The 18th century poet, Thomas Gray, is reputed to have said that ignorance is a bliss. A few years back, a young researcher from an Islamabad based think tank contributed an opinion column for a national daily on nuclear deterrence, technically, the second strike capability.
The discourse mentioned that sea based deterrence is ‘not a proven concept’. The writer could be forgiven for we live in a country where successive generations in academia, young university graduates, and even scholars in think tanks have ad nauseam used their written and oratory skills dissecting continental issues. They have grown up hearing and learning about land-centric matters, wars fought on land, trifling non-issues in domestic politics, etc. Sea, oceans or maritime matters are alien, not only to the commoners, but amongst large segments of the country’s intelligentsia as well. A dominant part of the armed forces is drawn from Punjab, a province with rich cultural traditions but abysmally low grasp of anything related to blue waters. The country’s diplomatic corps is quite wanting on maritime issues; the foreign office (FO) seldom talks about the Indian Ocean or Indo-Pacific. And in FO press briefings there are rarely any questions on maritime security. Until recently, the syllabus of CSS examination barely included anything worthwhile on nautical issues.
The problem compounds when national debate on nuclear matters remain exceedingly narrow and mostly restricted to a select group of officials from the strategic community. Interestingly, it’s quite the opposite with our neighbour to the east. In the Indian foreign service retired and serving diplomats are authors of internationally acclaimed books; others are often found expressing erudite views on nuclear and maritime security matters in international conferences organized by globally renowned think tanks like Carnegie, Rand, Stimson, etc.
One cannot overstate that it was the nuclear submarines that managed and sustained the overarching international security order during much of the cold war. These platforms constituted what could be conveniently termed as the most robust component in the deterrent equation (triad). A nuclear weapon embarked on a submarine operating underwater provided an assured ability to respond. It thus eliminated any incentives for the would-be attacker or adventurer. It was well- established that ground based strategic bombers and even missiles kept in hardened underground silos could be destroyed in a decapitating (preemptive) destabilizing first strike.
The initial US war planning was predominantly based on pre- emption against the Soviets. The retaliatory solution was found in nuclear weapons carrying submarines propelled via a nuclear reactor. The nuclear propulsion allowed these submarines an indefinite submerged time (endurance) without fear of detection as opposed to conventional diesel electric submarines with limited staying power underwater and fairly good chances of detection while recharging batteries, a process called snorkelling.
Suitably deployed hundreds of feet below the surface in the dark swathes of oceans, the inbuilt features of stealth, mobility and flexibility made nuclear submarines a formidable stabilizing element. The retaliatory options began to enter US war planning in the late 1950s. This was also the time when the submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) programme, Polaris kicked off in the United States. By 1960, these missiles were fully developed. In 1971, a new version of SLBMs, Poseidon started to replace Polaris. Both the US as well as British nuclear submarines carried these missiles. The ranges, warhead capacity and accuracy kept advancing steadily during all these years. At the height of the Poseidon program (in late 70s), 31 nuclear-powered submarines of the US navy carried 16 missiles each. Every missile could carry up to 14 independently target-able nuclear warheads to deliver these with twice the accuracy as the earliest version.
It may be noted that once operationally deployed both conventional as well as nuclear submarines usually do not transmit or communicate with shore authority lest radio signals are picked up by an adversary and the position of the submarine is compromised. The difficulty, therefore, is for a shore authority attempting to communicate with its submerged submarine in crisis as it patrols underwater away from homeport in distant parts of the oceans. This problem was resolved earlier and has since continued to improve over time with advances in technology. Various shore to submarine communication techniques including extremely low frequency (ELF) and VLF broadcast communications provide submarines a high degree of stealth and flexibility.
