The Afghanistan, Pakistan and USA Triumvirate

by Sahar Pirzada^*

It is akin to quicksand and all three seem to be struggling in it. The Afghans, the Americans and the Pakistanis. Thrown together, the triumvirate stumbles, gets sucked in and is unable to retract from this pool of angry sludge, violence, confused doctrines and antithetical state policies. The more vigorous the struggle the deeper one sinks. This causes a trapped body not unlike this triumvirate seeking peace and an end to extremist action to sink when it starts to move. It is uncompromising quicksand, this thing we commonly refer to as terrorism and extremist ideology.

But if quicksand becomes less viscous as you struggle, why is it so difficult to escape? The reason is that after its initial liquefaction, quicksand’s apparent viscosity (thickness or flow resistance) increases quite in the same way as extremist ideology to its nemesis – domestic and foreign governmental intervention aimed at containment.

Terrorism is a word that has worked its way into our consciousness and remains dominant as a filter through which we process the world around us, an in-expugnable part of our evolving argot, a subtext of every action we make. At any time, anything can happen anywhere at least in a country like Pakistan, and though everyone goes on with everyday life there is always a sense of vulnerability and a dull nagging fear of the worst eventuality; that of being an indiscriminate statistic in an act of terrorism.

Since it impacts our lives so significantly, it merits closer scrutiny.Surprisingly upon examining this phenomenon one discovers that it did not always carry this ubiquitous negative connotation, the deeply repugnant quality that it does today. Yet despite its various permutations it is a phenomenon that is used to harness political power and effect change through a violent medium. It is aimed at furthering a viewpoint through coercive intimidation.

Interestingly, During the French Revolution, where the word was first popularized, terrorism was perceived as a positive thing. During the “system or Regime du Terreur (1793-4) it was adopted as a means to establish order during the transient anarchical period of turmoil and upheaval that followed the uprisings of 1789” and taken as “an instrument of government wielded by the recently established revolutionary state” with an aim to intimidate subversives and consolidate the new government’s power.¹ According to the same author, in its original context it was associated with the “ideals of virtue and democracy.” It was the belief of revolutionary leader Maximillian Robespierre that “virtue was the mainspring of a popular government at peace, but that during the time of revolution must be allied with terror in order for democracy to triumph.’ He was of the belief that “virtue without which terror is evil; terror without which virtue is helpless.” He claimed, “Terror is nothing but justice, prompt, severe and inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue.”²

Despite the diametrically opposed understanding of the word today, the bane of modern day politics, terrorism that appears to be random and indiscriminate is exactly the opposite, and just like that of Robespierres time, very organized and systematic. Contemporary terrorism also claims to be aimed at creating a better society, albeit an Islamic society, a Caliphate. However, according to a 2005 Issue Paper, Centre for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College, the terrorism franchise of organizations like Al-Qaeda is a war of ideas between “Western democracy versus Salafi Islam.”³ But it is not only that, and jihadists have in the past also used Salafi Islam as a frame for modern political concerns, for example one of Bin Laden’s documents cites the United State’s failure to ratify the Koyoto Agreement on climate change and Aymen al Zwahiri lamented skewed economic systems such as in Egypt where farmers grew cash crops like strawberries for the West while people there couldn’t afford bread. The ISIS which has overtaken the terror landscape however, is more inwardly focused on creating a Caliphate. Whether that is a religious aspiration or a route to uncontested power is a matter of debate. The result is terror and it perpetuates itself through the brand names of ISIS, Taliban, al-Qaeda, etc. Analysts believe that though the terror setups do want to restore orthodox, conservative Islam and Sharia law, their “grievances are not about religion, they are about power and opportunity.”⁴

In any event, can terrorism ever be justified? The reflexive response to this question is an obvious no for it is violence without humanitarian restraint. However, if one looks at David Milliband’s defence of the ANC and the anti-apartheid activist Joe Slovo where he says that the state has a monopoly on violence which legitimates the use of it and that any other group using violence is illegitimate. Which would then make Nelson Mandella a terrorist. ⁵ The terrorists we see as killing nihilistically because they do it for a cause we do not believe in, and the former, however, uses it for a cause we believe in so it transforms their act into a just and achievable political project.⁶ Would the ANCs efforts have worked if it had been without an armed struggle?

