Dialogue”, The Wire, July 06, 2020. https://thewire.in/security/with-indias-options-in-the-ladakh-crisis-narrowing-high-level-talks-are-the-way-forward
  59. Ravi Agrawal, “Why India and China Are Sparring”, Foreign Policy, May 28, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/28/why-india-china-sparring-border-clashes-conflict/
  60. Iqbal Khan, “Indian hubris invites Chinese fury”, Pakistan Observer, June 06, 2020. https://pakobserver.net/indian-hubris-invites-chinese-fury/
  61. Ravi Agrawal, “Why India and China Are Sparring”, Foreign Policy, May 28, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/28/why-india-china-sparring-border-clashes-conflict/
  62. Ibid.
  63. Lt Gen H S Panag (retd), “China has taken LAC clock back to India not in a position to take back Aksai Chin”, The Print, October 08, 2020. https://theprint.in/opinion/china-has-taken-lac-clock-back-to-1959-india-not-in-a-position-to- take-back-aksai-chin/519101/
  64. Ibid.
  65. Ibid.
  66. Iqbal Khan, “Fallacy of Indian Muscle: The Reality is in Ladakh, Balochistan Express”, June 12, 2020. https://bexpress.com.pk/2020/06/fallacy-of-indias-muscle-the-reality-is-in-ladakh/
  67. Iqbal Khan, “China Calls India’s Bluff: America’s Final Disappointment?”, The Frontier Post, June 16, 2020. https://thefrontierpost.com/china-calls-indias-bluff-americas-final-disappointment/
  68. Haider Abbas, “Why US-India ‘BECA’ Pact Can Douse Border Fire With China But Engulf Pakistan In Flames?”, Eurasia Times, October 15, 2020, https://eurasiantimes.com/why-pakistan-must-prepare-for-a-war-with-india-after-delhi-signs-beca-pact-with-the-us/
  69. Ibid.
  70. Ibid.
  71. Ibid.
  72. Figures vary from source to source, from as little as 64-68 Sq Km to 1000 sq Km.
  73. Ibid.
  74. Haider Abbas, “Why US-India ‘BECA’ Pact Can Douse Border Fire With China But Engulf Pakistan In Flames?”, Eurasia Times, October 15, 2020, https://eurasiantimes.com/why-pakistan-must-prepare-for-a-war-with-india-after-delhi-signs-beca-pact-with-the-us/
  75. “ India’s Oft Forgotten Lesson” Chair’s Blog, Pakistan Focus, June 17, 2010, https://pakistanfocus.org/indias-oft-forgotten-lesson-china-is-here-america-is-there-far-away/admin/2020/06/17/2454/
  76. Aadesh Gindodiya,” India, China joint statement after SCO meeting in Moscow”, Asia News, September 11, 2020, https://asianews.press/2020/09/11/india-china-releases-joint-statement-after-sco-meeting-in-moscow/
  77. “After Moscow meeting, China and India agree to disengage troops on contested border” Reuters/Dawn, September 11. 2020. https://www.dawn.com/news/1579091/after-moscow-meeting-china-and-india-agree-to-disengage-troops-on-contested-border
  78. Pravin Sawhney, Look, the LAC has disappeared, YouTube, September 11, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n7s-llqrkYk&feature=emb_logo
  79. Ibid.
  80. Aadesh Gindodiya,” India, China joint statement after SCO meeting in Moscow”, Asia News, September 11, 2020, https://asianews.press/2020/09/11/india-china-releases-joint-statement-after-sco-meeting-in-moscow/
  81. Ibid.

Related Post

Dardistan – One of the Most Polyglot Regions in the World
Piero Sraffa’s Revolution in Economic Theory
India – Pakistan Relations
Middle Class Empowerment: Driving Pakistan’s Political and Social Landscape
Scroll to Top