The US has today 5,400 nuclear weapons, 1,744 of which are deployed and ready to be delivered. The weapons are kept onboard submarines and 80-foot-deep missile silos. The ready and fully mated missiles include almost 400 silo-based ICBMs and a comparable number of warheads on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The United Kingdom has an estimated 120 operationally ready and available nuclear warheads, all embarked onboard submarines. France maintains an arsenal of nearly 300 deployed nuclear weapons. Most of these are on submarines, with the remaining on air-launched cruise missiles. Israel has reportedly retrofitted its conventional German Dolphin class submarines with nuclear tipped cruise missiles.
None of the universities in Pakistan, including National Defence University, Islamabad which boasts of a large think tank can claim to have an expert in sea based nuclear deterrence issues or, for that matter, with deep understanding of larger maritime security cum naval matters. The classical role of navies in deterrence, reinforcing strategic deterrence, diplomacy or constabulary operations is just about understood. For someone to claim a solid grip or perceptive eye on what is currently unfolding in the Indo-Pacific would be nothing short of self- delusion. The discourse in a majority of the national and international conferences organized by local universities, national think tanks and even talk shows on electronic media centre on discussions other than naval or ocean related security matters. It took seven editions of the recently concluded AMAN exercises (held since 2007), underwritten by sustained efforts and resources of the Pakistan navy, to penetrate the thick crust of continental settings in the country’s landscape.
Sadly, this is so when over the past two decades most of the countries in Asia and Pacific regions have profoundly swung their strategic gaze from land to sea. China, once a deeply inward-looking country, now fields numerically the world’s largest fleet of warships. The maritime domain of what is called Indo-Pacific is loci of developing a great power rivalry. It is also at the centre stage of evolving alliances, unraveling strategic agreements and contesting for naval dominance above and beyond nuclearization. There are new players in the Indian Ocean and a new found love for wielding political and military sway over islands, particularly those in the Western Indian Ocean. The islands have suddenly discovered their political worth as never before in history and are now eagerly willing to sell themselves to the highest bidder. These islands, some smack in the middle of the Indian Ocean, provide an ideal staging ground for wielding influence and monitoring sea lines of communications transiting east west and vice versa.
Until recently, few if any universities in Pakistan attempted to take up higher studies in maritime or maritime security related subjects. This is especially true for academia in Punjab. This scribe recalls how in 2012, a young aspiring PhD scholar faced difficulty to find a suitable advisor in a leading university of Lahore when she decided to undertake her doctoral studies on ‘geopolitics in the Indian Ocean’. Despite having a history that dates back to around 1882, the university had never attempted a PhD work on such a subject. As luck would have it, the student not only earned her doctoral with flying colors but today heads a department in another leading women’s university at Lahore. Her study became a pioneering work in academic circles of Punjab thanks to the Pakistan navy and its presence in Lahore. The Pakistan navy war college, with its rich library and diverse faculty, extended full support to the prospective scholar.
Interestingly, when in 1995-96 the Pakistan navy first decided to upgrade its staff college to war college and contemplated to move the institute from Karachi to Lahore, it could only do so in the teeth of stiff opposition from the country’s civil-military bureaucracy. There was a strong vocal opposition even though the navy had made a strong case for such a move. Over the years, through the naval war college, the navy has reached out to bureaucracy, academia, entrepreneurs, media and others within and outside Lahore to expand the maritime culture. This resulted in a wider understanding of maritime security; its relationship with national security above and beyond appreciation of the role of the navy in the economic and strategic well-being of the country. Several students have since taken up maritime subjects in higher institutes while interest in the blue economy is on the rise. Alongside, memorandums of understanding have been inked between the naval war college, Lahore and over six leading Universities for joint research studies and collaborative events. A private university in Lahore now runs a vibrant Centre of Research and Innovation in Maritime Affairs.
A major surface area under the government sway is the exclusive economic zone of Pakistan. It is much larger than most federating units of the country. Pakistan’s monthly oil import bill is roughly USD 1.2 bn. The oil goods all come via sea. More than 95 percent of international telecommunications traffic today travels through 438 transoceanic cables. These cables vary in size from 17 mm to 50 mm and measure some 1.2 million Km in length. The cables crisscross ocean floors and provide voice and data transfer links all over the world. This includes Pakistan. The submarine cables are more reliable than satellites and have far greater capacity to transmit data across continents and islands.