Well, that is just apples and oranges. It would be naïve to use this argument for the Taliban, ISIS and other radical organisations for their scope, intent, outreach, modus operandi and political agenda is very different. Aside from the fact that terrorism targets innocent lives in an indiscriminate manner, the finest argument against it is that it goes to serve the implementation of ideas that are so far by empirical evidence, regressive. Their hubris is that they are going backwards. They begin by repressing women, taking away their rights to education, employment etc. If Islamic ideology is their premise, this is the exact opposite of what Islam teaches so their justifications immediately wear thin. History has been witness to armed struggle for political change but the terrorism we witness today can never be justified. It is inhumane and more a struggle for power in its usual connotations than anything else.

The Taliban use terrorism in a struggle to regain their government which they lost after the US invasion, for the ISIS it is the formation of a Caliphate and the means employed to fund that organization are anything but Islamic. The organization allegedly runs more like a crime syndicate employing tactics like kidnapping, drug trade and smuggling to fund itself. It shows no respect for life and liberty as it stages theatric executions to intimidate & establish power. Other smaller groups establish themselves independently or as franchises of these larger groups.

The reason these take a significant space in this analysis is because they carve out the political landscape of Afghanistan and by association Pakistan. There is an inter-dependency of growth and political stability of the two and by further extension the activities played out here also involve and impact the United States because the mindsets produced here take kinetic realization through acts of terror in the US. Also the US policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan affects this cauldron of simmering sentiments. The three are stuck in this together in varying degrees but hinged together nevertheless.

But it is not as simple as that, state policies of both Pakistan and the US remain antithetical. They claim to take one stance then execute an action in direct contradiction to it. The Pakistan government bans terrorist organizations but does little or finds itself ill-equipped to follow through on their containment when they reemerge with changed names and at times continue to operate in plain sight.

The UN Security Council Resolution 1267 provides for banning militant leaders and militant organizations and leaders and carries within it two dimensions, that of maintaining a database of all those names and monitoring the implementation of the ban by a dedicated body of terrorism experts. Pakistan, which is legally obligated to follow the ban also maintains such records and inside the country the ATA or the Anti-Terrorism Act provides the legal framework to do the same. Under this Act the government under Section 11-B is empowered to proscribe any organization involved in terrorism and Section 11-EE, inserted in 2013, states that if a new outfit is formed by an office bearer of a previously banned organization, the government may on suspicion of their linkages and involvement in terrorist activities proscribe the new outfit as well. What is noteworthy here is that banning a reincarnated organization is easier and requires less proof than banning an outfit for the first time.

Once an outfit is banned its infrastructure is sealed and it is unable to operate in the way that it cannot open bank accounts, hold public meetings or publish material. Also once enlisted in the 4^th Schedule of the ATA an individual involved or associated with such an organization may be kept under observation and, amongst other things, be directed that he shall not visit or go within surroundings specified without the written permission of the officer in charge of the Police Station within whose jurisdiction such a place is situated, including schools, colleges and other institutions where persons under twenty-one years of age or women are given education or other training or are housed permanently or temporarily which is a huge step in containing a certain ideology.

Such persons cannot act or move around easily and are required to fill out police bonds for good behavior.⁷ However, the truth of the matter is that good intentions aside, often people on the list do not provide the required bond to the police and the police do nothing about it.

This perfidy, this gap in law and implementation may be a result of lack of resources and information, since policing is a provincial subject and detailed lists of who is to be monitored should be shared on a local level as well that is sometimes not updated. Resultantly, banned outfits do reincarnate themselves despite efforts. “The ban on propagation of the ideology of banned organizations is nominally effective, if at all. A spot check of their web presence revealed that at least 20 out of 60 banned outfits have a vibrant internet presence. These include Hizb e Tahrir, members of which disseminate their leaflets in the capital Islamabad, and Ahl e Sunnat Wal Jamaat a sectarian group. Moreover, several banned groups publish their newspapers and magazines on regular basis, including Al Qalam by Jaish e Muhammad and Khilafat e Rashida by ASWJ”⁸

In 2002 the Sipah e Shabah Pakistan was banned but reinvented itself as Millat e Islamia, and also Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat and often operates publicly. Jaisha e Muhammad is also known as Khudam e Islam. In addition there are other organizations that operate as they are not banned in Pakistan due to a lack of evidence incriminating them such as the charity organization Jamaat ud Dawa which is allegedly a front for Sipah e Sahaba.⁹

This antithetical policy versus implementation ambiguity rears its head with incidents such as the 2015 February gathering when the banned ASWJ held a public rally in Karachi and the police, instead of arresting them, held a handful of protesters from the civil society that protested to allowing the rally. Again on 15^th Feb ASWJ held a protest against the targeted killing of its leaders in front of the Supreme Court and no action was taken. Playing the devil’s advocate one can only assume that this was done in the greater interest of an open showdown potentially resulting in a severe and unrestrained backlash from direct engagement with them. The following month, after another protest by them and a march from the Lal Masjid up to the Parliament without much fear of retribution form the state, the protest was called off post negotiations.

The US too has a complex relationship with Pakistan in this regard and at times the actions taken by both do not follow a straight path. The US joined hands with Pakistan for logistical help in fighting the USSR in Afghanistan and funded the crèches of jihadists that were producing human capital to win the war against communism. After the creation of a mindset and an armed and trained force of fighters, Pakistan was given the task of bringing them to the table for talks. The Pak US relationship remains in flux because the actions taken by both counter themselves effectively producing a political and strategic stalemate. One can safely assume that these are international antithetical stratagem concerning the region. Where domestically Pakistan promises one course of action and tolerates another as regarding banned outfits and their reemergence, on an international level the same failures in continuity of policy-driven action is mirrored. What hits home are Friedrich Nietzsche’s words, “All things are subject to interpretation. Whichever interpretation prevails at a given time is a function of power, not truth.”

The US wants Pakistan to negotiate with the Taliban and bring them to the table for discussions. The Taliban, however, do not accept and find too liberal for their culture and customs the Afghan government of Ghani, which is supported by the US. Thereafter, global pressure is asserted on Pakistan to curb terrorism and to deter support to the Taliban, effectively straining the Pak-Taliban relationship. It could be a result of this strain that factions in Afghanistan then aid India in engaging in subversive activities through Afghanistan in Baluchistan. The Quadrilateral Coordination Group efforts are further affected when the likes of Mullah Mansour are targeted within Pakistan. Pursuing the Taliban within Pakistan obviously creates distrust between the two, resulting in a Catch 22 like situation.

Further contradictory action, whether unintentionally or by design, was taken last year when Mullah Umar’s death was made public, 10 days before the meeting in Murree in July, undermining the peace process. Such hindrances keep repeating themselves and in the sage observation of Albert Einstein, “it is insanity to keep doing the same thing over and over again and expect different results.” Whether one likes it or not peace in Afghanistan will remain elusive without the Taliban on board and they currently seem to be in a position to influence our responses.

The ineluctable truth is that Pakistan has been naïve in its belief that it can deliver the Taliban for talks when the fact of the matter is that the Taliban, after they were romanced through the Afghan jihad stopped listening to Pakistan once they came into power up until their government was toppled in 2001 and thereafter. It is for this reason that the Americans believe the old canard that Pakistan is playing a double game and sharing information conveyed about strikes and targets with the Taliban and is not a real ally. It cannot be ignored that peace and stability in Afghanistan is essential to stability in Pakistan on account of the proximity of the two countries and the porous nature of the border that divides them. With or without Pakistan’s consent the likes of the Quetta Shura exist in Pakistan. According to Lt. Gen. David Barno, former commander of American forces in Afghanistan “The Quetta Shura is extremely important, they are the intellectual and ideological underpinnings of the Taliban insurgency.”