The telecommunication system in Pakistan comprises of eleven submarine cable systems with Karachi and Gawadar as landing stations. The two stations provide resiliency in the event of a cable fault, damage or failure. The bulk of the in-country services, including internet, e-commerce, etc. resides in fully functional and operationally available submarine cables. Hardly any of the 82.9 million internet users in Pakistan would know that his/her facility functions only via submarine cables. International reports cite that PTA, the authority responsible for safeguarding and maintaining these cables in the area under its responsibility, is ill-prepared. This is so despite Article 113 of the constitution of seas, UNCLOS-82 ratified by Pakistan in February 1997, demanding every State to adopt laws and regulations making it a “punishable offense” for ships or persons subject to its jurisdiction to break or injure a submarine cable beneath the high seas, either will-fully or through culpable negligence”.
For Pakistan the sea is a crucial enabler of oil transit, data transit and trade transit. It is also a medium for power projection, diplomacy and bolstering strategic deterrence. Land based fixed high value targets or even moving wheeled machines can be picked up by satellites or other arrangements, so can their electronic transmissions. It is only the sea-based capacity that is not predictable and could go largely undetected. The example of Australia is instructive. The country recently entered into AUKUS agreement to bolster its submarine fleet with nuclear propulsion. This will eventually provide Australian submarines an extended submerged staying time in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
Pakistan has neither claim on Antarctic nor a military naval base in any of the Islands in the Indian Ocean. India has bases in Mauritius, Seychelles, Maldives and Duqm (Oman). With a stepped up drive, India may soon have military facilities in Kenya, Zanzibar, Comoros, etc. In the context of foreign policy, New Delhi now enjoys deep strategic, military, economic and commercial ties with Saudi Arabia, UAE and Israel, a recent entry in the Indian Ocean. India has a vibrant diaspora in Africa, Gulf Arab States and countries in the Middle East. What’s more, the Indian and the United States navies have improved their operational flexibility and combat potential through a reciprocally serving logistics exchange agreement (LEMOA).
In June 2020, Stephan Fruhling, a professor at the Australian National University, while contributing a policy paper for a journal, had this to say:
‘No other weapon system embodies the menacing, but also out-of-sight, presence of nuclear weapons better than the stealthy nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) that have, for six decades, ceaselessly prowled the world’s cold ocean depths, waiting for an order that has never come. SSBNs on continuous at-sea deterrence missions remain the mainstay of the nuclear forces in the United States and France, and the sole platform carrying British nuclear weapons. Despite Russia’s significant investment in road- mobile missiles, SSBNs also remain an important element of its nuclear forces’.
So who is to blame for Pakistan not being able to catch up and mature its sea based assured second strike capability? The answer resides in history of our wars as much as in the academic culture prevalent in the professional military institutes of the country.
The land forces’ planning is mostly tactical; maritime military is strategic and long term. In the late 1960s, the United States, with support from Great Britain, depopulated the Island of Diego Garcia, 800 km south of Maldives. The natives of this tiny Island in the Indian Ocean were evicted and relocated to other Islands. Diego Garcia has since served as a secret military base of the United States. In October last year (2022), a US ballistic missile nuclear submarine (SSBN) docked in the Island for the first time. With China’s entry into the Indian Ocean, more nuclear platforms may be expected in times ahead.
Pakistan needs a sea based second strike capability. The current politico economic situation can delay its acquisition but cannot deny the need for such capability. The academic debate on such issues must open up, particularly in the professional military institutes of Pakistan. Our intellectuals must not be allowed to blunt our nuclear deterrence capacity. The self-imposed cognitive shackles must be removed. Critical national strategic matters require wide ranging debate, from grass root to the highest professional and policy making levels. The earlier our intelligentsia wakes up to this reality the better it would be for Pakistan.