Making the sludge murkier is the inherited history of the Pak Afghan border. The Afghans will never accept the Durand line. In fact after its creation Afghans refused to recognize Pakistan for a long time and still feel that territories occupied by the Pakhtun belong to Afghanistan in light of the Bannu Resolution passed by the Red Shirt Movement led by Bacha Khan.¹⁰ For all intents and purposes the border has never existed for the divided Pakhtun tribes and there has always been free movement across from both sides. Even politically this cross border movement has existed long before today. During Zulfiqar Bhuttos government, under Gen Zia, Baloch national leaders were provided asylum in Kabul and “religious dissidents of the Dawood National government were persuaded to cross over into Pakistan.”¹¹ These people later became the leaders of the Afghan mujahideen who subsequently became the rulers and Pakistan and US both helped bring these proxies into power. Pakistan was hoping to secure strategic depth in Afghanistan if India were ever to march into Pakistan and the US needed to drive out the Russians from Afghanistan. However, these Afghans nurtured by both turned their guns on Pakistan and have so far resulted in 70,000 martyrdoms of Pakistanis. They also turned on the United States and the resulting terrorist acts are no secret.

The Afghanistan landscape might be dominated by the Taliban but the ISIS has appeared on the scene also and recently the Khorasan Province of Islamic State has asserted its presence by claiming credit for the killing of Sher Wali Wardak, an Afghan Parliamentarian.

In addition to the warring factions, Afghanistan also has to combat the rivaling agendas of foreign powers like Pakistan and the US. The US is still struggling in its stabilization efforts even as it plans to leave and Pakistan allegedly supports the local proxies. In truth, however, foreign patrons have always been encouraged in this turbulent land. Afghans have encouraged their interference and syphoned off the benefits in this power play leaving the country vulnerable internally and externally, tearing from within and fraying at the edges.

Pakistan cannot remain indifferent to what goes on in Afghanistan, the two are too closely connected and the Taliban and other terrorist organizations that permeate Pakistan send their message across each time they are disgruntled, through acts of terror on Pakistani soil. Between 2002 and April 2010 there have been 8141 incidents of terrorism in Pakistan. Pakistan was thrown into the war on terror after 9/11 and not only the war, but the backlash has cost Pakistan dearly in monetary and non- fiscal terms. James Garfield, a former President of the United States, once said, “Battles are not the end of war; for the dead must be buried and the costs of conflict must be paid.”

So far in the over decade long war on terror Pakistan has lost 70,000 people and the material damages have been in the excess of $100 billion.¹² Official estimates claim that the Pakistan economy has been impacted to the extent of over $51.3 billion between 2001 – 2010.¹³ Pakistan has in response had to undertake military operations to snuff out terrorism which has displaced about 3 million people internally.

Aside from direct costs, terrorism results in driving away other opportunities from the country. In such an unstable and hostile environment the economy invariably suffers. Terrorism restricts trade and business opportunities and strains economic growth. It immediately reduces both foreign direct investment and internal investment and causes a decline in GDP. It leads to capital flight, including brain-drain, effecting the national exchequer and perhaps one of the worst long term effects is the redirection of funds away from development expenditure to security and defense. The Handbook on Statistics on Pakistan Economy 2010 reflects that before joining the war on terror in 2001 the growth in law & order expenses was 10.9% which increased to as high as 45.1% in 2005 – 2006.¹⁴ Galloping inflation and depreciation in price of the Pak rupee has also resulted due to a slowdown in economic activity directly impacting the standard of living of people and is one of the reasons for increasing poverty. The cost of the minimum food basket of basic items increased by 79% in the 4 years up to 2014. The price of wheat increased 67% during 2007 – 2011. ¹⁵ The environmental costs and costs of damaged infrastructure cannot be measured accurately but are considerable.

A study by Murdoch and Sandler(2004) suggests civil war can effect economic growth by 85%, amounting to 35% in the long run. This trend is not restricted to just the country itself but, through osmosis, finds its way into neighbouring countries as well. The study finds the short term economic reduction of neighbouring countries to be around 24% and 30% in the long run.¹⁶ So when Afghanistan goes to war, Pakistan combats its spillover terrorism and bleeds with it in every sense of the word, including economically.The war has not come cheap for the United States either. According to time magazine, a CRS report says the war in Afghanistan has cost them $685.6 billion.¹⁷ It has cost $33,000 per head divided equally among 30 million Afghan citizens. That is around $2300 per annum per person across 14 years of war. It would be pertinent to note that the annual per capita income of the Afghans in 2014 was a meagre $670.¹⁸ In addition, till October 2015, there have been 2,326 U.S. military deaths and 1,173 U.S. civilian contractor fatalities in Afghanistan.¹⁹ If the United States had envisioned victory after a swift blitzkrieg they have woken up to a very different and expensive reality.

Terrorism is the curse of contemporary life. However, the idee fixe that it can be wiped out single-handedly or though military action alone is a pedestrian view at a solution by all concerned. It should involve a more rounded social and ideological makeover, otherwise it will keep evolving into varied interpretations of the same form and keep wielding its destructive power. We have to stop treating terrorism like a one sided Mobius strip. Pakistan and Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States, The United States and Afghanistan: sometimes friends and often foes; sometimes saviours and often the exacerbating agents caught together; sometimes violently and sometimes as prey to euphemistic political doublespeak with promises made and promises broken. In this saga, in this quicksand of terrorism, the three nations are stuck apparently inextricably together, unable to escape one without the other, the movement of each effecting the position of the next. If they want to break free of its grip they must do it in unison. As intractable as it appears it is the only way out. It’s time to reframe and rethink, to clear the air of lies and doublespeak for quicksand can never be a friend to anyone and only knows how to take its victims down. It would help to keep in mind that we are all in it together. As for terrorism, in the words of Aristotle, “it is not enough to win the war but to organize the peace.”

References

1. CHAPTER ONE Inside Terrorism By BRUCE HOFFMAN – Columbia University Press https://www.nytimes.com/books/first/h/hoffman-terrorism. html
2.  Ibid.
3. Centre for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College- The Global War on Terror- Mistaking Ideology as the Centre of Gravity – By Lieutenant Col Cherlyl L Smart US Army- July 2005, Vol 08- 05
4. Ibid.
5. Yes, terrorism can be justified – Brian Brivati Wednesday 19 August 2009
6. ibid
7. Read 11-http://www.pljlawsite.com/html/TATA 11.htm
8. Stopping the banned groups 07 December 2015 Mehwish Rani http://pakpips.com/art php?art=174terrorism
9. ibid
10. The Quagmire of Mutual Treachery – Imtiaz Alam – The News 16^th June 2016
11. ibid
12. The Afghan Peace Process –By Ashraf Ali – The News 9^th June 2016
13. Embassy of Pakistan- Economic Division – Impact of Pakistan’s Campaign against Terrorism – 2011.
14. Impact Of Terrorism On Foreign Direct Investment And Key Indicators Of Development In Pakistan Muhammad Farooq and Zahoor Khan- City University Research Journal Volume 04 Number 01 January 2014 Article 04
15. ibid
16. Pakistan Business Review – Impact of Terrorism on Economic Development of Pakistan – Shabir Hyder, Naeem Akram & Ihtesham Padda – Jan 2015
17. The True Cost of the Afghanistan War May Surprise You by Mark Thompson – Jan. 1, 2015 http://time.com/3651697/afghanistan-war-cost/
18. Reuters blog- The great debate- By Peter Apps October 1, 2015 http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/10/01/the-war-in-afghanistan-cost-of-33000-per-citizen-and-will-not-end-well/
19. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_military_casualties_in_the_War_ in_Afghanistan

*The author is an editor of the journal and an educationist.